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Introduction
The field of comparative politics is ever-changing and dynamic.

international relations and its application to the field of

It requires scholars to be flexible and open in order to

comparative politics are found in each chapter.

continuously analyze the political movements of states, their
political systems, and their leaders. Due to the dynamic nature
of international politics, this book seeks to provide the key
concepts and theories that can be applied to states and political
systems as they persistently change. Additionally, methods and
concepts are depicted to think comparatively when considering
states and how they are similar or varied. This will also provide a
means of further understanding political structures, economic
instability, movements, conflict, and resolution.
This book provides a compilation of information on comparative
politics through a variety of texts, journal articles, and case
studies to provide an integrative approach to learning about
comparative politics. The text begins, in Chapter 1, by providing
an understanding of the field as well as the methods utilized in
the comparative approach. Next, in Chapter 2, it provides a
broad overview on methods in international relations and how it
impacts the comparative analysis of states, political systems,
and leadership. Concepts and definitions of key terminology in

As the chapters continue, the state is reviewed and defined in
Chapter 3. This definition is applied to the field of comparative
politics to begin comparing states’ political, economic, and
social structures. Then, the chapters progress to consider how
politics and the economy merge while considering fields of
political economy and development in Chapters 4 and 5.
Political styles are then considered in Chapters 6 and 7.
Democracy and democratic institutions as well as
authoritarianism are detailed and analyzed.
The structure of political systems follows in Chapters 8 and 9 by
examining constitutions in addition to state influences, such as
executives, interest groups, political parties, and political
systems. Opposition follows as Chapter 10 discusses
revolutions. Various states are highlighted in this chapter, and
many cases of revolution are identified, including Mexico’s
historical insurrection. Nationalism and nation are reviewed in
Chapter 11 with definitions provided as well as numerous cases
via the compilation of documents.
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Chapter 12 reviews the concepts of race, ethnicity, and gender
and their eﬀects on political systems are explored through
numerous examples both historic and current. A similar approach
can be found in Chapter 13, as it considers ideology and religion
in the current political landscape with numerous cases included.
Chapter 14 finishes with further exploration on the theories of
international relations and the dynamic of comparative politics in
international relations. Finally, Chapters 15-19 provide case
studies that highlight Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, and the
Russian Federation.
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Chapter 1

Comparative
Political
Analysis
(Approach)
Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Appreciate the importance of critical thinking.
• Understand the comparative approach.

Section 1

Defining comparative politics
Sometimes the term used is 'comparative government' or
'comparative political systems.' They all indicate that
comparative method is a common way of learning and teaching
political science. One learns by comparing entities that have
some similarities and then examining the reasons for the
observed diﬀerences.
The earliest practitioner was Aristotle who used his students to
collect details of the institutions and procedures of 158 Greek
city states (unfortunately now lost). From this data he drew up his
famous typology of political systems. Later exponents included
de Tocqueville, who, sometimes explicitly and at other times
implicitly, in writing about the USA was comparing it with his
native France. Much of his brilliant generalization was based on
travel and observation. Bryce and Lowell early in the twentieth
century pursued similar methods, though examining in depth
several countries and going beyond their constitutional
frameworks to study their parties.

trinity of 'powers'—executive, legislative and judicial—which
constitutional lawyers take to be the dimensions of a country's
political system. While understanding cannot be complete
without undertaking this exercise, it does not always produce a
realistic assessment of either the functioning or the power
structure of a modern state. To cite only one instance; judges

'Comparative political institutions' is frequently a component of

can make laws and executives often draft them and secure their

undergraduate Political Science syllabuses and consists, at the

passage with only the most perfunctory reference to the

most formal level, of comparing between diﬀerent states the

legislature.
5

More ambitious political scientists have extended comparative
treatment to political parties, pressure groups, centre-periphery
relations and political development. The success attending such
analyses is often dependent on the possibility for reliable
quantification. Thus comparative studies of electoral systems
may produce fairly reliable predictive models. On the other hand,
attempts to draw up 'democratic indices' in order to predict
which developing countries are likely to evolve into sustainable
democracies may fall back on trying to devise indices of
tolerance or trust. Values are not easily quantifiable. These
diﬃculties, however, do not detract from the great enlightenment
for political scientists that has been derived by comparative
method.
The previous section is provided by Lynn University
Library’s use of CREDO Reference.
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Section 2

The development of the study of comparative politics
‘Comparative politics’ existed long before it became a

drastically from the universe known to the great writers of the

recognized subfield of the modern discipline of political science.

past; second, it has become the special terrain of a recognized

A century or so ago, a knowledge of the variety of political

subfield of contemporary political science; and third, as such it

systems formed part of the normal education of literati in

shares in both paradigmatic shifts and new developments in

diﬀerent disciplines, such as law and philosophy, history and

research techniques in that discipline.

letters. There were classic writers on problems of modern
government in diﬀerent countries such as Mill, Bagehot,
Bluntschli, Radbruch, Redslob, Duguit or Bryce. Their treatises
contained many comparisons, over time as well between
diﬀerent societies. One might go back further in history. Political
theory abounds with comparative discourse on both contrasts
and commonalities in political life, as even a superficial survey of
the writings of Aristotle and Polybius, of Dante and Machiavelli,
of Bodin and Locke, of Montesquieu and De Tocqueville, not to
speak of the authors of The Federalist Papers, immediately
shows. Man has speculated comparatively on problems of
government and society in both prescriptive and descriptive
terms since times immemorial. If we nevertheless insist that
modern comparative politics is somehow diﬀerent, this is for
three not unrelated reasons: first, modern comparative politics
deals consciously with a political world which has changed

The academic tradition
[D]iscussions of government often reflected particular
conceptions of history. In the hands of some, this might lead to
the elaboration of ‘historical laws’, often couched in terms of
diﬀerent ‘stages’ through which societies would develop.
‘Diachronic’ comparisons thus came naturally. Models of social
change often showed a clear evolutionary or even teleological
bias....There was generally a strong emphasis on political
institutions, which were thought to be not only the results of past
political strife, but also factors which could control present and
future political developments. ‘[C]omparative’ politics generally
assumed specific country perspectives. Thus, in Britain ‘crosschannel’ dialogues easily developed into a contrast between
(stable) British ‘cabinet government’ and (unstable) French
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‘gouvernement d’assemblée’ (or for that matter British ‘rule of

transient players in a world in which the larger countries

law’ versus French ‘droit administratif’). Trans-Atlantic debates

determined history.

resulted in the conflicting typologies of a ‘parliamentary’ versus a
‘presidential’ system of democratic government. Perennial
debates in France on the merits, or lack of merits, of the French
revolution strongly coloured political discussions on problems of
constitutionalism and popular sovereignty. Debates in what was
to become Germany had a powerful impact on the analysis of
state and nation, of the exercise of power, of ‘organicist’ versus
‘liberal’ modes of social and economic development, and of the
comparative role of bureaucracies – subjects which were to
become the concerns of future social science also outside
German borders. Comparisons of European countries with the
United States underscored the early nature of American
democracy and stressed the importance of voluntary groups in a
free society, but the United States could also be held up as a
negative yardstick for alleged abuses, for its spoils system, the
role of lobbies or a yellow press, or more generally the dangers of
‘mass society’.

‘Comparative politics’ then went generally not much beyond
speculation and the study of ‘foreign government’. Other states
were generally seen as entities all on their own, or at most as
possible yardsticks against which to measure developments in
one’s own society, and then often as negative yardsticks at that.

The political shocks of the twentieth century & the
erosion of institutional certainties
All this was to change drastically in the wake of three
fundamental twentieth century shocks: the breakdown of
democracy in Weimar Germany, the rise of totalitarian systems
and the turn towards authoritarianism of most of the new states
which were established following the demise of European
colonialism. The formally legal ‘Machtübernahme’ in Weimar
Germany in 1933 shattered democratic hopes and selfconfidence. The Weimar constitution had been heralded as the

Typically, smaller European countries tended to be neglected in

perfect model of democratic constitutionalism. Its fall destroyed

the reasoning of learned men outside the borders of the particular

the trust in political institutions as suﬃcient guarantees of

country itself. Linguistic frontiers may partly explain this. But

democratic rule. Admittedly, some theoreticians attempted to

probably more important was the assumption, typical of

retain ‘institutionalist’ explanations, singling out ‘faulty’

nineteenth and early twentieth century power politics, that small

institutions such as proportional representation (e.g. Hermens,

countries hardly mattered. At best they might be of little more

1941), the presence of a directly elected President next to a

than folkloristic interest, at worst they were seen as no more than

‘normal’ but thereby weakened Kanzler, or the absence of judicial
8

review, as major factors in the destruction of democratic rule. But

traditional elites, military or bureaucratic governors, or

generally, institutionalist analyses stood discredited. A growing

revolutionary party leaders. Such developments further

awareness of the patent discrepancy between the promises of the

undermined a belief in institutional approaches, and called for

Soviet constitution of 1936 and the realities of naked power

alternative modes of analysis.

relations in the USSR reinforced this tendency, as did events in
Italy since 1922 and in France in 1940.

One eﬀect of the great political shocks of the twentieth century
was a massive migration of scholars, notably to the United States

The rise of totalitarian political systems massively changed the

of America, but to a lesser extent also the United Kingdom. One

perceptions of politics. Their development, in some countries and

needs only list prominent names such as Karl W. Deutsch, Henry

not in others, raised new problems of comparative enquiry. Earlier

W. Ehrmann, Otto Kirchheimer, Paul Lazarsfeld, Karl Loewenstein,

beliefs about the ‘natural’ development of democracy foundered.

Hans Morgenthau, Franz Neumann, Sigmund Neumann, and

‘Autocracy’ had been a time-honoured category of political

Joseph Schumpeter, to make clear the importance of this factor

analysis, and ‘absolutism’ had been the natural counterpoint of

for new developments in the study of politics. That field was also

constitutionalism and later of democracy. But totalitarianism

to attract the progeny of European refugees who, as a typical

seemed to represent an entirely new political phenomenon.

‘second generation’, turned to the analysis of comparative and

Problems of power and leadership, of propaganda and mass

international politics in great numbers. Exiles from Hitler were

publics, of repressive one-party systems and police rule, came to

followed by migrants from Communist repression, and later still

dominate political discussion. Sociological and psychological

by a growing number of Third World scholars who opted to stay in

explanations seemed to oﬀer better insights into the realities of

the First World. A desire for the systematic study of comparative

totalitarian rule than did traditional political theory or institutional

politics came naturally in such circumstances. It heightened

analysis.

concern with the realities of political power, both within and

The post-1945 world was soon to see also the rise of many new
states from what had been colonial dependencies. Such states
had generally been equipped with democratic constitutional
arrangements, which in most cases proved ineﬀective to stem
developments of authoritarian regimes, whether in the hands of

between states. It made for a characteristically ambivalent
attitude about democracy: if anything the belief in democratic
values became stronger, but expectations about its chances
turned toward pessimism.

Academe & a changing political universe
9

If migrant scholars looked back naturally on developments in

All this fitted in well with the traditional temper of American

continents they had left, the world was changing, and so was the

academics. The lure of ‘science’ had traditionally been strong and

role of the United States in what was rapidly becoming global

had expanded much beyond the ‘natural sciences’ into the social

politics for policy-makers and students of politics alike. Although

sciences and even the humanities. So had the assumption that

Europe remained a key area, other parts of the world, including

‘science’ could and should lead to practical policy results. There

notably the evolving Communist bloc, Japan and a rapidly

was a strong belief that the academic enterprise should centre on

growing number of new states, became matters of urgent political

the elaboration of testable theories. At the same time, the idea of

and intellectual concern. So did Latin America, long regarded as a

interdisciplinary study stood in high esteem. It was given a strong

backyard of a Monroe doctrine America. Comparative politics

impetus within some of the great universities (the University of

saw the number of its possible units of analysis grow beyond

Chicago being a particularly important centre). Such

recognition. At the same time problems of political stability and

interdisciplinarity was moreover reinforced by new agencies,

legitimacy, of social and economic development, of competing

including government research councils, the newly established

political regimes and ideologies assumed an entirely new

(American) Social Science Research Council and a growing

importance.

number of private foundations all becoming increasingly involved

The need to understand this new world could be met in a variety
of ways. It underscored the importance of experts on single
countries, notably those which became the object of particular
policy concern. It increased the relevance of traditional area
studies which it released from their (sometimes almost museumlike) preoccupation with the unique features of ‘other’ civilizations;
in the process cultural anthropology became a more central field
in contemporary social science. At the same time, older beliefs
about inevitable – and presumably static – diﬀerences gave way
to concerns with political and social change – inter alia toward
democracy – and beyond this: to discussions of the extent to
which such changes could, and should, be engineered.

in sponsoring ‘relevant’ research. This in turn facilitated a massive
expansion of graduate schools, and fostered collaborative
research between senior and junior scholars, the latter being
called upon to ‘test’ particular theories elaborated by the former
through detailed empirical research. All this came to coincide with
the development of new research tools, which helped to foster
what was soon to become known as the ‘behavioural
revolution’ (from which electoral and value studies have
benefited). Next to library research and field work in a
participatory setting, the survey became a powerful research
tool.3 Governments also began to develop more and more
important statistical data to monitor the eﬀects of new policies. A
rapidly growing number of international organizations, whether
10

global (such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies,

If both the mass, and the sophistication, of such developments in

the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund), or regional

social science were taking place initially mainly in the United

(the OECD growing from the eﬀorts of the Marshall Plan, and the

States, they soon became an international reality. Early in the

European Communities being particularly important), came to

post-1945 period deliberate eﬀorts were made to foster

collect statistical data on many countries. To the extent that they

international comparative research. One powerful stimulus came

were presented in standardized form, this facilitated comparative

from UNESCO, which established its own International Social

inquiry. More and more eﬀorts also went into the construction of

Science Research Council, and which provided a powerful

time-series data, necessary for the study of developments over

stimulus for the establishment of international professional bodies

time. This massively increased amount of quantitative data

such as the International Political Science Association (IPSA) or

(initially developed mainly in the context of economic and social

the International Sociological Association (ISA). Many national

policies and used in particular by economists and experts in

governments expanded their research councils. The idea of

social policies) also found its way into data handbooks and data

international exchange and research co-operation found

archives (see e.g. Banks et al., 1997; Mackie and Rose, 1991;

increasing favour, with the fellowship programmes of a number of

Woldendorp et al., 2000). The computer revolution was

American Foundations, the Fulbright programme, and to a lesser

concurrently to facilitate the storage, analysis and access to such

extent agencies like the British Council setting a pattern. In the

data. The eﬀorts of individual scholars first, research sponsoring

process English became increasingly the lingua franca of modern

agencies later, made the pooling and preservation of research

social science.

data (including the products of survey research for secondary
analysis) increasingly common practice. All this occurred at a time
of a massive expansion of academic enrollment, which increased
facilities not only for graduate research, but also for publishing
research findings. Both university presses and specialized
commercial publishers massively expanded. Journals
proliferated. So did professional associations and the number and
specialization of workshops and panels at academic conferences.

The new comparative politics
Against this general background of political change on the one
hand, and a massive expansion of international and national
policy-making and research on the other hand, ‘comparative
politics’ developed rapidly. The shift in terminology from the older
term of ‘comparative government’ to ‘comparative politics’ was
symbolic for what was in fact a conscious desire to move away
from the traditional concern with political institutions towards a
11

preoccupation with political and social developments generally

become apparent in the work of other scholars of the group, who

and within democratic systems in particular.

after all became editors and authors of influential textbooks

There are some particular landmarks in the development of
modern ‘comparative politics’. One of these was the Evanston
seminar at Northwestern University in 1952 which brought

organized on the basis of country studies (covering again mainly
the larger countries; e.g. Beer and Ulam, 1958; Macridis and
Ward, 1963).

together a group of then-younger scholars including Samuel Beer,

In the meantime, a group of scholars (including some members of

George Blanksten, Richard Cox, Karl W. Deutsch, Harry Eckstein,

the Evanston Seminar) was being formed who as a group would

Kenneth Thompson and Robert E. Ward under the chairmanship

have a lasting influence on the development of comparative

of Roy Macridis. In a statement, published in the American

politics. Many of them were, or would be, active in what was soon

Political Science Review, they branded the existing study of

to become known as ‘the Committee’ (i.e. the Committee on

comparative government as parochial in being mainly concerned

Comparative Politics of the American Social Science Research

with Europe only, as being merely descriptive instead of

Council). In the second half of the 1950s, this Committee

analytical, as overly concerned with institutions rather than

deliberately brought together a number of leading area experts.

processes, and as being insuﬃciently comparative, wedded

With Gabriel A. Almond as its highly influential chairman, it set

above all to case method approaches (Macridis and Cox, 1953).

itself to recasting the analysis of comparative politics along

Some of the members of the Evanston group vigorously clashed

mainly structural-functionalist lines. As Almond explicitly stated in

with stalwart representatives of an older generation, including

the influential volume edited by himself and James S. Coleman,

such luminaries as Carl J. Friedrich, Maurice Duverger, Dolf

The Politics of the Developing Areas (1960), the ambition was to

Sternberger and William A. Robson during a colloquium of IPSA

find ‘a common framework and set of categories to be used in …

in Florence in 1954 (Heckscher, 1957). Such older practitioners of

area political analysis’; to this end Almond himself engaged in

comparative government were not readily persuaded by the new

‘experiments in the application of sociological and

gospel. They were to note gleefully that the most irascible

anthropological concepts in the comparison of political systems’,

proponent of the new ‘comparative politics’, Roy Macridis, was

irrespective of time or area. This work was eventually to lead to

soon to publish work on France and other countries along what

the famous ‘crises of political development’ model, which sought

seemed after all rather traditional lines. The continuing need to

to analyse political systems in terms of the character and

take account of specific country perspectives was also to

sequence of six major processes: legitimacy, identity, penetration,
12

integration, participation and distribution (see also: Pye, 1966).

Such approaches also led to a reconsideration of past patterns of

One manner in which to validate such approaches was to bring

political and social change in nations already seen as fully or

together members of the Committee with experts on areas,

mainly modernized, including the United States itself and Western

particular institutions or social processes for a series of books on

Europe. Historians were asked to join in such eﬀorts at

diﬀerent aspects of political development, including

comparative understanding (see for example: Black, 1966; Tilly,

communications (Pye, 1963), bureaucracies (LaPalombara, 1963),

1975, 1990; Grew, 1978).

political culture (Pye and Verba, 1965), education (Coleman,
1965), parties (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966), and (belatedly)
state- formation (Tilly, 1975). Two works were intended to cap the
approach: a book oﬀered mainly as a textbook (Almond and
Powell, 1966), and a co-authored volume on Crises and
Sequences in Political Development (Binder et al., 1971). Whereas
the first seemed to proclaim certainty, the latter revealed
considerable self-doubt and disagreement in the Committee.
Clearly, its members did not see eye to eye on such fundamental
matters as the existence or not of a linear development from
tradition to modernity, and the possibility to engineer social
change and democratization or not.

The impact of these approaches on the discipline was
substantial. All manner of Ph.D. candidates swarmed out to study
processes of social and political modernization in countries all
over the world. They did so with diﬀerent interests and intent.
Some became thoroughly intrigued with the persistent role of
traditional structures and beliefs, making them eager novices in
the ranks of area specialists and cultural anthropologists. Others
concentrated rather on the other end of the presumed tradition–
modernity continuum, identifying largely with the search of
economists and experts on public administration for
‘development’. Yet others felt happier with the work of various
international organizations which sought to monitor and stimulate

Of course, such debates were not restricted to members of the

social and economic developments with the aid of statistical

Committee. A great many scholars, in diﬀerent disciplines, tried

indicators, regarding the universe of nations, or some particular

their hand at defining processes of political development and

sample of it, as a laboratory in which to test particular

modernization. For all their diversity and disagreement, such

development models (see: Przeworski and Teune, 1970).

writings had in common an attempt to understand processes of
social change, conceived as in principle comparable over
diﬀerent areas and time-periods, and tackled with instruments
from whatever social science discipline seemed appropriate.
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Inevitable reactions

urgent: the comparative study of Communist societies was to a
considerable extent a world unto itself, and many were happy to

For all its exhilaration the political development boom was to

leave it at that. The idea of a possible convergence of systems in

create its own reactions, in rather diﬀerent ways.

the West and the East seemed to most observers bereft of reality,

One reaction consisted in the development of counter-models of
development which treated the prosperous West not as the
prototype of a modern society which others were naturally to
attain at some later stage, but as the root cause of an inequitable
distribution of the world’s goods. Marxist theories of
(neo)imperialism held capitalist development responsible for the
exploitation of the Third World, and regarded the so-called
‘independence’ of former colonies as a thin guise for what was in
practice ‘neo-colonialism’. Notably from the background of Latin
America, which had much older independent states than Africa
and parts of Asia, developed the various brands of ‘dependency’
theory which emphasized the co-existence of traditional sectors
of society and the economy with modern economic sectors which
were in practice little more than the emporia of the advanced
economies in the USA and Europe. Such models were given a
more elaborate treatment in Wallerstein’s World System
approach, which became in many ways an academic industry of
its own.

perhaps a matter of speculation for economists, not for those
who knew the patent diﬀerences in political life from direct
physical experience or historical analogy. But developments of
Communist states did yet enter the field of general comparative
politics for at least two reasons. Communist models might and
did serve as example and inspiration for Third World countries,
notably in
their Chinese
and Cuban
variety. And
in a more
theoretical
vein, a
debate arose
on the issue
to what
degree
totalitarian
systems were

A second reaction came from those who had diﬃculty fitting

themselves a

Communist systems into the framework of general development

product of

theories. To many, such a problem did not seem particularly

modernity.
This point
14

had been strongly argued by Carl J. Friedrich, who saw in that

see: Ragin, 1987; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992 for recent attempts

characteristic the fundamental diﬀerence between older systems

to remedy these diﬀerences between the case study approach

of autocracy and royal absolutism and modern totalitarian

and ‘many cases, few variables’ studies).

systems (Friedrich, 1954; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956), but was
denied by scholars like Wittfogel who saw many common
features between the systems described by him in his Oriental
Despotism (1957) and systems of modern totalitarian rule.
Nevertheless, whether seen as possible models of modernization,
or as alternative expressions of modernity itself, the study of
totalitarian systems remained on the whole outside the scope of
general comparative politics writing. At least one reason for this
was the tendency to equate political modernity with democracy,
in systems already existing or as the natural end-product of
political development.

Rethinking Europe
For a time Europe became a somewhat ambiguous area in the
development of the new comparative politics. The Third World
seemed to attract most of the theorizing and field research, as did
to a lesser and more specialist sense the development of
Communist systems. Europe seemed possibly somewhat oldfashioned, a world of staid democracies about which all was
known and where little happened. The very concept of Europe
had become somewhat hazy, moreover. The erection of the Iron
Curtain had lopped oﬀ a number of countries which had formerly

A third reaction to the political development literature consisted in

formed a natural part of the European universe. If one saw

the allegation that it rode roughshod over the uniqueness of

Western Europe as for all practical purposes identical with

particular areas or countries. Such was the natural reaction of

‘democratic Europe’, then certain European countries (including

scholars nurtured in a tradition of ‘configurative’ studies, whether

some members of NATO, like Greece, or Portugal, not to speak of

of a particular local culture, or a particular political system. Such

Spain) presumably did not belong. If democracy were the defining

scholars were not comfortable with what they regarded as overly

characteristic, why then not study all modern democracies

general categories of analysis. They emphasized that the essence

together, thus abandoning the very existence of ‘Europe’ as a

of political and social systems lay in the complicated interaction

distinct area (a conclusion drawn for example by Lijphart, 1984)?

of many variables which could only be disentangled by destroying
the uniqueness of the whole. And they tended to deny the
possibility of real comparative study given the inability of scholars
to really know more than one or two cases suﬃciently well (but

Whatever such qualms, ‘Europe’ was soon to figure prominently
on the map of comparative politics again, through a variety of
circumstances. The persistent concern about ‘totalitarianism’
15

naturally made for comparative enquiry into past events: what

(for a fuller elaboration of this theme, see: Daalder, 1987). As a

after all had caused the breakdown of democratic regimes in

special subdiscipline, European comparative politics grew largely

some countries, and not others (see notably the consciously

from the eﬀorts of a new post-war generation of younger scholars

comparative study of Linz and Stepan, 1978). When much later

who engaged in a massive trek, to some extent to the United

Greece, Spain and Portugal all returned to democratic rule, the

Kingdom, but particularly to the United States. They found there

reverse question arose: what were the causes for such transitions

an exhilarating world of scholarship, with all manner of theoretical

from authoritarian rule (see: O’Donnell et al., 1986; Diamond et al.,

speculation and rich empirical research. This was in strong

1988).

contrast with the paucity of ‘modern’ social science literature in

The failure of imposed constitutional regimes in many former
colonies raised the issue whether alternative models of
democracy might have done better; where was one to find these
but in Europe (the British dominions usually being regarded as
mere oﬀshoots of a British system)? The general concern with
development posed many questions for which the history of
diﬀerent European countries might provide possible answers,
whatever the dangers of historical analogies. There was a rich
literature on European countries, and access to sources was
relatively easy. Europe contained, moreover, a variety of cases
vital for comparative analysis with a generalizing intent, provided

their own country, and led naturally to a desire to emulate and
replicate studies on America with comparable studies at home. At
the same time, a confrontation with Anglo-Saxon scholarship also
provoked a natural reaction against what were often felt to be too
specifically ‘British’ or ‘American’ theories, typologies or models,
and fostered a desire to develop alternative theories and
typologies which were more in line with the understanding of
one’s own country. At a minimum, more countries should be
brought onto the map of European comparative politics, which
somewhat ironically required ‘translating’ their experience into
Anglo-American concepts.

one really knew the specific cases that made up Europe, and

Thus, some of the most innovative comparative politics writing by

went beyond the exclusive concentration on a few larger

European scholars betrays, on closer analysis, a strong influence

countries only.

of particular country perspectives. This had been irritatingly clear

Much of the history of the development of comparative politics
writing in and on Europe can in fact be written in terms of a desire
to take account of the political experience of particular countries

from what purported to be a general study of political parties by
Maurice Duverger (1954), which for all the help the author
received in data collection from an early IPSA network of
European political scientists, was shot through with French
16

Switzerland, to counter the massive impact of what seemed too
easy an identification of Anglo-American models of government
with democracy per se.

From the mosaic of such parallel studies a much more
sophisticated picture emerged of the diversities of European
experience which could be studied both in a diachronic and a
synchronic manner, culminating in what is as yet the most
satisfactory attempt at understanding the complexities of
European political developments contained in Stein Rokkan’s socalled ‘topological-typological’ map, or ‘macro-model’ of Europe
(Flora et al., 1999; Rokkan, 1970; Rokkan, 1975; Rokkan and
Urwin, 1983; cf. Daalder, 1979).
perspectives and prejudices. But one can also document the

Diﬀerent research strategies for studying

impact of Italian concerns in the much more sophisticated

democracy

analyses of party systems by Giovanni Sartori (1976). There is the
disappointment of a left-socialist German emigré-scholar about

Taking developments in the study of ‘Europe’ as an example, the

post-war developments in Germany and Austria in the work of

considerable variety of modes of comparative study becomes

Otto Kirchheimer (see the collection by: Burin and Shell, 1969;

readily apparent.

Krouwel, 1999), just as Scandinavia provided the undoubted
background of the development of a centre–periphery model in
the rich work of Stein Rokkan (1970). An even clearer example is
the deliberate development of the consociationalist model against
the background of The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and

A seeming paradox is provided by the country monograph. To the
extent such a monograph is written to elucidate particular political
experiences for a more general public, it may oﬀer insights of
comparative importance. This is much more true if the
monograph seeks to prove, or disprove, specific theoretical
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propositions first developed with one or more other countries in

great comparative government treatises of the past (e.g.

mind. The most telling example, however, is the consciously

Friedrich, 1941; H. Finer, 1949; not to speak of earlier classics

theory-based analysis of a single country case (e.g. Eckstein,

such as Lowell, 1896 or Bryce, 1929). These are very hard to find

1966; Lijphart, 1968). Moving to a somewhat higher level of

(e.g. Blondel, 1969; S.E. Finer, 1970; for later attempts to analyse

abstraction are comparative analyses of two, or a few, particular

‘European democracies’ see Smith, 1972; Castles, 1982; Steiner,

countries. Most ‘comparativists’ must confess that their real

1986; Pelassy, 1992; Keman, 1996; Lane and Errson, 1998;

knowledge of diﬀerent countries tapers oﬀ quickly beyond a

Gallagher et al., 2000), and encounter the obvious problem of an

rather limited number of cases. One obvious way to overcome

increased number of countries to be treated, with many more

such limitations is collaborative research, in which, for any given

empirical research findings of potential relevance to be covered.

research question, experts on diﬀerent countries are asked to join
in a common research eﬀort. Most books on (European)
democratic comparative politics consist of edited volumes of this
kind. Such volumes bring much needed information on diﬀerent
countries together and testify to the fruits of cross-fertilization.
But most of them suﬀer the natural defects of group enterprises.
The choice of countries is often a function of the availability, or
even the reliability, of individual country experts. Even the most
rigorous attempt at editorial guidance rarely results in an even
quality, let alone genuine comparability, of country chapters.
Introductory and concluding chapters very often are of a rather ad
hoc and impressionistic nature (but see for impressive examples

Rather than on analysis at the level of countries as a whole, work
has tended to focus on particular institutions such as monarchy
(e.g. Fusilier, 1960), heads of state (Kaltefleiter, 1970), the
formation of cabinets (e.g. Bogdanor and Butler, 1983; Pridham,
1986; Budge and Keman, 1990; Laver and Shepsle, 1994),
parliaments (Wheare, 1963; von Beyme, 1970), electoral systems
(Lijphart, 1993), parties in general (Sartori, 1976; von Beyme,
1985; Panebianco, 1988), particular party families, interest
groups, bureaucratic structures, and so on. In studies focusing on
particular institutions or groups, there is always real danger of
analyses that are out of political and social context.

volumes of a lasting nature, such as Neumann, 1956; Dahl, 1966;

Alternatively, there is the massive growth of quantitative ‘cross-

Rose, 1974; Budge et al., 1987).

national studies’. As stated before, both the quantity and the

This strengthens the case for attempting individual syntheses
after all. The diﬃculty of such an enterprise becomes readily
apparent, however, if one seeks for post-war equivalents of the

quality of data have increased massively in the last decades,
through the eﬀorts of governments, international organizations,
the gallant work of those who prepare ‘data handbooks’), and
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organize data archives. Such data invite cross-national studies, in

some such ‘cross-national’ analyses verge on what Stein Rokkan

a large number of fields. Thus one need only inspect the guide to

once dubbed mere ‘numerological nonsense’.

journal articles in ‘Electoral Studies’, not to speak of important
collaborative volumes (ranging from Rose, 1974 to Franklin et al.,

New approaches to the study of democratic

1992), to see the richness of studies on electoral behaviour, and

politics

of elections (cf. Bartolini and Mair, 1990). We have important
studies on political participation (influenced notably by the works

Developments in modern comparative politics, then, were largely

of Verba et al., 1978; and Barnes and Kaase, 1979) and on the

the result of a greater knowledge of individual countries on the

impact of changing values (an area dominated by the highly

one hand, and of a true revolution in data collection and analysis

debated analyses of Inglehart, 1977, 1990). The study of cabinet

techniques on the other. But at the same time, new political

coalitions has oﬀered a fertile testing-ground of formal theories

problems appeared on the political agenda, which resulted in

(for a useful survey and discussion see Laver and Schofield,

something like a paradigmatic shift. If comparative politics had

1990). As we shall see presently, the data revolution has also had

concentrated thus far mainly on problems of regime change,

a great impact on the study of the development and problems of

political institutions, and what in systems theory one calls ‘input’

modern welfare states and public policy. Not all such cross-

structures, a new concern developed with problems of public

national studies are really comparative, however. Although they

policy and political ‘output’. Various factors contributed to this

draw on data from many countries, they are often directed more

development.

to problems of general political sociology or psychology than to a
systematic inspection of country variables. ‘Contextual’
knowledge is often neglected, and with it possibly the essence of
comparative politics itself, which in the words of Sidney Verba
presupposes that one tries to generalize – using that term loosely
– about nations, or to generalize about subnational entities like
bureaucracies, parties, armies and interests groups in ways that
use national variation as part of the explanation (italics HD; Verba,
1986: 28). A lack of knowledge of the countries studied has made

One cause was the (renewed?) ‘Left’ revolution in social science
in the 1960s and 1970s, which faced the question why ‘capitalist’
systems endured, once-confident prophesies to the contrary
notwithstanding. This led to a new concern with the role of the
state which seemed somewhat forgotten in otherwise rival
approaches of systems theory and economic determinism. A
parallel debate arose on the extent to which political parties –
notably Socialist ones (see Castles, 1978; Schmidt, 1982b;
Keman, 1988, 1990) – did aﬀect government policies or not. A
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major element in the discussion became the degree to which

A third major contribution came from those who set out to

states diﬀered in their dependence on external economic forces

analyse the development of the welfare state in comparative

(e.g. Katzenstein, 1985), which could only be solved by

terms. On the one hand, this work fitted in well with the concerns

comparative inquiry. Even when such studies related to European

of older development theorists: one should note the link between

countries only, the obvious relevance of international economic

state expansion, economic policies and processes of political

structures and events brought scholars closer to those who had

development which had characterized the work of German

long been preoccupied with world economic realities (e.g. the

Kathedersozialisten and Nationaloekonomen; (re)distribution had

proponents of a World Systems approach mentioned earlier).

been one of the paramount concerns of the Committee on

A second major factor was the development of ‘neo-corporatism’.
Originating to some extent from a transposition of an approach
found useful in the study of Latin America (e.g. Schmitter, 1974,
reprinted in Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979), it won great
acclaim in attempts to explain ‘Europe’, and possible diﬀerences
within it. By emphasizing the close interaction between public
and private actors, the neo-corporatist approach seemed
successfully to bridge input and output structures, and to present
a more realistic picture of power relations and policy-making than
either those who had spoken uncritically of ‘the’ state, or those
who had embraced a naive ‘pluralism’, had been able to provide.
Neo- corporatism became in Schmitter’s words ‘something like a
growth industry’. But the gap between ‘general’ theory and
empirical validation remained substantial, to the detriment of the

Comparative Politics; and the leading empirical scholar in this
field, Peter Flora (1974, 1975; Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981;
Flora, 1986) saw his work as filling a gap in Rokkan’s macromodel of democratic politics in Europe. On the other hand,
comparative work on the welfare state was to encounter what
was soon to become the major debate on its ‘fiscal crisis’, and on
possible limits of state intervention more generally (Castles et al.,
1987; Keman et al., 1987; Lane and Ersson, 1990). The label
‘political economy’ was to cover a wide variety of concerns,
ranging from rational choice paradigms based on individualist
self-interest, to studies of specific policy areas, competing
models of general economic and monetary and fiscal policy, and
renewed debates on political legitimacy.

The great new challenges

value of the approach as a tool for general comparative analyses
as distinct from the study of specific policy areas.

But such challenges would seem to pale before the momentous
changes taking place in what had been thought of as the
Communist world, and the attendant shifts in contemporary
20

international relations. In addition, the progress of European

At the same time, developments within the European Union

integration, however halting, is aﬀecting the very basis of

increasingly undermine the role of member states as independent

independent states as the unit of analysis on which so much of

units, even though international modes of decision-making

comparative politics has rested.

remain juxtaposed to supranational ones. Powers of decision in

The long-standing assumption of a natural division of labour
between the study of international relations engaged in analysing
the interaction of states, and comparative politics concerned with
the study of processes within states, always rested on somewhat
dubious ground. It left unclear how scholars were to handle the
formation of (new) states; it glossed over the great influence of
domestic political processes on the making of foreign policies; it

vital matters are either shared or transferred to organs ‘beyond
the nation-state’; while at the same time states also lose formal or
eﬀective powers to regional or local units. The ‘national’ power to
control citizens, groups and enterprises becomes more dubious
in a world of increased mobility and communication, aﬀecting the
status of individual ‘states’ as realistic units for comparative
analysis.

belittled what became known in the international relations

But the greatest, if generally unexpected, challenge to

literature as ‘transnational’ politics; and it postulated a degree of

comparative politics comes from events in Central and Eastern

political independence for ‘sovereign’ states which never

Europe. We mentioned earlier that the study of Communist states

completely fitted the realities of an interdependent world (as

had become mainly the concern of a specialist group of scholars.

advocates of a World System approach, dependency theorists

Experts on Communism have largely lost their ‘subject’, although

and other political economy theorists had long maintained).

they have retained their knowledge of language and area.

The division of the world into rival blocs had arguably permitted a
certain separation of international relations and comparative
politics. The assumption that existing states within a bloc
remained distinct units of analysis seemed tenable in a world of
relatively stable alliances (the necessary ceteris paribus
qualification being as easily forgotten as it was given). The much
more fluid international scene of today makes such an
assumption rather more questionable.

Scholars who were mainly concerned with the study of the
development and the working of democracies, on the other hand,
stand before an entirely new universe. Their concern had
generally been with the comparative treatment of existing
democratic states, which is a far cry from the making of new
democracies in societies which have not known democratic rule
for two political generations or more. For all the words spoken by
pundits at symposia, in newspaper columns or journal articles,
the extent to which proven knowledge exists is unclear. The future
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of democracy presupposes at a minimum the creation of new

one and the same time about the development of democracy,

institutions, but the brunt of comparative politics teaching since

democratic governance and related performances. In all honesty

Weimar has tended to discount the independent eﬀect of political

one should acknowledge that it provides few definite answers.

institutions. Seemingly abstract debates on the merits of
presidential, semi- presidential or parliamentary systems of

The previous section is provided by Lynn University

government, on unicameral or bicameral legislatures, on electoral

Library’s use of Ebook Central Academic Complete.

systems and their eﬀect on the politicization of cleavages and the
formation of party systems, on the proper role of judicial bodies,
have become suddenly matters of crucial importance again (see:
Lijphart, 1994). But they must function in areas with all the
remnants of a totalitarian past, rival claims for political
control and citizenship, possibly severe disagreements on the
nature of the political unit itself – and all this amidst economic ruin
and change. It is as if all major issues in the study of comparative
politics are chaotically thrown together: the formation of states,
the working of institutions, the rivalry of parties and groups,
competing ideologies, the provision of state services and their
limits, issues of economic interdependence, international power
politics, and what not. Against this, one must ruefully
acknowledge that basic political phenomena such as civil war,
terror, ethnic conflict or the shattering eﬀects of ideological strife,
have traditionally tended to fall in the interstices of the study of
international relations, comparative politics and political theory,
rather than forming their core.
Comparative politics, then, stands before its greatest challenge
yet. Never before were so many fundamental questions raised at
22

Section 3

Why compare countries?
Making comparisons is a natural human activity. From antiquity
to the present, generations of humans have sought to
understand and explain the similarities and diﬀerences they
perceive between themselves and others. Though historically,
the discovery of new peoples was often the product of a desire
to conquer them, the need to understand the similarities and
diﬀerences between the conquerors and the conquered was
none the less strong. At the turn of the new millennium, citizens
in all countries compare their position in society to those of
others in terms of their regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious,
familial, and cultural allegiances and identities; material
possessions; economic, social and political positions; and
relative location in systems of power and authority. Students
grow up worried about their types of fashion, circle of friends,
collections of music, appearance and behaviour of their partners,
money earned by their parents, universities they attend, and
careers they may achieve.

larger political world? In order to answer these important
questions, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first
section establishes the four main reasons for comparison,
including contextual description, classification and ‘typologizing’,

In short, to compare is to be human. But beyond these everyday

hypothesis-testing and theory-building, and prediction (Hague et

comparisons, how is the process of comparison scientific? And

al. 1992:24–27; Mackie and Marsh 1995:173–176). The second

how does the comparison of countries help us understand the

section specifies how political science and the sub-field of
comparative politics can be scientific, outlining briefly the
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similarities and diﬀerences between political science and natural

Contextual description

science. The third section clarifies the terms and concepts used
in the preceding discussion and specifies further those terms and

This first objective of comparative politics is the process of

concepts needed for a science of politics. The fourth section

describing the political phenomena and events of a particular

summarizes these reasons, justifications, and terms for a science

country, or group of countries. Traditionally, in political science,

of comparative politics.

this objective of comparative politics was realized in countries

Reasons for comparison
Today, the activity of comparing countries centres on four main
objectives, all of which co-exist and are mutually reinforcing in
any systematic comparative study, but some of which receive
more emphasis, depending on the aspirations of the scholar.
Contextual description allows political scientists to know what
other countries are like. Classification makes the world of politics
less complex, eﬀectively providing the researcher with ‘data
containers’ into which empirical evidence is organized (Sartori
1970:1039). The hypothesis-testing function of comparison allows
the elimination of rival explanations about particular events,
actors, structures, etc. in an eﬀort to help build more general
theories. Finally, comparison of countries and the generalizations
that result from comparison allow prediction about the likely
outcomes in other countries not included in the original
comparison, or outcomes in the future given the presence of
certain antecedent factors.

that were diﬀerent to those of the researcher. Through often highly
detailed description, scholars sought to escape their own
ethnocentrism by studying those countries and cultures foreign
to them (Dogan and Pelassy 1990:5–13). The comparison to the
researcher’s own country is either implicit or explicit, and the goal
of contextual description is either more knowledge about the
nation studied, more knowledge about one’s own political
system, or both. The comparative literature is replete with
examples of this kind of research, and it is often cited to
represent ‘old’ comparative politics as opposed to the ‘new’
comparative politics, which has aspirations beyond mere
description (Mayer 1989; Apter 1996). But the debate about what
constitutes old and new comparison often misses the important
point that all systematic research begins with good description.
Thus description serves as an important component to the
research process and ought to precede the other three objectives
of comparison. Purely descriptive studies serve as the raw data
for those comparative studies that aspire to higher levels of
explanation.
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From the field of Latin American politics, Macauley’s (1967)

The process of classification is not new. The most famous eﬀort

Sandino Aﬀair is a fine example of contextual description. The

at classification is found in Aristotle’s Politics (Book 3, Chapters

book is an exhaustive account of Agusto Sandino’s guerrilla

6–7), in which he establishes six types of rule. Based on the

campaign to oust US marines from Nicaragua after a presidential

combination of their form of rule (good or corrupt) and the

succession crisis. It details the specific events surrounding the

number of those who rule (one, few, or many), Aristotle derived

succession crisis, the role of US intervention, the way in which

the following six forms: monarchy, aristocracy, polity, tyranny,

Sandino upheld his principles of non-intervention through guerrilla

oligarchy, and democracy (see Hague et al. 1992:26). A more

attacks on US marines, and the eventual death of Sandino at the

recent attempt at classification is found in Finer’s (1997) The

hands of Anastasio Somoza. The study serves as an example of

History of Government, which claims that since antiquity (ca.

what Almond (1996:52) calls ‘evidence without inference’, where

3200 BC), all forms of government have belonged to one of the

the author tells the story of this remarkable political leader, but

following four basic types: the palace polity, the church polity, the

the story is not meant to make any larger statements about the

nobility polity, and the forum polity. Each type is ‘diﬀerentiated by

struggle against imperialism. Rather, the focus is on the specific

the nature of the ruling personnel’ (ibid.: 37). In the palace polity,

events that unfolded in Nicaragua, and the important roles played

‘decision-making rests with one individual’ (ibid.: 38). In the

by the various characters in the historical events.

church polity, the church has a significant if not exclusive say in

Classification can be a simple dichotomy such as between
authoritarianism and democracy, or it can be a more complex
‘typology’ of regimes and governmental systems. Like contextual
description, classification is a necessary component of
systematic comparison, but in many ways it represents a higher
level of comparison since it seeks to group many separate
descriptive entities into simpler categories. It reduces the
complexity of the world by seeking out those qualities that
countries share and those that they do not share.

decision-making (ibid.: 50). In the nobility polity, a certain preeminent sector of society has substantial influence on decisionmaking (ibid.: 47). In the forum polity, the authority is ‘conferred
on the rulers from below’ by a ‘plural headed’ forum (ibid.: 51).
Aristotle’s classification was derived deductively and then
‘matched’ to actual city states, while Finer’s classification scheme
is based on empirical observation and inductive reasoning (see
below for the distinction between these two types of reasoning).
Both scholars, however, seek to describe and simplify a more
complex reality by identifying key features common to each type
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Hypothesis-testing

the cumulative and incremental addition of system-level attributes
to existing explanatory theory, thereby making such theory

Despite the diﬀerences between contextual description and

progressively more complete’. The symposia on comparative

classification, both forms of activity contribute to the next

politics in World Politics (Kohli et al. 1995) and the American

objective of comparison, hypothesis-testing. In other words,

Political Science Review (vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 454–481), suggest

once things have been described and classified, the

that questions of theory, explanation, and the role of comparison

comparativist can then move on to search for those factors that

are at the forefront of scholars’ minds.

may help explain what has been described and classified. Since
the 1950s, political scientists have increasingly sought to use
comparative methods to help build more complete theories of
politics. Comparison of countries allows rival explanations to be
ruled out and hypotheses derived from certain theoretical
perspectives to be tested. Scholars using this mode of analysis,
which is often seen as the raison d’être of the ‘new’ comparative
politics (Mayer 1989), identify important variables, posit
relationships to exist between them, and illustrate these
relationships comparatively in an eﬀort to generate and build
comprehensive theories.

Description and classification
are the building blocks of
comparative politics.
Classification simplifies
descriptions of the important
objects of comparative inquiry.
Good classification should
have well-defined categories
into which empirical evidence
can be organized. Categories
that make up a classification

Arend Lijphart (1975) claims that comparison allows ‘testing

scheme can be derived

hypothesized empirical relationships among variables’. Similarly,

inductively from careful consideration of available evidence or

Peter Katzenstein argues that ‘comparative research is a focus on

through a process of deduction in which ‘ideal’ types are

analytical relationships among variables validated by social

generated. This briefing box contains the oldest example of

science, a focus that is modified by diﬀerences in the context in

regime classification and one of the most recent. Both Aristotle

which we observe and measure those variables’ (in Kohli et al.

and Samuel Finer seek to establish simple classificatory schemes

1995:11). Finally, Mayer (1989:46) argues somewhat more

into which real societies can be placed. While Aristotle’s scheme

forcefully that ‘the unique potential of comparative analysis lies in
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is founded on normative grounds, Finer’s scheme is derived

palace-church, forum- nobility, forum-church, and nobility-church.

empirically.

These pure and hybrid types are meant to describe all the regime

In Book 3 of Politics, Aristotle derives regime types which are
divided on the one hand between those that are ‘good’ and those
that are ‘corrupt’, and on the other, between the diﬀerent number
of rulers that make up the decision-making authority, namely, the
one, the few, and the many. Good government rules in the
common interest while corrupt government rules in the interests
of those who comprise the dominant authority. The intersection
between these two divisions yields six regime types; all of which
appear in Figure 1.1. The figure shows that the good types
include monarchy, aristocracy, and polity. The corrupt types
include tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Each type is based on
a diﬀerent idea of justice (McClelland 1997:57). Thus, monarchy is
rule by the one for the common interest, while tyranny is rule by

types that have existed in world history from 3200 BC to the
modern nation state. Finer concedes that there are few instances
of pure forms in history and that most polities fit one of his hybrid
types. These pure forms, their hybrids, and examples from world
history appear in Figure 1.2. The diagonal that results from the
intersection of the first row and column in the figure represents
the pure forms, while the remaining cells contain the hybrid forms.
Many regime types that were originally pure became hybrid at
diﬀerent points in history. Of all the types, the pure palace and its
variants have remained the most common through history, and
despite its popularity today, the forum polity that represents
modern secular democracies is a relatively rare and recent regime
type (Finer 1997:46).

the one for the one. Aristocracy is rule by the few for the common

Furthermore, the publication of truly comparative books in the

interest, while oligarchy is rule by the few for the few. Polity is rule

field continues to demonstrate the fruitfulness of this mode of

by the many for the common good, while democracy is rule by

analysis. For example, Luebbert (1991) compares Britain, France,

the many for the many, or what Aristotle called ‘mob rule’.

Switzerland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway,

Finer (1997:37) adopts an Aristotelian approach to regime
classification by identifying four ‘pure’ types of regime and their
logical ‘hybrids’. Each regime type is based on the nature of its
ruling personnel. The pure types include the palace, the forum,
the nobility, and the church. The hybrid types are the six possible
combinations of the pure types, palace-forum, palace-nobility,

Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, and Spain to uncover
the class origins of regime type in inter-war Europe.
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) compare the historical experiences of
the advanced industrial countries with those of the developing
world to uncover the relationship between capitalist development
and democracy. Wickham- Crowley (1993) compares instances of
revolutionary activity in Latin America to discover the causal
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configuration of successful and unsuccessful social revolution in

Prediction

the region. Foweraker and Landman (1997) compare the
authoritarian cases of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Spain to illustrate

The final and most diﬃcult objective of comparative politics is a

the relationship between citizenship rights and social movements.

logical extension of hypothesis-testing, namely, to make

Finally, Inglehart (1997) compares survey data from forty-three

predictions about outcomes in other countries based on the

societies to assess the mutual relationship between the

generalizations from the initial comparison, or to make claims

process of modernization (or post-modernization) and

about future political outcomes. Prediction in comparative politics

changing value systems. In all these works, key explanatory and

tends to be made in probabilistic terms, such as ‘countries with

outcome variables are carefully defined and the relationships

systems of proportional representation are more likely to have

between them are demonstrated through comparison of empirical

multiple political parties’. In this example, a political scientist

evidence.

would know the likely eﬀect of a nation switching its electoral

Voting participation
In Contemporary Democracies, Powell (1982) examines a number
of key hypotheses concerning voter participation in twenty-nine
democratic countries. Participation is measured using voter
turnout, or the percentage of the eligible voters who actually
voted in national elections. He argues that voting participation

system from a plurality or ‘first-past-the- post’ rule to a
proportional one (Hague et al. 1992). Another predictive example
involves the benefits accrued to political incumbents in contesting
future elections. Based on the empirical observations of past
electoral contests, political scientists could be reasonably secure
in predicting that the incumbent in any given election has a higher
probability of winning the election than the non-incumbent (see

ought to be higher in countries with higher levels of economic

King et al. 1994).

development (per capita GNP), a representational constitution,

Although prediction is less an aspiration of comparativists today

electoral laws that facilitate voting, and a party system with
strong alignments to groups in society (Powell 1982:120– 121).
His statistical analysis of the data from these countries reveals
positive eﬀects for all these variables on voter participation.

than in the past, there are those who continue to couch their
arguments in predictive language. For example, weak predictive
arguments are found in Huntington’s (1996) The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World Order, and
strong predictive arguments are found in Vanhanen’s (1997) The
Prospect of Democracy. Huntington (1996) identifies nine key
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cultural groupings which he believes currently characterize the

proportion of students, the size of the literate population, the

world’s population, and predicts that future conflicts will be more

number of family farms, and the degree of decentralization of

likely to appear in the areas where two or more of these cultures

non-agricultural economic resources (Vanhanen 1997:59–60). By

meet or ‘clash’. Not only does he seek to predict future conflicts

examining the relationship between the level of democracy and

in the world, but claims that his ‘civilization’ approach accounts

the distribution of power resources from 1850–1993, Vanhanen

for more post-Cold War events than rival approaches. His

compares the actual 1993 values of democracy to those that

predictions became all the more relevant after the terrorist attacks

were predicted using regression analysis. Simply put, making an

on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September

inference is ‘using facts we know to learn something about facts

2001, which many saw as proof of a clash between the ‘Western’

we do not know’ (King et al. 1994:119 after Mill; see also Couvalis

and ‘Islamic’ civilizations outlined in his book. Similarly, based on

1997). Gabriel Almond (1996) observes that ‘the object of political

observations of the presence of economic resources and the

science…is the creation of knowledge, defined as inferences or

occurrence of democracy in the world from the middle of the

generalizations about politics drawn from evidence’; and Mayer

nineteenth century until today, Vanhanen (1997:99–154) predicts

(1989:56) claims that ‘comparative analysis…[is] a method that

the degree to which individual countries and regions in the world

plays a central role in the explanatory mission of political science

are likely to become democratic

itself. Thus, comparative politics seeks to achieve the goal of

The science in political science
The preceding section specified the four main objectives of
comparison in political science and hinted, through reference to
questions of explanation, theory-building, and prediction, how

inference about politics through comparing countries. This
section of the chapter clarifies how the process of making
inferences is the underlying principle of comparative politics, and
how the methodological assumptions of natural science are
important to a science of politics.

comparison might be considered a science. The key term used

For the purposes of this volume, science is defined as the gradual

world based on their distribution of ‘power resources’.

accumulation of knowledge about the empirical world through

Democracy is measured by a combination of the smallest parties’

systematic practices of inquiry, including the collection of

share of the vote and the percentage turnout (ibid.: 35). The

evidence, the generation and testing of hypotheses, and the

distribution of power resources is measured by an index that

drawing of substantive inferences.1 But beyond this basic

combines the urban population, the non-agricultural population,

definition, what are the parallels between political science and
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natural science? What are the main diﬀerences between the two?

evolution and gravity are mental constructs, whose repeated

And how does comparison help resolve these diﬀerences? The

empirical verification has given them a law-like status.

strong case for a science of politics suggests that both
(comparative) political science and natural science share the
same basic goals, namely, description, classification, hypothesistesting, and prediction. Both activities require the systematic
collection of evidence; an ordering of the evidence and the search
for discernible patterns; the formulation and testing of contending
explanations for the occurrence of the patterns; and the building
of more general theories. Thus, a science of politics always
contains this ‘evidence-inference methodological core’ (Almond
1996:52), or the ‘customary pair’ of theory and observation
(Feyerabend 1993:23; see also Gordon 1991:589–634).

Political scientists also collect evidence systematically (e.g.
archival records, interviews, oﬃcial statistics, histories, or
surveys), search for discernible patterns in the evidence, and
formulate theories to account for those patterns. In comparative
politics, the political scientist compares countries in an eﬀort to
verify the theories that have been formulated. Thus, both the
natural and political sciences seek to make inferences based on
the empirical world they observe, and both seek to maximize the
certainty of these inferences. Despite these general similarities
between natural science and political science, there remain two
important (albeit not absolute) diﬀerences: experimentation and

Two examples from the natural sciences may help make these

the generation of scientific ‘laws’. These diﬀerences are

points clearer. Both the theory of evolution and the theory of

discussed in turn.

gravity are based on the systematic collection of evidence.
Charles Darwin sought to document the entirety of the Earth’s
flora and fauna. Originally in an eﬀort to demonstrate the glory
of God’s creation, Darwin soon discovered a pattern in what he
was observing for which an alternative explanation was possible.
The theory of evolution, buttressed later by the theory of natural
selection, emerged as the new explanation for the variety of
species found in the natural world. Similarly, Isaac Newton
formulated the theory of gravity based on the collection of
evidence (the falling apple!). Neither scientist had actually seen
evolution or gravity but merely observed its eﬀects. In this way,

The first diﬀerence between natural science and political science
is the role of experimentation. While for some areas of natural
scientific research, such as astronomy and seismology,
experimentation is not possible, the advances in natural science
are generally supported by evidence gathered through
experimentation, which involves the controlled manipulation of
the subject under study in an eﬀort to isolate causal factors.
Evidence in political science, on the other hand, tends not to be
gathered through experimentation, even though some political
scientists use experiments in their research (e.g. those who work
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on game theory, focus groups, and ‘citizen-juries’). Comparative

the comparativist seeks to demonstrate that the type of electoral

politics, in particular, cannot use experimentation for both

system has some bearing on the type of party system. In this

practical and ethical reasons. For example, it would be practically

way, comparative research ‘simulates’ experimentation

impossible to re-run the same election in the same country with a

(Lieberson 1987:45; Ferguson 1997b; see also Tetlock and

diﬀerent electoral system to observe the diﬀerences in the

Lebow 2001).

outcome of the two systems. Ethically, it would be impossible to
redistribute income intentionally in a developing country to see if
civil strife erupts. Both these examples demonstrate the use of
counterfactuals, or situations in which the researcher imagines a
state of aﬀairs where the antecedent factors to a given event are
absent and where an alternative course of events or outcomes is
considered (Ferguson 1997b).

The second diﬀerence between natural science and political
science involves the law- like status that is given to certain
scientific theories. Experimentation and repeated empirical
verification give theories in the natural sciences the status of laws
(e.g. the law of conservation of energy, or Boyle’s Law of Gases);
however, the nature of evidence marshalled in support of theories
of political science is such that law-like generalizations are rare.

Whether it is diﬀerent electoral systems, diﬀerent distributions of

Three famous ‘laws’ of political science are well known. Michels’

income, diﬀerent levels of economic development, or the

‘Iron Law of Oligarchy’ suggests that the natural processes

absence of particular revolutionary groups, political scientists

observable in the dynamics of organizations and small groups are

implicitly suggest a counterfactual situation when making claims

such that over time, all groups and organizations develop a

about important explanatory factors. The claim that ‘single-

hierarchical structure of authority with a small elite at their head.

member district electoral systems tend to produce two-party

In an example from the comparative literature, this law has been

systems’ is in eﬀect also claiming that countries without such

tested in the examination of social movement organizations,

electoral systems will necessarily have diﬀerent political party

where evidence suggests that the most successful and

systems. While some historians may construct alternative

longstanding social movement organizations tend to have formal

historical scenarios based on ‘calculations about the relative

bureaucratic structures and authoritative bodies composed of

probability of plausible outcomes’ (ibid.: 85), political scientists

elites from the movement (see Tarrow 1994). The second law,

compare countries that diﬀer in ways that supply the

called ‘Duverger’s Law’, states that electoral systems based on

counterfactual situation. For example, by comparing the political

single- member districts tend to produce two parties while

party systems across countries with diﬀerent electoral systems,

systems with proportional representation tend to produce multiple
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parties. This law has been repeatedly tested in comparative

logic of inference. Second, comparative politics is a non-

studies on electoral systems and on balance, is supported by the

experimental (or quasi-experimental) social science that seeks to

evidence (see Rae 1971; Lijphart 1994a).

make generalizations based on the best available evidence

The third law on ‘the democratic peace’ states that democracies
do not go to war with each other (Babst 1964). Repeated
comparative studies in international relations of war ‘dyads’ (i.e.
pairs of countries that engage in war with each other),
demonstrate that ‘[t]he number of wars between the democracies
during the past two centuries ranges from zero to less than a
handful depending on precisely how democracy is defined’ (Levy
1989:87– 88). Scholars argue that this ‘absence of war between
democracies comes as close to anything we have to an empirical
law in international relations’ (ibid.: 88). Moreover, combined with
the process of democratization, which has become more
pronounced since 1974 (see Chapter 7), the law of democratic

(Campbell and Stanley 1963; Lijphart 1975:162; Lieberson 1987).
Third, as a substitute for experimentation, comparison allows for
control (Sartori 1994:16), holding certain things constant while
examining and accounting for observed diﬀerences (see Chapter
2). Fourth, while not seeking ironclad laws, comparative politics
seeks clarity, understanding, and explanation of political
phenomena about which it can be reasonably certain. The goal of
this book therefore, is to provide the necessary tools for students
of politics to achieve this clarity, understanding, and explanation
while avoiding the pitfalls and obstacles that limit such an
enterprise.

Scientific terms and concepts

peace oﬀers optimism about future conflict in the world, since a
larger proportion of democracies in the world means fewer inter-

Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to define and

state wars (see Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Przeworski et al. 2000;

clarify terms that have been used thus far, as well as terms that

Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001).

will be encountered throughout the book. These are general terms

Aside from these three ‘laws’ of political science, the bulk of
comparative research eschews making such strong claims. What
then are the main conclusions about comparative politics that can
be drawn from this cursory comparison to natural science? First,
for practical and ethical reasons, comparative politics relaxes
some of the rigours of natural science, but still employs the same

used throughout the social sciences that all students of politics
ought to know if they aspire to a more scientific approach to
understanding the political world. These terms include theory and
method; ontology, epistemology, and methodology; cases (or
countries), units of analysis, variables, and observations; levels of
analysis; and quantitative and qualitative methods. Throughout
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the discussion every eﬀort is made to show how the book uses

empirical theory of social revolution may posit a series of socio-

these terms and concepts of social science.

economic factors that account for revolutionary behaviour in

Theory & method
There are two basic types of theory in political science, normative
and empirical. Normative theory specifies how things in society
ought to be, given a desired set of outcomes and philosophical
position. From the Greeks and Romans to Rawls, normative
political theorists establish frameworks for realizing the common
good and address key problems of society through theoretical
argumentation.

certain types of people, which would then be tested using
evidence. In addition, theories in political science can be
deductive or inductive. Deductive theories arrive at their
conclusions by applying reason to a given set of premises (Stoker
1995:17; Lawson 1997:16–19; Couvalis 1997). For example, the
rational choice perspective in political science assumes that all
political actors maximize their own personal utility, or self-interest,
when choosing between alternatives. From that basic
assumption, the scholar logically deduces the range of possible
outcomes (Ward 1995:79; Levi 1997). Inductive theories, on the
other hand, arrive at their conclusions through observation of
known facts (Couvalis 1997). For example, a scholar observing
higher instances of peasant rebellion in geographical areas with
higher levels of land and income inequality will arrive inductively
at the conclusion that inequality is related to rebellion.
Comparison of evidence from other countries or geographical
regions would seek to confirm this generalization.

Locke, Rousseau, and Kant

For example, Rawls (1971) carries on the tradition of liberal
contract theory found in Locke, Rousseau and Kant, by deriving
principles of justice from an idealized thought experiment. In
contrast, empirical theory seeks to establish causal relationships
between two or more concepts in an eﬀort to explain the
occurrence of observed political phenomena. For example, an

Method, on the other hand, is the means by which a theory is
derived and tested, including the collection of evidence,
formulation and testing of hypotheses, and the arrival at
substantive conclusions. Evidence can be collected, for example,
through the examination of historical records, the collation and
analysis of open-ended interviews of political activists, the
systematic reporting of the participant observation of social
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movement activities, or the construction and analysis of mass

contrast to ontology, it concerns what knowledge of the political

surveys of a sample of the population. In formulating and testing

world is possible and what rules of inquiry scholars follow in

hypotheses, method makes the decision rules and the rejection of

knowing the political world. In the history and philosophy of

rival hypotheses explicit. Finally, substantive conclusions are

science, epistemology has moved from the strong claim made by

drawn from the theories and the evidence. As the preceding

positivists that a unity of the natural and social sciences is

discussion in this chapter suggests, this book, although not

possible to one that recognizes a certain plurality of approaches

primarily concerned with diﬀerent theories of comparative

grounded in the link between evidence and inference of the kind

politics, seeks to demonstrate the diﬀerent ways in which

that this book advocates (see Gordon 1991:589–668). In contrast

comparative methods can be used to test deductive and

to ontology and epistemology, methodology concerns the ways in

inductive empirical theories of politics.

which knowledge of the political world is acquired. As its name

Ontology, epistemology & methodology
Ontology, epistemology, and methodology are terms that occur in
the discussion of the philosophy of science and the distinctions
between them often become blurred in the comparative literature.
Ontology is, quite literally, the study of being, or the metaphysical
concern with the essence of things, including the ‘nature,
constitution, and structure of the objects’ of comparative inquiry

suggests, methodology is the study of diﬀerent methods or
systems of methods in a given field of inquiry. There are thus rules
of inquiry specific to qualitative and quantitative methods, even
though both strive to provide explanation and understanding of
observed political phenomena. These three concepts also have
‘directional dependence’ such that ontology establishes what is
knowable, epistemology how it is knowable, and methodology
how it is acquired systematically (Hay 2002:61–66).

(Lawson 1997:15). It concerns what can be studied, what can be

Having defined these terms, it is helpful for the reader to know

compared, and what constitutes the political. In other words, for

how the discussions throughout the rest of this book are

comparative politics, ontology concerns the countries, events,

grounded in certain ontological, epistemological, and

actors, institutions, and processes among other things that are

methodological assumptions. Without entering a philosophical

observable and in need of explanation. Epistemology is the study

debate, this book is grounded in the ontological belief that

of the nature of knowledge, or how scholars come to know the

animate and inanimate objects in the world exist in and of

world, both through a priori means and through a posteriori

themselves, and by extension observable events exist in and of

means of observation, sense impression, and experience. In

themselves. The object of political science is to account for and
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understand these events in terms of why they happened, how

adherence to rules of inquiry. On the other hand, it recognizes

they happened, and the likelihood of them happening again in the

that knowledge of the political world cannot be ‘value-free’ and

future, as well as in diﬀerent parts of the world. While adhering to

that the processes of theory generation and observation may not

the notion that history is ‘open ended’ (Popper 1997), this book

be mutually exclusive (Feyerabend 1993:27; Sanders 1995:67–68;

accepts that there are certain ‘event regularities’ (Lawson 1997) in

Couvalis 1997). It therefore accepts that certain kinds of cross-

the world that political science seeks to describe and explain.

cultural comparisons and cross-national comparisons can be

Epistemologically, comparative politics inhabits a broad
spectrum. One end of the spectrum contends that all things
political and social are knowable through the process of
deduction based on indisputable assumptions about human
nature. Typically labelled nomological-deductivism, such an
epistemological position adheres to the positivist quest for law

made if certain procedures are adopted. Methodologically, the
book is concerned with the application of comparative methods
to real research problems in comparative politics in an eﬀort to
help students make more valid generalizations about the political
world they observe.

Cases, units of analysis, variables & observations

like generalizations about political behaviour. The other end of the
spectrum claims that all knowledge is culturally bound and

These four terms are vital aspects of systematic research in

relative, suggesting that it is impossible to know anything beyond

comparative politics. Cases are those countries that feature in the

the strict confines of the local cultural context (Kohli et al. 1995).

comparative analysis. For example, in States and Social

Such a position suggests that a science of comparative politics is

Revolutions (1979), Theda Skocpol examines the cases of France,

not possible, since political concepts would not ‘travel’ across

Russia, and China. Units of analysis are the objects on which the

diﬀerent cultural contexts and there would be fundamental

scholar collects data, such as individual people, countries,

diﬀerences in their meaning (see Macintyre 1971).

electoral systems, social movements, etc. Variables are those

In an eﬀort to be inclusive of diﬀerent methods of comparison,
this book is located somewhere in between these two extremes.
On the one hand, it accepts that certain deductive theories of
politics can be tested in the real world and that generalizations
about the world of politics are possible given the proper

concepts whose values change over a given set of units, such as
income, political party identification, propensity to join a protest
movement, etc. Observations are the values of the variables for
each unit, which can be numeric, verbal, or even visual. For
example, a hypothetical study of social movements in Britain,
France, The Netherlands, and Germany may have a variable
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entitled ‘strategy’, which has categories denoted ‘political

the commercialization of agriculture, or elite bargaining. In his

lobbying’, ‘peaceful demonstration’, ‘violent direct action’,

study of guerrillas and revolution in Latin America, Wickham-

‘grass-roots organizing’, and ‘consciousness-raising’. In this

Crowley (1993) seeks to explain the occurrence of successful

hypothetical study, the cases are the countries, the units of

social revolutions.

analysis are the movements, the variable is ‘strategy’, and the
observation is the value of the strategy variable for a given
movement in a given country. In addition to the diﬀerent values
that variables assume, they can either be dependent or
independent. Dependent variables (alternatively referred to as
outcome variables, endogenous variables, or the explanandum)
are those political outcomes that the research is trying to explain.

In this case, successful social revolution is the dependent
variable. The independent variables include the presence of a
guerrilla group, the support of workers and peasants, suﬃcient
guerrilla military strength, the presence of a traditional patrimonial
regime, and the withdrawal of US military and economic support
for the incumbent regime (Wickham-Crowley 1993:312).

An independent variable, on the other hand, is that which
explains the dependent variable (and is alternatively labelled a
causal variable, an explanatory variable, an exogenous variable,
or the explicandum). The distinction between dependent and
independent variables is derived from the specific research
question of a comparative project and the particular theoretical
perspective that has been adopted. Since most political events
have multiple explanations, it is possible to have more than one
independent variable for a given dependent variable. In formal
models of politics, the dependent variable is often depicted by a

Levels of analysis
Levels of analysis in political science are divided between the
micro, or individual level, and the macro, or system level. Micropolitical analysis examines the political activity of individuals,
such as respondents in a mass survey, elite members of a
political party or government, or activists in a protest movement.
Macro-political analysis focuses on groups of individuals,

y, and the independent variable is often depicted by an x.

structures of power, social classes, economic processes, and the

For example, a dependent variable may include votes for a leftist

science, there are those who believe all of politics can be

party, military coups, revolutions, or transitions to democracy.

explained by focusing on micro-level processes, and there are

Independent variables to account for each of these dependent

those who believe that all of politics can be explained by a focus

variables may include, respectively, social class, economic crisis,

on macro-level processes. This is sometimes called the

interaction of nation states. As in other divisions in political
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‘structure-agency’ problem of politics (see Hay 1995, 2002).

limited but did not determine the actions of individual leaders.

Micro-analysts believe that the world of politics is shaped by the

This present book does not privilege one level of analysis over

actions of ‘structureless agents’, while macro-analysts believe

another. Rather, it demonstrates the ways in which diﬀerent levels

that that world is shaped by the unstoppable processes of

of analysis fit into diﬀerent comparative methods.

‘agentless-structures’.

Quantitative and qualitative methods

The comparative politics literature is rich with examples of these
diﬀerent levels of analysis. In The Rational Peasant, Samuel

Simply put, quantitative methods seek to show diﬀerences in

Popkin (1979) argues that revolutionary movements are best

number between certain objects of analysis and qualitative

understood by focusing on the preferences and actions of

methods seek to show diﬀerences in kind. Quantitative analysis

individual peasants (a micro-level analysis). Support for this

answers the simple question, ‘How many of them are

assertion comes from his intense study of peasant activity in

there?’ (Miller 1995:154), where the ‘them’ represents any object

Vietnam. In contrast to Popkin, Jeﬀrey Paige (1975) in Agrarian

of comparison that can either be counted or assigned a numerical

Revolution, demonstrates that revolutions are most likely in

value. For example, it is possible to count the number of protest

countries with a particular structural combination of owners and

events or assign values to diﬀerent social movement strategies

cultivators. This macro-level analysis is carried out through

(see above, p. 17), the degree to which human rights are

comparing many countries at once, and then verifying the

protected (see Chapter 9), and an individual’s identification with

findings in the three countries of Vietnam, Angola, and Peru (see

political parties. Quantitative data can be oﬃcial aggregate data

Chapter 2). In Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy, Gregory

published by governments on growth rates, revenues and

Luebbert (1991) claims that the types of regime that emerged in

expenditures, levels of agricultural and industrial production,

inter-war Europe had nothing to do with ‘leadership and

crime rates and prison populations, or the number of hectares of

meaningful choice’ (ibid.: 306), but were determined structurally

land devoted to agrarian reform. Quantitative data can also be

by mass material interests, social classes, and political parties (a

individual, such as that found in the numerous market research

macro-level analysis). Finally, in the Breakdown of Democratic

surveys and public opinion polls. Quantitative methods are based

Regimes, Stepan (1978) finds the middle ground in accounting for

on the distributions these data exhibit and the relationships that

the 1964 breakdown of democracy in Brazil, where he suggests

can be established between numeric variables using simple and

that macro-political conditions at the time of breakdown certainly

advanced statistical methods.
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Qualitative methods seek to identify and understand the

observation strive to uncover a deeper level of information in

attributes, characteristics, and traits of the objects of inquiry, and

order to capture meaning, process, and context, where

the nature of the method necessarily requires a focus on a small

explanation ‘involves describing and understanding people as

number of countries. In comparative politics, there are three types

conscious and social human beings’ (Devine 1995:140). Similarly,

of qualitative methods: macro-historical comparison (and its three

interpretivism, hermeneutics, and ‘thick description’ are

subtypes) (Skocpol and Somers 1980; Ragin et al. 1996); in-depth

concerned with interpretation, understanding, and the deeper

interviews and participant observation (Devine 1995); and what is

structures of meanings associated with the objects of inquiry.

variously called interpretivism, hermeneutics, and ‘thick
description’ (Geertz 1973; Fay 1975). In none of these types of
method is there an attempt to give numerical expression to the
objects of inquiry, and in all of them, the goal is to provide wellrounded and complete discursive accounts. These more
complete accounts are often referred to as ‘ideographic’ or
‘configurative’, since they seek to identify all the elements
important in accounting for the outcome.

Over the years a division in political science has developed
between those who use quantitative methods and those who use
qualitative methods; however, it seems that this division is a false
one if both methods adhere to the goal of making inferences from
available evidence (Foweraker and Landman 1997:48–49). In
other words, this book is grounded in the belief that the same
logic of inference ought to apply equally to quantitative and
qualitative methods (see King et al. 1994). Perhaps more

Through focus on a small number of countries, comparative

importantly, the qualitative distinction made among categories in

macro-history allows for the ‘parallel demonstration of theory’, the

comparative classification schemes necessarily precedes the

‘contrast of contexts’, or ‘macrocausal’ explanation (Skocpol and

process of quantification (Sartori 1970, 1994). And, as the

Somers 1980). Parallel demonstration of theory tests the

ensuing chapters will demonstrate, it is clear that the field of

fruitfulness of theory across a range of countries. The contrast of

comparative politics is richly populated with studies that use

contexts helps to identify unique features of countries in an eﬀort

quantitative and qualitative methods (or both) at all levels of

to show their eﬀect on social processes, while bringing out the

analysis, as well as across all methods of comparison.

richness of the individual countries and aspiring to ‘descriptive
holism’. Macro-causal analysis seeks to explain observed political

Summary

phenomena through the identification and analysis of ‘master’
variables (Luebbert 1991:5). In-depth interviews and participant
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This chapter has outlined the four main objectives of comparative
politics and argued further that all co-exist and are necessary for
systematic research. Predictions cannot be made without wellfounded theories; theories cannot be made without proper
classification; and classification cannot be made without good
description. The chapter has shown how comparative politics is
scientific if it aspires to making inferences about the political
world based on the best available evidence. Finally, it defined the
key terms that will be used throughout the book. The next chapter
examines the diﬀerent methods of comparison that are available
to students, all of which can be used to make larger inferences
about the political world that we observe.
The previous section is provided by Lynn University
Library’s use of EBSCO eBooks.
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Chapter 2

Theories,
Hypotheses &
Evidence
Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Understand theories, hypotheses, and evidence.
• Analyze the use of theories, hypotheses and evidence
with the comparative approach.

Science & scientific research

equipment in their laboratories. Etymologically, the word
“science” is derived from the Latin word scientia meaning

What is research? Depending on who you ask, you will likely get

knowledge. Science refers to a systematic and organized body of

very diﬀerent answers to this seemingly innocuous question.

knowledge in any area of inquiry that is acquired using “the

Some people will say that they routinely research diﬀerent online

scientific method” (the scientific method is described further

websites to find the best place to buy goods or services they

below). Science can be grouped into two broad categories:

want. Television news channels supposedly conduct research in

natural science and social science. Natural science is the science

the form of viewer polls on topics of public interest such as

of naturally occurring objects or phenomena, such as light,

forthcoming elections or government-funded projects.

objects, matter, earth, celestial bodies, or the human body.

Undergraduate students research the Internet to find the

Natural sciences can be further classified into physical sciences,

information they need to complete assigned projects or term

earth sciences, life sciences, and others. Physical sciences

papers. Graduate students working on research projects for a

consist of disciplines such as physics (the science of physical

professor may see research as collecting or analyzing data

objects), chemistry (the science of matter), and astronomy (the

related to their project. Businesses and consultants research

science of celestial objects). Earth sciences consist of disciplines

diﬀerent potential solutions to remedy organizational problems

such as geology (the science of the earth). Life sciences include

such as a supply chain bottleneck or to identify customer

disciplines such as biology (the science of human bodies) and

purchase patterns. However, none of the above can be

botany (the science of plants). In contrast, social science is the

considered “scientific research” unless: (1) it contributes to a

science of people or collections of people, such as groups, firms,

body of science, and (2) it follows the scientific method. This

societies, or economies, and their individual or collective

chapter will examine what these terms mean.

behaviors. Social sciences can be classified into disciplines such

Science
What is science? To some, science refers to diﬃcult high school

as psychology (the science of human behaviors), sociology (the
science of social groups), and economics (the science of firms,
markets, and economies).

or college-level courses such as physics, chemistry, and biology

The natural sciences are diﬀerent from the social sciences in

meant only for the brightest students. To others, science is a craft

several respects. The natural sciences are very precise, accurate,

practiced by scientists in white coats using specialized

deterministic, and independent of the person making the
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scientific observations. For instance, a scientific experiment in

problem such as reduce global terrorism or rescue an economy

physics, such as measuring the speed of sound through a certain

from a recession. Any student studying the social sciences must

media or the refractive index of water, should always yield the

be cognizant of and comfortable with handling higher levels of

exact same results, irrespective of the time or place of the

ambiguity, uncertainty, and error that come with such sciences,

experiment, or the person conducting the experiment. If two

which merely reflects the high variability of social objects.

students conducting the same physics experiment obtain two
diﬀerent values of these physical properties, then it generally
means that one or both of those students must be in error.
However, the same cannot be said for the social sciences, which
tend to be less accurate, deterministic, or unambiguous. For
instance, if you measure a person’s happiness using a
hypothetical instrument, you may find that the same person is
more happy or less happy (or sad) on diﬀerent days and
sometimes, at diﬀerent times on the same day. One’s happiness
may vary depending on the news that person received that day or
on the events that transpired earlier during that day. Furthermore,
there is not a single instrument or metric that can accurately
measure a person’s happiness. Hence, one instrument may
calibrate a person as being “more happy” while a second
instrument may find that the same person is “less happy” at the
same instant in time. In other words, there is a high degree of
measurement error in the social sciences and there is
considerable uncertainty and little agreement on social science
policy decisions. For instance, you will not find many
disagreements among natural scientists on the speed of light or

Sciences can also be classified based on their purpose. Basic
sciences, also called pure sciences, are those that explain the
most basic objects and forces, relationships between them, and
laws governing them. Examples include physics, mathematics,
and biology. Applied sciences, also called practical sciences, are
sciences that apply scientific knowledge from basic sciences in a
physical environment. For instance, engineering is an applied
science that applies the laws of physics and chemistry for
practical applications such as building stronger bridges or fuel
eﬃcient combustion engines, while medicine is an applied
science that applies the laws of biology for solving human
ailments. Both basic and applied sciences are required for human
development. However, applied sciences cannot stand on their
own right, but instead relies on basic sciences for its progress. Of
course, the industry and private enterprises tend to focus more
on applied sciences given their practical value, while universities
study both basic and applied sciences.

Scientific knowledge

the speed of the earth around the sun, but you will find numerous

The purpose of science is to create scientific knowledge.

disagreements among social scientists on how to solve a social

Scientific knowledge refers to a generalized body of laws and
42

theories to explain a phenomenon or behavior of interest that are

The goal of scientific research is to discover laws and postulate

acquired using the scientific method. Laws are observed patterns

theories that can explain natural or social phenomena, or in other

of phenomena or behaviors, while theories are systematic

words, build scientific knowledge. It is important to understand

explanations of the underlying phenomenon or behavior. For

that this knowledge may be imperfect or even quite far from the

instance, in physics, the Newtonian Laws of Motion describe

truth. Sometimes, there may not be a single universal truth, but

what happens when an object is in a state of rest or motion

rather an equilibrium of “multiple truths.” We must understand

(Newton’s First Law), what force is needed to move a stationary

that the theories, upon which scientific knowledge is based, are

object or stop a moving object (Newton’s Second Law), and what

only explanations of a particular phenomenon, as suggested by a

happens when two objects collide (Newton’s Third Law).

scientist. As such, there may be good or poor explanations,

Collectively, the three laws constitute the basis of classical

depending on the extent to which those explanations fit well with

mechanics – a theory of moving objects. Likewise, the theory of

reality, and consequently, there may be good or poor theories.

optics explains the properties of light and how it behaves in

The progress of science is marked by our progression over time

diﬀerent media, electromagnetic theory explains the properties of

from poorer theories to better theories, through better

electricity and how to generate it, quantum mechanics explains

observations using more accurate instruments and more informed

the properties of subatomic particles, and thermodynamics

logical reasoning. We arrive at scientific laws or theories through a

explains the properties of energy and mechanical work. An

process of logic and evidence. Logic (theory) and evidence

introductory college level text book in physics will likely contain

(observations) are the two, and only two, pillars upon which

separate chapters devoted to each of these theories. Similar

scientific knowledge is based. In science, theories and

theories are also available in social sciences. For instance,

observations are interrelated and cannot exist without each other.

cognitive dissonance theory in psychology explains how people

Theories provide meaning and significance to what we observe,

react when their observations of an event is diﬀerent from what

and observations help validate or refine existing theory or

they expected of that event, general deterrence theory explains

construct new theory. Any other means of knowledge acquisition,

why some people engage in improper or criminal behaviors, such

such as faith or authority cannot be considered science.

as illegally download music or commit software piracy, and the
theory of planned behavior explains how people make conscious
reasoned choices in their everyday lives.

Scientific research
Given that theories and observations are the two pillars of
science, scientific research operates at two levels: a theoretical
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level and an empirical level. The theoretical level is concerned
with developing abstract concepts about a natural or social
phenomenon and relationships between those concepts (i.e.,
build “theories”), while the empirical level is concerned with
testing the theoretical concepts and relationships to see how well
they reflect our observations of reality, with the goal of ultimately
building better theories. Over time, a theory becomes more and
more refined (i.e., fits the observed reality better), and the science
gains maturity. Scientific research involves continually moving
back and forth between theory and observations. Both theory and
observations are essential components of scientific research. For
instance, relying solely on observations for making inferences and
ignoring theory is not considered valid scientific research.

both inductive and deductive research. It is important to
understand that theory building (inductive research) and theorytesting (deductive research) are both critical for the advancement
of science. Elegant theories are not valuable if they do not match

Depending on a researcher’s training and interest, scientific

with reality. Likewise, mountains of data are also useless until

inquiry may take one of two possible forms: inductive or

they can contribute to the construction to meaningful theories.

deductive. In inductive research, the goal of a researcher is to

Rather than viewing these two processes in a circular

infer theoretical concepts and patterns from observed data. In

relationship, perhaps they can be better viewed as a helix, with

deductive research, the goal of the researcher is to test concepts

each iteration between theory and data contributing to better

and patterns known from theory using new empirical data. Hence,

explanations of the phenomenon of interest and better theories.

inductive research is also called theory-building research, and

Though both inductive and deductive research are important for

deductive research is theory-testing research. Note here that the

the advancement of science, it appears that inductive (theory-

goal of theory-testing is not just to test a theory, but possibly to

building) research is more valuable when there are few prior

refine, improve, and extend it. You cannot do inductive or

theories or explanations, while deductive (theory-testing) research

deductive research if you are not familiar with both the theory and

is more productive when there are many competing theories of

data components of research. Naturally, a complete researcher is

the same phenomenon and researchers are interested in knowing

one who can traverse the entire research cycle and can handle

which theory works best and under what circumstances.
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Theory building and theory testing are particularly diﬃcult in the

that cannot be “taught” but rather learned though experience. All

social sciences, given the imprecise nature of the theoretical

of the greatest scientists in the history of mankind, such as

concepts, inadequate tools to measure them, and the presence of

Galileo, Newton, Einstein, Neils Bohr, Adam Smith, Charles

many unaccounted factors that can also influence the

Darwin, and Herbert Simon, were master theoreticians, and they

phenomenon of interest. It is also very diﬃcult to refute theories

are remembered for the theories they postulated that transformed

that do not work. For instance, Karl Marx’s theory of communism

the course of science. Methodological skills are needed to be an

as an eﬀective means of economic production withstood for

ordinary researcher, but theoretical skills are needed to be an

decades, before it was finally discredited as being inferior to

extraordinary researcher!

capitalism in promoting economic growth and social welfare.
Erstwhile communist economies like the Soviet Union and China
eventually moved toward more capitalistic economies
characterized by profit-maximizing private enterprises. However,
the recent collapse of the mortgage and financial industries in the
United States demonstrates that capitalism also has its flaws and
is not as eﬀective in fostering economic growth and social welfare
as previously presumed. Unlike theories in the natural sciences,
social science theories are rarely perfect, which provides
numerous opportunities for researchers to improve those theories
or build their own alternative theories.
Conducting scientific research, therefore, requires two sets of
skills – theoretical and methodological – needed to operate in the
theoretical and empirical levels respectively. Methodological skills
("know-how") are relatively standard, invariant across disciplines,
and easily acquired through doctoral programs. However,
theoretical skills ("know-what") is considerably harder to master,

Scientific method
In the preceding sections, we described science as knowledge
acquired through a scientific method. So what exactly is the
“scientific method”? Scientific method refers to a standardized
set of techniques for building scientific knowledge, such as how
to make valid observations, how to interpret results, and how to
generalize those results. The scientific method allows researchers
to independently and impartially test preexisting theories and
prior findings, and subject them to open debate, modifications, or
enhancements. The scientific method must satisfy four key
characteristics:
1. Logical: Scientific inferences must be based on logical
principles of reasoning.
2. Confirmable: Inferences derived must match with observed
evidence.

requires years of observation and reflection, and are tacit skills
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3. Repeatable: Other scientists should be able to independently

Types of scientific research

replicate or repeat a scientific study and obtain similar, if not
identical, results.

Depending on the purpose of research, scientific research
projects can be grouped into three types: exploratory, descriptive,

4. Scrutinizable: The procedures used and the inferences

and explanatory. Exploratory research is often conducted in new

derived must withstand critical scrutiny (peer review) by other

areas of inquiry, where the goals of the research are: (1) to scope

scientists.

out the magnitude or extent of a particular phenomenon,

Any branch of inquiry that does not allow the scientific method to
test its basic laws or theories cannot be called “science.” For
instance, theology (the study of religion) is not science because
theological ideas (such as the presence of God) cannot be tested
by independent observers using a logical, confirmable,
repeatable, and scrutinizable. Similarly, arts, music, literature,
humanities, and law are also not considered science, even though
they are creative and worthwhile endeavors in their own right.

problem, or behavior, (2) to generate some initial ideas (or
“hunches”) about that phenomenon, or (3) to test the feasibility of
undertaking a more extensive study regarding that phenomenon.
For instance, if the citizens of a country generally dissatisfied
with governmental policies regarding during an economic
recession, exploratory research may be directed at measuring the
extent of citizens’ dissatisfaction, understanding how such
dissatisfaction is manifested, such as the frequency of public
protests, and the presumed causes of such dissatisfaction, such

The scientific method, as applied to social sciences, includes a

as ineﬀective government policies in dealing with inflation,

variety of research approaches, tools, and techniques, for

interest rates, unemployment, or higher taxes. Such research may

collecting and analyzing qualitative or quantitative data. These

include examination of publicly reported figures, such as

methods include laboratory experiments, field surveys, case

estimates of economic indicators, such as gross domestic

research, ethnographic research, action research, and so forth.

product (GDP), unemployment, and consumer price index, as

Much of this book is devoted to learning about these diﬀerent

archived by third-party sources, obtained through interviews of

methods. However, recognize that the scientific method operates

experts, eminent economists, or key government oﬃcials, and/or

primarily at the empirical level of research, i.e., how to make

derived from studying historical examples of dealing with similar

observations and analyze these observations. Very little of this

problems. This research may not lead to a very accurate

method is directly pertinent to the theoretical level, which is really

understanding of the target problem, but may be worthwhile in

the more challenging part of scientific research.
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scoping out the nature and extent of the problem and serve as a
useful precursor to more in-depth research.
Descriptive research
Descriptive research is directed at making careful observations
and detailed documentation of a phenomenon of interest. These
observations must be based on the scientific method (i.e., must
be replicable, precise, etc.), and therefore, are more reliable than
observations by untrained people. Examples of descriptive
research are tabulation of demographic statistics by the United
States Census Bureau or employment statistics by the of Labor,
who use the same or similar instruments for estimating
employment by sector or population growth by ethnicity over
multiple employment surveys or censuses.

Explanatory research
Explanatory research seeks explanations of observed
phenomena, problems, or behaviors. While descriptive research
examines the what, where, and when of a phenomenon,
explanatory research seeks answers to why and how types of
questions. It attempts to “connect the dots” in research, by
identifying causal factors and outcomes of the target
phenomenon. Examples include understanding the reasons
behind adolescent crime or gang violence, with the goal of
prescribing strategies to overcome such societal ailments. Most
academic or doctoral research belongs to the explanation
category, though some amount of exploratory and/or descriptive
research may also be needed during initial phases of academic
research. Seeking explanations for observed events requires

If any changes are made to the measuring instruments, estimates

strong theoretical and interpretation skills, along with intuition,

are provided with and without the changed instrumentation to

insights, and personal experience. Those who can do it well are

allow the readers to make a fair before-and-after comparison

also the most prized scientists in their disciplines.

regarding population or employment trends. Other descriptive
research may include chronicling ethnographic reports of gang
activities among adolescent youth in urban populations, the
persistence or evolution of religious, cultural, or ethnic practices
in select communities, and the role of technologies such as
Twitter and instant messaging in the spread of democracy
movements in Middle Eastern countries.

History of scientific thought
Before closing this chapter, it may be interesting to go back in
history and see how science has evolved over time and identify
the key scientific minds in this evolution. Although instances of
scientific progress have been documented over many centuries,
the terms “science,” “scientists,” and the “scientific method”
were coined only in the 19th century. Prior to this time, science
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was viewed as a part of philosophy, and coexisted with other

reasoning activity), and developed empiricism as an influential

branches of philosophy such as logic, metaphysics, ethics, and

branch of philosophy. Bacon’s works led to the popularization

aesthetics, although the boundaries between some of these

of inductive methods of scientific inquiry, the development of the

branches were blurred.

“scientific method” (originally called the “Baconian method”),

In the earliest days of human inquiry, knowledge was usually
recognized in terms of theological precepts based on faith. This
was challenged by Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle,

consisting of systematic observation, measurement, and
experimentation, and may have even sowed the seeds of atheism
or the rejection of theological precepts as “unobservable.”

and Socrates during the 3rd century BC, who suggested that the

Empiricism continued to clash with rationalism throughout the

fundamental nature of being and the world can be understood

Middle Ages, as philosophers sought the most eﬀective way of

more accurately through a process of systematic logical

gaining valid knowledge. French philosopher Rene Descartes

reasoning called rationalism. In particular, Aristotle’s classic work

sided with the rationalists, while British philosophers John Locke

Metaphysics (literally meaning “beyond physical [existence]”)

and David Hume sided with the empiricists. Other scientists, such

separated theology (the study of Gods) from ontology (the study

as Galileo Galilei and Sir Issac Newton, attempted to fuse the two

of being and existence) and universal science (the study of first

ideas into natural philosophy (the philosophy of nature), to focus

principles, upon which logic is based). Rationalism (not to be

specifically on understanding nature and the physical universe,

confused with “rationality”) views reason as the source of

which is considered to be the precursor of the natural sciences.

knowledge or justification, and suggests that the criterion of truth

Galileo (1564-1642) was perhaps the first to state that the laws of

is not sensory but rather intellectual and deductive, often derived

nature are mathematical, and contributed to the field of

from a set of first principles or axioms (such as Aristotle’s “law of

astronomy through an innovative combination of experimentation

non-contradiction”).

and mathematics.

The next major shift in scientific thought occurred during the 16th

In the 18th century, German philosopher Immanuel Kant sought

century, when British philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626)

to resolve the dispute between empiricism and rationalism in his

suggested that knowledge can only be derived from observations

book Critique of Pure Reason, by arguing that experience is

in the real world. Based on this premise, Bacon emphasized

purely subjective and processing them using pure reason without

knowledge acquisition as an empirical activity (rather than as a

first delving into the subjective nature of experiences will lead to
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theoretical illusions. Kant’s ideas led to the development of

Lazarsfield who pioneered large-scale survey research and

German idealism, which inspired later development of interpretive

statistical techniques for analyzing survey data, acknowledged

techniques such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, and critical

potential problems of observer bias and structural limitations in

social theory.

positivist inquiry. In response, antipositivists emphasized that

At about the same time, French philosopher Auguste Comte
(1798–1857), founder of the discipline of sociology, attempted to
blend rationalism and empiricism in a new doctrine called
positivism. He suggested that theory and observations have
circular dependence on each other. While theories may be

social actions must be studied though interpretive means based
upon an understanding the meaning and purpose that individuals
attach to their personal actions, which inspired Georg Simmel’s
work on symbolic interactionism, Max Weber’s work on ideal
types, and Edmund Husserl’s work on phenomenology.

created via reasoning, they are only authentic if they can be

In the mid-to-late 20th century, both positivist and antipositivist

verified through observations. The emphasis on verification

schools of thought were subjected to criticisms and

started the separation of modern science from philosophy and

modifications. British philosopher Sir Karl Popper suggested that

metaphysics and further development of the “scientific method”

human knowledge is based not on unchallengeable, rock solid

as the primary means of validating scientific claims. Comte’s

foundations, but rather on a set of tentative conjectures that can

ideas were expanded by Emile Durkheim in his development of

never be proven conclusively, but only disproven. Empirical

sociological positivism (positivism as a foundation for social

evidence is the basis for disproving these conjectures or

research) and Ludwig Wittgenstein in logical positivism.

“theories.” This metatheoretical stance, called postpositivism (or

In the early 20th century, strong accounts of positivism were
rejected by interpretive sociologists (antipositivists) belonging to
the German idealism school of thought. Positivism was typically
equated with quantitative research methods such as experiments
and surveys and without any explicit philosophical commitments,
while antipositivism employed qualitative methods such as
unstructured interviews and participant observation. Even
practitioners of positivism, such as American sociologist Paul

postempiricism), amends positivism by suggesting that it is
impossible to verify the truth although it is possible to reject false
beliefs, though it retains the positivist notion of an objective truth
and its emphasis on the scientific method. Likewise,
antipositivists have also been criticized for trying only to
understand society but not critiquing and changing society for the
better. The roots of this thought lie in Das Capital, written by
German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which
critiqued capitalistic societies as being social inequitable and
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ineﬃcient, and recommended resolving this inequity through

This is a skill that takes many years to develop, is not something

class conflict and proletarian revolutions. Marxism inspired social

that is taught in graduate or doctoral programs or acquired in

revolutions in countries such as Germany, Italy, Russia, and

industry training, and is by far the biggest deficit amongst Ph.D.

China, but generally failed to accomplish the social equality that it

students. Some of the mental abstractions needed to think like a

aspired. Critical research (also called critical theory) propounded

researcher include unit of analysis, constructs, hypotheses,

by Max Horkheimer and Jurgen Habermas in the 20th century,

operationalization, theories, models, induction, deduction, and so

retains similar ideas of critiquing resolving social inequality, and

forth, which we will examine in this chapter.

adds that people can and should consciously act to change their
social and economic circumstances, although their ability to do
so is constrained by various forms of social, cultural and political
domination. Critical research attempts to uncover and critique the
restrictive and alienating conditions of the status quo by analyzing
the, conflicts and contradictions in contemporary society, and
seeks to eliminate the causes of alienation and domination (i.e.,
emancipate the oppressed class).

Unit of analysis
One of the first decisions in any social science research is the unit
of analysis of a scientific study. The unit of analysis refers to the
person, collective, or object that is the target of the investigation.
Typical unit of analysis include individuals, groups, organizations,
countries, technologies, objects, and such. For instance, if we are
interested in studying people’s shopping behavior, their learning

Thinking like a researcher

outcomes, or their attitudes to new technologies, then the unit of

Conducting good research requires first retraining your brain to

street gangs or teamwork in organizations, then the unit of

think like a researcher. This requires visualizing the abstract from

analysis is the group. If the goal of research is to understand how

actual observations, mentally “connecting the dots” to identify

firms can improve profitability or make good executive decisions,

hidden concepts and patterns, and synthesizing those patterns

then the unit of analysis is the firm. In this case, even though

into generalizable laws and theories that apply to other contexts

decisions are made by individuals in these firms, these individuals

beyond the domain of the initial observations. Research involves

are presumed to represent their firm’s decision rather than their

constantly moving back and forth from an empirical plane where

personal decisions. If research is directed at understanding

observations are conducted to a theoretical plane where these

diﬀerences in national cultures, then the unit of analysis becomes

observations are abstracted into generalizable laws and theories.

a country. Even inanimate objects can serve as units of analysis.

analysis is the individual. If we want to study characteristics of
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For instance, if a researcher is interested in understanding how to

collect it from. If your unit of analysis is a web page, you should

make web pages more attractive to its users, then the unit of

be collecting data about web pages from actual web pages, and

analysis is a web page (and not users). If we wish to study how

not surveying people about how they use web pages. If your unit

knowledge transfer occurs between two firms, then our unit of

of analysis is the organization, then you should be measuring

analysis becomes the dyad (the combination of firms that is

organizational-level variables such as organizational size,

sending and receiving knowledge).

revenues, hierarchy, or absorptive capacity. This data may come

Understanding the units of analysis can sometimes be fairly
complex. For instance, if we wish to study why certain
neighborhoods have high crime rates, then our unit of analysis
becomes the neighborhood, and not crimes or criminals
committing such crimes. This is because the object of our inquiry
is the neighborhood and not criminals. However, if we wish to
compare diﬀerent types of crimes in diﬀerent neighborhoods,
such as homicide, robbery, and so forth, our unit of analysis
becomes the crime. If we wish to study why criminals engage in
illegal activities, then the unit of analysis becomes the individual
(i.e., the criminal). Like, if we want to study why some innovations
are more successful than others, then our unit of analysis is an
innovation. However, if we wish to study how some organizations
innovate more consistently than others, then the unit of analysis is

from a variety of sources such as financial records or surveys of
Chief Executive Oﬃcers (CEO), who are presumed to be
representing their (rather than themselves). Some variables such
as CEO pay may seem like individual level variables, but in fact, it
can also be an organizational level variable because each has
only one CEO pay at any time. Sometimes, it is possible to collect
data from a lower level of analysis and aggregate that data to a
higher level of analysis. For instance, in order to study teamwork
in organizations, you can survey individual team members in
diﬀerent organizational teams, and average their individual scores
to create a composite team-level score for team-level variables
like cohesion and conflict. We will examine the notion of
“variables” in greater depth in the next section.

Concepts, constructs & variables

the organization. Hence, two related research questions within the
same research study may have two entirely diﬀerent units of

Although research can be exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory,

analysis.

most scientific research tend to be of the explanatory type in that

Understanding the unit of analysis is important because it shapes
what type of data you should collect for your study and who you

they search for potential explanations of observed natural or
social phenomena. Explanations require development of
concepts or generalizable properties or characteristics associated
51

with objects, events, or people. While objects such as a person, a

as a person’s weight, or a combination of a set of related

firm, or a car are not concepts, their specific characteristics or

concepts such as a person’s communication skill, which may

behavior such as a person’s attitude toward immigrants, a firm’s

consist of several underlying concepts such as the person’s

capacity for innovation, and a car’s weight can be viewed as

vocabulary, syntax, and spelling. The former instance (weight) is a

concepts.

unidimensional construct, while the latter (communication skill) is

Knowingly or unknowingly, we use diﬀerent kinds of concepts in
our everyday conversations. Some of these concepts have been
developed over time through our shared language. Sometimes,
we borrow concepts from other disciplines or languages to
explain a phenomenon of interest. For instance, the idea of
gravitation borrowed from physics can be used in business to

a multi-dimensional construct (i.e., it consists of multiple
underlying concepts). The distinction between constructs and
concepts are clearer in multi-dimensional constructs, where the
higher order abstraction is called a construct and the lower order
abstractions are called concepts. However, this distinction tends
to blur in the case of unidimensional constructs.

describe why people tend to “gravitate” to their preferred

Constructs used for scientific research must have precise and

shopping destinations. Likewise, the concept of distance can be

clear definitions that others can use to understand exactly what it

used to explain the degree of social separation between two

means and what it does not mean. For instance, a seemingly

otherwise collocated individuals. Sometimes, we create our own

simple construct such as income may refer to monthly or annual

concepts to describe a unique characteristic not described in

income, before-tax or after-tax income, and personal or family

prior research. For instance, technostress is a new concept

income, and is therefore neither precise nor clear. are two types

referring to the mental stress one may face when asked to learn a

of definitions: dictionary definitions and operational definitions. In

new technology.

the familiar dictionary definition, a construct is often defined in

Concepts may also have progressive levels of abstraction. Some
concepts such as a person’s weight are precise and objective,
while other concepts such as a person’s personality may be more
abstract and diﬃcult to visualize. A construct is an abstract
concept that is specifically chosen (or “created”) to explain a
given phenomenon. A construct may be a simple concept, such

terms of a synonym. For instance, attitude may be defined as a
disposition, a feeling, or an aﬀect, and aﬀect in turn is defined as
an attitude. Such definitions of a circular nature are not
particularly useful in scientific research for elaborating the
meaning and content of that construct. Scientific research
operational definitions that define constructs in terms of how they
will be empirically measured. For instance, the operational
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definition of a construct such as temperature must specify

plane, while variables are operationalized and measured at the

whether we plan to measure temperature in Celsius, Fahrenheit,

empirical (observational) plane. Thinking like a researcher implies

or Kelvin scale. A construct such as income should be defined in

the ability to move back and forth between these two planes.

terms of whether we are interested in monthly or annual income,
before-tax or after-tax income, and personal or family income.
One can imagine that constructs such as learning, personality,
and intelligence can be quite hard to define operationally.

Depending on their intended use, variables may be classified as
independent, dependent, moderating, mediating, or control
variables. Variables that explain other variables are called
independent variables, those that are explained by other variables

A term frequently associated with, and sometimes used

are dependent variables, those that are explained by independent

interchangeably with, a construct is a variable. Etymologically

variables while also explaining dependent variables are mediating

speaking, a variable is a quantity that can vary (e.g., from low to

variables (or intermediate variables), and those that influence the

high, negative to positive, etc.), in contrast to constants that do

relationship between independent and dependent variables are

not vary (i.e., remain constant). However, in scientific research, a

called moderating variables. As an example, if we state that

variable is a measurable representation of an abstract construct.

higher intelligence causes improved learning among students,

As abstract entities, constructs are not directly measurable, and

then intelligence is an independent variable and learning is a

hence, we look for proxy measures called variables. For instance,

dependent variable. There may be other extraneous variables that

a person’s intelligence is often measured as his or her IQ

are not pertinent to explaining a given dependent variable, but

(intelligence quotient) score, which is an index generated from an

may have some impact on the dependent variable. These

analytical and -matching test administered to people. In this case,

variables must be controlled for in a scientific study, and are

intelligence is a construct, and IQ score is a variable that

therefore called control variables.

measures the intelligence construct. Whether IQ scores truly
measures one’s intelligence is anyone’s guess (though many
believe that they do), and depending on whether how well it
measures intelligence, the IQ score may be a good or a poor
measure of the intelligence construct. Scientific research
proceeds along two planes: a theoretical plane and an empirical
plane. Constructs are conceptualized at the theoretical (abstract)

If we believe that intelligence influences (or explains) students’
academic achievement, then a measure of intelligence such as an
IQ score is an independent variable, while a measure of academic
success such as grade point average is a dependent variable. If
we believe that the eﬀect of intelligence on academic
achievement also depends on the eﬀort invested by the student
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in the learning process (i.e., between two equally intelligent

relationships between these constructs. Such patterns of

students, the student who puts is more eﬀort achieves higher

relationships are called propositions. A proposition is a tentative

academic achievement than one who puts in less eﬀort), then

and conjectural relationship between constructs that is stated in a

eﬀort becomes a moderating variable. Incidentally, one may also

declarative form. An example of a proposition is: “An increase in

view eﬀort as an independent variable and intelligence as a

student intelligence causes an increase in their academic

moderating variable. If academic achievement is viewed as an

achievement.” This declarative statement does not have to be

intermediate step to higher earning potential, then earning

true, but must be empirically testable using data, so that we can

potential becomes the dependent variable for the independent

judge whether it is true or false. Propositions are generally derived

variable academic achievement, and academic achievement

based on logic (deduction) or empirical observations (induction).

becomes the mediating variable in the relationship between
intelligence and earning potential. Hence, variable are defined as
an independent, dependent, moderating, or mediating variable
based on their nature of association with each other. The overall
network of relationships between a set of related constructs is
called a nomological network. Thinking like a researcher requires
not only being able to abstract constructs from observations, but
also being able to mentally visualize a nomological network
linking these abstract constructs.

Propositions & hypotheses

Because propositions are associations between abstract
constructs, they cannot be tested directly. Instead, they are
tested indirectly by examining the relationship between
corresponding measures (variables) of those constructs. The
empirical formulation of propositions, stated as relationships
between variables, is called hypotheses. Since IQ scores and
grade point average are operational measures of intelligence and
academic achievement respectively, the above proposition can be
specified in form of the hypothesis: “An increase in students’ IQ
score causes an increase in their grade point average.”
Propositions are specified in the theoretical plane, while

[I]ntelligence, eﬀort, academic achievement, and earning potential

hypotheses are specified in the empirical plane. Hence,

are related to each other in a nomological network. Each of these

hypotheses are empirically testable using observed data, and

relationships is called a proposition. In seeking explanations to a

may be rejected if not supported by empirical observations. Of

given phenomenon or behavior, it is not adequate just to identify

course, the goal of hypothesis testing is to infer whether the

key concepts and constructs underlying the target phenomenon

corresponding proposition is valid.

or behavior. We must also identify and state patterns of
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Hypotheses can be strong or weak. “Students’ IQ scores are

specify a directional relationship that can be evaluated as true or

related to their academic achievement” is an example of a weak

false.

hypothesis, since it indicates neither the directionality of the
hypothesis (i.e., whether the relationship is positive or negative),
nor its causality (i.e., whether intelligence causes academic
achievement or academic achievement causes intelligence). A
stronger hypothesis is “students’ IQ scores are positively related
to their academic achievement”, which indicates the directionality
but not the causality. A still better hypothesis is “students’ IQ
scores have positive eﬀects on their academic achievement”,
which specifies both the directionality and the causality (i.e.,
intelligence causes academic achievement, and not the reverse).
Also note that scientific hypotheses should clearly specify
independent and dependent variables. In the hypothesis,
“students’ IQ scores have positive eﬀects on their academic
achievement,” it is clear that intelligence is the independent
variable (the “cause”) and academic achievement is the
dependent variable (the “eﬀect”). Further, it is also clear that this
hypothesis can be evaluated as either true (if higher intelligence
leads to higher academic achievement) or false (if higher
intelligence has no eﬀect on or leads to lower academic
achievement). Later on in this book, we will examine how to
empirically test such cause-eﬀect relationships. Statements such
as “students are generally intelligent” or “all students can achieve
academic success” are not scientific hypotheses because they

Theories & models
A theory is a set of systematically interrelated constructs and
propositions intended to explain and predict a phenomenon or
behavior of interest, within certain boundary conditions and
assumptions. Essentially, a theory is a systemic collection of
related theoretical propositions. While propositions generally
connect two or three constructs, theories represent a system of
multiple constructs and propositions. Hence, theories can be
substantially more complex and abstract and of a larger scope
than propositions or hypotheses.
I must note here that people not familiar with scientific research
often view a theory as a speculation or the opposite of fact. For
instance, people often say that teachers need to be less
theoretical and more practical or factual in their classroom
teaching. However, practice or fact are not opposites of theory,
but in a scientific sense, are essential components needed to test
the validity of a theory. A good scientific theory should be well
supported using observed facts and should also have practical
value, while a poorly defined theory tends to be lacking in these
dimensions. Famous organizational research Kurt Lewin once
said, “Theory without practice is sterile; practice without theory is

do not specify independent and dependent variables, nor do they
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blind.” Hence, both theory and facts (or practice) are essential for

mathematical models, network models, and path models. Models

scientific research.

can also be descriptive, predictive, or normative. Descriptive

It is important for researchers to understand that theory is not
“truth,” there is nothing sacrosanct about any theory, and theories
should not be accepted just because they were proposed by
someone. In the course of scientific progress, poorer theories are
eventually replaced by better theories with higher explanatory
power. The essential challenge for researchers is to build better
and more comprehensive theories that can explain a target better
than prior theories.

models are frequently used for representing complex systems, for
visualizing variables and relationships in such systems. An
advertising expenditure model may be a descriptive model.
Predictive models (e.g., a regression model) allow forecast of
future events. Weather forecasting models are predictive models.
Normative models are used to guide our activities along
commonly accepted norms or practices. Models may also be
static if it represents the state of a system at one point in time, or
dynamic, if it represents a system’s evolution over time. The

A term often used in conjunction with theory is a model. A model

process of theory or model development may involve inductive

is a representation of all or part of a system that is constructed to

and deductive reasoning. Recall...that deduction is the process of

study that system (e.g., how the system works or what triggers

drawing conclusions about a phenomenon or behavior based on

the system). While a theory tries to explain a phenomenon, a

theoretical or logical reasons and an initial set of premises. As an

model tries to represent a phenomenon. Models are often used

example, if a certain bank enforces a strict code of ethics for its

by decision makers to make important decisions based on a

employees (Premise 1) and Jamie is an employee at that bank

given set of inputs. For instance, marketing managers may use

(Premise 2), then Jamie can be trusted to follow ethical practices

models to how much money to spend on advertising for diﬀerent

(Conclusion). In deduction, the conclusions must be true if the

product lines based on such as prior year’s advertising expenses,

initial premises and reasons are correct.

sales, market growth, and competing products. Likewise, weather
forecasters can use models to predict future weather patterns
based on parameters such as wind speeds, wind direction,
temperature, and humidity. While these models are useful, they
may not necessarily explain advertising expenditure or weather
forecasts. Models may be of diﬀerent kinds, such as

In contrast, induction is the process of drawing conclusions
based on facts or observed evidence. For instance, if a firm spent
a lot of money on a promotional campaign (Observation 1), but
the sales did not increase (Observation 2), then possibly the
promotion campaign was poorly executed (Conclusion). However,
there may be rival explanations for poor sales, such as economic
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recession or the emergence of a competing product or brand or
perhaps a supply chain problem. Inductive conclusions are
therefore only a hypothesis, and may be disproven. Deductive
conclusions generally tend to be stronger than inductive
conclusions, but a deductive conclusion based on an incorrect
premise is also incorrect. [I]nductive and deductive reasoning go
hand in hand in theory and model building. Induction occurs
when we observe a fact and ask, “Why is this happening?” In
answering this question, we advance one or more tentative
explanations (hypotheses). We then use deduction to narrow
down the tentative explanations to the most plausible explanation
based on logic and reasonable premises (based on our
understanding of the phenomenon under study). Researchers
must be able to move back and forth between inductive and
deductive reasoning if they are to post extensions or
modifications to a given model or theory, or built better ones,
which are the essence of scientific research.

The research process

Paradigms of social research
Our design and conduct of research is shaped by our mental
models or frames of references that we use to organize our
reasoning and observations. These mental models or frames
(belief systems) are called paradigms. The word “paradigm” was
popularized by Thomas Kuhn (1962) in his book The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, where he examined the history of the
natural sciences to identify patterns of activities that shape the
progress of science. Similar ideas are applicable to social
sciences as well, where a social reality can be viewed by diﬀerent
people in diﬀerent ways, which may constrain their thinking and
reasoning about the observed phenomenon. For instance,
conservatives and liberals tend to have very diﬀerent perceptions
of the role of government in people’s lives, and hence, have
diﬀerent opinions on how to solve social problems. Conservatives
may believe that lowering taxes is the best way to stimulate a
stagnant economy because it increases people’s disposable
income and spending, which in turn expands business output and
employment. In contrast, liberals may believe that governments

[Earlier], we saw that scientific research is the process of

should invest more directly in job creation programs such as

acquiring scientific knowledge using the scientific method. But

public works and infrastructure projects, which will increase

how is such research conducted? This [section] delves into the

employment and people’s ability to consume and drive the

process of scientific research, and the assumptions and

economy. Likewise, Western societies place greater emphasis on

outcomes of the research process.

individual rights, such as one’s right to privacy, right of free
speech, and right to bear arms. In contrast, Asian societies tend
to balance the rights of individuals against the rights of
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families,organizations, and the government, and therefore tend to

looking at the same problem through a “social lens” may seek out

be more communal and less individualistic in their policies. Such

social deficiencies such as inadequate user training or lack of

diﬀerences in perspective often lead Westerners to criticize Asian

management support, while those seeing it through a “political

governments for being autocratic, while Asians criticize Western

lens” will look for instances of organizational politics that may

societies for being greedy, having high crime rates, and creating a

subvert the technology implementation process. Hence,

“cult of the individual.” Our personal paradigms are like “colored

subconscious paradigms often constrain the concepts that

glasses” that govern how we view the world and how we

researchers attempt to measure, their observations, and their

structure our thoughts about what we see in the world.

subsequent interpretations of a phenomenon. However, given the

Paradigms are often hard to recognize, because they are implicit,
assumed, and taken for granted. However, recognizing these
paradigms is key to making sense of and reconciling diﬀerences
in people’ perceptions of the same social phenomenon. For

complex nature of social phenomenon, it is possible that all of the
above paradigms are partially correct, and that a fuller
understanding of the problem may require an understanding and
application of multiple paradigms.

instance, why do liberals believe that the best way to improve

Two popular paradigms today among social science researchers

secondary education is to hire more teachers, but conservatives

are positivism and post-positivism. Positivism, based on the

believe that privatizing education (using such means as school

works of French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798- 1857), was

vouchers) are more eﬀective in achieving the same goal?

the dominant scientific paradigm until the mid-20th century. It

Because conservatives place more faith in competitive markets

holds that science or knowledge creation should be restricted to

(i.e., in free competition between schools competing for

what can be observed and measured. Positivism tends to rely

education dollars), while liberals believe more in labor (i.e., in

exclusively on theories that can be directly tested. Though

having more teachers and schools). Likewise, in social science

positivism was originally an attempt to separate scientific inquiry

research, if one were to understand why a certain technology was

from religion (where the precepts could not be objectively

successfully implemented in one organization but failed miserably

observed), positivism led to empiricism or a blind faith in

in another, a researcher looking at the world through a “rational

observed data and a rejection of any attempt to extend or reason

lens” will look for rational explanations of the problem such as

beyond observable facts. Since human thoughts and emotions

inadequate technology or poor fit between technology and the

could not be directly measured, there were not considered to be

task context where it is being utilized, while another research

legitimate topics for scientific research. Frustrations with the
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strictly empirical nature of positivist philosophy led to the

behaviors, and believe that the best way to study such a world is

development of post-positivism (or postmodernism) during the

using objective approach (epistemology) that is independent of

mid-late 20th century. Post-positivism argues that one can make

the person conducting the observation or interpretation, such as

reasonable inferences about a phenomenon by combining

by using standardized data collection tools like surveys, then they

empirical observations with logical reasoning. Post-positivists

are adopting a paradigm of functionalism. However, if they believe

view science as not certain but probabilistic (i.e., based on many

that the best way to study social order is though the subjective

contingencies), and often seek to explore these contingencies to

interpretation of participants involved, such as by interviewing

understand social reality better. The post-positivist camp has

diﬀerent participants and reconciling diﬀerences among their

further fragmented into subjectivists, who view the world as a

responses using their own subjective perspectives, then they are

subjective construction of our subjective minds rather than as an

employing an interpretivism paradigm. If researchers believe that

objective reality, and critical realists, who believe that there is an

the world consists of radical change and seek to understand or

external reality that is independent of a person’s thinking but we

enact change using an objectivist approach, then they are

can never know such reality with any degree of certainty.

employing a radical structuralism paradigm. If they wish to

Burrell and Morgan (1979), in their seminal book Sociological
Paradigms and Organizational Analysis, suggested that the way
social science researchers view and study social phenomena is

understand social change using the subjective perspectives of
the participants involved, then they are following a radical
humanism paradigm.

shaped by two fundamental sets of philosophical assumptions:

To date, the majority of social science research has emulated the

ontology and epistemology. Ontology refers to our assumptions

natural sciences, and followed the functionalist paradigm.

about how we see the world, e.g., does the world consist mostly

Functionalists believe that social order or patterns can be

of social order or constant change. Epistemology refers to our

understood in terms of their functional components, and therefore

assumptions about the best way to study the world, e.g., should

attempt to break down a problem into small components and

we use an objective or subjective approach to study social reality.

studying one or more components in detail using objectivist

Using these two sets of assumptions, we can categorize social

techniques such as surveys and experimental research. However,

science research as belonging to one of four categories. If

with the emergence of post-positivist thinking, a small but

researchers view the world as consisting mostly of social order

growing number of social science researchers are attempting to

(ontology) and hence seek to study patterns of ordered events or

understand social order using subjectivist techniques such as
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interviews and ethnographic studies. Radical humanism and

phase, we observe a natural or social phenomenon, event, or

radical structuralism continues to represent a negligible

behavior that interests us. In the rationalization phase, we try to

proportion of social science research, because scientists are

make sense of or the observed phenomenon, event, or behavior

primarily concerned with understanding generalizable patterns of

by logically connecting the diﬀerent pieces of the puzzle that we

behavior, events, or phenomena, rather than idiosyncratic or

observe, which in some cases, may lead to the construction of a

changing events. Nevertheless, if you wish to study social

theory. Finally, in the validation phase, we test our theories using

change, such as why democratic movements are increasingly

a scientific method through a process of data collection and

emerging in Middle Eastern countries, or why this movement was

analysis, and in doing so, possibly modify or extend our initial

successful in Tunisia, took a longer path to success in Libya, and

theory. However, research designs vary based on whether the

is still not successful in Syria, then perhaps radical humanism is

researcher starts at observation and attempts to rationalize the

the right approach for such a study. Social and organizational

observations (inductive research), or whether the researcher starts

phenomena generally consists elements of both order and

at an ex ante rationalization or a theory and attempts to validate

change. For instance, organizational success depends on

the theory (deductive research). Hence, the observation-

formalized business processes, work procedures, and job

rationalization-validation cycle is very similar to the induction-

responsibilities, while being simultaneously constrained by a

deduction cycle of research.

constantly changing mix of competitors, competing products,
suppliers, and customer base in the business environment.
Hence, a holistic and more complete understanding of social
phenomena such as why are some organizations more successful
than others, require an appreciation and application of a multiparadigmatic approach to research.

Overview of the research process
So how do our mental paradigms shape social science research?
At its core, all scientific research is an iterative process of
observation, rationalization, and validation. In the observation

The first phase of research is exploration. This phase includes
exploring and selecting research questions for further
investigation, examining the published literature in the area of
inquiry to understand the current state of knowledge in that area,
and identifying theories that may help answer the research
questions of interest.
The first step in the exploration phase is identifying one or more
research questions dealing with a specific behavior, event, or
phenomena of interest. Research questions are specific questions
about a behavior, event, or phenomena of interest that you wish
60

to seek answers for in your research. Examples include what

manually browse through each article, or at least its abstract

factors motivate consumers to purchase goods and services

section, to determine the suitability of that article for a detailed

online without knowing the vendors of these goods or services,

review. Literature reviews should be reasonably complete, and

how can we make high school students more creative, and why

not restricted to a few journals, a few years, or a specific

do some people commit terrorist acts. Research questions can

methodology. Reviewed articles may be summarized in the form

delve into issues of what, why, how, when, and so forth. More

of tables, and can be further structured using organizing

interesting research questions are those that appeal to a broader

frameworks such as a concept matrix. A well-conducted literature

population (e.g., “how can firms innovate” is a more interesting

review should indicate whether the initial research questions have

research question than “how can Chinese firms innovate in the

already been addressed in the literature (which would obviate the

service-sector”), address real and complex problems (in contrast

need to study them again), whether there are newer or more

to hypothetical or “toy” problems), and where the answers are not

interesting research questions available, and whether the original

obvious. Narrowly focused research questions (often with a binary

research questions should be modified or changed in light of

yes/no answer) tend to be less useful and less interesting and

findings of the literature review. The review can also provide some

less suited to capturing the subtle nuances of social phenomena.

intuitions or potential answers to the questions of interest and/or

Uninteresting research questions generally lead to uninteresting

help identify theories that have previously been used to address

and unpublishable research findings.

similar questions.

The next step is to conduct a literature review of the domain of

Since functionalist (deductive) research involves theory-testing,

interest. The purpose of a literature review is three-fold: (1) to

the third step is to identify one or more theories can help address

survey the current state of knowledge in the area of inquiry, (2) to

the desired research questions. While the literature review may

identify key authors, articles, theories, and findings in that area,

uncover a wide range of concepts or constructs potentially

and (3) to identify gaps in knowledge in that research area.

related to the phenomenon of interest, a theory will help identify

Literature review is commonly done today using computerized

which of these constructs is logically relevant to the target

keyword searches in online databases. Keywords can be

phenomenon and how. Forgoing theories may result in measuring

combined using “and” and “or” operations to narrow down or

a wide range of less relevant, marginally relevant, or irrelevant

expand the search results. Once a shortlist of relevant articles is

constructs, while also minimizing the chances of obtaining results

generated from the keyword search, the researcher must then

that are meaningful and not by pure chance. In functionalist
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research, theories can be used as the logical basis for postulating

desired construct will be measured (e.g., how many items, what

hypotheses for empirical testing. Obviously, not all theories are

items, and so forth). This can easily be a long and laborious

well-suited for studying all social phenomena. Theories must be

process, with multiple rounds of pretests and modifications

carefully selected based on their fit with the target problem and

before the newly designed instrument can be accepted as

the extent to which their assumptions are consistent with that of

“scientifically valid.” We will discuss operationalization of

the target problem.

constructs in a future chapter on measurement.

The next phase in the research process is research design. This

Simultaneously with operationalization, the researcher must also

process is concerned with creating a blueprint of the activities to

decide what research method they wish to employ for collecting

take in order to satisfactorily answer the research questions

data to address their research questions of interest. Such

identified in the exploration phase. This includes selecting a

methods may include quantitative methods such as experiments

research method, operationalizing constructs of interest, and

or survey research or qualitative methods such as case research

devising an appropriate sampling strategy. Operationalization is

or action research, or possibly a combination of both. If an

the process of designing precise measures for abstract

experiment is desired, then what is the experimental design? If

theoretical constructs. This is a major problem in social science

survey, do you plan a mail survey, telephone survey, web survey,

research, given that many of the constructs, such as prejudice,

or a combination? For complex, uncertain, and multifaceted

alienation, and liberalism are hard to define, let alone measure

social phenomena, multi-method approaches may be more

accurately. Operationalization starts with specifying an

suitable, which may help leverage the unique strengths of each

“operational definition” (or “conceptualization”) of the constructs

research method and generate insights that may not be obtained

of interest. Next, the researcher can search the literature to see if

using a single method.

there are existing prevalidated measures matching their
operational definition that can be used directly or modified to
measure their constructs of interest. If such measures are not
available or if existing measures are poor or reflect a diﬀerent
conceptualization than that intended by the researcher, new
instruments may have to be designed for measuring those
constructs. This means specifying exactly how exactly the

Researchers must also carefully choose the target population
from which they wish to collect data, and a sampling strategy to
select a sample from that population. For instance, should they
survey individuals or firms or workgroups within firms? What
types of individuals or firms they wish to target? Sampling
strategy is closely related to the unit of analysis in a research
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problem. While selecting a sample, reasonable care should be

Pilot testing is an often overlooked but extremely important part

taken to avoid a biased sample (e.g., sample based on

of the research process. It helps detect potential problems in your

convenience) that may generate biased observations.

research design and/or instrumentation (e.g., whether the

At this stage, it is often a good idea to write a research proposal
detailing all of the decisions made in the preceding stages of the
research process and the rationale behind each decision. This
multi-part proposal should address what research questions you
wish to study and why, the prior state of knowledge in this area,
theories you wish to employ along with hypotheses to be tested,
how to measure constructs, what research method to be
employed and why, and desired sampling strategy. Funding

questions asked is intelligible to the targeted sample), and to
ensure that the measurement instruments used in the study are
reliable and valid measures of the constructs of interest. The pilot
sample is usually a small subset of the target population. After a
successful pilot testing, the researcher may then proceed with
data collection using the sampled population. The data collected
may be quantitative or qualitative, depending on the research
method employed.

agencies typically require such a proposal in order to select the

Following data collection, the data is analyzed and interpreted for

best proposals for funding. Even if funding is not sought for a

the purpose of drawing conclusions regarding the research

research project, a proposal may serve as a useful vehicle for

questions of interest. Depending on the type of data collected

seeking feedback from other researchers and identifying potential

(quantitative or qualitative), data analysis may be quantitative

problems with the research project (e.g., whether some important

(e.g., employ statistical techniques such as regression or

constructs were missing from the study) before starting data

structural equation modeling) or qualitative (e.g., coding or

collection. This initial feedback is invaluable because it is often

content analysis).

too late to correct critical problems after data is collected in a
research study.

The final phase of research involves preparing the final research
report documenting the entire research process and its findings in

Having decided who to study (subjects), what to measure

the form of a research paper, dissertation, or monograph. This

(concepts), and how to collect data (research method), the

report should outline in detail all the choices made during the

researcher is now ready to proceed to the research execution

research process (e.g., theory used, constructs selected,

phase. This includes pilot testing the measurement instruments,

measures used, research methods, sampling, etc.) and why, as

data collection, and data analysis.

well as the outcomes of each phase of the research process. The
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research process must be described in suﬃcient detail so as to

certain (and be able to convince others) that the research

allow other researchers to replicate your study, test the findings,

questions they seek to answer in fact deal with real problems

or assess whether the inferences derived are scientifically

(and not hypothetical problems) that aﬀect a substantial portion of

acceptable. Of course, having a ready research proposal will

a population and has not been adequately addressed in prior

greatly simplify and quicken the process of writing the finished

research.

report. Note that research is of no value unless the research
process and outcomes are documented for future generations;
such documentation is essential for the incremental progress of
science.

Common mistakes in research

Pursuing research fads: Another common mistake is pursuing
“popular” topics with limited shelf life. A typical example is
studying technologies or practices that are popular today.
Because research takes several years to complete and publish, it
is possible that popular interest in these fads may die down by
the time the research is completed and submitted for publication.

The research process is fraught with problems and pitfalls, and

A better strategy may be to study “timeless” topics that have

novice researchers often find, after investing substantial amounts

always persisted through the years.

of time and eﬀort into a research project, that their research
questions were not suﬃciently answered, or that the findings

Unresearchable problems: Some research problems may not be

were not interesting enough, or that the research was not of

answered adequately based on observed evidence alone, or

“acceptable” scientific quality. Such problems typically result in

using currently accepted methods and procedures. Such

research papers being rejected by journals. Some of the more

problems are best avoided. However, some unresearchable,

frequent mistakes are described below.

ambiguously defined problems may be modified or fine tuned into
well-defined and useful researchable problems.

Insuﬃciently motivated research questions. Often times, we
choose our “pet” problems that are interesting to us but not to

Favored research methods: Many researchers have a tendency

the scientific community at large, i.e., it does not generate new

to recast a researchproblem so that it is amenable to their favorite

knowledge or insight about the phenomenon being investigated.

research method (e.g., survey research). This is an unfortunate

Because the research process involves a significant investment of

trend. Research methods should be chosen to best fit a research

time and eﬀort on the researcher’s part, the researcher must be

problem, and not the other way around.
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Blind data mining: Some researchers have the tendency to

those constructs) that collectively presents a logical, systematic,

collect data first (using instruments that are already available),

and coherent explanation of a phenomenon of interest within

and then figure out what to do with it. Note that data collection is

some assumptions and boundary conditions (Bacharach 1989).

only one step in a long and elaborate process of planning,
designing, and executing research. In fact, a series of other
activities are needed in a research process prior to data
collection. If researchers jump into data collection without such
elaborate planning, the data collected will likely be irrelevant,
imperfect, or useless, and their data collection eﬀorts may be
entirely wasted. An abundance of data cannot make up for
deficits in research planning and design, and particularly, for the
lack of interesting research questions.

Theories should explain why things happen, rather than just
describe or predict. Note that it is possible to predict events or
behaviors using a set of predictors, without necessarily explaining
why such events are taking place. For instance, market analysts
predict fluctuations in the stock market based on market
announcements, earnings reports of major companies, and new
data from the Federal Reserve and other agencies, based on
previously observed correlations. Prediction requires only
correlations. In contrast, explanations require causations, or

Theories in scientific research

understanding of cause-eﬀect relationships. Establishing

As we know from previous [sections], science is knowledge

constructs, (2) temporal precedence (the cause must precede the

represented as a collection of “theories” derived using the

eﬀect in time), and (3) rejection of alternative hypotheses (through

scientific method. In this chapter, we will examine what is a

testing). Scientific theories are diﬀerent from theological,

theory, why do we need theories in research, what are the

philosophical, or other explanations in that scientific theories can

building blocks of a theory, how to evaluate theories, how can we

be empirically tested using scientific methods.

apply theories in research, and also presents illustrative examples
of five theories frequently used in social science research.
Theories
Theories are explanations of a natural or social behavior, event, or
phenomenon. More formally, a scientific theory is a system of
constructs (concepts) and propositions (relationships between

causation requires three conditions: (1) correlations between two

Explanations can be idiographic or nomothetic. Idiographic
explanations are those that explain a single situation or event in
idiosyncratic detail. For example, you did poorly on an exam
because: (1) you forgot that you had an exam on that day, (2) you
arrived late to the exam due to a traﬃc jam, (3) you panicked
midway through the exam, (4) you had to work late the previous
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evening and could not study for the exam, or even (5) your dog

operate at the empirical or observational level, while theories

ate your text book. The explanations may be detailed, accurate,

operate at a conceptual level and are based on logic rather than

and valid, but they may not apply to other similar situations, even

observations.

involving the same person, and are hence not generalizable. In
contrast, 1 Bacharach, S. B. (1989). “Organizational Theories:
Some Criteria for Evaluation,” Academy of Management Review
(14:4), 496-515.

There are many benefits to using theories in research. First,
theories provide the underlying logic of the occurrence of natural
or social phenomenon by explaining what are the key drivers and
key outcomes of the target phenomenon and why, and what

Nomothetic explanations seek to explain a class of situations or

underlying processes are responsible driving that phenomenon.

events rather than a specific situation or event. For example,

Second, they aid in sense-making by helping us synthesize prior

students who do poorly in exams do so because they did not

empirical findings within a theoretical framework and reconcile

spend adequate time preparing for exams or that they suﬀer from

contradictory findings by discovering contingent factors

nervousness, attention deficit, or some other medical disorder.

influencing the relationship between two constructs in diﬀerent

Because nomothetic explanations are designed to be

studies. Third, theories provide guidance for future research by

generalizable across situations, events, or people, they tend to be

helping identify constructs and relationships that are worthy of

less precise, less complete, and less detailed. However, they

further research. Fourth, theories can contribute to cumulative

explain economically, using only a few explanatory variables.

knowledge building by bridging gaps between other theories and

Because theories are also intended to serve as generalized

by causing existing theories to be reevaluated in a new light.

explanations for patterns of events, behaviors, or phenomena,

However, theories can also have their own share of limitations. As

theoretical explanations are generally nomothetic in nature. While

simplified explanations of reality, theories may not always provide

understanding theories, it is also important to understand what

adequate explanations of the phenomenon of interest based on a

theory is not. Theory is not data, facts, typologies, taxonomies, or

limited set of constructs and relationships. Theories are designed

empirical findings. A collection of facts is not a theory, just as a

to be simple and parsimonious explanations, while reality may be

pile of stones is not a house. Likewise, a collection of constructs

significantly more complex. Furthermore, theories may impose

(e.g., a typology of constructs) is not a theory, because theories

blinders or limit researchers’ “range of vision,” causing them to

must go well beyond constructs to include propositions,

miss out on important concepts that are not defined by the

explanations, and boundary conditions. Data, facts, and findings

theory.
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Building blocks of theory

exactly how the construct will be measured and at what level of
analysis (individual, group, organizational, etc.). Measurable

David Whetten (1989) suggests that there are four building blocks

representations of abstract constructs are called variables. For

of a theory: constructs, propositions, logic, and boundary

instance, intelligence quotient (IQ score) is a variable that is

conditions/assumptions. Constructs capture the “what” of

purported to measure an abstract construct called intelligence.

theories (i.e., what concepts are important for explaining a

As noted earlier, scientific research proceeds along two planes: a

phenomenon), propositions capture the “how” (i.e., how are these

theoretical plane and an empirical plane. Constructs are

concepts related to each other), logic represents the “why” (i.e.,

conceptualized at the theoretical plane, while variables are

why are these concepts related), and boundary conditions/

operationalized and measured at the empirical (observational)

assumptions examines the “who, when, and where” (i.e., under

plane.

what circumstances will these concepts and relationships work).
Though constructs and propositions were previously
discussed…,we describe them again here for the sake of
completeness.

Propositions are associations postulated between constructs
based on deductive logic. Propositions are stated in declarative
form and should ideally indicate a cause-eﬀect relationship (e.g.,
if X occurs, then Y will follow). Note that propositions may be

Constructs are abstract concepts specified at a high level of

conjectural but MUST be testable, and should be rejected if they

abstraction that are chosen specifically to explain the

are not supported by empirical observations. However, like

phenomenon of interest. Recall that constructs may be

constructs, propositions are stated at the theoretical level, and

unidimensional (i.e., embody a single concept), such as weight or

they can only be tested by examining the corresponding

age, or multi-dimensional (i.e., embody multiple underlying

relationship between measurable variables of those constructs.

concepts), such as personality or culture. While some constructs,

The empirical formulation of propositions, stated as relationships

such as age, education, and firm size, are easy to understand,

between variables, is called hypotheses.

others, such as creativity, prejudice, and organizational agility,
may be more complex and abstruse, and still others such as
trust, attitude, and learning, may represent temporal tendencies
rather than steady states. Nevertheless, all constructs must have
clear and unambiguous operational definition that should specify

The third building block of a theory is the logic that provides the
basis for justifying the propositions as postulated. Logic acts like
a “glue” that connects the theoretical constructs and provides
meaning and relevance to the relationships between these
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constructs. Logic also represents the “explanation” that lies at the

implicit assumptions clearly, which leads to frequent

core of a theory. Without logic, propositions will be ad hoc,

misapplications of theories to problem situations in research.

arbitrary, and meaningless, and cannot be tied into a cohesive
“system of propositions” that is the heart of any theory.

Attributes of a good theory

Finally, all theories are constrained by assumptions about values,

Theories are simplified and often partial explanations of complex

time, and space, and boundary conditions that govern where the

social reality. As such, there can be good explanations or poor

theory can be applied and where it cannot be applied. For

explanations, and consequently, there can be good theories or

example, many economic theories assume that human beings are

poor theories. How can we evaluate the “goodness” of a given

rational (or boundedly rational) and employ utility maximization

theory? Diﬀerent criteria have been proposed by diﬀerent

based on cost and benefit expectations as a way of understand

researchers, the more important of which are listed below:

human behavior. In contrast, political science theories assume
that people are more political than rational, and try to position
themselves in their professional or personal environment in a way
that maximizes their power and control over others. Given the
nature of their underlying assumptions, economic and political
theories are not directly comparable, and researchers should not
use economic theories if their objective is to understand the
power structure or its evolution in a organization. Likewise,

• Logical consistency: Are the theoretical constructs,
propositions, boundary conditions, and assumptions logically
consistent with each other? If some of these “building blocks”
of a theory are inconsistent with each other (e.g., a theory
assumes rationality, but some constructs represent non-rational
concepts), then the theory is a poor theory.
• Explanatory power: How much does a given theory explain (or

theories may have implicit cultural assumptions (e.g., whether

predict) reality? Good theories obviously explain the target

they apply to individualistic or collective cultures), temporal

phenomenon better than rival theories, as often measured by

assumptions (e.g., whether they apply to early stages or later

variance explained (R-square) value in regression equations.

stages of human behavior), and spatial assumptions (e.g.,
whether they apply to certain localities but not to others). If a

• Falsifiability: British philosopher Karl Popper stated in the

theory is to be properly used or tested, all of its implicit

1940’s that for theories to be valid, they must be falsifiable.

assumptions that form the boundaries of that theory must be

Falsifiability ensures that the theory is potentially disprovable, if

properly understood. Unfortunately, theorists rarely state their

empirical data does not match with theoretical propositions,
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which allows for their empirical testing by researchers. In other

degrees of freedom, which allow them to be more easily

words, theories cannot be theories unless they can be

generalized to other contexts, settings, and populations.

empirically testable. Tautological statements, such as “a day
with high temperatures is a hot day” are not empirically testable
because a hot day is defined (and measured) as a day with high
temperatures, and hence, such statements cannot be viewed as
a theoretical proposition. Falsifiability requires presence of rival
explanations it ensures that the constructs are adequately
measurable, and so forth. However, note that saying that a
theory is falsifiable is not the same as saying that a theory
should be falsified. If a theory is indeed falsified based on
empirical evidence, then it was probably a poor theory to begin
with!
• Parsimony: Parsimony examines how much of a phenomenon

Approaches to theorizing
How do researchers build theories? Steinfeld and Fulk (1990)
recommend four such approaches. The first approach is to build
theories inductively based on observed patterns of events or
behaviors. Such approach is often called “grounded theory
building”, because the theory is grounded in empirical
observations. This technique is heavily dependent on the
observational and interpretive abilities of the researcher, and the
resulting theory may be subjective and non-confirmable.
Furthermore, observing certain patterns of events will not
necessarily make a theory, unless the researcher is able to

is explained with how few variables. The concept is attributed to

provide consistent explanations for the observed patterns. We will

14th century English logician Father William of Ockham (and

discuss the grounded theory approach in a later chapter on

hence called “Ockham’s razor” or “Occam’s razor), which states

qualitative research.

that among competing explanations that suﬃciently explain the
observed evidence, the simplest theory (i.e., one that uses the
smallest number of variables or makes the fewest assumptions)
is the best. Explanation of a complex social phenomenon can
always be increased by adding more and more constructs.
However, such approach defeats the purpose of having a
theory, which are intended to be “simplified” and generalizable
explanations of reality. Parsimony relates to the degrees of
freedom in a given theory. Parsimonious theories have higher

The second approach to theory building is to conduct a bottomup conceptual analysis to identify diﬀerent sets of predictors
relevant to the phenomenon of interest using a predefined
framework. One such framework may be a simple input-processoutput framework, where the researcher may look for diﬀerent
categories of inputs, such as individual, organizational, and/or
technological factors potentially related to the phenomenon of
interest (the output), and describe the underlying processes that
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link these factors to the target phenomenon. This is also an

Examples of social science theories

inductive approach that relies heavily on the inductive abilities of
the researcher, and interpretation may be biased by researcher’s

In this section, we present brief overviews of a few illustrative

prior knowledge of the phenomenon being studied.

theories from diﬀerent social science disciplines. These theories

The third approach to theorizing is to extend or modify existing
theories to explain a new context, such as by extending theories
of individual learning to explain organizational learning. While
making such an extension, certain concepts, propositions, and/or
boundary conditions of the old theory may be retained and others
modified to fit the new context. This deductive approach
leverages the rich inventory of social science theories developed
by prior theoreticians, and is an eﬃcient way of building new
theories by building on existing ones.

explain diﬀerent types of social behaviors, using a set of
constructs, propositions, boundary conditions, assumptions, and
underlying logic. Note that the following represents just a
simplistic introduction to these theories; readers are advised to
consult the original sources of these theories for more details and
insights on each theory.
Agency theory
Agency theory (also called principal-agent theory), a classic
theory in the organizational economics literature, was originally

The fourth approach is to apply existing theories in entirely new

proposed by Ross (1973) to explain two-party relationships (such

contexts by drawing upon the structural similarities between the

as those between an employer and its employees, between

two contexts. This approach relies on reasoning by analogy, and

organizational executives and shareholders, and between buyers

is probably the most creative way of theorizing using a deductive

and sellers) whose goals are not congruent with each other. The

approach. For instance, Markus (1987) used analogic similarities

goal of agency theory is to specify optimal contracts and the

between a nuclear explosion and uncontrolled growth of networks

conditions under which such contracts may help minimize the

or network-based businesses to propose a critical mass theory of

eﬀect of goal incongruence. The core assumptions of this theory

network growth. Just as a nuclear explosion requires a critical

are that human beings are self-interested individuals, boundedly

mass of radioactive material to sustain a nuclear explosion,

rational, and risk-averse, and the theory can be applied at the

Markus suggested that a network requires a critical mass of users

individual or organizational level.

to sustain its growth, and without such critical mass, users may
leave the network, causing an eventual demise of the network.

The two parties in this theory are the principal and the agent; the
principal employs the agent to perform certain tasks on its behalf.
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While the principal’s goal is quick and eﬀective completion of the

of the assigned task to make it more programmable and therefore

assigned task, the agent’s goal may be working at its own pace,

more observable.

avoiding risks, and seeking self-interest (such as personal pay)
over corporate interests. Hence, the goal incongruence.

Theory of planned behavior

Compounding the nature of the problem may be information

Postulated by Azjen (1991), the theory of planned behavior (TPB)

asymmetry problems caused by the principal’s inability to

is a generalized theory of human behavior in the social

adequately observe the agent’s behavior or accurately evaluate

psychology literature that can be used to study a wide range of

the agent’s skill sets. Such asymmetry may lead to agency

individual behaviors. It presumes that individual behavior

problems where the agent may not put forth the eﬀort needed to

represents conscious reasoned choice, and is shaped by

get the task done (the moral hazard problem) or may

cognitive thinking and social pressures. The theory postulates

misrepresent its expertise or skills to get the job but not perform

that behaviors are based on one’s intention regarding that

as expected (the selection problem). Typical contracts that are

behavior, which in turn is a function of the person’s attitude

behavior-based, such as a monthly salary, cannot overcome

toward the behavior, subjective norm regarding that behavior, and

these problems. Hence, agency theory recommends using

perception of control over that behavior. Attitude is defined as the

outcome-based contracts, such as a commissions or a fee

individual's overall positive or negative feelings about performing

payable upon task completion, or mixed contracts that combine

the behavior in question, which may be assessed as a summation

behavior-based and outcome-based incentives. An employee

of one's beliefs regarding the diﬀerent consequences of that

stock option plans are is an example of an outcome-based

behavior, weighted by the desirability of those consequences.

contract while employee pay is a behavior-based contract.

Subjective norm refers to one’s perception of whether people

Agency theory also recommends tools that principals may

important to that person expect the person to perform the

employ to improve the eﬃcacy of behavior-based contracts, such

intended behavior, and represented as a weighted combination of

as investing in monitoring mechanisms (such as hiring

the expected norms of diﬀerent referent groups such as friends,

supervisors) to counter the information asymmetry caused by

colleagues, or supervisors at work. Behavioral control is one's

moral hazard, designing renewable contracts contingent on

perception of internal or external controls constraining the

agent’s performance (performance assessment makes the

behavior in question. Internal controls may include the person’s

contract partially outcome-based), or by improving the structure

ability to perform the intended behavior (self-eﬃcacy), while
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external control refers to the availability of external resources

innovation diﬀusion as a process of communication where people

needed to perform that behavior (facilitating conditions). TPB also

in a social system learn about a new innovation and its potential

suggests that sometimes people may intend to perform a given

benefits through communication channels (such as mass media

behavior but lack the resources needed to do so, and therefore

or prior adopters) and are persuaded to adopt it. Diﬀusion is a

suggests that posits that behavioral control can have a direct

temporal process; the diﬀusion process starts oﬀ slow among a

eﬀect on behavior, in addition to the indirect eﬀect mediated by

few early adopters, then picks up speed as the innovation is

intention.

adopted by the mainstream population, and finally slows down as

TPB is an extension of an earlier theory called the theory of
reasoned action, which included attitude and subjective norm as
key drivers of intention, but not behavioral control. The latter
construct was added by Ajzen in TPB to account for
circumstances when people may have incomplete control over
their own behaviors (such as not having high-speed Internet
access for web surfing).

the adopter population reaches saturation. The cumulative
adoption pattern therefore an S-shaped curve, and the adopter
distribution represents a normal distribution. All adopters are not
identical, and adopters can be classified into innovators, early
adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards based on their
time of their adoption. The rate of diﬀusion also depends on
characteristics of the social system such as the presence of
opinion leaders (experts whose opinions are valued by others)

Innovation diﬀusion theory

and change agents (people who influence others’ behaviors).

Innovation diﬀusion theory (IDT) is a seminal theory in the

At the micro (adopter) level, Rogers (1995) suggests that

communications literature that explains how innovations are

innovation adoption is a process consisting of five stages: (1)

adopted within a population of potential adopters. The concept

knowledge: when adopters first learn about an innovation from

was first studied by French sociologist Gabriel Tarde, but the

mass-media or interpersonal channels, (2) persuasion: when they

theory was developed by Everett Rogers in 1962 based on

are persuaded by prior adopters to try the innovation, (3)

observations of 508 diﬀusion studies. The four key elements in

decision: their decision to accept or reject the innovation, (4)

this theory are: innovation, communication channels, time, and

implementation: their initial utilization of the innovation, and (5)

social system. Innovations may include new technologies, new

confirmation: their decision to continue using it to its fullest

practices, or new ideas, and adopters may be individuals or

potential. Five innovation characteristics are presumed to shape

organizations. At the macro (population) level, IDT views

adopters’ innovation adoption decisions: (1) relative advantage:
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the expected benefits of an innovation relative to prior

individuals can be influenced to change their attitude toward a

innovations, (2) compatibility: the extent to which the innovation

certain object, events, or behavior and the relative eﬃcacy of

fits with the adopter’s work habits, beliefs, and values, (3)

such change strategies. The ELM posits that one’s attitude may

complexity: the extent to which the innovation is diﬃcult to learn

be shaped by two “routes” of influence, the central route and the

and use, (4) trialability: the extent to which the innovation can be

peripheral route, which diﬀer in the amount of thoughtful

tested on a trial basis, and (5) observability: the extent to which

information processing or “elaboration” required of people. The

the results of using the innovation can be clearly observed. The

central route requires a person to think about issue-related

last two characteristics have since been dropped from many

arguments in an informational message and carefully scrutinize

innovation studies. Complexity is negatively correlated to

the merits and relevance of those arguments, before forming an

innovation adoption, while the other four factors are positively

informed judgment about the target object. In the peripheral

correlated. Innovation adoption also depends on personal factors

route, subjects rely on external “cues” such as number of prior

such as the adopter’s risk-taking propensity, education level,

users, endorsements from experts, or likeability of the endorser,

cosmopolitanism, and communication influence. Early adopters

rather than on the quality of arguments, in framing their attitude

are venturesome, well educated, and rely more on mass media for

towards the target object. The latter route is less cognitively

information about the innovation, while later adopters rely more

demanding, and the routes of attitude change are typically

on interpersonal sources (such as friends and family) as their

operationalized in the ELM using the argument quality and

primary source of information. IDT has been criticized for having a

peripheral cues constructs respectively.

“pro-innovation bias,” that is for presuming that all innovations
are beneficial and will be eventually diﬀused across the entire
population, and because it does not allow for ineﬃcient
innovations such as fads or fashions to die oﬀ quickly without
being adopted by the entire population or being replaced by
better innovations.
Elaboration likelihood model
Developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), the elaboration
likelihood model (ELM) is a dual-process theory of attitude
formation or change in the psychology literature. It explains how

Whether people will be influenced by the central or peripheral
routes depends upon their ability and motivation to elaborate the
central merits of an argument. This ability and motivation to
elaborate is called elaboration likelihood. People in a state of high
elaboration likelihood (high ability and high motivation) are more
likely to thoughtfully process the information presented and are
therefore more influenced by argument quality, while those in the
low elaboration likelihood state are more motivated by peripheral
cues. Elaboration likelihood is a situational characteristic and not
a personal trait. For instance, a doctor may employ the central
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route for diagnosing and treating a medical ailment (by virtue of

and medical treatment, GDT focuses on the criminal decision

his or her expertise of the subject), but may rely on peripheral

making process and situational factors that influence that

cues from auto mechanics to understand the problems with his

process. Hence, a criminal’s personal situation (such as his

car. As such, the theory has widespread implications about how

personal values, his aﬄuence, and his need for money) and the

to enact attitude change toward new products or ideas and even

environmental context (such as how protected is the target, how

social change.

eﬃcient is the local police, how likely are criminals to be

General deterrence theory

apprehended) play key roles in this decision making process. The
focus of GDT is not how to rehabilitate criminals and avert future

Two utilitarian philosophers of the eighteenth century, Cesare

criminal behaviors, but how to make criminal activities less

Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, formulated General Deterrence

attractive and therefore prevent crimes. To that end, “target

Theory (GDT) as both an explanation of crime and a method for

hardening” such as installing deadbolts and building self-defense

reducing it. GDT examines why certain individuals engage in

skills, legal deterrents such as eliminating parole for certain

deviant, anti-social, or criminal behaviors. This theory holds that

crimes, “three strikes law” (mandatory incarceration for three

people are fundamentally rational (for both conforming and

oﬀenses, even if the oﬀenses are minor and not worth

deviant behaviors), and that they freely choose deviant behaviors

imprisonment), and the death penalty, increasing the chances of

based on a rational cost-benefit calculation. Because people

apprehension using means such as neighborhood watch

naturally choose utility-maximizing behaviors, deviant choices

programs, special task forces on drugs or gang-related crimes,

that engender personal gain or pleasure can be controlled by

and increased police patrols, and educational programs such as

increasing the costs of such behaviors in the form of punishments

highly visible notices such as “Trespassers will be prosecuted”

(countermeasures) as well as increasing the probability of

are eﬀective in preventing crimes. This theory has interesting

apprehension. Swiftness, severity, and certainty of punishments

implications not only for traditional crimes, but also for

are the key constructs in GDT.

contemporary white-collar crimes such as insider trading,
software piracy, and illegal sharing of music.

While classical positivist research in criminology seeks
generalized causes of criminal behaviors, such as poverty, lack of

The previous section is by the University of South

education, psychological conditions, and recommends strategies

Florida’s Scholar Commons.

to rehabilitate criminals, such as by providing them job training
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Chapter 3

Political
Economy

Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Understand concepts of political economy.
• Identify characteristics of economic systems.
•
• Analyze states and their political economy.

Section 1

Defining political economy
Classical political economy emerged as a distinct field of

the absolutist state. It is part of the more general European

scholarship and policy-oriented analysis during the eighteenth

Enlightenment. A parallel tradition in Germany, which was an

century, in rough parallel with the development of a distinct

economic laggard, was more oriented to the political dimension

sphere of profit-oriented, market-mediated economic activities

of the emerging system of political economy - reflected in the

that was nonetheless seen as dependent on a wider nexus of

Polizeiwissenschaften (“police” or policy sciences) that were

legal, political, social, and moral conditions. In contrast with the

concerned with good economic, political, and moral government

later discipline of neoclassical economics, which studies such

on behalf of the population of a given state.

activities in isolation, classical political economy was a
predisciplinary field of inquiry insofar as it tried to put the
emerging capitalist economy in its wider social context. Adam
Smith (1723-90) is exemplary here, writing not only An Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) but
also A Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and studies of
jurisprudence, politics, logic, and language. Other key figures in
this tradition are David Malthus (1766-1834), and David Ricardo
(1772-1823) whose work On the Principles of Political
Economyand Taxation (1817) made him its leading figure.
Classical political economy is linked to the rise of a commercial
and industrial bourgeoisie that sought to challenge the
economic, political, and ideological domination of feudalism and

Following the rolling back of feudalism and the consolidation of
capitalism, the rise of organized working-class resistance, and
the recurrence of capitalist crises, classical political economy
was slowly displaced by vulgar political economy. This
downplayed the class relations between capital and labor and
the origins of value in the labor process, began to focus on the
eﬃcient allocation of scarce factors of production to competing
uses, and sought the causes of economic crisis in factors
external to the nature and dynamic of capitalism itself.
Although their work is often mentioned as a key part of the
tradition of political economy, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
developed an explicit critique of classical and vulgar political
economy both as scholarship and as the basis of economic
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policy and practice. They elaborated an alternative account of the

dynamic of capitalism were rooted in the inhuman treatment of

capitalist mode of production based on radically diﬀerent

labor power as if it were a commodity. Capitalism is the first

philosophical assumptions and a political commitment to the

mode of production based on the existence of formally free

proletariat rather than the bourgeoisie. Thus a significant part of

wage-labor and a labor market in which workers sell their labor

their studies was concerned to critique the economic categories

power in a formally free and equal commercial transaction to the

and analyses of orthodox political economy. Two major examples

owners of the means of production, who in turn need this labor to

are Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844 [trans.

set the labor process into motion. The resulting goods and

1964]) and the three-volume Theories of Surplus Value (1861-3

services belong initially to the capitalists for whom the proletariat

[trans. 1963]). They also built on this critique to provide an

works, who are therefore free to sell these commodities in the

alternative account of the capitalist mode of production, its social

marketplace. Beneath the surface appearance of free and equal

foundations, its dynamic, and its crisis tendencies. Marx's

market exchange, however, lay a despotic world of production in

Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), the

which capital sought to maximize the production of surplus labor

Grundrisse (1857 [trans. 1973]), and the incomplete analysis in

as the basis for economic exploitation and the accumulation of

the three volumes of Capital (1867, 1885, 1894 [trans. 1970]) are

capital.

his best-known work here. Their guiding theme is that capital is
not a thing (a simple, transhistorical factor of production) but a
social relation that is a historically specific class relation between
persons, mediated through the instrumentality of things.

Marxism became a crucial reference point for the subsequent
development of radical, heterodox, and more orthodox forms of
evolutionary and institutional political economy. This trend is
sometimes signified in the idea that authors such as Max Weber,

Marx argued that the best starting point for such a critique was to

Werner Sombart, Joseph Schumpeter, and Karl Polanyi engaged

ask why wealth in societies where the capitalist mode of

in a debate with the “ghost of Marx.” Evolutionary political

production is dominant presents itself as an immense

economy holds that time matters: there can be no valid

accumulation of commodities. He regarded the commodity as the

transhistorical analysis of economic activities because the nature

“cell form” of capitalism and, on this basis, unfolded the key

of economic institutions and conduct, the sites and stakes of

contradictions of capital as a social relation. He defined the

economic conflict, and the scope for economic change depend

historical specificity of capitalism in terms of the generalization of

on their prior developmental trajectory. And institutional political

the commodity form to labor power, arguing that the nature and

economy argues that institutions matter: there can be no pure,
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isolated economic calculation and conduct because these are
always shaped by specific economic institutions and market
relations and their embedding in a complex extra-economic
environment. It is on this basis that political economy has not only
studied the development of diﬀerent forms of economic
organization but has also identified a number of more or less
distinct varieties of capitalism.
Vulgar political economy was the basis for neoclassical
economics. This tries to develop a universal, transhistorical
analysis of economic activities based on a general model of
rational economic calculation about the most eﬃcient allocation
of scarce resources (factors of production) to competing ends.
Neoclassical economics is associated with “economics
imperialism,” that is, the extension of economic analysis to social
spheres that are not dominated by profit-oriented, marketmediated economic activities but are nonetheless marked, it is
claimed, by individual utility maximization within defined rules of
the game. The extension of this model is the basis for rational
choice institutionalism, theories of constitutional design and
public policy, and a new form of political economy.

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Credo Reference.
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Section 2

Economic inequality & welfare
Poverty and inequality: diﬀerent concepts, diﬃcult
realities

The global social movements that have been vocal in opposing
this new phase of capitalism have largely based their criticisms
on the claim that globalisation increases inequality in the world.

One of the most potent sources of protest and conflict in

Yet supporters of the liberal approach, who see globalisation as

contemporary global politics is the presence of global economic

a source of development on a global scale, claim that the poor

inequality, of which persistent poverty is a consequence and

have benefited the most in those places where economic

sometimes, it is argued, a cause. Accurate and useful

integration has been made more viable, and that this decreases

estimations of poverty levels and especially income inequality

inequality in the long term. What follows is a brief analysis of the

have always been a concern of social scientists and policy

ambiguities of recent estimates of inequality. But, before, it is

makers.

important to determine, even in general terms, why – besides the
assessment of the general social consequences of globalisation

In recent decades, the technological revolution that gave rise to

– inequality matters.

the latest stage of international economic integration, especially
via trade and financial liberalisation – usually termed

There are many ways in which income inequality can be severely

‘globalisation’ – has sparked a more contentious debate. This

crippling for socioeconomic development, with serious political

has centred not only on the study of ‘real’ levels of income

implications – historically perceived. In the 2001 Human

inequality as an end in itself but also on the analysis of inequality

Development Report, Birdsall points out that income inequality

that helps to create an accurate picture of the social

with the concentration of income at the top combined with

consequences of the singular speed, depth and width of

substantial poverty at the bottom of the social pyramid produces

contemporary globalisation.

political support for policies that may generate even more
concentration of income and/or support for populist policies that
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criminality which, in turn, is closely linked to increased levels of
inequality within countries.
In the current geopolitical context, global inequality also matters
not only as part of a framework for human rights that establishes,
among many related functions, the basic right for development,
education and freedom but also in strategic geopolitical terms.
Although the link between inequality, or poverty itself, and
terrorism is not linear and is just one correlation among many that
feeds terrorist activity, the ‘super empowered angry men’ Thomas
Friedman mentions as being at the root of global insecurity do
certainly rely on those who have little (if any) material wealth and
even less in terms of prospective employment or a stable future
(Friedman, 2000; Wade, 1999).

produce only short-term positive (if any) results. It may well be

The challenge of estimating income inequality

that the absence of a middle class is detrimental to the

In 1955, Kuznets famously expounded the idea that higher levels

development of accountable governments, which ultimately

of growth would in time lead to less income inequality. However,

compromises sustainable economic growth and even social

today it is clear that inequality is far more persistent than

welfare (UNDP, 2001). In addition, inequality is likely to erode

expected, even in high-income countries. Thus the links between

social capital. This is now a widely used term which, put roughly,

income inequality and economic growth are not automatically

refers to trust, collaboration and citizen responsibility, attributes

correlated but are mediated by a series of variables, such as

which are also key to the formation of eﬀective political

voting patterns, market failures (especially in capital markets) and

institutions. Social capital determines participation in spheres of

uncertain property rights. In this sense, the discussion becomes

community life such as parks, parent-teacher associations of

wider: not only does it matter to understand how growth can

public schools, sports leagues, all of which are undermined by
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produce inequality but also how inequality inhibits the chances of

perception is unquestionably substantial. Yet those who see

economic growth.

globalisation as a source of unmatched opportunities for

Much controversy underlies the debate on income inequality.
Although recent estimates have been developed by technically
consistent studies, albeit using diﬀerent measures, variables, data
sets and interpretations of the concepts studied, they have
sometimes produced very diﬀerent conclusions as to a recent rise

development claim that inequality decreases in countries that
have managed to introduce reforms that allow for more
liberalisation of markets, thus taking advantage of this process of
global integration as much as possible. To them, it is less and not
more globalisation that leads to inequality.

or fall in inequality, especially among countries or in total world

Rather than try to settle the debate, it is important to

inequality. On the one hand, there are those who believe that the

acknowledge some of the elements that need to be clear when

proportion of people living in extreme poverty in developing

using these diﬀerent studies, as well as some of the evidence that

countries declined in the 1990s. On the other hand, there are

seems most plausible in explaining the diﬃcult reality of

studies that point to modest gains by the poor in the same

inequality.

period. Yet there are many NGOs which claim that the last decade
has led to greater poverty. Even more convincing, and now

What is being measured & how: ambiguities & controversy

receiving increased international attention, is a study (possibly the

First, it is crucial to understand that ‘poverty’, ‘inequality’ and

first in a series) that challenges the methodology used by the

even ‘welfare’ are vague concepts, subject to diﬀerent

World Bank and claims that inequality has been grossly

interpretations. While for microeconomic theory ‘welfare’ refers to

underestimated by conventional analyses.

utility and satisfaction, other interpretations of the word take into

Inevitably, diﬀerent answers to the question of whether or not
inequality has been rising can feed diverse political and
ideological positions. The street protests organised by
international social movements/networks in world capitals during
World Bank, IMF and G-8 meetings are derived from the belief
that globalisation leads to rich people getting richer and the poor
increasingly becoming poorer. The political impact of this

account elements of ‘quality of life’ rooted in a philosophical
understanding of the human condition and human needs (see, for
example, Sen and Nussbaum, 1993; Strengmann-Kuhn, 2000).
Inequality also may point to a diﬀerent picture if taken in ‘relative’
or ‘absolute’ terms. Economists typically use ‘relative inequality’
as referring to the ratio of individual income as compared with a
mean of overall income. If all incomes grow at the same rate,
relative inequality remains unchanged. When it comes to
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analysing the eﬀects of trade openness, which is an important

currencies. It tries to come up with average price levels for all

component of globalisation, on income distribution, a common

commodities, weighted by their share in international expenditure,

finding is that greater trade openness has about the same impact

so as to make it possible to compare not simply income levels

on the growth rate of income at diﬀerent levels of income. That is

but what people can actually purchase with the money they

not a definitive piece of evidence, but when talking about relative

make.

inequality, discrepancies are not so outstanding (Ravallion, 2003).

Sanjay Reddy and Thomas Pogge have claimed that the PPP

However, ‘absolute inequality’ refers to the absolute diﬀerences in

framework leads to a mistaken assessment of real poverty levels.

incomes. So when incomes grow by the same ratio but starting

They argue that in order to evaluate accurately whether a

from an unequal base, inequality in absolute terms inevitably also

household is poor, consumption and income must be related not

rises. Thus when they say that inequality has been rising

to the local price level of commodities in general but to the local

considerably in the recent years, it is absolute inequality that they

cost of a basket of basic necessities, generically described to

usually mean. As Ravallion claims, no one concept is more

allow for variations in how the poor in diﬀerent locations meet

correct than the other; they reflect judgement calls about what

their nutritional and other basic needs. In order to avoid the

really constitutes ‘inequality’.

arbitrariness of the $1/day standard suggested by PPP

In the same sense, ‘poverty’ is also an imprecise concept by its
very nature. As stated before, determining levels of poverty
depends on how incomes fall in relation to a ‘poverty line’. This
will vary considerably according to which of many views of what
‘poverty’ really means has been adopted. Most recently, an
engaging debate has developed, which is gaining notoriety in
academic circles as well as in the media, regarding the
methodology used by international institutions, such as the World
Bank, for measuring levels of inequality. Normally, the standard
parity purchase power (PPP) framework is favoured. PPP is a

calculations, a basket based on specific needs and local realities
must be specified. This avoids the obvious lack of real
comparability if, for example, the cost of rice is included in both
India and Iceland. Both this eﬀort and the eﬀort of actually
measuring inequality using this new methodology are yet to be
developed. However, Reddy and Pogge do anticipate that the
results to be revealed would prove that World Bank estimates (as
well as those of analysts who rely heavily on the Bank’s data)
severely underestimate income inequality levels in the world
today.

method of arriving at an accurate exchange rate for foreign
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Inequality among and within countries/regions
In addition to measurement discrepancies and ambiguities,
another source of confusion in determining inequality is whether it
is inequality between countries or within countries that is being
referred to.
According to Birdsall, the ratio of average income of the richest
country in the world to that of the poorest rose from about 9:1 at
the end of the nineteenth century to at least 60:1 in 1999. This
means that the average family in the United States is 60 times
richer than the average family in Ethiopia. In addition, since 1950,
while the population of poor countries increased 250 per cent,
that of rich countries grew by less than 50 per cent.

Colombia and nearly 25 per cent in Mexico. The most populous
countries in the world, China and India, have enjoyed faster
income growth than the rich countries. However, it would take
them almost a century of constant growth at rates higher than
those in today’s industrialised countries just to reach current US
income level.
In sub-Saharan Africa poverty is widespread, spreading a number
of epidemic diseases, condemning a huge number of adults in
their prime to death. In 16 of the 22 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa with data for the 1990s, the poorest 10 per cent of the
population earned less than one-tenth of the income of the
richest 10 per cent. Conclusions as to the causes and patterns of
such a problem, however, are still lacking due to limited available

Latin America and the Caribbean are the regions with the highest

data. Eastern Europe has relatively low inequality, though Russia

levels of income inequality. In 13 of the 20 countries with data for

and Lithuania have registered increases in the recent decade.

the 1990s, the poorest 10 per cent of the population had less
than one-twentieth of the income of the richest 10 per cent,
according to UNDP in 2001. This severe inequality means that
millions of people are living in extreme poverty. In Brazil, for
example, the ratio of income of the top 20 per cent of earners to
the bottom is about 25:1, making the country probably the
world’s most unequal (compared with about 10:1 in the United
States and about 5:1 in Western Europe). Although Peru,
Colombia and Mexico registered the greatest wage increases in
the region, the gap between the skilled and the unskilled rose in
the 1990s by more than 30 per cent in Peru, 20 per cent in

Among OECD countries, while inequality is low, there is diversity
in the levels of inequality between countries. The United Kingdom
and the United States have high levels of inequality in their group.
Birdsall points out that income inequality in the latter grew in
recent years not only because profits were sometimes unusually
high (especially in the financial sector) but because there were
losses of income for the bottom income level of the population.
She claims that the average wage of white male high-school
graduates fell 15 per cent from 1973 to 1993, and the number of
men aged 25 to 54 years earning less than $10,000 a year grew.
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Possibly for the first time in US history, educational gains may be

and nationalism, which combined to push the world towards war

reinforcing rather than oﬀsetting income inequality: higher

after 1937 (Polanyi, 1944).

education has become a prerequisite for economic success, but
because access to it depends on family income, the poor are at a
disadvantage.

However, after the Second World War, the international economic
order assumed a new and very distinct feature. Unlike the
economic nationalism of the 1930s or the laissez-faire liberalism

In conclusion, although there is controversy about global

of the gold standard and free trade years, the new multilateralism

inequality trends, there seems to be evidence that inequality is

that emerged was based on domestic governmental intervention.

rising within many countries. However, rising inequality is not

This was a kind of political bargain and it shaped the post-war

correlated with growth rates. Ravallion explains that even among

economic order: it has been termed by John Ruggie ‘the

growing economies, ‘inequality tends to fall about as often as it

compromise of embedded liberalism’. One side of the bargain

rises’ (Ravallion, 2003, p. 7).

involved the recognition of the advantages of international

The welfare state & the notion of ‘embedded
liberalism’: a brief background

liberalisation while the other required the provision of domestic
social safety nets to relieve the dislocations of those who lost out
from heightened international competition in local markets. Thus,
from the start, international liberalisation was coupled with a

In The Great Transformation, Polanyi explored the socially

domestic social compact in which ‘governments asked their

disruptive and polarising tendencies in the world economy driven

public to embrace the change and dislocation that comes with

by what he called the self-regulating market. Those tendencies

liberalisation in return for the promise of help in containing and

were characterised by a ‘double movement’, within which an

socialising the adjustment costs’ (Ruggie, 1994, p. 4). Hence, as

unprecedented expansion of the market coexisted with massive

Pauly summarises, the compromise combined the ideal of liberal

social disruption and a sharp political reaction in the form of

international markets with the practical reality of national

public demands on the state to counteract the deleterious eﬀects

economic regulation (Pauly, 1997).

of such market-driven capitalism. Indeed, for Polanyi, this double
movement ultimately generated the political context of the 1930s

In fact, empirical evidence confirms that there is a strong positive

and produced a breakdown in liberal economic structures,

correlation between openness to trade and the growth of

leading to the phenomena of depression, fascism, unemployment

government activity in many countries since the 1960s. Societies
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(rich and poor alike) have demanded and received a larger

insurance while reducing its ability to perform that role eﬀectively.

government role as the price of exposing themselves to greater

Indeed, there is a visible tension between the consequences of

amounts of external risks. This finding leads to an important

globalisation and the requirements for maintaining the social

conclusion: the social welfare state is the flip side of the open

legitimacy of free trade and other pieces of economic

economy since wherever external risk is perceived to increase

liberalisation that inevitably impose wide domestic social costs,

when liberalisation occurs, the importance of government

along (at times) with gains that tend, however, to remain

intervention in the shape of the provision of social insurance is

concentrated, sometimes by policy on one societal group.

accentuated significantly.

Globalisation & the end of the embedded liberalism
compromise: new challenges ahead

According to Ruggie there are two sources of ‘disembeddedness’
of the state. One has to do with the success of the post-war trade
regime in liberalising the economy. As barriers to the flow of
economic transactions were eliminated and cross-border market

However, the internationalisation and integration of production,

forces were encouraged, some of the standard policy tools the

investment and trade – economic globalisation – plays a

government had in its power to manage the consequences of this

challenging role in this scenario and threatens the basic bargain

liberalisation were lost. The result of this process was the

of ‘embedded liberalism’. On one side, public opinion polls show

denationalisation of capital, or put in other words, the increasing

that, despite the perception of a backlash against expansionary

separation of national ownership from the physical location of

fiscal policies, due to the spread of neoliberal practices worldwide

production. The second source of disembeddedness is related to

with their emphasis on the economic perils of interventionism, the

the weakening of domestic social safety nets throughout the

principles behind the welfare state remain highly popular among

capitalist world. Ruggie blames this outcome on the decline in

broad segments of society. On the other side, it is possible to

productivity and competition from low-labour-cost countries in

attest that confidence in government spending has diminished

the context of closer integration in international production

considerably in most advanced countries.

networks, as well as on the weight of the welfare state itself on
national budgets. Budget deficits and tax-weary publics

The combination of these two facts leads to what Rodrik

compelled governments to shrink the traditional web of social

considers to be the dilemma brought about by globalisation: it

policies significantly.

results in increased demands on the state to provide social
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In addition, at the same time as fiscal austerity was being
pursued, added pressure from global capital for reduced taxes
and labour costs has driven many governments to cut back

The place of the state in the context of
globalisation

welfare programmes. In an eﬀort to boost global competitiveness,

Given these facts about both developed and developing

‘governments across the planet have, since 1980, rolled back

countries, it is important to place this analysis within the context

social democracy and dismantled state socialism’, each following

of the vast literature on globalisation. To acknowledge an

very similar macroeconomic programmes based on neoliberal

increasing and wide trend in the reduction of public social

premises (Scholte, 1997, p. 448).

spending is not to say that the state has grown ‘powerless’ in the

According to the UNDP Human Development Report of 1999, in
developing countries as well, the fiscal resource base is being
squeezed. That can be perceived in four ways. The first happens
through trade liberalisation and the reduction in trade taxes that
follows it. The second has to do with the fact that transnational

face of globalisation because its capacity to dictate fiscal and
monetary policies is subject to the restless moods of global
capital. But equally this approach does not deny the fact that
important changes are indeed happening in the real power of the
state due to globalisation.

operations are diﬃcult to tax. Third, countries compete in

Even those who do not accept the argument of the

lowering their corporate and capital gains taxes, reducing tax

‘powerlessness of the state’ admit that there are significant

receipts – a pattern inaugurated by developed countries. Finally,

constraints on government capacity to make and implement

the growth of the informal economy is translated into a

policy. In fact, the general slide towards more fiscally conservative

substantial reduction in tax revenues in many countries.

policies, both on the left and on the right, entailing tax reforms as

Consequently, as the resource base in developing countries
shrinks, the demand for public resources increases, but in the
face of reduced revenues, states are reducing spending. Public
spending on health and education in countries with low human

well as a significant reduction in social spending, is a reality for
states; and this is so at a time when social disparities remain high
and are likely to become even more a source of political stress in
the context of a global recession.

development declined from 2 per cent of GDP in 1986–1990 to

Because of this, it is important to identify the new features of the

1.8 per cent in 1991–1996 (UNDP, 1999).

state in the context of globalisation. In other words, what kind of
state are we talking about? It is not a ‘powerless state’; neither is
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it a Keynesian, welfare-producing, interventionist state. It is best

provision of social insurance domestically via interventionist

described as a ‘negotiator state’. This view is explored by Sassen

public policies? For Rodrik, that is unlikely to happen if

as she explains that the role of the state in today’s global

governments lose their autonomy in generating tax revenues and

economy, unlike in earlier times, has been to negotiate the

shaping social policies. Again, global capital increasingly

intersection between national law and foreign actors – whether

demands both austerity and the continuation of the agenda of

firms, markets or supra-national organisations. This condition

liberalisation in the places it will invest, allowing governments in

makes the current phase distinctive. The existence of an

rich and poor countries only limited room for manoeuvre in

enormously elaborate body of law that secures the exclusive

policymaking – and in poor countries significantly less, if any. In

territoriality of national states to an extent not seen in earlier

fact, the slowdown in the 1990s followed a period of inflation,

centuries has now to be seen cohabiting with a considerable

deficit spending and increasing government debt levels around

institutionalising of the ‘rights’ of non-national firms, cross-border

the industrialised world. Hence, in order to stabilise their budgets,

transactions and supra-national organisations. This illustrates the

states adopted stringent monetary fiscal policies, which were the

unavoidable engagement by national states in the process of

ones deemed sustainable or credible by financial markets

globalisation and confirms its cooptation with global capital.

because they favoured financial stability over employment. This

Thus, globalisation is not just a matter of crossing geographic
borders, as is captured by measuring international investment
and trade. It also has to do with the relocation of national public
governance functions to transnational private arenas and with the
development inside national states – through legislation, court
rulings, executive orders – of the mechanisms necessary to
accommodate the rights of the global capital in what are still
national territories under the exclusive control of their states.
In the light of these facts, a final question needs to be asked: can
the bargain of ‘embedded liberalism’ be sustained – i.e., the
combination of economic liberalisation internationally with the

became known as the ‘politics of financial credibility’ and created
a crucial pressure, forcing cuts in social spending at a time when
the geopolitical scenario had led to higher than ever expenditures
on security in some developed countries.

From ‘unequal terms of trade’ to a ‘race to the
bottom’?
In the 1960s a theory of development emanating from developing
countries emphasised that international trade was based on an
unequal exchange between rich and poor countries. Those less
industrialised countries especially reliant on exports of raw
materials faced unequal terms of trade with industrialised
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countries whose export prices used to rise disproportionately

liberalisation to workers in developed countries. Trade unions and

more than the prices of the raw materials they imported. This

NGOs (most notably) were vocal in claiming that ‘globalisation’

theoretical understanding of the realities of underdevelopment

led to a ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon. That is to say, they

became known as ‘dependency theory’ and was at the root of a

believed (and some still do) that because of international

strategy of industrialisation via import substitution that developing

competition and the fact that developing countries are abundant

countries, especially in Latin America, followed in the 1960s and

in low-skilled labour, the wages of this labour were lower than the

1970s. This strategy followed the logic that protecting the

pay of low-skilled labour in developed countries. As markets are

national market was necessary to stimulate the evolution of

already interconnected and international trade becomes more

national industries.

open, firms have the option of buying low-skilled labour in

Although it is now understood that import substitution had merits
in fostering industrialisation in developing countries, it failed to
produce sustainable improvements via increased employment
and the fostering of international competitiveness in Latin
America. By contrast, in East Asia where an export-oriented

developing countries (especially by building plants in these
countries). So, there is pressure – it is argued – for the reduction
of the wages of low-skilled labour in developed countries. This
would characterise the infamous race to the bottom, which fuels
contentious ‘anti-globalisation’ movements.

economy took shape, the 1980s was a time of growth and not the

The USA of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s registered greater

‘lost decade’ that it became for protectionist economies. In the

earnings diﬀerentials between older and younger workers, and

late 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the interventionist ideas

greater diﬀerentials between high-skilled and low-skilled

that had motivated ‘dependency theorists’ were vigorously

occupations. Also, the economic position of low-skilled men has

exchanged for the neoliberal approach of international institutions

fallen by staggering amounts (Freeman, 2000). In Europe, the

and applied by local technocrats. This emphasised international

problem was less one of income diﬀerentials and more of the

‘free’ trade – or the significant reduction in trade barriers

availability of jobs, chiefly because wages are less flexible there

worldwide – as a key to ‘development’.

than in the USA. Whether it is earning inequalities or joblessness

Developed country workers and trade liberalisation
An interesting twist in this story – seldom related to it – was the
intense debate in the 1990s about the damaging eﬀects of trade

that is the major concern, the question remains for both the USA
and Europe as to what has caused this decline in the relative
supply for low-skilled labour. Is there indeed a race to the
bottom?
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It is a fact that trade between the USA and Europe and

developed countries, but it does not account for all of it. As

developing countries has increased significantly in the last two

Freeman concludes, the debate over the causes for the

decades. This was the result of several developments, especially

‘immiseration’ of less-skilled workers has an element of a

the significant reduction in trade barriers which followed from

judgement call about it. Increased trade with developing countries

international trade agreements and trade reforms in developing

is not the sole culprit. Freeman concludes that ‘technological

countries, and the vigorous ‘support’ of the IMF and the World

changes that occur independent of trade, unexpected political

Bank for export-oriented strategies as a source of growth and

developments, such as German reunification, policies to educate

capital for debt repayment in developing countries. As more

and train workers, union activities, the compensation policies of

international trade is still intrafirm trade, the increase in overall

firms, and welfare state and related social policies’ have

trade among rich and poor countries is intimately linked also to

historically played a crucial role in determining workers’ well-

the expansion of multinational firms which outsource production

being and will remain crucial determinants of wages and

to places where labour is cheaper.

employment in the future (Freeman, 2000, p. 352).

Despite these facts, there is insuﬃcient evidence to see trade

This debate is certainly not likely to become less salient, however.

with developing countries as the culprit for the decrease in

Global recession and the deepening of trade integration (most

demand for low-skilled labour in developed countries. Freeman

notably via the consolidation of the Free Trade Area of the

explains that the race to the bottom argument is not consistent

Americas) are likely to fuel strong political reactions among

with evidence in the USA, where wage diﬀerences among states

diﬀerent interest groups. The inability of modern states to

and localities have persisted for decades despite free trade,

compensate the losers from globalisation is likely to make

migration and capital flows. Also, ‘among countries, wage

matters even more serious.

diﬀerences between workers with seemingly similar skills have
also persisted for decades, albeit exaggerated by the divergences

Sovereign debt and the challenges it poses for

between purchasing power parities and exchange rates, and by

economic welfare

diﬀerences in skills that are hard to measure’ (Freeman, 2000, p.
348).

Debt has always been a diﬃcult part of the reality of developing
countries. Defaults on debt payments have existed for as long as

Increased trade with developing countries may have produced

credit itself. Indeed, the problems of debt servicing preceded

some of the reduction in wages of low-skilled workers in

Mexico’s first foreign loan after independence in 1827. However,

89

debt has become a particularly prominent issue in international

criticised for several reasons. These range from complaining

debates on economic development in recent decades.

about its complexity to the idea that relief under the Initiative is

Much of that has to do with the strong activism emerging from
transnational social networks and campaigns which have not only

‘too little too late’ and should be less reliant on pervasive IMF
conditionalities and ‘unrealistic’ calculations of debt sustainability.

brought the issue to the forefront of economic discussions but

Moreover, one could also add many other aspects that may have

have stressed the link between debt and human rights. Thus, the

reactivated the debt discussion at the international level. The

reasons for the current salience of debt in the global economy are

deregulation of financial markets in most developing countries

intimately linked to the emergence and recognition of movements

has allowed for a more volatile environment, in which debt, issued

such as the Jubilee 2000 Coalition (now the Jubilee Research)

in the form of sovereign bonds, is traded and consequently

and the recent technological advances that have permitted the

subjected to the swings of speculative investment by increasingly

proliferation of information via the Internet. Using this last is a

numerous and dispersed groups of private creditors. Recent

core piece of these activists’ technique.

financial crises have brought to the front the intimate connections

In addition, this reconsideration of debt as a severe economic
constraint to development has been an ongoing process within
international financial institutions since the 1980s. Although there
was a clear perception as long ago as 1967 that debt service
payments were becoming severely constraining to some
countries, debt relief began to flow to poor countries only in 1979
as a product of the 1977–1979 UNCTAD meetings. These led to

between international (unregulated) financial markets, currency
crises and ultimately debt crises. Debt thus became an issue of
interest not only to debtors and the social activists who support
cancellation and relief but also to financial market players and,
naturally, increasingly to international financial institutions,
especially the IMF, which acts as a ‘lender of last resort’ in times
of chaos.

oﬃcial creditors writing oﬀ $6 billion in debt to 45 poor countries.

There are important diﬀerences between debt as a

Debt relief initiatives followed, culminating in the HIPC Initiative of

macroeconomic issue in middle-income countries, where the

1996, managed by the World Bank and the IMF. This programme,

issue is seen in terms of alternative mechanisms for debt

which involves a comprehensive framework for debt relief under

restructuring, and in low-income countries, where the debate

conditions of macroeconomic management (via stabilisation

concerns cancellation, relief and aid. Despite these diﬀerences,

programmes supported by the Bank and the Fund), has been

the scale of debt problems is indeed substantial overall. The debt
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owed by the most highly indebted countries in the world is about

Congo, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,

$170 billion (in 1999 nominal terms). Approximately 50 per cent of

Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,

this is owed to bilateral creditors such as the United States,

Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome

Japan, France and other European countries. Moreover, while 37

and Principe, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda

per cent of the total is owed to multilateral creditors, the World

and Zambia.

Bank, the IMF and the regional and sub-regional development
bank, 13 per cent is owed to private creditors. The debt of the
highly indebted, poorest countries in the world represents only 8
per cent of the. developing countries’ approximate $2 trillion debt
and only 35 per cent of the debt of all low-income countries.
Although current debt discussions signal some new elements in
the global economy, the burden of debt has always been

In Latin America (4 countries): Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras,
Nicaragua
In Asia (3 countries): Laos, People Dem. Rep., Vietnam,
Myanmar (Burma)
In the Middle East (1 country): Republic of Yemen

substantial especially for low-income countries, which depend on

In fact, the debt burden of the poorest countries is 93 per cent of

international lending from multilateral institutions, as they are

their income. According to a report produced by the United

considered too risky an investment to attract private capital.

Nations Development Programme, cited by Sachs, Tanzania, for

There are two direct eﬀects from indebtedness under these

example, has been spending nine times more for debt servicing

circumstances. One is the impact of servicing debt on the

than for basic health and four times more than for primary

national budget, because it leads to a reduction in the allocation

education. Moreover, in Ethiopia, where more than 100,000

of resources in social spending, probably already a small amount.

children die annually from easily preventable diseases, debt

Secondly, there is no doubt that highly indebted poor countries

payments are four times more than public spending on health

face severe budgetary constraints and therefore lack resources to

care. Sachs describes further this dramatic situation with the case

invest in basic social service provision.

of Zambia, which spent more than 30 per cent of its national

In Africa (34 countries):
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of

budget on debt payments each year during the 1990s but only 10
per cent on basic social services. In fact, the Zambian
government’s annual health expenditures per person are
estimated to be $17, compared with G7 expenditures on health
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care of around $2,300 per person. But to make matters worse, in

that requiring citizens of poor countries to pay debts accumulated

Zambia 20 per cent of the population is HIV positive (as of 1999)

by undemocratic regimes, and for purposes never intended to

and it is estimated that around 9 per cent of Zambian children

benefit them, is inherently unjust. This is, in fact, a persuasive

under 15 have lost a mother or both parents to AIDS. Half of all

scenario in which arguments for debt relief gain more support.

Zambians have no access to safe drinking water and
approximately 30 per cent of children remain unvaccinated.
Indeed, ‘life expectancy has dropped to 43 years in the country
and is expected to decline still further as AIDS continues to take
its toll’ (Sachs, 1999).
In addition, in Africa as a whole, where only one child in two goes
to school, governments transfer four times more to northern
creditors in debt payments than they spend on health and
education. Of 27 countries, only 10 spend more on basic social
services than on debt servicing (as of 1998). Those services
include basic education, basic health care, safe water and
sanitation provision, family planning and nutrition. Indeed, in
many countries, the combined expenditure on defence and debt

Some characteristics of highly indebted poor countries
• Highly indebted: The debt of HIPC Initiative-eligible countries
grew from about $59 billion in 1980 to $170 billion in 1999,
which increased the average debt-to-export ratio from 199 per
cent to 414 per cent and the average debt-to-GNP ratio from 31
per cent in 1981 to 103 per cent in 1999.
• Poor: Of the total population of 615 million, almost half lives on
less than $1 a day. With slow growth, the global number and
proportion of poor people have increased in the past two
decades.
• High receipt of oﬃcial development assistance (ODA): Gross

is higher than that on basic social services and often higher than

transfers in the form of grants and loans from bilateral and

the combined budgets for health and education.

multilateral donors and creditors in the past two decades

Increasingly, debates on debt relief focus on the option of
cancellation, because they spur fundamental questions about the
legitimacy of the debts owned by developing countries. Indeed,
considerations about the legacy of debts entered into by corrupt
and otherwise illegitimate governments are central to the
advocacy for debt cancellation. Few analysts disagree on the fact

amounted to about $445 billion in constant 1995 dollars. On
average, net transfers (gross transfers minus debt transfers)
paid by them to the group of countries that eventually become
HIPCs were about 10 per cent of their GDP in the 1990s,
representing as much as 60 per cent of government revenue
and financing. Transfers often exceeded revenue collection by
governments.
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• Unmanageable stock of debt: The high levels of development

is that loans received by corrupt governments – not used to serve

assistance and the stagnation in exports and government

the population they ruled in any welfare-increasing aspect –

revenue (which resulted from the low growth) combined to

cannot be expected to be repaid by the legitimate governments

produce a more and more unmanageable stock of debt.

that took oﬃce later.

Of the nearly $140 billion of loans committed to HIPCs between

It is also important to notice that odious debt cases are not all

1972 and 1999, about 60 per cent has gone to countries

confined to the group of countries which qualifies for debt relief

considered not free in the year they received the funds. Between

under the HIPC initiative. Notably, South Africa and Croatia are

1982 and 1995, 33 per cent of these loans went to countries

not candidates for HIPC-granted debt relief. In these cases,

ranked by the International Country Risk Guide as corrupt and not

perhaps, the argument of odious debt itself – and not simply the

free. Although some of these loans were never delivered, as

claim for cancellation of debts based on assessments of

Birdsall and Williamson conclude, the facts show that creditors

economic sustainability – seems to hold strength as an argument

have funded utterly illegitimate governments. Because the debts

for writing oﬀ such debts.

acquired under such singular circumstances are outstanding and
delay a possibility of development for the poorest countries in the
world, they are usually referred to as ‘odious debts’ and are
inevitably the object of international scrutiny, both at the level of
increasingly engaged international advocacy by civil societybased groups and at the level of oﬃcial creditors involved in the
HIPC initiative.

The ‘digital’ & ‘ecological’ divides
Income inequality is a consequence and a producer of other
kinds of inequalities. In some sense, it is a consequence,
according to Sachs, of an ‘ecological divide’ – although this is by
no means the only cause of inequality and extreme poverty. By
‘ecological divide’ is meant the profound eﬀect that the

Cases of ‘odious debts’ reveal an essential feature of the debt

geographical circumstance can have, whether as an

debate, especially when it comes to making eﬀorts towards

encouragement to their development or as a crucial obstacle to

achieving significant relief. They point to the fact that not all debts

growth. The poorest countries in the world are not merely an

acquired by sovereigns – especially in the cases of the poorest

‘underdeveloped’ version of rich countries. If that were true, the

countries with illegitimate regimes – are to be subjected to the

alleviation of poverty would be an easier task. However, as Sachs

obligation of repayment. In other words, the argument in this case

emphasises, ‘the poor live in diﬀerent ecological zones, face
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diﬀerent health conditions and must overcome agronomic

systems, thus allowing them to benefit from the inflow of

limitations that are very diﬀerent from those of rich countries’.

international capital. This is the case in a number of developing

Hunger is not only a product of ineﬃcient or corrupt governance
but of serious ecological conditions, such as droughts and low
productivity of the land in some tropical areas. The vast spread of
diseases such as malaria, hookworm, sleeping sickness and
schistosomiasis (whose transmission often depends on a warm
climate) is not only a result of inadequate health policies but a
sign that scientific breakthroughs are confined to rich countries,
even if they are sometimes achieved by scientists who came from

countries and/or regions experiencing some level of economic
growth, such as the coastal regions of east Asia, coastal China,
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia
and Indonesia. Impoverished regions with unfavourable
geographical conditions were excluded from possibly benefiting
from globalisation and are ‘trapped in poverty’. These are
countries in most of sub-Saharan Africa, central Asia, large parts
of the Andean region and the highlands of Central America.

a poor country. In the case of malaria, for example, tropical

Moreover, income inequality also produces a ‘digital divide’ in that

conditions allow the infection to spread. Mosquito control is

there is a sharply uneven diﬀusion of information and

expensive and not always eﬀective. If more resources were

communications technology among diﬀerent regions of the world

invested in the search for a vaccine, things could be diﬀerent. Yet

and also within countries. Not only is new technology largely

research and development of this kind demands a market. The

produced in OECD countries (even if through using foreign labour

biggest vaccine producers believe there is no market in malaria

from developing countries), but the use of this technology is also

and international subsidies that could provide the large labs with

highly uneven. OECD countries, with only 14 per cent of the

incentives to produce the needed vaccines to cure tropical

world’s population, accounted for 86 per cent of patent

diseases are not available.

applications filed in 1998 and 85 per cent of scientific and

The emphasis of development economists on the role of
institutions seems to neglect the fact that the countries which
have prospered the most in the current context of globalisation
are not only places where institutions are eﬃciently managed and
were well developed, but places where geographical conditions
were favourable to their closer integration into global production

technical journal articles published worldwide. Not surprisingly,
these are also the countries that invest the most in research and
development: 2.4 per cent compared with 0.6 per cent in South
Asia. Because innovation also means ownership, which produces
profits in the form of royalties and licences, economic inequality is
also a part of this picture. Of worldwide royalty and licence fees in
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1999, 54 per cent went to the United States and 12 per cent to
Japan (UNDP, 2001).
Technology use is uneven within countries. Internet use in urban
regions is greater than in rural ones; it is concentrated among the
better educated and the young, and in many regions men are
more connected than females. In China, the 15 least connected
provinces, with 600 million people, have only 4 million Internet
users, while Shanghai and Beijing (with 27 million people) have 5
million users. In the Dominican Republic, 80 per cent of Internet
users live in Santo Domingo, the capital. In Thailand, 90 per cent
of the users live in urban areas, while in India, from 1.4 million
Internet connections, more than 1.3 million are in only five states
– Delhi, Karnatake, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Mumbai. In
Chile, 89 per cent of Internet users have had tertiary education.
The numbers for Sri Lanka and China are 65 per cent and 70 per
cent, respectively. Men make up 86 per cent of users in Ethiopia,
83 per cent in Senegal, 70 per cent in China, 67 per cent in
France and 62 per cent in Latin America (UNDP, 2001).

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Credo Reference.
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Section 3

An approach to comparative analysis or a subfield?
The first edition of this volume featured a chapter on political

concepts of the subfield. This positioning is helpful, I suggest,

economy by Peter A. Hall (Hall 1997). In it, Hall sought to define

insofar as while many political scientists see rational choice and

political economy by asking the following question: In the subset

political economy as synonymous (Weingast and Wittman 2006;

of those scholars who study the comparative politics of the

Alt and Shepsle 1990), a focus on interests rather than rationality

advanced industrial states, how are political economy

as a core concern allows me to place political economy in a

explanations constructed? Seen from this vantage, political

broader frame that engages a more variegated set of literatures,

economy, Hall answered, appears as a field defined by a specific

particularly those on institutions and ideas, than would at first

set of concepts; interests, institutions, and ideas within

blush appear to constitute it. When one makes this distinction,

comparative politics. Ten years later, I still find Hall’s specification

political economy does not become coterminous with rationality,

of the boundaries of the field, by reference to this troika of

and hence with rational choice theory. Rational choice is

concepts, to be most useful for defining what political economy

masterfully surveyed in this volume by Margaret Levi, and

is and what it is not. However, in replicating Hall’s analysis, two

indeed, much of the work she covers is and should be

caveats are in order.

considered political economy. However, in terms of the framing

First of all, in following Hall’s troika of “interests,” “institutions,”
and “ideas” as defining political economy, I necessarily break
with this volume’s emphasis on “rationality,” “culture,” and
“structure” as defining comparative politics.Why then do I prefer
Hall’s troika of boundary-setting concepts to the one oﬀered by
the editors? I do so since taking this route allows me to focus on

of this chapter, if rational choice gets to “own” the concept of
rationality, then much of the work I would wish to include here
must be recoded as some kind of cultural or structural “other
than political economy” approach. Rather than privilege any
particular literature, Hall’s framework allows us more freedom to
broadly define and survey political economy.

interests rather than rationality as one of the three defining
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Despite having just made the case for the usefulness of these

perspectives can be understood as an extension of the core

concepts in defining the boundaries of political economy, my

insights of each of these classic statements. In noting this

second caveat concerns how developments in the subfield over

increasing plurality of approaches, however, I assess two things.

the past decade may have actually made sustaining these

First, I return to the relationship of political economy, as it is

boundaries more diﬃcult for two reasons. That is, while political

bounded here, to rational choice theory. Second, I ask whether

economy is indeed still very much a way of doing comparative

the plurality of approaches this broad view of political economy

politics, one can argue that it has grown from its “reborn”

establishes is a problem for a putatively scientific field of study.

beginnings in the 1970s to become a distinct “way of doing”

Comparative politics, as a subfield, is sometimes criticized for its

political science in and of itself. For example, as well as scholars

intellectual pluralism (Skocpol et al. 1995; Bates 1997b). I argue

working with interests, institutions, and ideas developing their

instead that as far as political economy is concerned, such

own research programs, we have also recently seen the decay of

pluralism is its signal strength. When one considers that the

the boundary that traditionally set so-called international political

objects of political economy are open-ended evolutionary social

economy apart from comparative political economy, increasing

and economic systems, the idea that a “theory of everything” can

conceptual borrowing across the subfield, and the emergence of

help us understand the world has surely proven fallacious (Blyth

new approaches that go beyond the troika of interests,

2003a, 2007). As such, the increasing pluralism of political

institutions, and ideas (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007; Langley

economy should be embraced rather than rejected.

2004; MacKenzie 2006). With those caveats in order, I first
discuss what political economy is and how its modern form came

Political economy: what it was & how it

about. Following this, I suggest that the modern troika of political

(unexpectedly) came about

economy perspectives just outlined can be read as extensions of
three books published almost a quarter of a century ago: Peter A.

The answers to these questions are not as obvious as is typically

Gourevitch’s Politics in Hard Times (1986), Peter A. Hall’s

portrayed. What one might call the “standard story” is one where

Governing the Economy (1986), and Peter J. Katzenstein’s Small

the birth of capitalism in Europe transforms property relations and

States in World Markets (1985). I link each of these books to

patterns of distribution, and “political economy” thinkers theorize
about it (Heilbroner 1953; cf. Halperin 2003). Reflecting upon

one part of the troika; interests, institutions, and ideas,

these momentous changes, thinkers such as Smith, Malthus,

respectively, and show how the evolution of each of these

Ricardo, and Marx explained these events by reference to factors
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as diﬀerent as the division of labor, changes in population, the

because it smacked of Marxism, but also because the move

“average” level of profits, and the unfolding of class

toward ever greater formalism further “depoliticized” the subject,

contradictions, respectively. Despite their ostensible diﬀerences,

economics ascended as a legitimate field of inquiry during a

what these classical political economists agreed upon – and this

period in which the social sciences as a whole were politically

is the correct part of the standard story – was the essential unity

suspect, and as a consequence, “political” economy dropped out

of the economic and the political as equal components in

of view (Samuelson 1997; Amadze 2003).

understanding the way the world works (Watson 2005).1
However, such unity was not to last into the modern era, and here
lies the less well-known part of the standard story.

The (unexpected) rebirth of political economy
With economics ascendant and political economy out of fashion,

Later political economists, such as Jevons, Walras, and Marshall,

it would take a shock to the system to bring it back in. That shock

separated economics from political economy during their

came in the 1970s, when the gloss came oﬀ the post–World II

“marginalist revolution” by focusing on the moment of exchange

economic boom and the developed world underwent its first

rather than the process of value creation. But in making such a

postwar recession (Lindberg and Maier 1985; Krugman 1994).

move, they did something else: They removed from political

Stagflation, oil shocks, unemployment, and low growth all dented

economy a concern with distribution – who gets what, when,

the prestige of economics since economics, as a discipline, didn’t

where, and why – and hence any notion of politics and

see it coming, and economists as a group couldn’t agree on what

economics as mutually constitutive. In this reductionist moment,

to do about it once it came (Bell and Kristol 1981). In this moment

Pareto eﬃciency trumped political expediency, and “the politics”

of crisis, many scholars began to argue that the separation of

of political economy was evacuated. The result of this separation

politics and markets that economics instantiated was perhaps

was that economics forgot history in the search for timeless

part of the problem all along.

generalizations about a field of action called “the economy,”
where politics appears only as a distortion of (or a distraction in)
an otherwise self-regulating world (Hodgson 2001). Although
there were some holdouts to this view, such as Veblen (1899) and
Kalecki (1944), the early years of the Cold War eﬀectively put paid
to political economy, at least in the American academy. In part

First out of the block were Marxist theorists, eager to denounce
the latest dip in capitalist performance as “the end of times.”
James O’Connor (1974) diagnosed the postwar welfare state as
being in a terminal fiscal crisis, while Jurgen Habermas (1975)
identified a parallel “legitimation crisis” in which the overstressed
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mechanisms of state redistribution worked against eﬃcient

back in part because with states around the world appropriating,

mechanisms of capitalist exploitation. In other parts of the

taxing, and spending between 30 and 50 percent of gross

academy, liberal theorists such as Charles Lindblom (1977)

domestic product (GDP), the idea of an “economy” that ran by its

pondered the “privileged position” of business as a political actor

own transcendental laws apart from politics became an

in capitalist states.2 Meanwhile, other scholars began to wonder

increasingly questionable assertion. Most importantly, however, it

if it wasn’t democracy that was the problem, with politicians

came back because hard-won empirical research showed that

meshing their electoral cycle to the mechanisms of state

the economy was inseparable from politics. Modern political

intervention to produce inflation and low growth through a

economy showed that if one wanted to understand significant

“political business cycle” (Nordhaus 1975; Lindbeck 1976;

variations in economic outcomes, then embracing the mutual

Buchanan and Wagner 1977).

imbrications of states and markets was a pretty good place to

Political scientists embraced these new ideas and pondered, for
example, which states would survive the downturn better than
others, and in doing so began to see the organization of the state
itself as a critical variable in explaining economic outcomes

start.

Interests, institutions & ideas as explanatory
alternatives

(Katzenstein 1976; Krasner 1976). Building upon these insights,

Despite their desire to place markets and states in the same

some scholars sought answers in analyzing how a post–Bretton

equation, what this new generation of political economists had in

Woods financial environment would impact states (Block 1977;

common were more questions than answers. The question some

Strange 1970). Others worried more specifically about the United

scholars asked was “Qui bono?” – who benefits? (Gourevitch

States in its role as world hegemon and provider of public

1986; Strange 1988). This question privileges the concept of

goods” (Kindleberger 1973). From this angle, an entire body of

“interests” by forcing the analyst to ask, “In whose benefit would

work concerned with the stability of the global economy and the

it be for outcome X to pertain over outcome Y?” Doing so, in turn,

role of the United States therein, a distinct international political

leads the analyst to ask how people come to want what they

economy (IPE) began to take shape. Indeed, by the mid-1980s,

want, and then try to link those wants to specific outcomes worth

political economy, in a multiplicity of forms, was back. It was back

explaining. Given this desire to link intentions and outcomes,

in part because the excision of the political from the economic

interest-based arguments tend to be underpinned by a materialist

that economics as a field relied upon had seemingly failed. It was
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theory of action, based upon the not unreasonable notion that

The first version, as Hall’s definition suggests, sees institutions as

where one sits economically may guide one’s preferences

historically specific and ontologically prior to the agents who

politically.3 Actors’ class positions, what assets they have, how

occupy them. Such institutions structure agents’ choices (Hall

fungible those assets are, how exposure to particular economic

1986; Steinmo et al. 1992). North’s quote, in contrast, suggests a

shocks impacts agents’ resource portfolios: these variables

diﬀerent but equally relevant way of viewing institutions. Rather

become empirical grist to the theoretical mill of interest-based

than institutions structuring choices, humans are seen to design

accounts (Block 1977; Frieden 1991b; Rogowski 1989; Swenson

institutions to achieve their goals given their preexisting material

2002).

interests. Whether to overcome collective action problems or reap

A second group of theorists asked another question: “Who varies
and why?” Here institutions rather than interests come to the fore.
One influential definition of institutions views them as “the formal
rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices
that structure the relationship between individuals in various units
of the polity and the economy” (Hall 1986: 19). Another defines
institutions, more broadly, as “humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction” (North 1990: 3). Basically,
institutionalists want to know whether agents act according to
their materially derived interests or because of the institutional
context in which they find themselves. Institutional explanations
focus our attention on how economies are organized and how
such configurations impact agents’ interests. Seen in this way,
institutions link larger economic structural changes and interests
but become causally important in their own right. There are,
however, two versions of institutionalism that have evolved from
this common position that institutions matter.

gains in trade, institutions are chosen structures (North 1990). In
either case, while interests are important, it is how they are
refracted through institutions that is the explanatory causa prima.
Building on these prior positions, a third group of political
economists asked another question: “Who constructs?” Given
that many of the causes that generate outcomes in the political
economy are highly complex and not directly observable, some
theorists began to attend to the social constructions agents use
to decode and navigate the political economy, seeing those
constructions as causally important in and of themselves (Blyth
2002; Parsons 2003). Take globalization, for example. Standard
materialist accounts of globalization’s eﬀects on politics tend to
focus on how particular actors are impacted by, for example,
greater integration into financial markets (Frieden 1991b, 2005),
labor markets (Rodrik 1997; Iversen 2005), or product markets
(Keohane and Milner 1996b). In contrast, scholars who attend to
the social construction of globalization ask instead how the
multiple causes of the global economy come to be known as
having such specific and unusually linear outcomes in the first
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place. They point out that what globalization “is” is itself

Interest-based political economy: origins

constructed diﬀerentially across nations. In the United Kingdom
and the United States, globalization is portrayed as an imperative

Gourevitch’s Politics in Hard Times (1986) is in many ways the

to be embraced. In France and Germany, it is seen instead as a

touchstone for contemporary interest-based explanations in

political choice that, when embraced, undermines national

political economy. For Gourevitch, interests are the primary

conceptions of welfare (Hay and Rosamond 2002; Schmidt 2002).

explanatory concept, and in this regard he is thoroughly

Such scholarship points to something important: How particular

materialist. As he puts it, “what people want depends on where

constructions of the political economy agents develop and deploy

they sit” (Gourevitch 1986: 56). However, although Gourevitch

helps bring into being that which is described, rather than simply

seeks to reduce politics to the materially derived preferences of

describing an already existing state of aﬀairs (MacKenzie 2006).

social actors, the way he does this shows an aﬃnity with other

That is, how agents think about, and hence act, in the political

approaches that later works in this tradition eschew. Gourevitch

economy is causally important.

explains how changes in the international economy impact a

Clearly, such a variety of perspectives invites a plurality of
methodological stances. Rather than adjudicate the one “true”
version of political economy or suggest that a single approach
actually covers all the bases, in the next section I show how these
three strands of modern political economy can be usefully
understood as the outgrowth of three particular works that all
sought to explain the same thing: the economic policy choices of
states. These texts can be seen as the springboards for our troika
of approaches. Following this discussion, I address the
relationship of this version of “what political economy is” to
rational choice theory, a body of work that not only has a strong
lineage in political economy but sometimes aspires to define itself
as political economy.

state’s “production profile” – the configuration of its economic
sectors – and alters the preferences of domestic actors, given
their assets and resources within such sectors. For Gourevitch,
changes in the global economy create moments of political crisis
that alter agents’ preferences, and into this breech enter
politicians who act as “brokers” who attempt to forge new
coalitions of common interest. These coalitions then seek
electoral or other forms of power in order to advance public
policies to benefit themselves, rather than other contending
coalitions whose assets are diﬀerentially aﬀected by the same
changes (Gourevitch 1986: 55–60, 32–34). Examining the
economic crises of the 1870s, 1930s, and 1970s, Gourevitch
shows how these variables and causal mechanisms produce
political coalitions that vary as his theory predicts.
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What makes Politics in Hard Times particularly interesting,

if political parties are brokers of broad social coalitions, then

however, is how Gourevitch’s key category of material interest is

Britain has seen an alteration in governing parties and coalitions

actually bound up with, and only understandable through, a host

but little alteration in economic policies (Hall 1986: 26–37). Hall’s

of secondary variables. Specifically, Gourevitch notes how

answer was to see agents’ interests as mediated by their

exogenous economic changes rarely, if ever, telegraph into

institutional position rather than being telegraphed straight from

agents’ heads “what has gone wrong” and “what should be

their structural location. In brief, Britain was the first industrializer,

done.” As such, political parties, the institutional configuration of

an imperial power, and a financial center, all of which led to an

the state, the economic ideas mobilized by agents, and even “a

economy that was an agglomeration of small firms with fractious

country’s placement in the international state system of political-

labor–management relations, small banks, and externally oriented

military rivalries” all come into play (Gourevitch 1986: 21). Indeed,

capital flows (Hall 1986: 37–47).While this set of institutions

one of the most striking findings of Gourevitch’s book was that as

worked well in the nineteenth century, once other countries

one moved temporally from one crisis to the next, the role of such

caught up and surpassed the United Kingdom in the early

secondary factors became more important in explaining

twentieth century, these institutions became increasingly

outcomes over time (Gourevitch 1986: 227–228). Yet, despite this,

dysfunctional. However, since such institutions served as the

the take-home message was that to explain states’ policy

context in which policymakers’ choices were made, they

choices, materially derived preferences, political brokerage, and

structured agents’ choices rather than being themselves objects

coalitional politics were what should be attended to.

of choice; key actors’ interests became a derivative function of

Institutional political economy: origins
A contemporaneous text that sought to explain state policy
choices by reference to institutions rather than interests was
Peter A. Hall’s Governing the Economy (1986). Hall’s puzzle was
that if Britain had been in relative economic decline since 1913,
and if agents’ interests were in the driving seat, then why did
none of these agents seem to have an interest in arresting this
decline? Or even if they did, why were they unable to do so? For

their institutional rather than their material position. In short,
British politicians’ eﬀorts at reform were thwarted by their
particular institutions. Like Gourevitch, however, Hall also relies
upon other secondary variables as part of his explanation. After
all, how do institutions structure choices? Hall says that they do
so by processes of social learning such that “oﬀ-the-path” policy
thinking, and hence radical policy choices, remain oﬀ the table
(Hall 1986: 233, 277). Institutions may be granted analytic
primacy, but Hall sees them as acting on and through economic
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ideas, political parties, and even the mass media (Hall 1986: 277–

processes of domestic bargaining, developed two mutually

280).

supporting sets of institutions: corporatist intermediation and

Constructivist political economy: origins
A third major contribution was Peter J. Katzenstein’s Small States
in World Markets (1985). Katzenstein sought to explain why, in the
aftermath of the economic shocks of the 1970s, it was the smaller
and more vulnerable European economies that seemed to better
weather the economic storm. What makes Small States
particularly important was that it embedded one explanation (a
materialist-coalitional one) in another (institutional) that, in turn,
opened the door to other approaches (ideational) that attempt to
transcend both. Katzenstein’s puzzle was that while large
economies adjusted to external shocks either through the market
(via wages and prices) or through the state (via policy
interventions), given their relative openness to the international
economy, small states had to find other, less destructive ways to
adjust (Katzenstein 1985: 24–27). That alternative was flexible
adjustment through domestic institutions, specifically corporatist
institutions, where peak organizations and the state shared the
costs of adjustment among encompassing coalitions of social
partners (Katzenstein 1985: 30–38).

welfare compensation. This occurred as exogenous economic
shocks altered agents’ interests such that coalitions favoring
compensation won the day and built institutions to serve their
interests. But on the other hand, this Gourevitchian story was a
bit too neat and functionalist for Katzenstein. After all, why
compromise? Why not conflict as diﬀerent coalitions push the
costs of adjustment onto one another, as happened in the larger
European states in the 1930s? Herein lies the deeper institutional
version of events that actually drives the argument as a whole.
The lack of a strong feudal past and the consequent weakness of
the landed aristocracy, as far back as the Late Middle Ages, sets
the scene for compromise (Katzenstein 1985: 159–160). Given
this..., evolving links between industrial and agricultural sectors,
the emergence of proportional representation, and late
industrialization all combined to favor compromise rather than
conflict among business and labor groups by the time we get to
the critical period of the 1930s (Katzenstein 1985: 171, 174). It is
this domestic long-run historical and institutional development
that drives the ostensible materialist-coalitional story. Each alone
is insuﬃcient as an explanation, but together they have more
explanatory reach. Yet, Small States also suggests a move

On the one hand, Small States was a straightforward materialist

beyond interests and institutions as explanatory categories,

IPE story.4 Given their degree of openness and exposure to the

noting, for example, that the “first trait” of such economies was

international economy, these smaller European states, through

“an ideology of social partnership” (Katzenstein 1985: 32).
Motivating such patterns of compromise was the perception of
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vulnerability . . . which . . . generated an ideology of social

Samuelson models of trade to determine who benefits and who

partnership . . . [and] . . . acted like a glue for the corporatist

loses under protection and free trade, Rogowski predicts the

politics of the small European states. . . . Yet none of the reviews

eﬀects of rising and declining trade on capital-rich and capital-

of the book published after it appeared paid any attention to it.

poor economies with diﬀerent land/labor endowments (Rogowski

Why? A decade before the constructivist turn in security studies

1989: 16). Rising and declining trade are seen to have diﬀerential

and international relations, scholars of comparative and

eﬀects on relatively abundant and scarce factors, respectively,

international political economy simply did not know what to do

with diﬀerent combinations of factors promoting diﬀerent social

with ideology as an explanatory construct (Katzenstein 2003: 11).

cleavages, and from there divergent coalitional outcomes ranging

This is why Small States is more than a synthesis of coalitional

from the U.S. New Deal to Asian fascism.

and institutional approaches. It also opened the door to moving

An important extension of this logic is provided by Hiscox (2002).

beyond them, to put ideas and social constructions front and

While Gourevitch (1986) focuses on narrow sector-specific

center in political economy explanations rather than treat them as

interests and the coalitions they generate, Rogowski (1989)

a residual category to mop up variance unexplained by these

focuses on broader class- and factor-based coalitions; Hiscox

other approaches (Blyth 1997).

wondered if they might both be right. Might it be the case that

Extensions of interest-based political economy
Trade, mobility & politics

sometimes we see trade politics played out on a broad classbased canvas and at other times in narrow sectoral politics, and if
so, why? Hiscox links both bodies of work together by focusing
on the degree of interindustry factor mobility, and in doing so he

Taking Politics in Hard Times as our starting point, we can trace

expands the reach of both theories.His argument is simple and

the development and refinement of interest-based approaches in

elegant. If factors are mobile between industries, we can predict

political economy.5 Eschewing the richness of Gourevitch’s

broad-based class politics. If they are specific and immobile, we

analysis in favor of parsimony and predictive power, one strand of

can predict narrow sectoral conflict. In other words, “class

work that emerges from this focus on the eﬀects of the

conflict is more likely when levels of factor mobility are high . . .

international economy on domestic politics is Rogowski’s work on

industry-based conflict is more likely when levels of mobility are

shifts in trade patterns and their eﬀect on domestic political

relatively low” (Hiscox 2002: 5). The logic is that in the early

alignments (Rogowski 1989). Using Hecksher–Ohlin/Stolper–

stages of industrialization factor mobility is high since skills are
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basic and transferable, technology is simple, and transportation

as her point of departure the observation that in explaining the

innovations have large eﬀects. As such, both capitalists and

development of social policies, it is usually assumed that workers

workers have broadly similar, albeit orthogonal, interests. More

and employers have orthogonal interests (Korpi 1978; Esping-

developed political economies, however, produce “more specific

Andersen 1985). But given employers’ need for skills and labor’s

forms of human and physical capital and far greater

need to acquire them, might it not be possible that Gourevitchian

complementarity between technology and labor skills” (Hiscox

coalitions of interest between diﬀerent employers and workers

2002: 11). This, in turn, implies that workers’ and capitalists’

across sectors could have played a role here (Mares 2003: 2–9)?

interests become more cross-cutting, giving rise to new nonclass

Conceiving of skills as mutual investments in specific assets by

or factor based coalitions. Using this framework, Hiscox is not

both employers and workers, Mares is able to view social

only able to show how and why forms of trade politics vary, but

policies, and indeed entire regimes of social protection, in a new

also oﬀers insight into important questions of economic history

light. Rather than view such outcomes as something “won or

and economic policy.

lost” by labor in its contest with capital, Mares views social

Assets, skills & compensation
Another significant contribution to this literature that uses a
similar “interests and assets” framework is made by scholars who
highlight the importance of skills in the political economy. Insofar
as the skills held by labor and sought by employers are valuable
assets, focusing on skills might shed light on, for example, the
highly varied forms that welfare states and labor markets take
around the world. Although more obviously linked to the varieties
of capitalism literature in political science (Thelen 2004; Hall and
Soskice 2001), this literature also owes its existence to the focus
on sectors, assets, mobility, and exogenous changes in the world
economy that lie at the heart of Gourevitch’s concerns. Pioneers
of this literature are Mares (2003) and Iversen (2005). Mares takes

policies as employer-produced devices to encourage workers to
invest in skills and thereby insure against specific production
risks. Mares’s logic is powerful and compelling. If the marginal
productivity theory of wages is correct, then returns to skill
account for the diﬀerential in wages observed across an industry.
As such, it is reasonable for workers to learn skills and earn more
returns to their factor. Skills in this sense become tradable assets.
The problem is, of course, that learning skills is a risky business
for both workers and employers. From the worker’s point of view,
not only is it costly to train, but the more skilled you are, the more
redundant (substitutable) one may become if technologies
change or terms of trade turn against you (Iversen 2005: 3). Yet,
from the employer’s point of view, if you spend a lot of money
training workers and they can easily move to a rival firm, why
bother doing so in the first place? But you still need skilled
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workers. Mares argues that in order to convince workers to share

Andersen 1985). The latter is Mares’s own approach, in which

some of the costs of training, the possibility of nonemployment

employers actually set up the welfare state (Mares 2003). Key in

due to their skill set has to be factored into workers’ estimations

reconciling these positions is to see the former’s focus on

of their future income streams in making their decision to

redistribution and the latter’s focus on insurance as two sides of

undertake training (Mares 2003: 24). Social policies are best seen,

the same coin rather than as opposing positions. Making this

then, as a subsidy paid by either the state or the employer (itself a

move allows Iversen to “understand how popular preferences for

function of the degree of risk an employer faces) to support the

social insurance and redistribution are rooted in people’s position

reservation wage of skilled workers such that the returns to their

in the economy, how these preferences are aggregated into social

skills (assets) do not fall below the market-clearing rate of the

policies, and how these policies in turn aﬀect individual

unskilled when they are unemployed. For if they did, why would

investments into assets that shape economic performance and

anyone bother to learn a trade? Variations in employment

interests” (Iversen 2005: 13).

protection can then be understood as employers’ responses to
trading oﬀ heightened production risk against securing adequate
skilled labor via mechanisms of internal firm or external state
control. Social policies can then, in the aggregate, benefit
employers as well as workers, which is why employers help set
them up. Meanwhile, the coalitions of workers and capitalists that
promote such policies can then be deduced given the nature of
assets, risks, and skills in a given economy (Mares 2003: 21–63).

Drawing on the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice
2001), Iversen posits that economic systems that rely on general
skills (typically, the Anglo-American model) create wage inequality
and poverty since they “limit . . . incentives for skill acquisition at
the low end of the academic ability distribution” (Iversen 2005:
18). Such systems specialize in low-skill manufacturing and
increasingly in services, areas in which productivity enhancement
through skills is limited. Consequently, few such skills are

Taking this logic further is Iversen (2005).6 Building on Mares’s

supplied, and over time the wages of those at the bottom end of

analysis, Iversen argues for a micro-level “asset theory of the

the distribution fall. However, despite their position in the labor

welfare state” (2005: 11). Like Hiscox, Iversen seeks to unite and

market, such workers may not prefer higher taxes and more

extend two interest-based theories. The first is Mares’s foil, the

redistribution since “without an investment in distributive

“power-resources” school of welfare state development, which

insurance, investment in general skills is the best defense against

sees labor and labor-backed parties as pushing business into

adverse changes in the labor market” (Iversen 2005: 24). In

producing welfare policies against their will (Korpi 1978; Esping

contrast, where the economic system relies upon more specific
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skills (typically, in continental Europe), training regimes and

Take Rogowski’s description of mid-nineteenth-century Britain as

compensation via insurance come to the fore. Given this

an alliance of abundant factors (capital and labor) against the

alternative set of institutional complementarities, workers demand

scarce factor (land) (Rogowski 1989: 10). While this has intuitive

greater welfare transfers and pay more taxes to shoulder the

plausibility, it also sidesteps the following question: To what

costs of becoming, in eﬀect, “specific assets.” Just as Hiscox

extent, in a predemocratic United Kingdom, where political action

unites Rogowski and Gourevitch through a focus on mobility,

by labor was met with imprisonment and exile to the colonies

Iversen unites rival views of the origins of the welfare state

under the Transportation Acts, could a “political coalition” in any

through a focus on insurance and redistribution as

meaningful sense have actually existed? Similarly, Hiscox’s focus

complementary products and as the basis of political coalitions.

on the eﬀects of factor mobility leads him to impute to the

Interest-based theories: strengths & weaknesses
Taken together, this body of literature has several strengths. First
of all, it links macro-level changes in the economy to a set of
plausible microfoundations grounded in agents’ material
environments; there are no explanatory “leaps of faith” from one
level of analysis to another. Second, such approaches are
parsimonious and predictive. Clear and testable propositions can

authors of the postwar Swedish model of capitalism, Gøsta Rehn
and Rudolph Meidner, a desire to promote intraindustry factor
mobility as a way of limiting rent-seeking (Hiscox 2002: 6, 162–
163). Again, this is a logical consequence of the model, but it is
hard to find direct evidence that Rehn and Meidner ever thought
this way. In fact, what they did say shows a desire to use mobility
to enhance productivity while squeezing profits, which is an
entirely diﬀerent rationale (Meidner 1980; Blyth 2002).

be deduced from them. Third, they put the politics back into

These reinterpretations of history become even more pronounced

political economy by putting the question of distribution front and

in the work of Mares and Iversen. Here the works of generations

center. These approaches take seriously the question “Who

of labor historians, and quite a few political scientists, are thrown

benefits?” They do, however, have some characteristic

into question in what is a rather apolitical reading of events where

limitations, perhaps the most salient of which is how the powerful

strikes, lockouts, shootings, revolts, Communist Party agitations,

beam of illumination such theories produce has over time

socialist Sunday schools, and hunger marches all become quite

become perhaps somewhat distorting of the historical record.

puzzling. After all, employers apparently wanted to give workers a
welfare state, so what was all the trouble about? This is a rather
bold position that may risk sacrificing historical accuracy for
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theoretical fit by reducing violent political struggles where

resources literature that this school juxtaposes itself to, no one

interests were opposed to a coordination game where labor

ever called Saltsj€obaden “the historic victory”; it was always “the

activists and social scientists, each lacking the correct theory,

historic compromise” – a moment when capital compromised

somehow misread business’ intentions. Countering such claims,

because labor had the whip hand (Blyth 2002; Hacker and

Mares notes that this scholarship argues that “the recognition that

Pierson 2002; Korpi 1978). Reducing all politics to a series of

employers have been active participants in the creation of the

coordination problems and incentives might fit the model, but it

welfare states does not imply that . . . workers have been passive

might also, inadvertently rob interest-based political economy of

by-standers . . . [n]or does it imply that employers have been

its politics.8

agenda-setters in welfare state reform”. . . [because] . . . “it is
often diﬃcult to distinguish empirically among [actors] underlying
preferences and strategic motives” (Mares this volume). Yet, if
one cannot make such distinctions, can one really link actors’
intentions to outcomes via their material interests, as this
literature presumes?

Developments in institutional political economy
As argued previously, what diﬀerentiates an institutional from an
interest-based explanation is the contention that institutions
structure choices and are prior to interests. However, as also
noted previously, there is a parallel reading of institutions that

For example, during the 1920s, Belgian capitalists insisted on

views them as chosen structures designed to reap gains in trade

including transportation subsidies in welfare packages. In this

and/or solve collective action problems (North 1990). In

sense, they helped build the welfare state. But the question

examining extensions of this body of scholarship, what stands

remains:Why did they do so? Under this framework, one could

out is how later institutionalist work has attempted to synthesize

argue that they did so to solve a coordination problem – getting

both sides of this literature. This desire to do so is seen most

labor to work – but one could equally argue that they wanted

clearly in recent game-theoretic extensions of institutionalist

such subsidies so that workers did not live near their factories

analysis (Hall and Soskice 2001; Greif 2006).

and therefore could not organize (Liebman 1979).7 So, did
employers build the welfare state to secure skills or demobilize
labor? It is perhaps worth recalling that the labor power thesis
that this “skills-based” explanation of welfare institutions is often
juxtaposed to is a bit of a straw man. In the original power-

Parallelling work by Iversen et al. (1999), Hall and Soskice (2001)
develop a micro-level explanation of the continuing institutional
diversity found among the advanced industrial economies despite
globalization’s supposed “regression to the institutional mean.”
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This “varieties of capitalism” approach takes firms to be the

extension of institutionalist theory, it does so by cleaving to what

primary agents of institutional construction and focuses on their

is, at base, a less “institutionalist” understanding of institutions.

strategic interaction in game-theoretic terms. Firms, seen as
actors in a series of infinitely sequenced games, are both the
product of and, more importantly, the producer of specific
institutions. These institutions come into being and evolve over
time as a function of nationally based firms’ attempts to find
solutions to five coordination problems that jointly determine the
particular variety of capitalism that a country has (Hall and
Soskice 2001: 9–21).9 Over time, such strategic interactions
among firms pursuing their interests produce self-reinforcing
institutional complementarities via feedback loops and increasing
returns, which in turn produce two distinct regime clusters,
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market
Economies (CMEs).
In this version of institutional theory, the weighting is very much
on firms’ choices creating institutions, which then serve as the
context of subsequent choices. But note that those institutions
are causally powerful only to the extent that these firms find the
institutional complementarities created by them to be useful
(Blyth 2003b; Howell 2003). In this sense, firms’ interests are
conditioned by and endogenous to the institutional content, but
the origins and maintenance of these institutions are exogenous
properties of firm’s prior strategic interests. Therefore, while the
varieties of capitalism literature represents a progressive

Also working within a game-theoretic tradition is Greif (2006).
Greif, however, uses game theory to move institutionalist political
economy in another direction entirely. While viewing institutions
as “chosen structures” that “structure choices,” for Greif the
weighting is the other way around. For Greif, institutions are no
mere context or instrument. Rather, “institutions are the engine of
history” (Greif 2006: 399). Greif’s empirical purpose is to explain
the role of institutions in producing the late medieval economic
expansion, and to analyze how diﬀerent institutions led to
diﬀerent outcomes among European and Islamic communities
(Greif 2006: 25, 252–255, 300–301).
Greif begins by attacking the chosen structures/structuring
choices dichotomy. As he puts it, “[t]hese two seemingly
contradictory views on institutions . . . must be bridged because
each captures an important feature of reality” (Greif 2006: 41). He
aims to do so by rethinking what an institution is and to then
embed this in a game-theoretic framework (Greif 2006: 14–28,
35–39). Greif views institutions as “elements” that can be
creatively recombined by agents rather than as objects cut from
whole cloth. As he puts it, “[t]hese institutional elements are
exogenous to each individual whose behavior they influence.
They provide individuals with the cognitive, coordinative,
normative, and informational micro-foundations . . . [that] . . .
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motivate them” (Greif 2006: 14).10 Key here is the stress on

act as if they were the fully informed agents of game theory (Greif

motivation and cognition, or, as he puts it, “cultural beliefs . . .

2006: 126, 138).11 As such, Greif is able to give a game-theoretic

influence the selection of institutions,” since the “motivation

institutional account of institutional stability and change, growth

provided by beliefs and norms . . . is the linchpin of

and decline, where material interests pale before beliefs and

institutions” (Greif 2006: 28, 45). Viewing institutions as a

ideas.

compound of beliefs and motivations leads Greif to explain
variation in the practices of Christian and Muslim traders as a
function of their particularistic beliefs and the institutions such
beliefs made possible. In brief, individualism and weak kin ties
brought about the corporation and growth in Europe; strong kin
ties and collectivist beliefs, in contrast, brought about in-group
sanctioning, a mistrust of diﬀerence, and restricted trade
networks in the Arab world (Greif 2006: 25, 253, 300–301, 389–
400).

Non-game-theoretic extensions: the developmental
A final body of institutional scholarship worth examining is the
literature on the developmental state in East Asia. This
scholarship took an entirely diﬀerent path from the previously
discussed works and developed a form of institutional analysis
that is much more classically “historical institutionalist.” That is,
this literature is more obviously related to works such as
Katzenstein’s Small States (1985) and Hall’s Governing the

In contrast to Hall and Soskice (2001), where game theory is

Economy (1986) since it deals with institutions as contingent

largely used metaphorically, Greif actually uses game theory, but

historical products that structure choices, but it does so from the

his employment of it is rather unusual. Greif is well aware of the

basis of the inductive observation of particular cases. Deyo’s The

standard criticisms of game-theoretic models as being too

Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (1987) was the

determinate if perfect information is assumed and completely

first major statement of this approach. Deyo and his contributors

indeterminate if information is less than complete (McKelvey

sought to explain why East Asian industrialization succeeded

1976). As such, its relevance for “the games real actors play” is

while most developing states’ industrialization eﬀorts failed. In

often questioned (Scharpf 1997; Munck 2001). Greif accepts

explaining this outcome, Deyo et al. highlighted the role of the

these criticisms and then uses institutions to rehabilitate game

state in industrial development and, like Hall (1986), stressed the

theory. Accepting that the assumptions underlying game theory

importance of institutional linkages. Specifically, the volume

are completely unrealistic, Greif argues that institutions

highlighted how institutions that promoted savings for investment

“compress” information into rules and norms that allow agents to

capital, insulated state bureaucracies, and facilitated credit
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controls were unique parts of the East Asian experience. Three

these states succeeded while others failed, with the answer being

contributions built upon this opening: Haggard (1990), Wade

“the right institutions.” But such an answer simply begged

(1990), and Amsden (1989). Haggard (1990) examined why Brazil,

another question: What made those institutions the right

Mexico, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore all began their

institutions?

industrialization drives with a strategy of import substitution
industrialization (ISI), yet only the East Asian states managed to
change to a more sustainable export-led growth (ELG) strategy.
Haggard’s answer to this puzzle invokes factors as diverse as
egalitarian land reforms and the size of the domestic market, but
what really drives his argument is state autonomy and, crucially,
the institutions that make coherent long-term industrial policy
over the heads of the powerful possible (Haggard 1990: 23–48,
261–264).12 This is why, according to Haggard, despite having
similar initial conditions and strategies, East Asia flourished while
Latin America stagnated. While Haggard situated critical
domestic institutions within a global context, Wade (1990) and
Amsden (1989) grappled with the details of East Asian
industrialization to see how rather than “governing the economy,”
East Asian states sought instead to “govern the market.” For both
of these authors, how the state organized, rationed, and
authorized inputs was crucial in explaining their success. At base,
rather than “getting the prices right” via wholesale liberalization,
these authors show how East Asian states actively sought to get
the prices wrong in order to direct capital into specific sectors to
overcome the problem of the small size of their domestic markets
and move up the value chain via ELG (Wade 1990: 108–112, 157–
158, 191–194). Such studies had a clear purpose: to explain how

Key in addressing this issue was Evans (1995), who sought to
explain variations in the growth and development of the
information technology sectors of Brazil, India, and Korea.
Creating two ideal types of predatory and developmental states,
both of which are interventionist but only one devolves into
chronic rent-seeking, Evans argues that what matters is how the
state simultaneously penetrates and yet remains uncaptured by
society. Key in doing this is a specific type of bureaucracy, one
that is meritocratic and eﬃcient. Evans argues that developmental
states with such “Weberian” bureaucracies exhibit a quality he
calls “embedded autonomy,” where “highly selective meritocratic
recruitment creates . . . corporate coherence” inside the state,
which facilitates the degree of autonomy necessary to formulate
longer-term developmental projects. However, this autonomy is
“embedded in a concrete set of social ties that [allows for] . . .
continual negotiation” by societal actors. As he puts it, “only
when embeddedness and autonomy are joined can a state
become developmental” (Evans 1995: 12). To make this
explanation more than tautologous, Evans brings institutions to
the fore, arguing that institutions give content to interests since
they “have a reality that is prior to ‘individual interests’” (Evans
1996: 28). As such, institutions, historically contingent and hard to
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replicate, once again appear as the source of growth and

same way across cases. They are also a reminder of how

development.

complex political economies are and how thinking institutionally

Extensions to this literature are voluminous and form a critical
part of contemporary political economy approaches to
development. Some scholars have moved away from the notion
of autonomous and enlightened elites maximizing pigovian
welfare functions to stress how mutual hostage taking in diﬀerent
parts of the state explains variations in development (Kang 2002).
Others have examined cases of failure and found that even the
best Weberian bureaucracies can be thwarted by noncooperation
by capitalists (Chibber 2003), while some are indirectly aided by
an ideology of isolation (Woo-Cummings 1999). Regardless, this
literature has made a significant contribution to our understanding
of the complex roles played by states in development.

Institutionalist political economy: strengths & and
weaknesses
Like the interest-based approaches discussed earlier, institutional
approaches exhibit both considerable strengths and some
signature weaknesses. One major strength is that they “move
beyond the tendency of conventional economic analysis to treat
all developed [and developing] economies as if they were
institutionally identical” (Hall 1997: 182). In doing so,
institutionalist accounts give us some leverage on why similarly
placed agents in similar structural positions do not in fact act the

allows theorists to compare across cases. What we also see in
this literature is a useful “coming together” of both sides of the
institutional chosen structures/structured choices dichotomy.
Scholars such as Hall and Soskice have become far more attuned
to how institutions are chosen structures, while scholars on the
other side of the divide, such as Greif, are increasingly concerned
with how they structure choices. There are also, of course, some
general limitations to institutionalist analysis, such as the
availability of comparative cases, but as each branch of this
literature has developed, each exhibits its own characteristic
strengths and weaknesses. The approach to institutionalism
exemplified by the “varieties” approach of Hall and Soskice has
quickly become one of the most copied, and critiqued, positions
in the literature. Criticisms of this type of institutionalist political
economy tend to revolve around three issues. First, there is the
tendency to confuse ideal types with real existing political
economies, with the result that the more one takes the ideal to be
real, the fewer actual cases the model seems to fit (Crouch 2005;
Campbell and Pedersen 2007). Second is the tendency, similar to
that found in Mares and Iversen, to see political struggle as a
“too-rational” process where functional fit and self-regulating
equilibrium institutions replace more basic political struggles
(Howell 2003). Third is the attribution of causes to sets of
institutions whose purported eﬀects may be generated elsewhere
(Blyth 2003b).
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Greif’s institutionalism, emblematic of the recent “sociological

approaches, is severely attenuated, as recent discussions of the

turn” of economics (Greif 2006: 22), is burdened by a separate set

relevance of the developmental state model for the Chinese

of concerns. Perhaps the most basic concern is whether the

experience demonstrate (Tsai 2002, 2007).

game (theory) is worth the candle. While multimethod
interdisciplinary work is to be applauded, such explanations must

Beyond coalitions & institutions: ideational political

add value to other approaches. Subtract the game theory

economy

exposition of the cases and the reinterpretation of everyday
economic and sociological concepts, and one is arguably left with

As argued previously, Katzenstein’s Small States (1985) opened

a rather strong culturalist framework where, because agents think

the door to moving beyond material and institutional approaches,

in certain categories, given the institutions that their unique ideas

suggesting that ideas and ideologies needed to be taken

and beliefs allow them to build, such agents act in specific ways,

seriously as explanatory concepts in their own right. This call has

given the institutions that their unique ideas and beliefs allow

been taken up by a diverse group of political economists. While

them to build (Seabrooke 2006: 26). Why one needs higher math

such approaches began with, and to some extent retained, a

to reach a rather tautological conclusion that anthropologists

focus on how elites instrumentally use ideas as resources, more

grew dissatisfied with a generation ago is an open question.

recent literature has sought to go beyond this instrumentalist

Finally, the analyses that grew out of the focus on the

position. To trace how this branch of political economy has

developmental state also have several limitations. In contrast to

evolved over time, I group ideational works under two headings:

our other two versions of institutionalist political economy where

ideas as resources and conventions, and ideas as governance

“theoretical overreach” may be a problem, what this literature

technologies spread of Keynesian ideas across nations (Hall

exhibits is arguably a lack of theoretical reach. Being inductively

1989). Building on his prior work on how institutions structure

generated from the examination of a few select cases sets up a

choices, Hall examined diﬀerent national receptions of Keynesian

classic “survivorship bias” problem (Taleb 2007).13 By correlating

ideas as a way of explaining institutional change. Specifically,

the attributes of “winners” as causes, when “losers” are

how individual actors used Keynesian ideas as resources to forge

encountered they are examined from the premises generated by

new social coalitions during the dislocation of the 1930s comes

analyses of the successful cases, thus biasing the results. Given

to the fore in this analysis. In contrast to materialist models, in

this, the portability of the framework outside of the cases where it

Hall’s view, exogenous shocks to agents’ material positions do

was developed, a strength of deductively derived interest-based

not unproblematically translate into new political preferences
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without some kind of elite mediation as to what such shocks

ideas so successful in its time? Berman focuses squarely on

signify; hence the importance of Keynesian ideas. For Hall, what

ideas and how elites use ideas, not just to fashion coalitions, as

determines the degree to which such elite mediation is possible,

stated earlier, but in a prior step, to interpret what changes in the

and whether such ideas can recast political debate and thus

political economy mean for other agents (Berman 2006). In doing

possible lines of cleavage, is the ideas’ degree of “fit” with the

so, Berman moves beyond ideas as individual resources and

existing “structure of political discourse” of a nation (Hall 1989:

stresses the importance of ideas as intersubjective conventions

383). Building on Hall’s opening were several contributions that

that can restructure agents’ interests. Berman argues that fascism

created a head of steam for ideational scholarship during the

came to power because of the “cognitive locking” Marxist

1990s. Notable and influential were Sikkink’s examination of how

thinking encouraged among left parties in the 1920s and 1930s.

developmentalist ideas impacted economic policymaking in Latin

Marxism was, especially for the German Social Democrats (SPD),

America (Sikkink 1991); how ideas can serve as “road maps” and

the paradigm through which contemporary developments were

focal points in situations of multiple equilibria (Goldstein and

understood. As such, rigid adherence to the axioms of historical

Keohane 1993); and how neoliberal ideas informed the project of

materialism prevented the SPD from reacting in any positive way

EMU (McNamara 1998).

to the Depression. After all, if capitalism was going to come

What these contributions all have in common is the instrumental
use of ideas. That is, ideas are used by agents to realize their
goals. However, within this literature there is, implicitly at least,
another position: that ideas are not reducible to agents’ a priori

tumbling down, and Marxism told you why, and also told you that
this was a good thing, why try to stop it? Trapped within this
logic, left parties became forces for political inaction, which
paradoxically laid the groundwork for the rise of fascist parties.

material interests or institutional position (McNamara 1998: 6–9).

Unencumbered by such ideas, fascist parties were able to oﬀer

Once “let out of the box,” ideas “have a life of their own” and can

alternative diagnoses of and hence alternative policies to the

take interests in new and unexpected directions. To understand

Depression that diﬀered from those of liberals (“just wait until

this subtle but important distinction, consider the work of Berman

things get better”) or those of Marxists (“just wait; it can only get

(2006), Blyth (2002), and Jabko (2006). Berman asks two

worse”). Fascist parties were then able, through argument and

questions: First, why, during the crisis of the 1920s and 1930s,

action, to create a new narrative of what the Depression meant

did two sets of political ideas came to prominence: social

(and who was responsible for it) that recast agents’ interests and

democracy and fascism? And second, why was the set of fascist

served as the basis of their new coalitions. For Berman, ideas are
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indeed instruments, but they are instruments that can recast

consequential purposive action” (Katznelson 2003: 274). In these

interests. They are social technologies that frame and decode

unsettled times, the power of ideas to make agents powerful

complex environments such that intersubjective understandings

comes to the fore. This theme is developed further in the work of

can be created among diﬀerentially located actors as a necessary

Jabko (2006). Jabko asks where the ideas for the institutional

step in mobilizing collective action.

design of the European Union (EU) came from. For Jabko, a focus

My own work very much follows in this tradition of viewing ideas
as both resources and conventions. In Great Transformations
(Blyth 2002) I oﬀered an explanation of why one common
phenomenon, deflation, produced institutional responses as
varied as Japanese imperialism, Italian fascism, and Swedish
social democracy. Focusing on ideas as interfaces with the world
constructed by agents to make sense of complexity and
uncertainty, I sought to show how economic ideas formed the
basis of both the distinctive social coalitions and new institutions
that emerged in these periods in the United States and Sweden. I
argued that ideas matter for political economy explanations to the
extent that phenomena such as deflation and inflation can
produce nonprobabilistic Knightian uncertainty, a situation where

on French elites (Parsons 2003) or on a transnational “neoliberal
consensus” (McNamara 1998) is necessary but insuﬃcient to
explain the institutional form of the EU. Jabko focuses instead on
the role of the European Commission, a weak actor at the heart of
the EU as the generator and transmitter some very constituencyspecific ideas (Jabko 2006: 42–57). As a weak actor that
nonetheless held a critical position in the emerging European
system of transnational governance, Jabko argues, the
Commission “worked at constructing a particular integrationist
agenda . . . premised on the renewed popularity of market
ideas” (Jabko 2006: 48). The Commission thus “sold” the project
of integration to diﬀerent constituencies according to logics those
constituencies wanted to hear.15

agents can be unsure of what their interests are because

By “playing the market” in this way, the Commission was able to

following their first-best strategies leads to Pareto-inferior

bring other, more powerful actors on board and create

outcomes (Blyth 2002, 2007, 2008). In such moments, when

momentum for a series of institutional reforms that were in no

individually rational actions lead to collectively suboptimal

way reducible to the supposed material interests of the actors in

outcomes, uncertainty over what has gone wrong and what to do

whose name these reforms were made, including the Commission

about it leads to an indeterminacy between structure and action

itself. In all of these accounts, what comes across clearly is the

where, as Ira Katznelson has put it, “structurally induced

contingency of political change and institutional development.

unsettled times can provoke possibilities for particularly

Rather than the linear equation of “structural position ! interests !
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actions” that we find in interest-based accounts or the path

subject positions.16 Langley analyzes how pensions in the United

dependence of institutional accounts (Pierson 2004; Mahoney

States and the United Kingdom have increasingly moved from the

2000), these approaches stress, as do constructivist accounts in

province of the state to the market, characterized by a decline in

general, how things “could have been diﬀerent” had it not been

state-based funding and a general shift from defined to defined

for certain socially constructed (ideational) factors (Hacking 1999;

contribution schemes (Langley 2006a: 920). This much is well

Hay 1999). Given this, what other perspectives take as almost

known. What is not so obvious is how such schemes rest upon

overdetermined, these accounts portray as underdetermined and

creating a particular subject, what Langley calls the

dependent upon the particular constructions wielded by less than

“entrepreneurial investor subject” (Langley 2006a: 921). Crucially,

powerful actors. Once again, ideas are not simply weapons

such subjects are not simply “out there” as already constituted

wielded by powerful agents, although they can be that. Instead,

individuals waiting around for the financial services industry to

ideas are contingent properties that can make agents powerful

pick them up.17 After all, why should, for example, a technical

(Epstein 2008).

worker in an export industry have a given “interest” in a defined

Ideas as governance technologies

contribution program?
Such subjects must be discursively constructed before they can

A final contribution to this literature worth mentioning goes further

act in the political economy as entrepreneurial agents. For

still. These authors seek to understand how particular ideas not

Langley, the creation of such subjects rests upon “the sidelining

only serve as resources or intersubjective conventions, but are

of insurance as a means of . . . managing . . . risks in favor of the

themselves technologies of governance. One such attempt of

promotion of investment . . . to bear risk.” In such a world, risk is

note is the work of Paul Langley, who applies actor-network

no longer “represented as potential dangers to be collectively

theory to the study of pension privatization and mortgage

managed . . . [instead] ‘risk’ [is] represented as . . . a reward for

securitization (Langley 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). Again, while

individuals” (Langley 2006a: 921). Creating such subject positions

materialist and institutionalist analyses of these phenomena do

is then not simply a matter of appealing to agents’ pre-given

point to important determinants of choice and action (Brooks

interests. Rather, it is a process of discursive construction where

2005), what Langley brings to our attention is how such

instruments as varied as popular television programs on

“topdown” projects rely upon not just an appeal to agents’

investment, state-sponsored savings programs (401[k]s), and

interests, but an attempt to craft particular subjectivities and

calculative technologies of credit reporting are brought to bear to
116

create particular risk-bearing subjects who “perform” risk-bearing

“performance” over time in the world, made the world more like

practices. Taking this focus on “performativity” further, that is,

the theory (MacKenzie 2006: 143–179). In particular, the use of

investigating how the action of employing ideas that seek to

the Black–Scholes options pricing model by market participants,

represent or measure a given phenomenon brings the

which made assumptions about markets having zero transactions

phenomenon into being, is MacKenzie’s work on the performative

costs and being eﬃcient, helped legitimate arguments and

role of financial theory in the economy (MacKenzie 2006). For

policies designed to make markets more eﬃcient (MacKenzie

MacKenzie, financial ideas do not merely describe the world; they

2003: 854). Doing so, in turn, enabled agents to employ the

can also help bring that world into being. As he puts it, “financial

model in ever wider areas of finance such that the fit between the

economics . . . did more than analyze markets; it altered them. It

model and the reality it purported to describe increased over

was an ‘engine’ . . . an active force transforming its environment,

time. As he puts it, using the model “altered patterns of pricing in

not a camera passively recording it” (MacKenzie 2006: 12). For

a way that increased the validity of the model’s

MacKenzie, economic analyses do not stand outside of reality,

predictions” (MacKenzie 2003: 852).

“analyzing it as an external thing” (MacKenzie 2006: 16). Rather,
as is common in complex social systems, there is an
interdependence of subject and object such that beliefs about the
former influence the behavior of the latter. As a consequence,
applying an idea changes the nature of the system where it is
applied (Blyth 2008). This is more than Merton’s famous idea of a
“self-fulfilling prophecy” (Merton 1968). In this case, by
performing theory, MacKenzie draws attention to how the use of
specific models in financial markets becomes part of the
infrastructure of markets. That is, such ideas constitute the
“algorithms, procedures, routines, and material devices” that are
markets (MacKenzie 2006: 19).

In a wonderful case of causal recursion, it was not that the
model’s fit got better over time as its accuracy grew. Rather, the
model’s usage by more and more actors made the markets
themselves behave more like the model (MacKenzie 2006: 263–
268; 2003: 852–856). These developments, in turn, enabled
agents to deploy ever more sophisticated risk-calculating
technologies based on these same ideas that, in turn, allowed the
development of the “risk society” and risk-bearing subjects
Langley is concerned with (MacKenzie 2006: 211–243). In sum,
these approaches show how ideas not only inform but constitute
structures of governance. Following Hirschman (1978), Langley
and MacKenzie show how ideas themselves can constitute and

Given this object/subject interdependence, MacKenzie shows

alter the world they supposedly describe. By constructing

how the use of particular financial technologies, their

subjects and performing theory, we gain insight into how
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governance is not simply a property of government, but is

change oﬀers a very diﬀerent vantage to the soft functionalism of

something that occurs on and through individual agents.

interest-based and institutionalist approaches that sometimes see

Ideational political economy: strengths &
weaknesses

the world as all too stable.
However, like our other approaches, it has certain problems. First
of all, disentangling the eﬀects of ideas from other factors, if seen

Like interest-based and institutional approaches, ideational

as possible at all, is extremely diﬃcult. That agents thought in a

approaches have specific strengths and particular weaknesses.

certain way may be established, but the extent to which

One strength is that such work enables analysts to ask questions

outcomes are directly attributable to these ideas is still diﬃcult to

that other approaches do not even consider asking. After all, if

ascertain. Strategies can be applied to attack this problem

one takes complex mediated phenomena such as the causal

(Parsons 2003, 2007), but the “How much do ideas matter?”

generators behind deflation, globalization, and multigenerational

question never really goes away.18 A second perennial question

institution building projects to be equally obvious to all agents,

is “Where do such ideas come from?” This is a problem because

then there would be no point in attending to ideas. However, as

if ideas are reducible to agents’ interests, and if they really are just

these examples show, while interest-based accounts can point to

instruments to help people get what they want, then the

coalitions that “should be there,” given sectoral alignments, and

ideational story collapses into an interest-based account.19

while institutional accounts can point to path dependencies in

Finally, there is the quite reasonable question “What do such

policymaking, ideational approaches drop down below the level

approaches do to our ability as social scientists to generalize and

of the possible to investigate what real actors thought and did. As

predict?” After all, if contingency, construction, and

such, the problematic “reimagining of history” noted earlier is

interdependence eﬀects are as replete as at least some of these

avoided. Second, that agents’ subjectivities and interests can be

scholars say they are, then whether political economy can aspire

reconstructed despite their ostensible structural positions, as this

to the status of a predictive social science is questionable at

literature also demonstrates, is ruled out of bounds by other

best.20 Given these concerns, while ideas may matter for political

approaches. In this literature, interests are treated as something

economy explanations, it is not clear that they need matter for all

to be explained rather than something to do the explaining with.

the questions that political economists ask.

Third, this literature also excels in explaining change. Its focus on
the contingent and dynamic nature of political and economic
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The link not made? Rational choice theory &
political economy
I return now to the first caveat we opened with: the relationship of
political economy to rational choice theory. After all, one could tell
several other versions of this story that include rational choice as
a core component of political economy. One version would be a
more expansive set of four concepts rather than three: rationality,
interests, ideas, and institutions, for example. This version of
events would have Arrow (1948) and Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1953) laying the conceptual foundations upon
which Downs (1957), Riker (1962), and Olson (1965) build the
basic concerns of the field: spatial models, bargaining, collective
action, strategic interaction, to name but a few. Following this,
one could point to Bates on development (1981), Elster on
technical change (1983), Przeworski on left parties and social
democracy (1986), and North on institutions (1990) as the “killer
apps” of the period, and then, again as Levi has done in her
contribution to this volume, map recent developments from there.
Indeed, there would be nothing wrong with doing so, except for
the fact that it would essentially repeat Levi’s chapter. Since she
has done such a good job of this, I see no point in repeating her
eﬀort here. Apart from redundancy, however, there are other good
reasons for not including rational choice theory, and rationalism
as a concept, as its own category in this discussion of political
economy: namely, that interests as a concept are not exhausted

by rationality as a behavioral postulate, and that political
economy is broader than rational choice and vice versa.
The first issue is best exemplified by going back to the extensions
of interest-based political economy discussed earlier. One could
argue, quite reasonably, that while Iversen, Mares, Hiscox, et al.
can trace their substantive ideas to Gourevitch, their thinking,
both theoretical and methodological, is rationalist. As such, they
are more “rational choice theorists” than “interest-based” political
economists. I would not even be surprised if the aforementioned
scholars would self-identify in exactly this way. My point here in
mapping the field in this way is somewhat diﬀerent. Even though
this chapter seeks to draw boundaries using discrete concepts, if
one makes interests a derivative function of rationalism, then one
misses how other schools of political economy also deal with
interests: in terms of how our interests are endogenous to the
institutional context or from analyzing our “ideas about our
interests.” That is, theories of institutions are also theories of
interest generation, and theories of ideas are also theories of
institutional change. By reducing “acting on one’s interests” to
“acting according to a rationalist behavioral postulate,” one risks
ignoring what large numbers of scholars who also regard
themselves as political economists have to say about these same
questions. Second, political economy is broader than rational
choice theory, and rational choice theory is broader than political
economy. For some rational choice theorists, rational choice
theory is political economy – period. Consequently, if you are not
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doing what they do, then you are not a political economist.

described between the camps [rationalists and historicists] in the

Consider, for example, the introduction to the Oxford Handbook

earlier edition of this volume has subsided” (Levi this volume). In

of Political Economy (2006). According to the editors of this

sum, I argue that rather than rational choice positioning itself as

Handbook, “[I]n our view, political economy is the methodology of

political economy, it is more usefully seen as an extremely

economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and

important general position in comparative politics that has

institutions” (Weingast and Wittman : 3). Political economy is a

evolved into far more than an application of the methodology of

field where “the unit of study is typically the individual. The

economics to any and all political economy questions as defined

individual is motivated to achieve goals . . . the theory is based in

solely by the concepts of equilibrium, endogenous institutions,

mathematics . . . [and] . . . sophisticated statistical

and the like. That this is the case is clearly seen in the embrace of

techniques” (ibid.: 4). Moreover, political economy is defined by

ideational and other variables by rational choice theorists, not as

its common foci: “endogenous institutions,” “the revelation and

a takeover bid, but as a broadening of the perspective itself.

aggregation of information,” and “the concepts of survival and
equilibrium” (ibid.).
Now, while I fully admit that this is an approach to political

Conclusions: comparing approaches & the
question of boundaries

economy, one that can happily sit within the interest-based

Having said all that, I do not want the reader to leave this survey

approaches outlined here, it also defines itself in relation to sets

with the idea that the field started with interests, moved to

of concepts and categories that eﬀectively says to many of the

institutions, and now embraces ideas as some kind of teleological

other scholars discussed here that whatever it is they are doing, it

progression. This is simply not the case. All three of these

is not political economy. Rather than adjudicate the “one true

positions are vibrant research programs. That they emerged at

version” of the field, I find it more useful to point out here that

the same time out of the core concerns of three exemplar works

political economy may be seen as a broader field with more

is significant, but one did not succeed the other. What I wish to

concerns than are often portrayed by some rational choice

return to here is the issue of the boundaries of political economy

theorists. Indeed, as Professor Levi notes in her chapter, far from

and our second opening caveat: the extent to which this diversity

being monolithic, rational choice theory “now tends to be

of approaches is something to be concerned about or embraced.

multimethod and catholic in its approach” such that rather than

Key in determining this is the extent to which these diﬀerent

squeezing out other approaches, “the competitiveness I

approaches speak to one another. To the extent that they do,
120

political economy as a field has a certain coherence. To the

while other parts of it have headed oﬀ in entirely diﬀerent

degree that they do not, it remains simply a collection of

directions. As seen in the approaches reviewed here, theoretical

approaches within comparative politics that happen to focus on

divergence and convergence coexist in this literature. Varieties-

economic questions.

type approaches explicitly set as a goal a desire to bring the

As we have seen, each strand of political economy has a
distinctive evolution. Interest-based political economy has, when
seen in terms of the overall history of political economy, had the
most peculiar evolution. We noted earlier how political economy
was reborn in the 1970s as a partial alternative to formal
economic analysis. In its canonization in Gourevitch (1986) this
strand of political economy put interests front and center, but saw
those interests as nonetheless mediated by a host of secondary
factors. As noted, however, later contributions have been far more
reductionist. This strand of the literature has increasingly become
more like mainstream economics with an emphasis on equilibrium
modeling and formal theory, which is somewhat ironic when one
remembers that what “kick-started” this approach was a rejection
of economics’ separation of politics and markets and its
attendant reductionism. This strand of the literature now seems to

literatures of economics and political science together in a gametheoretic synthesis (Hall and Soskice2001). But approaches are
not defined simply by particular technologies. Greif’s use of game
theory, for example, productively steps beyond its usual
materialist/ rationalist formulations insofar as it is embedded in a
cultural and sociological approach that rejects notions of fixed
interests and institutions as products of conscious design. As
such, this type of institutional political economy can deploy
economic technologies without pushing political economy back
into economics. Finally, there is more mainstream historical
institutionalist political economy, here identified with, but not
limited to, work on the developmental state. This body of work
has continued the type of scholarship that Hall (1986)
exemplified, and has become perhaps the most common form of
institutional political economy practiced in the field.

be repeating this separation insofar as politics in these

Ideational political economy is the most variegated type and is

approaches is increasingly reduced to a series of coordination

also the most recent vintage. As such, it is harder to give an

games and/ or equilibrium states to be modeled. For some

account of its evolution. What one can say is that it has become

scholars this is a concern; for others, it is a sign of progress.

an approach to be reckoned with in its own right. Although this

Indeed, the evolution of one strand of institutional political
economy in part reflects this “back to economics” tendency,

approach contains within it everyone from “thin” constructivists to
actor-network theorists, it has established itself asmore than just
a helper for other approaches (c.f. Goldstein and Keohane 1993)
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or as appropriate only for peculiar limit cases” where normal
dynamics break down. Its diversity of approaches, and the types
of questions it asks, certainly add to the breadth of political
economy approaches, and do so in a way that, even more than
institutional works, pulls away from a “reeconomizing” of political
economy toward a genuine postdisciplinary stance.
In sum, if one does not reduce political economy to a singular
approach, it appears as a diverse and thriving area of study.
Given that the object of study of political economy contains
everything from microphenomena to large-scale social processes,
such diversity is probably, on balance, a good thing. After all, in
an uncertain world, diversification is generally regarded as a
prudent strategy – not just to protect us from the “all the eggs in
one basket” problem, but to position us to take advantage of the
unexpected events that often destroy singular theories (Taleb
2007; Blyth 2006).
The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Ebook Central Academic Complete.
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Chapter 4

Development

Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Understand concepts of development.
• Identify characteristics of economic development.
• Analyze states and their overall development utilizing
tools such as the UN’s HDI.

Section 1

An introduction to the human development & capability approach:
freedom & agency
The human development & capability approach

from the earlier approach: first, the analysis shifts from the
economy to the person. Second, the currency of assessment

How would you define ‘successful’ development? Let us start

shifts from money to the things people can do and be in their

with two oversimplifications. Consider first an approach to

lives, now and in the future.

development in which the objective is to achieve and sustain
high rates of economic growth. In this situation, the unit of
analysis is evident: the economy. This may be the national
economy or the economy of a particular region or sector. The
currency of assessment is also clear: income now and in the
future. Trade-oﬀs, such as between environment protection and

In both situations, trade-oﬀs surface. Policy must consider which
groups of the population to focus on (distribution), and which
period of time to prioritize (dynamics). In the second approach,
there are also trade-oﬀs to be considered between which
aspect(s) of people’s lives to focus on (dimension).

employment creation, or between this generation and the next,

While each perspective takes a fundamentally diﬀerent objective,

are resolved by market prices, exchange rates and discount

they are not totally distinct; they overlap. Those who focus on

rates; in some cases prices may be corrected for social,

people’s lives are still vitally concerned with economic growth,

environmental and distributional concerns.

macroeconomic stability, income poverty reduction and many

Now consider an approach to development in which the
objective is to expand what people are able to do and be – what
might be called their real freedoms. It puts people first. In this
view, a healthy economy is one that enables people to enjoy a
long and healthy life, a good education, a meaningful job,
physical safety, democratic debate and so on. Notice two shifts

other means of improving people’s lives. And those focused on
sustained growth still concern themselves with healthy, educated
and skilled workers, and some modicum of peace and stability.
Yet as has been discussed in the previous chapter, normative
frameworks and ideas about what matters have enormous
practical implications.
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This chapter describes the second perspective, the people-

perspective on one set of issues. In addition to the annual global

focused one, otherwise known as the human development and

report, roughly 100 diﬀerent countries are producing their own

capability approach. Human development has been pioneered by

National and Regional Human Develop- ment Reports today, with

diﬀerent people under diﬀerent names and at diﬀerent times. A

some of these countries producing state or provincial reports as

focus on people’s freedoms can be found in the notion of ubuntu

well. These reports are intended to assess the quality of life of a

in Southern Africa,1 with liberation theology in Latin America and

population and be an advocacy tool for its improvement. The

beyond,2 with participatory development, community

analysis draws upon data regarding health, education, nutrition,

mobilization, rights- based approaches, sustainable livelihoods

work, political freedoms, security, the environment and many

and many other ethical approaches to development. It is equally

other aspects of people’s lives. In assessing the state of a

applicable in developed and developing countries. One of its

population from a people-centred perspective, these reports have

leading voices is the philosopher and Nobel laureate in

the political purpose of raising awareness and generating debate

economics Amartya Sen, whose writings on the ‘capability

on public issues and concerns which would otherwise not be on

approach’ provide the philo- sophical basis of human

the political agenda.

development and hence of this textbook. Later sections will
present his foundational work and its basic terms and concepts.
But, before moving to these, we begin by oﬀering an overview of
the key elements of human development.

Human development

• 2009: Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development
• 2007/8: Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided
world
• 2006: Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water
crisis

The idea of human development has been circulated in policy
circles and public debate for the past two decades, with various
degrees of persuasiveness, incisiveness and accuracy. One
powerful vehicle of communication has been the annual Human
Development Report produced by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). The first report was published

• 2005: International cooperation at a crossroads
• 2004: Cultural liberty in today’s diverse world
• 2003: Millennium Development Goals: A compact among
nations to end human poverty

in 1990, and all reports seek to articulate the human development
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• 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world
• 2001: Making new technologies work for human development
• 2000: Human rights and human development 1999:
Globalization with a human face 1998: Consumption for
human development
• 1997: Human development to eradicate poverty 1996:

them, simply because the production of weapons makes the
gross domestic product (GDP) of that particular country
significantly higher. The following quote, taken from a speech
given by Robert F. Kennedy on 4 January 1968, encapsulates the
limitations of GDP as a measure of what makes life valuable:
The Gross National Product of the United States is the
largest in the world, but that GNP, if we should judge our

Economic growth and human development 1995: Gender and

nation by that, counts air pollution and cigarette advertising

human development

and ambulances to clear the highways of carnage. It counts
special locks for our doors and jails that break them. It

• 1994: New dimensions of human security
• 1993:

People’s participation

• 1992: Global dimensions of human development
• 1991: Financing human development
• 1990: Concept and measurement of human development
The Human Development Reports were the brainchild of Mahbub
ul Haq, a Pakistani economist who wanted to see the world’s
economic and social progress assessed in a diﬀerent way,
moving away from the usual income and economic growth
considerations that had come to characterize the World Bank’s

counts the destruction of our redwoods and the loss of our
natural wonder and chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and
the cost of a nuclear warhead and armoured cars that fight
riots in our streets. Yet the gross national product does not
allow for the health of our children, the quality of their
education or the joy of their play. It does not include the
beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the
intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public
oﬃcials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither
our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor
our devotion to our country. It measures everything, in short,
except that which makes life worthwhile.4

annual World Development Reports.3 As ul Haq argued, a country

Human development draws attention to ‘what makes life

that sells weapons should not be considered more ‘developed’

worthwhile’: people. In so doing, the appraisal of income growth

than a country that has chosen not to make weapons and export

itself is altered altogether. The limited value of income and wealth
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has been recognized for centuries. Aristotle argued that ‘wealth is

The human development paradigm covers all aspects of

evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely useful and

development – whether economic growth or international trade;

for the sake of something else’ (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1,

budget deficits or fiscal policy; savings, investment or technology;

chap- ter 5, 1096a5–10). Going even further back in time, the first

basic social services or safety nets for the poor. No aspect of the

chapter of Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom relates a

development model falls outside its scope, but point of reference

discussion described in an 8th century BC Sanskrit manuscript. A

remains the widening of people’s choices and the enrichment of

woman, Maitreyee, asks her husband ‘if “the whole earth, full of

their lives. All aspects of life – economic, political or cultural – are

wealth” were to belong to her, she (would) achieve immortality

viewed from that perspective. Economic growth therefore

through it.’ Hearing that she would not, Maitreyee asks, ‘What

becomes only one subset of the human development paradigm.

should I do with that by which I do not become immortal?’ (cited
in Sen, 1999, p13).
That people matter does not mean that income does not. Income
is obviously an important instrument in enabling people to realize
their full potential. A 12-year old boy who wishes to pursue
secondary education and become a doctor might have his

On some aspects of the human development paradigm, there is
fairly broad agreement:
• Development must put people at the centre of its concerns.
• The purpose of development is to enlarge all human choices
and not just income.

dreams blighted by the fact that he has to The basic purpose of
development is to enlarge people’s choices. In principle, these

• The human development paradigm is concerned both with

choices can be infinite and can change over time. People often

building human capabilities (through investment in people) and

value achievements that do not show up at all, or not

with using those human capabilities more fully (through an

immediately, in income or growth figures: greater access to

enabling framework for growth and employment).

knowledge, better nutrition and health services, more secure
livelihoods, security against crime and physical violence,
satisfying leisure hours, political and cultural freedoms and a
sense of participation in community activities. The objective of
development is to create an enabling environment for people to
enjoy long, healthy and creative lives.

• Human development has four essential pillars: equality,
sustainability, productivity and empowerment. It regards
economic growth as essential, but emphasizes the need to pay
attention to its quality and distribution, analyses at length its link
with human lives and questions its long-term sustainability.
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• The human development paradigm defines the ends of
development and analyses sensible options for achieving them.

disagreements resolved? What about values that seem
reprehensible, ill-informed or harmful?

But income is not everything. The 12-year old would not have to

Because of human diversity itself, our respective values tend to

work if there were adequate public health services for low-income

be somewhat heterogeneous. Still, development in a given

families. And, in some cases, income does not help. A girl born in

society tends to reflect its most cherished values – of equity,

a well-to-do family might have her dreams of becoming a lawyer

harmony with nature, peace and order, material wealth or

blighted because her family and community think it improper for

children’s well-being. The UK is the fourth largest global economy

her to work outside the home.

but a 2007 UNICEF report on child well-being in rich countries

The first Human Development Report in 1990 defined human
development as ‘both the process of widening people’s choices
and the level of their achieved well-being’ (UNDP, 1990, p9). The
purpose of development is to enhance people’s capabilities, in

concluded that UK children had the lowest level of well-being
among industrialized nations.5 Not surprisingly, the report
created substantial concern. This type of analysis helps people
clarify what their values are, and what they might wish to change.

the present and in the future, in all areas of their life – economic,

In 2007, a British TV channel brought a group from the small

social, political and cultural. It is here that human development

Pacific island of Vanuatu to make an anthropological study of

rests fully on Amartya Sen’s core idea of capabilities and agency.

British people. The trip was sparked by an alternative index of

As these are very rich concepts, we will take time in the next

well-being in which Vanuatu ranked as the most ‘developed’

section to introduce these terms with care. For the moment, let us

country on earth, while the UK came in at 108.6 In one episode,

continue with our swift tour through ideas of human development,

the Vanuatu citizens spent half an hour in Central London during

by noting one feature: choices relate to our values and we have

rush hour trying in vain to engage commuters in conversation.

diﬀerent values and often disagree, so human development also

They could not grasp why people would pass each other like

is, fundamentally, engaged in an ongoing conversation about

objects and rush like bees in a busy beehive. As a newspaper

what it would be most valuable for us to do next.

review of the series put it: ‘This they thought was “crazy,” a

This issue of values is critical in the human development
approach. What are the valuable choices that public policy should
promote? Who defines what is valuable? How are deep

rejection of the most important things in life, which they believe to
be “love, happiness, peace and respect.”’7 Human development
raises issues of values, priorities and trade-oﬀs so that people are
128

better able to reflect profoundly on their circumstances and shape

Agency and the expansion of valuable freedoms go hand in hand

their respective societies.

(see Box 2.3). In order to be agents of their own lives, people

One of the central goals of human development is enabling
people to become agents in their own lives and in their
communities. As Sen argues, in development activities ‘the
people have to be seen … as being actively involved – given the

need the freedom to be educated, to speak in public without fear,
to have freedom of expression and association, etc. But it is also
by being agents that people can build the environment in which
they can be educated and speak freely, etc.

opportunity – in shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive

The human development approach is inherently multi-dimensional

recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs’ (Sen,

and plural (see Box 2.4). While, in practice, most policies focus on

1999, p53). From this perspective, development relies on people’s

one or several components of human development, the approach

freedom to make decisions and advance key objectives. People

itself is potentially broad. It is about education as much as it is

themselves decide upon what kind of development they would

about health. It is about culture as much as it is about political

like for themselves. When people and social groups are

participation. It deals with fiscal policy as much as health policy –

recognized as agents, they can define their priorities as well as

higher taxes on alcohol and cigarettes could be as eﬀective in

choose the best means to achieve them. Referring to the choice

giving people opportunities to live long and healthy lives as

between cultural tradition and poverty, on the one hand, and

spending more on health services. It deals with agricultural

modernity and material prosperity, on the other hand, Sen (1999,

policies as much as it deals with exchange rate policies – the

p31) writes: ‘If a traditional way of life has to be sacrificed to

devaluation of a currency may do more to promote exports and

escape grinding poverty or minuscule longevity, then it is the

provide farmers with greater opportunities to earn a decent

people directly involved who must have the opportunity to

income than farm subsidies. It deals with educational policy as

participate in deciding what should be chosen.’ While the

much as gender, environmental, industrial or technological

principle of agency is clear, its implementation is more complex.

policy. Human development thus relates to many aspects that

Many decisions are made by groups rather than by individuals,

concern people’s lives, not only economic ones. It can therefore

and a person’s ability to aﬀect collective choices varies greatly in

not be subsumed under one single academic discipline. It

diﬀerent contexts, as we shall discuss later.

encompasses many disciplines, including economics, law,
sociology, history, public policy, political science and philosophy.
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Thus far we have focused mainly on the ‘objective’ of human

necessary to demonstrate that the chosen intervention oﬀers

development. Now we turn to the process. Mahbub ul Haq

the highest impact in terms of people’s opportunities. When

identified four procedural concerns or principles which have been

applying this principle, one must conceive of eﬃciency in a

used repeatedly in applying human development. They are:

dynamic context since what is eﬃcient at one point in time may

equity, eﬃciency, participation and sustainability. Of course other

not necessarily be eﬃcient in the long run.

principles such as responsibility or respect for human rights also
matter. But we will start with these four because they are often
used:
• Equity draws on the concept of justice, impartiality and fairness

• Participation and empowerment is about processes in which
people act as agents – individually and as groups. It is about
the freedom to make deci- sions in matters that aﬀect their
lives; the freedom to hold others accountable for their promises,

and incorporates a consideration for distributive justice

the freedom to influence development in their communities. For

between groups. In human development, we seek equity in the

example in the reform of an education system, human

space of people’s freedom to live valuable lives. It is related to,

development would consider and try to draw upon the agency

but diﬀerent from, the concept of equality, which implies

of children, parents, teachers, the local community, teachers

equality of all people in some space. In human development,

unions, NGOs, the media, the ministry of education, the finance

equity draws attention to those who have unequal opportunities

ministry, social movements and advocacy groups for education,

due to various disadvantages and may require preferential

and so on. Whether at the level of policy-making or

treatment or aﬃrmative action. For example, the poor,

implementation, this principle implies that people need to be

diﬀerently-abled, women, ethnic minorities and other

involved at every stage, not merely as beneficiaries but as

disadvantaged sections of the population may need special

agents who are able to pursue and realize goals that they value

measures to enable them to have the same level of capabilities.

and have reason to value.

• Eﬃciency refers to the optimal use of existing resources. From a

• Sustainability is often used to introduce the durability of

human development perspective, eﬃciency is defined as the

development in the face of environmental limitations but is not

least cost method of reaching goals through the optimal use of

confined to this dimension alone.9 It refers to advancing human

human, material, environmental and institutional resources to

development such that outcomes progress in all spheres –

expand capabilities for individuals and communities. It is

social, political and financial – endures over time. Environmental
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sustainability implies achieving developmental results without

economics and in the social sciences in general, so it is that

jeopardizing the natural resource base and biodiversity of the

approach upon which we concentrate.

region and without aﬀecting the resource base for future
generations. Financial sustainability refers to the way in which
development is financed without penalizing future generations
or economic stability. For example, development should not
lead countries into debt traps. Social sustainability refers to the
way in which social groups and other institutions are involved
and support development initiatives over time, and avoid
disruptive and destructive elements. Cultural liberty and respect
for diversity are also important values that can contribute to
socially- sustainable development.
These four principles are not exhaustive, and later chapters
consider the rights- based approach, and aspects of justice and
responsibility, in greater detail. But these complete the swift
mapping of human development. The next section focuses in
further on key terms.

Going deeper: The capability approach

In 1979, at Stanford University, Sen gave the Tanner lectures on
human values called ‘Equality of What?’ He questioned the
adequacy of measuring equality in the space of marginal or total
utility, or primary goods. And he outlined for the first time his
conception of capabilities, which has been developed in greater
detail since. This section introduces the capability approach – its
key terms, its contrast to other approaches and how various
components interrelate.
In Inequality Re-examined, Amartya Sen writes: ‘A person’s
capability to achieve functionings that he or she has reason to
value provides a general approach to the evaluation of social
arrangements, and this yields a particular way of viewing the
assessment of equality and inequality’ (1992, p5). The key idea of
the capability approach is that social arrangements should aim to
expand people’s capabilities – their freedom to promote or
achieve what they value doing and being. An essential test of
development is whether people have greater freedoms today than

The human development approach has been profoundly inspired

they did in the past. A test of inequality is whether people’s

by Amartya Sen’s pioneering works in welfare economics, social

capability sets are equal or unequal.

choice, poverty and famine, and development economics.10
While Sen’s works cover an extremely wide range of topics, his
‘capability approach’ has provided the basis of a new paradigm in

Diﬀerent phrases are used to try to communicate this basic idea
in simple ways:
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• The Human Development Reports describe the objective of
‘expanding people’s choices’
• Amartya Sen’s 1999 book was entitled ‘Development as
Freedom’
• Sometimes the words ‘eﬀective freedoms’ or ‘real freedoms’ are
used to emphasize that what matters is the actual possibilities
not hollow promises or paper freedoms.

survival, health, work, education, relationships, empowerment,
self-expression and culture.
A vitally important phrase in the definition of functionings is ‘value
and have reason to value’. It sounds abstract but is of
tremendous practical importance. Why? First, functionings are
things people value. In other words, an activity or situation
‘counts’ as a functioning for that person only if that person values
it. This encourages the participation and engagement of those

Formulations of capability have two parts: functionings and

people whose lives are at stake, in order to ascertain whether

opportunity freedom. Sen’s significant contribution has been to

they will value changes that might ensue. Second, functionings

unite the two concepts. We start with functionings, which are

are things people ‘have reason to value’. The capability approach

being and doing activities that people value and have reason to

introduces value judgements explicitly. Why? In fact some

value. For example, being nourished, literate and employed.

people do value activities that are harmful, such as a

However, functionings are not limited, which is why the human

psychopath who values the triumph of the kill as much as the

development approach applies to rich and poor countries, and to

victim would value not being killed. The phrase ‘reason to value’

rich and poor people. Functionings also include playing a virtuoso

just acknowledges that given our disagreements we do need to

drum solo, having a good reputation and a warm circle of friends.

make some social choices. The issues that will be contentious are

At one point Sen considered whether one should ‘separate

many and include female genital mutilation, domestic violence,

“material” functionings and capabilities (e.g. to be well-

censorship, discrimination, air travel and so on. The capability

nourished) from others (e.g. being wise and contented)’ and

approach raises the issue of what process, group, philosophical

evaluate standards of living with reference to material capabilities.

structure or institution has the legitimate authority to decide what

In the end he suggested that living standards encompass all

people have reason to value. But while the capability approach

valued functionings. ‘It is possible that this way of drawing the

argues that public debate and critical scrutiny are often helpful, it

line is a little too permissive, but the alternatives that have been

stops well short of proposing one particular process as relevant in

proposed seem clearly too narrow’ (Sen, 1987, p23). So

all contexts, and rather depends on the agency of people acting

functionings relate to many diﬀerent dimensions of life – including
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in those contexts to address these questions themselves and

In Mexico, as well as in other parts of the world, there are people

build up and share their repertoire of good practices.

who are in the business of dealing with ‘second-hand goods’.

Capabilities are the freedom to enjoy valuable functionings. So
they combine functionings with a kind of opportunity freedom.
Just like a person with a pocket full of coins can buy many
diﬀerent combinations of things, a person with many capabilities
can elect between many diﬀerent functionings and pursue a
variety of diﬀerent life paths. For this reason, the capability set
has been compared to a budget set. Capabilities are thus
described as the real and actual possibilities open to a given

These people go to apartment buildings and neighbourhoods to
buy used things that people no longer want. This merchandise
can vary from clothing, electronic appliances and tableware to
CDs and toys. The profit in this business lies in buying things at a
very low price and later going to open-air markets and selling
them at a higher price. So the second-hand goods dealer is a
collector of useless things that he can occasionally improve,
which he then sells in various markets.

person. As T. H. Green wrote, ‘We do not mean merely freedom

The case discussed here is that of Jorge Solís, who began to

from restraint or compulsion … when we speak of freedom as

work as a second-hand goods dealer when he was 17 years old.

something to be so highly prized, we mean a positive power or

This was because he and his mother were left on their own. His

capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or

brothers and sisters had married and no one was there to help

enjoying’ (cited in Sen, 2002b, p586).

out with the household expenses.

Again, as Green’s quote implies, capabilities include only

People know that the second-hand goods dealer is in the

possibilities that people really value. Truly evil or utterly vacuous

neighbourhood when they hear him shouting: ‘Old appliances you

activities are not capabilities (although they still exist and must be

want to sell?’ Consumers like me hear him and invite him to our

reckoned with, as we shall see). Some of Sen’s descriptions of

homes to see what he is selling. One day, I saw Jorge through the

capability stress this, such as his description of capability as ‘a

window and I invited him in to see what merchandise he had.

person’s ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of
being’ (1993, p30). Box 2.6 illustrates the distinction between
functionings and capabilities.

Pedro: Sir, I didn’t hear you shout. I want to sell several things.
Jorge: The thing is that I can’t shout. I have a sore throat.
Pedro: Really? Have you taken some medicine for your sore
throat? Jorge: No, I don’t have enough money to buy medicine.
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Pedro: But if you don’t buy any medicine, you won’t get better

important to be able to choose a career than to be able to choose

and you won’t be able to shout. As a consequence, we won’t be

between an array of rival brands of toothpaste, and human

able to hear you and we won’t oﬀer you our things.

development needs to identify which choices are valu- able. Also,

Jorge: Well, yes, but there is no other way. I just hope that people
see me even if they don’t hear me shout, so that I’ll be able to get
something today and sell it.

the phrase ‘expanding people’s choices’ seems to imply that
more choices are always better – but this is not necessarily the
case. Often people value having to make only a few good
choices, rather than many cumbersome choices. As Sen writes,

What does this simple story illustrate? Jorge did not have the

‘Indeed sometimes more freedom of choice can bemuse and

functionings required to be healthy and this restricted his

befuddle, and make one’s life more wretched’ (1992, p59).

possibilities of promoting his services and receiving a decent

Actually the capability approach recognizes that the goal is not to

income. If Jorge does not have more money, he won’t be able to

expand the number of choices – it is to expand the quality of

buy the medicine he needs for his throat to heal, and the circle of

human life. Also, the term choices itself is problematic because

restrictions will not be broken.

the desirability of individual choices varies by culture, and a high
value of ‘choice’ is associated with western liberal individualism.

Common misunderstandings 1: choice
Through the years, a number of common misunderstandings of
the capability approach, and relatedly of human development,
have emerged. This section describes misunderstandings
regarding the role of choice, and the extent of individualism.

People also sometimes value making some choices together – as
a family or a community – and not individually. Also, in fact many
capabilities are necessarily the outcome of joint process, not
individual decisions. The term ‘choice’ obscures this – the
capability approach’s preference for terms like ‘real freedoms’ is
an attempt to express the core objective in a culturally adaptable

A misunderstanding between ‘capability’ and ‘choice’ often

way. In sum, ‘expanding people’s choices’ does not mean that we

surfaces, especially because the Human Development Reports

focus on expanding all choices – regardless of their value, and as

use the phrase ‘expand people’s choices’ instead of the rather

if the more choice the better. Furthermore, most choices aﬀect

cumbersome term of ‘capabilities’. The phrase has the advantage

more than one person and many are often made after

of being simple English. But the term ‘choices’ is problematic

discussion and consultation with others. So, in trying to

because it does not introduce the issues of ‘value’ and ‘have

‘expand people’s choices’ or real freedoms, we are not imagining

reason to value’ that are central to capabilities. It is usually more

that individuals are to make choices in isolation. Indeed, many
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capabilities can only be created and sustained by people acting
together.
Common misunderstandings 2: individualism
This brings up one further misunderstanding of Sen’s capability
approach and its relation to individualism. Often people argue that
the capability approach is ‘individualistic’ and by this wrongly
imply that it is a western liberal approach that presumes persons
act alone rather than as members of groups. To clarify in what
sense the capability approach focuses only on individuals it is
useful to distinguish three kinds of individualism, only the first of
which is advanced by the capability approach (Robeyns, 2005,
p107; 2008, p90 all quotes):
• Ethical individualism ‘postulates that individuals, and only

• Explanatory or methodological individualism presumes ‘that all
social phenomena can be explained in terms of individuals and
their properties.’
Many presume that the capability approach is individualistic
because it focuses on what individual people (not groups) can do
and be. First, we must point out that much of the work on the
capability approach and human development as a whole has
engaged groups specifically – women’s groups, social
movements, public actions, democratic practices and so on.
Also, many choices are made by groups, not individuals. The
capability approach thus does not defend methodological or
ontological individualism. But even if we are highly interested in
groups, the capability approach, as initially framed by Sen, takes
the normative position of ‘ethical individualism’ – the view that

individuals, are the ultimate units of moral concern… This, of

what ultimately matters is what happens to every single individual

course, does not imply that we should not evaluate social

in a society.

structures and societal properties, but ethical individualism
implies that these structures and institutions will be evaluated in
virtue of the causal importance that they have for individual
well-being.’
• Ontological individualism holds that ‘society is built up from

The reason Sen supports ethical individualism is that if the
smallest fundamental unit of moral concern is any group, such as
the family, the social group or the community, then analyses will
systematically overlook any existing or potential inequalities
within these units. For example, the deprivations particular to

only individuals and nothing (but) individuals, and hence is

women and children have regularly been overlooked by analyses

nothing more than the sum of individuals and their properties.’

that focus on the household. Only if we probe into the well-being
of each person do we have the possibility of discovering the
relative under- nutrition, or subordination, of women.
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A disagreement remains among a group of authors within the

While a nuanced consideration of individual capabilities seems

capability approach about the suﬃciency of ethical

suﬃcient to evaluate a state of aﬀairs, recognizing the vital role of

individualism. Critics have questioned whether a rejection of

social norms, groups, movements and social institutions is

ontological individualism is consistent with a commitment to

essential for developing policies to advance capabilities. We shall

ethical individualism. When human beings live together, they

return to this point shortly when we discuss the prospective or

generate something truly collective, which is more than the sum

policy role of the human development and capability approach.

total of their individual lives and cannot be reduced to individual
characteristics. Assessing states of aﬀairs only to the extent that

Why freedom? Capabilities not just functionings

they have a positive or negative eﬀect on the well-being of each

As highlighted earlier, Sen’s capability approach proposes that we

individual is therefore insuﬃcient. This group recognizes that

identify functionings – the things (within reason) people value

there may be something genuinely positive in the ‘irreducibly

doing and being. The focus of development and policy is then to

social goods’,11 even if it has been generated by the oppression

make people free to enjoy some combination of functionings,

of some individuals. According to this argument, an orchestra

allowing them to expand their capabilities. But, some people

performance has an intrinsic value even if some members are

wonder, why should we focus on freedoms so much? Do poor

forced to play. The architectural beauty of pyramids in Egypt and

people really want to have the freedom to avoid hunger and

medieval cathedrals in Europe provide other examples of

discomfort? Do they not simply want to avoid hunger and

irreducibly social goods which are of positive value to some, even

discomfort? In most cases, yes, but what is distinctive about

if built by oppression and with terrible human cost. A full

Sen’s approach is the substantive role that freedom plays. Here

assessment of the situation from either view would trade oﬀ the

are two of many reasons why freedom is important.

contribution to future generations of people’s capabilities to enjoy
beauty or other irreducibly social goods, against the lack of

First, if we only focus on expanding functionings, we could do so

capabilities of some workers. That trade-oﬀ is clearly contested,

by force, coercion, domination or colonialism. Most basic needs

with those supporting irreducibly social goods implicitly giving a

can be met in a prison, for example. Indeed, some countries have

greater weight to the generations that use and enjoy a good, and

used force to advance functionings: for example, forced

others arguing for a greater weight – or even for human rights,

sterilization or the forced isolation of people who are HIV-

hence certain absolute protections – to be given to those whose

positive. Focusing on freedom draws attention to social

capabilities are curtailed by the activity.
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development and the value of empowerment, responsibility and

opportunity aspect of freedom, while the notion of agency, which

informed public action.

is explained below, refers to the personal process of freedom.

Also, reasonable people sometimes choose to be deprived in one

Agency

area of life in order to enjoy another kind of goodness. A person
who is fasting is in a state of under-nutrition, which may seem
very similar to starvation. But, in the one case, the fasting person
could eat, although she chooses not to, whereas the starving
person would eat if he could. Similarly, a student who could live
well if he worked may instead endure poor and overcrowded
housing conditions so that he might obtain a degree. People

The third core concept of the capability approach is agency.
Agency refers to a person’s ability to pursue and realize goals that
she values and has reason to value. An agent is ‘someone who
acts and brings about change’ (Sen, 1999, p19). The opposite of
a person with agency is someone who is forced, oppressed or
passive.

should be free to refrain from a functioning for good reasons if

The agency aspect is important ‘in assessing what a person can

and when they so choose.

do in line with his or her conception of the good’ (Sen, 1985,

Note that, conceptually, ‘there is no diﬀerence as far as the space
is concerned between focusing on functionings or on capabilities.
A functioning combination is a point in such a space, whereas
capability is a set of such points’ (Sen, 1992, p50).
Second, the notion of capability is also closely related to that of
freedom. Sen defines freedom as ‘the real opportunity that we
have to accomplish what we value’ (1992, p31). Freedom, he
argues, has two aspects: opportunity and process. The
opportunity aspect pays attention ‘to the ability of a person to
achieve those things that she has reason to value’, and the

p206). Agency expands the horizons of concern beyond a
person’s own well-being to include concerns such as solidarity
with the extreme poor. From this perspective, people can be
active and creative, with the ability to act on behalf of their
aspirations.
Agency is related to other approaches that stress selfdetermination, authentic self-direction, autonomy, self-reliance,
empowerment, voice and so on. The strong collective desire for
agency suggests that development processes should foster
participation, public debate and democratic practice.

process aspect pays attention to ‘the freedom involved in the

Agency is inescapably plural in both concept and measurement.

process itself’ (2002b, p10). The notion of capability refers to the

In Sen’s view:12
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1. Agency is exercised with respect to the goals the person
values and has reason to value.
2. Agency includes eﬀective power as well as direct control, that
is, it includes not just individual agency, but what one can do
as a member of a group, collectivity or political community.

her up in prison. Anna’s achieved well-being has obviously been
considerably lowered. Anna is given the option to sign a piece of
paper declaring that she committed violence and is a member of
an extreme-left organization (which will then give her a criminal
record). If she does not sign, she will be kept in prison for an
unspecified length of time. Anna therefore has a (highly

3. Agency may advance well-being or may address other goals –

constrained) option to trade her freedom of agency for a higher

for example, relating to the good of one’s family or community,

achieved well-being. Becca had the same potential agency but

of other people and of art and the environment.

chose not to use it. She is concerned about human rights
violations and the hollowing of democracy itself, but does not

4. To identify agency entails an assessment of whether the

wish to sacrifice her achieved well-being for these goals.

agent’s goals are in some way reasonable – a person who
harms or humiliates others would not, in this view, be exerting

Such an example shows that the distinctions Sen makes are

agency.

important because, in evaluative exercises, one has to ask
whether the relevant dimension of advantage is the standard of

5. The agent’s responsibility for creating or sustaining a state of

living, achieved well-being, agency achievement, well-being

aﬀairs should be incorporated into his or her evaluation of how

freedom or agency freedom. The central claim of the capability

to act as an agent.

approach is that whatever concept of advan- tage one chooses

Suppose two sisters, Anna and Becca, live in a peaceful village in
England and have the same levels of achieved well-being. Both
believe that the power of global corporations is under- mining
democracy, and that governments should give greater emphasis
to global justice. Anna decides to travel to Genoa to demonstrate
against the G8 meetings, while Becca stays at home. At that
moment, Anna is using her freedom of agency to voice some of
her politi- cal concerns. However, the Italian police do not like the

to consider, the informational base of this judgement must relate
to the space of functionings and/or capabilities, depending upon
the issue at hand. Sen’s claim is that well-being achievements
should be measured in functionings, whereas well-being freedom
is reflected by a person’s capability set. A focus on agency will
always transcend an analysis in terms of functionings and
capabilities, and will take agency goals into account. However, it
is typical of Sen’s work that he does not defend this as a closed

protesters and violate Anna’s civil and political rights by beating
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theory or dogma: there can be good reasons to include other

therefore compare and contrast the capability approach with

sources of information as well.

other approaches to the evaluation of well-being that inform

Compare & contrast
Human development and the capability approach arose in

development policy.
With happiness

conversation with other approaches to development. At that time

Much conventional economics is based on a utilitarian approach.

– and, indeed, even now – many were suggesting that social

It assumes that the most desirable action is the one that

arrangements and development itself should focus on maximizing

increases people’s psychological happiness or desire-fulfilment

income, assets and other commodities in the interests of

the most. This view has made a tremendous comeback in recent

achieving happiness. This section compares and contrasts

years, drawing on new data on happiness and life satisfaction.

human development with competing approaches.

Richard Layard (2005), for example, thoughtfully examines how

Income, happiness and commodities are obviously important.
The problem is that, if policies aim only to increase one of these,
they might unintentionally create distortions. This is because

our entire economic system could evolve if our steady and
enduring purpose were to maximize a nation’s happiness, instead
of its income.

policies that focus on only one objective tend to ignore everything

This approach has tremendous appeal. Happiness seems to

else. For example, if a programme aims to maximize individual

invite a deeper reflection upon our material goals and values. It

happiness alone, it may celebrate the achieve- ment of a deeply

helps people see these goals from a diﬀerent perspective. Sen

joyous political prisoner, without feeling any obligation to address

and others writing on the capability approach consider happiness

the unjust detention in which the prisoner finds himself. A more

to be ‘a momentous achievement’ to be celebrated. But when

thorough analysis of the situation might appreciate the prisoner’s

you look beyond the headlines, some concerns continue to arise.

tremendous inner strength, on the one hand, while working
immediately to help free her, on the other.

First and perhaps most importantly, our mental utility may not
track in any predictable fashion the things we really value. A poor,

The capability approach argues that focusing on capabilities is a

devout widow may become serenely reconciled to her

more direct and accurate way of expanding what people really

circumstances, but this does not mean that she would not value

value. Focusing on capabilities introduces fewer distortions. We

also having warm socks and pain medication for her arthritis.
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Alternatively, a middle-aged man may become a hospice

Third, self-reported utility may often be biased by information and

volunteer following the death of his mother because he wishes to

social circumstances. As Sen (2002a) pointed out in the British

share with others the inner peace he has found as a result of

Medical Journal, the state of Kerala, which had almost universal

having come to terms with her terminal illness. In doing this, he

education and a life expectancy of

may share the pain and tragedy of others’ lives, so his
‘happiness’ would be lower than if he did not do hospice work at
all. But he would not wish for any other kind of life.

74 at the time, also had the highest self-reported morbidity in
India. In contrast, Bihar, one of India’s poorest states, with a life
expectancy below 60, had the lowest rate of self-reported

Second, happiness levels may obscure significant deprivations.

morbidity. The objectively healthy state was subjectively health-

Sen notes that people whose deprivations deserve systematic

poor and vice versa. How do we evaluate this? It seems that the

attention may often not be utility-deprived:

low self-reported morbidity in Bihar occurred because people had

Consider a cripple…. Suppose that he is no worse oﬀ than
others in utility terms despite his physical handicap because
of certain other utility features. This could be because he
has a jolly disposition. Or because he has a low aspiration
level and his heart leaps up whenever he sees a rainbow in
the sky. Or because he is religious and feels that he will be
rewarded in [the] after-life, or cheerfully accepts what he
takes to be just penalty for misdeeds in a past incarnation.
The important point is that, despite his marginal utility
disadvantage, he no longer (has) a total utility deprivation.
(Sen, 1980, p217)

less ability to assess their own health situation, and had less hope
of doing anything to remedy it. Subjective data, whether on
happiness or morbidity, is therefore conditioned, to a great
degree, for example by our knowledge, aspirations and peer
group.
With resources
Many other approaches to development focus instead on
cultivating diﬀerent kinds of resources; these may be assets,
property rights or basic needs, such as housing, food, clothing,
sanitation and so on. These approaches recognize the
fundamental importance of commodities and material goods to

His happiness rating, being durably independent of his quality of

our well-being in the short- and long-term. They identify valid

life, would therefore not provide a very good policy indicator of

connections between resources and capabilities, and argue that,

the requirements needed to address his deprivations.

in order to expand capabilities and sustain these expansions,
certain resources are required. In many cases, these analyses are
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utterly apt, and will form, as we shall see, an integral aspect of the
human development approach.
But measuring resources is still diﬀerent from measuring
functionings. The capability approach argues that we will

2. Environmental diversities (pensioners in Scotland will need a
diﬀerent income to keep warm in winter than pensioners in Dar
es Salaam);
3. Institutional variations (parents in a country with good free

inadvertently make mistakes if we try to give everyone the same

public education will require a diﬀerent income to educate their

resources, because people’s ability to convert the same

children than parents in a country without free public education

resources into functionings varies a lot. To take a simple example,

or with poor quality schools);

the same amount of rice (or other good), will be converted into
radically diﬀerent levels of physical vigour by a child, a disabled
teenager, an agricultural worker or an elderly person. Similarly,
people who are physically impaired require greater resources to
achieve mobility. Clearly, people have diﬀerent abilities to convert

4. Diﬀerences in relational perspectives (the material requirements
for appearing in public without shame when having guests
depends on local customs); and
5. Distribution within the family (the family income might not be

resources into capabilities and, if policies equalize resources, they

spent to feed the children adequately but instead to buy the

will disadvantage certain groups (in the case of food, labourers,

parents’ drinks).

pregnant women, those with allergies or with a high metabolism)
in significant ways. For this reason, we should aim for greater

In order to assess people’s well-being, further information is

equality in the space of functionings and capabilities directly.

therefore needed on other aspects of people’s lives – their health,
education, nutritional status, dignity, autonomy and so on.

Sen identifies five vital factors that are often overlooked when we
focus on income and resources instead of capabilities (1999,

Another problem is that people value things other than increased

pp70–71):

resources. The process of maximizing resources may have social
and environ- mental costs (changes in culture and lifestyle) that

1. Personal heterogeneities (a pregnant woman will have diﬀerent
nutrition requirements from an elderly woman);

people have good reason to reject. In the words of the 1990
Human Development Report: ‘The basic objective of
development is to create an enabling environment for people to
enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. This may appear to be a
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simple truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate concern

access to the resource coupled with the person’s own

with the accumulation of commodities and financial wealth’ (p9).

characteristics (balance, etc.), creates the capability for the

Putting it all together

person to move around town when she wishes. Furthermore, let
us suppose that the person enjoys having this capability to leap

A bicycle provides a good example of how these diﬀerent

upon a bicycle and pedal over to a friend’s house for lunch – thus

concepts relate. A person may own or be able to use a bicycle (a

having this capability contributes to happiness or utility.

resource). By riding the bicycle, the person moves around town
and, we assume, values this mobility (a functioning). However, if
the person is unable to ride the bicycle (because, perhaps, she
has no sense of balance or is not permitted to ride), then having a
bicycle would not in fact result in this functioning. In this case, the

The bicycle example illustrates how the various concepts are all

access to the resource coupled with the person’s own

related to one another when they coincide nicely. The question is:

characteristics (balance, etc.), creates the capability for the

which concept do we focus on? Which will be distorted most (or

person to move around town when she wishes. Furthermore, let

least) often? The capability approach argues that utility can be

us suppose that the person enjoys having this capability to leap

distorted by personality or adaptive preferences; functionings can

upon a bicycle and pedal over to a friend’s house for lunch – thus

be enjoyed in a prison or stifled environment; and a bicycle can

having this capability contributes to happiness or utility.

be useless if you cannot balance, so capability represents the

Putting it all together
A bicycle provides a good example of how these diﬀerent
concepts relate. A person may own or be able to use a bicycle (a

most accurate space in which to investigate and advance the
various forms of human well- being.
The capability approach

resource). By riding the bicycle, the person moves around town

The capability approach has often been mistaken for a theory of

and, we assume, values this mobility (a functioning). However, if

justice, which it is not. So what is it? Basically, while human

the person is unable to ride the bicycle (because, perhaps, she

development and the capability approach require positive,

has no sense of balance or is not permitted to ride), then having a

normative, predictive and policy analyses, two roles have been

bicycle would not in fact result in this functioning. In this case, the
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more visible to date: an evaluative (normative) role, and a

The Human Development Reports, both nationally and globally,

prospective (policy) role.13

represent a good example of the prospective or policy approach.
Prospective analyses ask ‘which policy should be

Simply put, the normative or evaluative role examines which

implemented’. A prospective application of the capability

capabilities have expanded:

approach is a working set of the policies, activities, courses of
action and recommendations that seem, at any given time, most

[T]he capability approach is a proposition, and the
proposition is this: that social arrangements should be

likely to generate considerable capability expansion and human

evaluated according to the extent of freedom people have to

development. The set of policies should be considered together

promote or achieve functionings they value. If equality in

with the processes by which these policies were generated, and

social arrangements is to be demanded in any space – and

situated in terms of the contexts in which they will be more likely

most theories of justice advocate equality in some space – it

to deliver these benefits.

is to be demanded in the space of capabilities. (Alkire, 2005,

Selecting capabilities or functionings

p122)

As we have seen, the capability approach is incomplete. It relies

For example, the Human Development Index is used to rank

on the agency and involvement of people in diﬀerent contexts to

countries according to their achievements in key functionings.

specify which capabilities to focus on, for example. As noted

Similarly, Robeyns refers to the capability approach as a ‘broad

earlier, the development process should be assessed according

normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of

to the extent to which it expands the ‘capabilities that people

individual well-being and social arrangements’:

have reason to choose and value’.

[T]he capability approach is not a theory that can explain
poverty, inequality and well-being; instead, it rather provides
tool and a framework within which to conceptualize and
evaluate these phenomena. Applying the capability
approach to issues of policy and social change will therefore
often require the addition of explanation theories. (Robeyns,
2005, p4)

a

Because of its resistance to overt prescription, the capability
approach is open to many diﬀerent forms of specifications
regarding what constitute valuable capabilities. Even if it was not
necessarily erroneous to look for a complete ordering of what
constitutes human well-being, it cannot be identified in practice.
This is what Sen calls the ‘fundamental and pragmatic
reasons’ (Sen, 1992, p49) for incompleteness.
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However, the task of specifying capabilities – for example in a

because not all human freedoms are equally valuable, Nussbaum

participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy, in a national or local

argues that one might need to go beyond the incompleteness of

plan, for an NGO project, or for inclusion in an international

Sen’s capability approach so that equal freedom for all can be

multi-dimensional health measure – faces two challenges: a

respected.

challenge of omission and a challenge of power. In terms of
omission, groups may inadvertently overlook a capability that is
quite important. Having a list of capabilities others in a similar
situation have selected can help people to clarify their own set,
and may bring to mind important capabilities they might have
overlooked or not dared to hope for. In terms of power, there is
always a danger that the powerful – be these economic elite, a
particular ethnicity or gender or family or party – will select
capabilities that advance their views, perhaps at the expense of

She grounds her version of the capability approach on what she
calls an ‘internalist essentialist’ position. Insofar as we
recognize human beings as human, there should be an
essentialist basis for any view about what constitutes human life
and what deprives it of its full human character. Her list of central
human capabilities is as follows (Nussbaum, 2000, pp78–80):
1. Life: Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal
length; not dying prematurely.

minority voices.
2. Bodily health: Being able to have good health, including
Many authors work to address these concerns. The most

reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have

prominent of these, Martha Nussbaum, has proposed a list of ten

adequate shelter.

central human capabilities that, she argues, should be the basis
of constitutional guarantees. In her view, having a list of

3. Bodily integrity: Being able to move freely from place to place;

capabilities is vital to avoid the issues of omission and power. She

to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault

notes that, ‘just as people can be taught not to want or miss the

and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual

things their culture has taught them they should not or could not

satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.

have, so too can (they) be taught not to value certain functionings
as constituents of their good living’ (Nussbaum, 1988, p175).

4. Senses, imagination, and thought: Being able to use the
senses, to imagine, think and reason; being able to use

Since what people consider to be valuable and relevant can often

imagination and thought; being able to use one’s mind in ways

be the product of structures of inequality and discrimination, and

protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect
to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious
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exercise; being able to have pleasurable experiences and to

having the right of political participation, protections of free

avoid non-beneficial pain.

speech and association. (B) Material: Being able to hold

5. Emotions: Being able to love, to grieve, to experience longing,
gratitude and justified anger, not having one’s emotional
development blighted by fear and anxiety.
6. Practical reason: Being able to form a conception of the good

property (both land and movable goods), and having property
rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek
employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom
from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to
work as a human being, exercising practical reason and

and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s

entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition

life (this includes liberty of conscience and of religious

with other workers.

observance).
7. Aﬃliation: (A) Being able to live with and toward others, to

Sen has no objection to Nussbaum’s project of eliminating the
incompleteness of his approach, as long as no one’s list is seen

recognize and show concern for other human beings, to

as ‘the only route’ (1993, p47). He also supports sharing best

engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to

practices in identifying important capabilities. Fixing one pre-

imagine the situation of another (this includes freedom of

determined authoritative list, however, undermines people’s

assembly and political speech). (B) Having the social bases of

agency. Setting a fixed and forever list of capabilities, he argues,

self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a

would be ‘to deny the possibility of fruitful participation on what

dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others (this

should be included and why’ (Sen, 2004, p77). Robeyns and

includes non-discrimination).

Alkire have thus focused on diﬀerent aspects of the process of
selecting capabilities, to which we return in Chapter 6. The key

8. Other species: Being able to live with concern for and in
relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play: Being able to laugh, to play and to enjoy recreational
activities.

questions to keep in mind when selecting capabilities are: (1)
which capabilities do the people who will enjoy them value (and
attach a high priority to); and (2) which capabilities are relevant to
a given policy, project or institution?

10.Control over one’s environment: (A) Political: Being able to
participate eﬀectively in political choices that govern one’s life;
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Ideas Related to Human Development

vote and be educated. It is the idea of equality between races
that put an end to the institution of slavery.

‘Ideas change history’. This was the theme of the 2007
conference organized by the Human Development and Capability
Association at the New School in New York. The conference blurb
read as follows:

The idea of capability, as opposed to utility, forces us to assess
policy from a diﬀerent perspective. As we have already discussed
in the first chapter, ideas about what matters profoundly influence
human actions. Ideas underpin normative frameworks, which in

The special theme of the conference will be on the spread of

turn underpin public policy. This chapter explores the relationship

ideas and their social impact. ‘The ideas of economists and

between the ideas contained in the human development and

political philosophers, both when they are right and when

capability approach and other related ideas in development

they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly

thinking.

understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else’ (Keynes).
As the famous quote by Keynes reflects, breakthrough ideas
in economics and political philosophy can change history,
but what are the processes that shape their spread? Ideas
spread and have impact through three channels: academia,
government policy and social movements. What has been
the experience of progressive ideas in the past and what are
the prospects for (the) human development and capability
approach in shaping development policy? What is the likely
intellectual trajectory of capability and human development?
Indeed, ideas do have the power to change history. Without the
idea of equality between men and women, or the equality
between races, the world today would look very diﬀerent. It is the
idea of equality between genders that granted women the right to

The human development and capability approach does not have
a monop- oly on ‘people-centred’ development theories
emphasizing that the ultimate goal of policy and development is
human flourishing. The basic needs approach held this idea as
early as the 1970s. Equally, the human rights approach holds core
human development ideas as being sacred, such as the right to
non-discrim- ination, to be free from hunger, to be educated, etc.
More recently, the idea of human security, with its emphasis on
freedom from violence, fear and insecurity
– all critical to the human development approach – has also
received much attention. How do these ideas compare with one
another? And how do such ideas influence policy? These are the
types of questions this chapter attempts to address. But, before
doing so, we begin by examining how the notion of free- dom
diﬀers in the human development and capability approach, on the
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one hand, from that espoused in market liberalism, on the other. It

From this perspective, it is possible to be free while starving to

is critical that these distinctions be clarified at the outset, given

death at the same time. In 1943, a famine struck Bengal, a region

the centrality of freedom to both approaches and to prevent any

in the north-eastern part of India, which is now in part the country

unnecessary confusion.

of Bangladesh. More than three million people died. As Sen has

Human development & market liberalism: freedom
compared

observed in his writing on famine, this did not happen because
people were prevented from trading, were systematically abused
by the military or because of food shortages (the amount of
available food in fact rose) – but because an economic shock cut

Earlier, we saw that the idea of freedom – as expressed in the

the earnings of people in a wide range of jobs (for example, those

concepts of capability and agency – is the core idea of the human

in the fishing industry) and left them unable to buy the food they

development and capability approach.1 But advocates of

needed. Sen (1981) has been able to demonstrate a strong link

unbridled market liberalism are also heralds of the idea of

between democracy and the reduction of famine. In countries

freedom. For them, increasing people’s choices and freedoms in

with a free press, and with political oppositions able to unseat

life also constitutes their main policy objective. That both human

unpopular regimes, government takes the action necessary to

development and market liberalism – understood here as the

make sure everyone is fed. Given the opportunity, people use

economic ideology that markets should be restricted as little as

their political freedom to counteract the inequalities generated by

possible – endorse freedom and human choices as central

uncontrolled ‘economic freedom’.

values, has led to some confusion about the distinctions between
them. There are, however, fundamental diﬀerences between the

For the human development and capability approach, freedom is

two. For market liberalism, freedom means first and foremost

not only negative freedom, such as freedom from interference,

being free from interference. For example, one is less free if the

but also positive freedom: the freedom to do or be what one

money one earns is taken oﬀ in high taxation, even though that

values. In order to enjoy the freedom of being fed, some

money is used for providing public goods, such as a national

freedoms sometimes have to be restricted. In the example above,

security system. Similarly, one is less free when regulations

the freedom to buy and sell can be limited to allow others to have

restrict the trading of goods across borders, even though the

what they need to live and flourish. Or the freedom of some to

restrictions might improve the quality of life of poor farmers in

speculate on the housing market can be limited so that others

developing countries.

can buy aﬀordable housing. In other words, the freedom that
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matters is not the freedom from interference from others, but the

health-care facilities by lower income groups (if the privatization

freedom that one has to live a good and worthwhile life.

of health services is accompanied by lower public investment in

According to the human development and capability approach,

the public health system).

expanding this freedom should be the primary goal of public
policy. A consequence of this is that economic and social policies
become deeply intertwined. The economic policy of increasing
interest rates, for example, has consequences for the freedom of
those who go into debt simply to meet the basic costs of living.
When human freedom is used to assess economic policy, the
policy itself cannot be analysed without overlooking its social
eﬀects.

Unlike market liberalism, which prescribes the openness of
economies and other ready-made policies irrespective of context,
the human development and capability approach is not
prescriptive about public policy.2 It never prescribes a policy as
being ‘good’ for any country. Its richness lies in providing an
analytical framework to make appropriate policies in given
contexts, within the overall objective of promoting human
freedoms. For example, if a country subsidizes the provision of

That human freedom is the ultimate objective of public policy

gas, this may appear to be a desirable social policy, since it

does not suggest that one could, or should, get rid of the market

lowers family expenditure, reduces wood and carbon

economy. The freedom to buy and sell, the capability to

consumption, and thereby promotes environmental sustainability.

participate in markets, remains an important freedom (Sen, 1999,

But, on the other hand, industries that use gas would be

p112). But other freedoms are important as well. Market freedom

advantaged over other industries, creating a distortion in the

is only one kind of human freedom. It is not an absolute that

market. And what was initially a subsidy to help poor families may

necessarily justifies inaction in the face of human needs or non-

turn out to be a government transfer to a group of industries.

market aspirations. If the free exchange of goods is only one

Thus, what is at first sight a good policy to help fight poverty and

freedom among many which we have reason to value, then the

protect the environment might in the end be an ineﬃcient and

marketplace should not dictate society’s shape but should

inequitable measure. Although the human development and

instead be seen as a tool to help realize the kind of society human

capability approach is not policy prescriptive, its policies are

beings have reason to value. For example, extensive freedom in

guided by the questions: Is this policy eﬃcient? Is it equitable? Is

market transactions may result in environmental loss (if an

it sustainable? Does it promote empowerment?

increase in the volume of goods bought and discarded is not
accompanied by a recycling policy) or in reduced access to
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Human development and market liberalism may have the same
concerns for ‘choice’ and ‘freedom’, but their underlying
philosophies and ensuing policies are quite diﬀerent. For human
development, choice is understood in terms of the valuable things
that people are able to be or do. For market liberalism, in
comparison, valuable choices are those that satisfy people’s
preferences. Consider the example of importing cheap goods
from China. For market liberalism, this increases people’s choices
in the sense that consumers in importing countries have a wider
variety of goods to buy from, and they have a choice to
buy the commodities at a cheaper price. But the human
development and capability approach asks additional questions.
Is it a valuable choice to be able to buy, say, toys made in China
for a third of the price of toys made in Europe (because of low
wages) and to be able to choose from a selection of 100 instead
of 50 toys? In contrast to market liberalism, human development
asks us to also examine the valuable choices available to the
Chinese workers who have produced these goods. The cheap
price paid may be a reflection of exploitative labour conditions.
Both human development and market liberalism oppose
discrimination but one does it for reasons of eﬃciency, while the

such as a more creative and dynamic workforce that could lead

other does it on the basis of human rights. For example, the

to higher economic performance.

exclusion of women from labour markets is seen by human
development as a denial of women’s right to employment. For
market liberalism, in contrast, the exclusion of women from
labour markets is a denial of greater economic opportunities,

While both agree on the importance of the state, human
development advocates a much larger role for states. For market
liberalism, it is not the role of the state to ensure a minimum level
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of well-being for its population. However, as we have highlighted

market liberalism even if both share, on the surface, the same

above, the principle of non-intervention often requires greater

concern for human freedom. This has led to a confusion between

scrutiny given the lack of equity and justice it often engenders.

the human development approach and human resources, a core

Within the human development and capability approach, market

concept in market liberalism. Both approaches perceive health

freedoms go hand in hand with freedoms in other spheres, such

and education as being the central focus of public policy, but

as freedom in the political sphere. This is why political and civil

there remain fundamental diﬀerences between them. Paul

rights, on the one hand, and economic and social rights, on the

Streeten (1994) highlights the following: first, he writes, human

other, are inextricably linked. That some groups enjoy the right to

development is concerned ‘with the unproductive, the lame

non-discrimination more than others is often the consequence of

ducks, and the unemployables: the old, infirm, disabled, and

political action to overcome discrimination.

chronically sick’, while human resources are not. Second, the

Another distinction is that market liberalism believes that
everything can be measured in terms of utility, income and
opportunity cost. In contrast, human development recognizes
that well-being is multi-dimensional. There are some dimensions
that cannot be compared monetarily: for example, if one chooses
to work hard during weekends, at the expense of time spent with
one’s family, market liberalism assumes that the two activities can
be compared on a single scale, namely, the amount of extra
money one can earn by doing so. Human development
recognizes that the fulfilment one derives from work, and
the fulfilment one derives from family relationships, remain
incommensurable. An additional income can therefore not
‘compensate’ for the loss of quality in one’s family life. This is not
merely a matter of ‘opportunity cost’: the benefit of extra work
and the loss of family life cannot be reduced to a single monetary
measure. Human development is thus fundamentally distinct from

human resources approach tends to treat people as passive
‘targets’ and not as ‘active, participating agents’. Third, seeing
education and health as ends (instead of means to other ends)
entails diﬀerent educational curricula and health programmes.
The human resources approach focuses on vocational training
aimed at the labour market, while human development aims at
education for its own sake and for understanding and
transforming the world. Fourth, both have a gender focus, but for
very diﬀerent reasons. The human resources approach argues
that it is important for a well-functioning economy for women to
participate in labour markets. Human development advocates
women’s rights in general, whether it leads to economic returns or
not. In sum, for human development, promoting education and
health does not have to be justified on the grounds of productivity
or eﬃciency. Even if a certain educational programme does not
yield high economic returns – funding a school for disabled
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people vs. funding a vocational secondary school – it may be

case for laissez-faire market economics. The post-war context

worthwhile.

was one that saw the rising influence of Communism in Europe

How the idea of freedom spread
The idea of freedom as conceived by market liberalism – freedom
as non- interference from government – had a tremendous
influence on the world in the post-World War II period, particularly
from the 1980s onwards, with Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher as its major protagonists in politics, and the Bretton

and elsewhere in the world. Within that political context, the Road
to Serfdom tried to defend the moral case for upholding the
values of human dignity and freedom against its alternative: the
model of a state-controlled economy. The book narrates the kind
of society that could emerge if diﬀerent economic and social
policies were at play. It specifically depicted scenarios about what
might happen if collectivist policies were to be implemented.

Woods institutions – the International Monetary Fund and the

The second ingredient is that of targeting ‘second-hand traders’;

World Bank – as its major advocates in the arena of international

that is, once the narrative has been written, it has to be

development. This conception of freedom did not however

disseminated to an audience. Hayek makes the distinction

spread in a ‘natural’ way. It was a conscious strategy

between the producers of ideas and the second- hand traders.

orchestrated by a set of individuals. In a paper examining how the

These are the people who communicate ideas to a mass

idea of freedom in the context of market liberalism spread, Alkire

audience (journalists, novelists, entrepreneurs and film-makers).

and Ritchie (2007) highlight the following ingredients necessary

The narrative is thus not restricted to an academic community but

for the spread of ideas, all of which market liberals deployed in

is shared with people who are able to bridge the academic world

order to spread their idea of freedom all over the world. Exploring

and that of mass media.

how this idea was disseminated may oﬀer some insights about
how other ideas, such as those in the human development and
capability approach, might equally be spread.

Third, ideas need to be sustained by an intellectual community. At
first, the advocates of free market liberalism had a diﬃcult time
finding employment in universities, and their ideas were not well-

The first element necessary in spreading an idea is the use of

received in a world where many young people were actively

moral narratives. In 1945, Friedrich von Hayek published the

flirting with communism. So they set out to develop an

Road to Serfdom. This was a clearly and accessibly written book

international community of scholars who shared similar principles.

– it was published by the Reader’s Digest – that outlined a moral
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They met once a year in Switzerland and became known as the

people who endorsed the idea of freedom as non-inter- ference.

Mont Pélerin Society. Its mission statement is as follows:

Another way in which students at universities were exposed to

The Mont Pélerin Society is composed of persons who
continue to see the dangers to civilized society outlined in
the statement of aims. They have seen economic and
political liberalism in the ascendant for a time since World
War II in some countries but also its apparent decline in

such ideas was through the publication of accessible policy
papers by the Institute of Economic Aﬀairs,4 such as the Hobart
papers, which summarized in simple terms how various issues
could be tackled by market liberalism, such as the role of the
state, taxation, housing and the provision of public goods, etc.

more recent times. Though not necessarily sharing a

A final, crucial ingredient is political engagement with political

common interpretation, either of causes or consequences,

parties and interest groups willing to take these ideas on board.

they see danger in the expansion of government, not least in

For example, the spread of neoliberalism in Chile in the 1970s

state welfare, in the power of trade unions and business

had a lot to do with: (1) a group of Chicago- educated Chilean

monopoly, and in the continuing threat and reality of

economists who worked closely with General Pinochet to manage

inflation.3

the Chilean economy; and (2) powerful interest groups, such as

In addition, intellectual communities need to be given academic
credence. This has been the role of the University of Chicago,
where the first chairs in free market economics were endowed.
The academic community was able to permeate the policy world

landowners, who had a stake in the idea of freedom as noninterference. In the UK, there was also very close collaboration
between the Institute of Economic Aﬀairs and the government of
Margaret Thatcher during the 1980s.

with its ideas through a policy think-tank, namely the Institute of

But freedom as non-interference was not the only prevalent

Economic Aﬀairs, which was founded by the donation of a

development idea during this period. Other ideas more related to

businessman (a chicken farmer) who had been inspired by the

the human development and capability approach were also

ideas in The Road to Serfdom.

present, namely the idea of basic needs, but the idea did not

A fourth ingredient is that of fostering talent and investing in
senior and junior members to disseminate ideas further. This was
done through additional donations to universities from the

achieve the kind of momentum that freedom in market liberalism
did because all the necessary preconditions for its successful
spread were not gathered.

business world to create lectureships and research positions for
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The basic needs approach

countries and ‘to create conditions in which the national incomes
of … developing countries would (increase) by five per cent yearly

The idea of freedom as non-interference did not capture the

by 1970 and would continue to expand at this annual rate

imagination of development economics overnight. An early

thereafter’ (Emmerij et al, 2001, p44). These aims were of course

influence in development thinking was that of economic growth

compatible with those of socialist economies. The state was

as the key mechanism for eliminating poverty and securing better

thereby granted a strong interventionist role in the economy in

living conditions for people, thereby increasing human choices

order to set up the conditions for high economic growth and to

(Srinivisan, 1994; Streeten, 2003). It was believed that an increase

achieve the necessary savings rate for investment. The idea of

in wealth would endow people with greater opportunities to live

economic growth as the major objective of development was

the kind of lives they chose to live. Streeten (2003, p68) gave

increasingly questioned by the narrative that began to unfold in

three justifications for this belief:

the 1970s. The narrative was as follows: economic growth tended

(1) that ‘through market forces – such as the rising demand for
labour, rising productivity, rising wages, (and) lower prices of the
goods bought by the people – economic growth would spread
its benefits widely and speedily’; (2) ‘progressive taxation, social
services and other government interventions would spread the
benefits downwards’; and (3) poverty should not be a
concern in the early stages of development, since what mattered
was to build the productive capacity of the economy first.

to concentrate income and wealth in the hands of the few,
increasing human choices of a few and leaving many in
destitution. The academic community first reacted by trying to
find alternative ways of linking economic growth with
redistribution policies by publishing studies such as the 1974
‘Redistribution with Growth’ by the Institute of Development
Studies at Sussex University. But the academic community
remained unable to find a suﬃcient number of allies in the
political world. Because governments were themselves part of the

This concern for economic growth should not be confused with

elite and reluctant to redistribute the benefits of growth towards

market liber- alism. When, in 1961, the United Nations General

the poor, it was diﬃcult to put this alternative approach into

Assembly adopted its first ‘Development Decade’, its initial

practice. Further and more successful attempts at finding an

objective was to intensify its eﬀorts to support both developed

alternative to economic growth were made at the end of the

and developing countries in their eﬀorts to achieve ‘self-sustain-

1970s, with the establishment of the ‘basic needs’ approach. The

ing growth … and social advancement’ in their respective

idea of the satisfaction of basic needs as the primary objective of
devel- opment emerged from work on employment at the
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International Labour Organisation (ILO) in the early 1970s. An

Although the idea of basic needs emerged as a practical

analysis of data on employment conditions in developing

response to poverty in developing countries, it lacked sound

countries demonstrated that economic growth and employment

formal and theoretical foundations. It therefore also lacked the

were not necessarily a guarantee of freedom from poverty.

backing of a wider intellectual community, which would have

Indeed, many hard-working people remained unable to have their

been instrumental in disseminating its ideas. Economic and social

basic human needs – health, food, education and others – met. In

narratives had also shifted in the 1980s, which did little to

1977, the ILO published a report on Employment, Growth and

buttress the idea of basic needs in the policy arena. The turmoil of

Basic Needs which formally introduced the idea of basic needs as

the debt crisis in the 1980s, and the imposition of

the objective of development policy for the first time. The idea

macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment policies that

acquired further policy influence when taken up by the then World

drastically restricted states in their ability to provide basic social

Bank President Robert McNamara, who set up a special

services for their people, essentially brought the basic needs

commission to work explic- itly on basic needs. The work of that

approach to a standstill.

commission, led by Paul Streeten, was published in 1981, and
became known as the basic needs approach, which was defined
as ‘an approach that attempts to provide the opportunities for the
full physical, mental and social development of human personality
and then derive the ways of achieving this objective’ (Streeten, et
al, 1981, p33).

It was only in the early 1990s that the essential ideas behind the
basic needs approach – that providing the ideal conditions for a
full human life require a multi-dimensional and non-monetary
conception of well-being, which should be the ultimate goal of
development – was reintroduced to the public policy arena.
Amartya Sen’s groundbreaking theoretical work on equality and

Although the basic needs approach initially emphasized that the

poverty measurement, welfare economics and social choice

objective of development was to provide the conditions for a full

theory5 – with Mahbub ul Haq playing the critical role of

human life (material, social, cultural and political), it primarily

translating these ideas into practicable policy through the creation

focused, in operational terms, on the minimum requirements for a

of the Human Development Report and the Human Development

decent life – health, nutrition and literacy – and the goods and

Index in 1990 (Fukuda-Parr and Kumar, 2003)

services needed to realize it, such as shelter, sanitation, food,
health services, safe water, primary education, housing and
related infrastructures.

– firmly established the importance of the human development
and capability approach in policy and development circles.
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The human development approach oﬀers three additional

war narratives. The Declaration was written in the hopes that the

dimensions to basic needs: first, it is based on a much stronger

atrocities committed during wartime would never be repeated

philosophical foundation, thanks to Sen’s pioneering work in

again. While political philosophers had long espoused the

welfare economics and social choice, which questioned utility as

centrality of human rights, ‘second-hand traders’ like journalists,

the primary marker for judging states of aﬀairs. Second, it blurs

and the political engagement of individuals like Eleanor Roosevelt

the distinction between developed and developing countries. It is

and public entities like the United Nations (UN), gave it enormous

a framework as relevant for assessing the quality of life of people

momentum after World War II.

in the US as it is for, say, Sierra Leone, while basic needs had little
application in industrialized countries. Finally, human
development places a greater emphasis on human freedom and
participation (although the latter was initially a feature of the ILO’s
basic needs approach, it eventually became less of a priority).

Human rights

There are significant connections between the human rights
approach and that of human development and capability. As the
opening sentence of the 2000 Human Development Report on
human rights puts it: ‘Human rights and human development
share a common vision and a common purpose – to secure the
freedom, well-being and dignity of all people everywhere’ (UNDP,
2000, p1).

In addition to the idea of basic needs, another influential idea in
policy circles in tune with the core principles of the human
development and capability approach was human rights. Indeed,
one could argue that seeing humans as ends of the development
process was not the sole purview of the human development
para- digm alone. It was, in fact, the central concern of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights as early as 1948: all
humans should be free and equal in dignity and rights (Article 1),

In a briefing on the capability approach and human rights, Polly
Vizard defines a human right as ‘a claim to a fundamental benefit
that should be enjoyed universally by all people everywhere on
the basis of equality and non- discrimination.’6 She highlights
five underlying human rights principles:
1. Universality: they apply to all people everywhere by virtue of
their humanity;

such as the right to work, the right to education, the right to
health, the right to vote, the right to non-discrimination, the right
to a decent standard of living, etc. Like many ideas in

2. Equality: the benefits of human rights should be enjoyed on the
basis of equality and non-discrimination;

international policy, human rights evolved as a response to post155

3. Inalienability: human rights cannot be transferred or taken
away;
4. Indivisibility: civil, political, economic and social rights are
indivisible – one cannot give priority to one over the other; and
5. Interdependence: economic, social, civil and political rights are
deeply interdependent.

assessed. The human rights approach enhances human
development with its stronger focus on obligations and duties,
while the latter remains an evaluative framework for assessing
states of aﬀairs. In contrast, human development does not focus
on the state and legal institutions alone. Ensuring that people live
flourishing human lives – through the protection of, say, their
freedom of conscience, movement or association – is after all not
only the role and responsibility of the state: it is also the role of

She notes that a characteristic aspect of the idea of human rights

multiple entities, such as civil society organizations, businesses

is that of ‘assignment of responsibility’. Human rights are usually

and individuals. If a country passes a law that ensures the right of

conceived in terms of corresponding notions of obligations and

every child to education, the human development approach will

duties. If there is a human right to, say, freedom of conscience,

go beyond that right and look at the institutional framework that

then there are obligations on behalf of states and other

allows that right to be fulfilled. It will look at the economic, social,

institutions to ensure that people are free to hold opinions they

political and cultural institutions that constrain or enhance the

believe to be true. The idea of human rights thus focuses on the

fulfilment of that right.

question: who should be doing what for whom? Given that
human rights are inscribed in inter- national law, nation states are

According to Sen (2005), the idea of capabilities is distinct from

therefore the primary duty holders for enforcing human rights.

the idea of rights in the sense that the former refers to the

States have the main responsibility for providing an adequate

opportunity aspect of freedom alone, while the latter also refers

legal framework and institutions that guarantee a respect for

to its process aspect. Let us consider two people who do not

human rights.

enjoy going out in evenings: one of them, a political dissident, has
been put by the government under house arrest after 5pm every

The major similarity between the two approaches is that both are

day and must be accompanied by government agents to all her

based on the maxim that individuals should not be treated as a

meetings and walks. The concept of capability tells us that both

means but as an end. Human life, and its quality and dignity,

could go out if they chose to. However, the concept of human

should be the criteria according to which states of aﬀairs, as well

rights includes in addition the process aspect in the freedom

as economic, political and social arrangements, should be

these two have: the political dissident does not enjoy the right of
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free movement. A focus on capabilities only can sometimes

freedom for a life of dignity. Human development, in turn, is

violate basic principles of equity. Sen oﬀers the example of

process of enhancing human capabilities – to expand

women living longer than men: if, in order to promote equality of

choices and opportunities so that each person can lead a

capability to be healthy between men and women, women were

life of respect and value. When human development and

denied health care, this would actively constitute gender

human rights advance together, they reinforce one another –

discrimination, which is a violation of human rights.

expanding people’s capabilities and protecting their rights

Another aspect that the concepts of capability and human rights

a

and fundamental freedoms. (UNDP, 2000, p2)

do not share is that of sensitivity to means. Two people might

The report highlights the mutual enrichment of ideas of human

enjoy the same right of freedom of movement, but if one were

rights and human development (UNDP, 2000, pp1–2): first, human

disabled, she would require diﬀerent means in order to be able to

rights draw attention to the accountability of governments and

enjoy that right. The idea of capability includes diﬀerences in

other institutions, to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of

means requirement: the capability to move freely would require

all people. Second, the idea of human rights requires a large set

diﬀerent resources for a blind person (such as special signs at

of legal instruments in order to enforce these rights and secure

train stations). The human rights approach does not necessarily

people’s freedoms. Third, human rights add moral legitimacy to

take such diﬀerences into account.

the objectives of human development. Given that the rights to

Another diﬀerence between the idea of human rights and human
development is that the latter emphasizes both the intrinsic and
instrumental character of civil and political rights.

education, health, non-discrimination and so forth are inscribed in
international legislation, this gives moral legitimacy to the
objective of development, which is about promoting people’s
health, education and so forth. Fourth, the idea of human rights

These diﬀerences suggest that both approaches are

draws attention to the people who lack these rights. It gives to

complementary and can in fact reinforce one another. In the

human development a sense of prioritization. Social and

words of the 2000 Human Development Report:

economic policies should be oriented towards those who are
deprived of basic human rights. As for the contribution of human

Human rights express the bold idea that all people have

development to human rights, the report argues that human

claims to social arrangements that protect them from the

development brings a ‘dynamic long-term perspective to the

worst abuses and deprivations – and that secure the

fulfilment of rights’, and ‘directs attention to the socio-economic
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context in which rights can be realized – or threatened’. Human

1994 Human Development Report shifted the focus of security

development focuses on the institutional factors that violate

from the protection of the state and its borders by military means

human rights and tries to find ways of changing these constraints,

to the protection of individuals from a wider range of threats to

and of mobilizing resources, so that human rights can be

their well-being. It defined human security as including ‘safety

guaranteed, because legislation alone is not suﬃcient to ensure

from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and

the protection and provision of these rights.

protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of

Human security
Along with human rights, another idea that was increasingly
prominent during the 1990s was human security. The idea of
security has long been central to the military world. Again,

daily lives, whether in homes, jobs or communities’ (UNDP, 1994,
p1). The report divided human security into seven main
categories: economic security (such as job security), food
security, health security, environmental security, personal security,
community security and political security.

narratives that unfolded in the 1990s played a role in emphasizing

Human security is thus much more than the absence of violent

the importance of security considerations beyond the military

conflict:

arena. Indeed, the rise of internal conflicts in many developing
countries led to an increasing consolidation of security and
development goals. Under- development, poverty and injustice
have also been considered as breeding grounds for civil conflicts.
Development, along with the reduction of poverty and inequality,
was therefore seen as a way of achieving security and peace.

Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more
than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human
rights, good governance, access to education and health
care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities
and choices to fulfil his or her own potential… Freedom from
want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future

Emerging from this changing context, human security attempted

generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these

to overcome the limitations of conventional interpretations of

are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore

security to generate responses that were suﬃciently adequate for

national, security’. (Commission on Human Security 2003,

dealing with the new sources of insecurity in the post-Cold War

p4)

period. Human security essentially highlights the fact that a
military solution is not necessarily the answer to insecurity. The
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Human development & human security
The human development approach, pioneered by the visionary
economist Mahbub ul Haq (under the broad umbrella of the
UNDP), has done much to enrich and broaden the literature on
development. In particular, it has helped to shift the focus of
development attention away from an overarching concentration
on the growth of inanimate objects of convenience, such as
commodities produced (reflected in the GDP or the GNP), to the
quality and richness of human lives, which depend on a number
of influences, of which commodity production is only one. Human

expansionist perspective of human development by directly
paying attention to what are sometimes called ‘downside risks’.
The insecurities that threaten human survival or the safety of daily
life, or imperil the natural dignity of men and women, or expose
human beings to the uncertainty of disease and pestilence, or
subject vulnerable people to abrupt penury related to economic
downturns, demand that special attention be paid to the dangers
of sudden deprivation. Human security demands protection from
these dangers and the empowerment of people so that they can
cope with – and, when possible, overcome – these hazards.

development is concerned with removing the various hindrances

There is, of course, no basic contradiction between the focus of

that restrain and restrict human (life) and prevent its blossoming.

human security and the subject matter of the human development

A few of these concerns are captured in the much-used ‘human

approach. Indeed, formally speaking, protection and safeguarding

development index’ (HDI), which has served as something of a

can also be seen as augmentations of a sort, to wit, that of safety

flagship for the human development approach. But the range and

and security. But the emphasis and priorities are quite diﬀerent in

reach of that perspective have motivated a vast informational

the cautious perspective of human security from those typically

coverage presented in the UNDP’s annual Human Development

found in the relatively sanguine and upward-oriented literature of

Report and other related publications that go far beyond the HDI.

the human focus of development approaches (and this applies to

The idea of human development, broad as it is, does, however,
have a powerfully buoyant quality, since it is concerned with
progress and augmentation. It is out to conquer fresh territory on
behalf of enhancing human lives and is far too upbeat to focus on
rearguard actions needed to secure what has to be safeguarded.
This is where the notion of human security becomes particularly
relevant. Human security as an idea fruitfully supplements the

human development as well), which tend to concentrate on
‘growth with equity’, a subject that has generated a vast literature
and inspired many policy initiatives. In contrast, focusing on
human security requires that serious attention be paid to
‘downturns with security’, since downturns may inescapably
occur from time to time, fed by global or local aﬄictions. This is in
addition to the adversity of persistent insecurity of those whom
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the growth process leaves behind, such as the displaced worker

security that the world currently faces and will long continue to

or the perennially unemployed.

face.

Even when the much-discussed problems of uneven and

Human rights & human security

unequally-shared benefits of growth and expansion have been
successfully addressed, a sudden downturn can make the lives of
the vulnerable thoroughly and uncommonly deprived. There is
much economic evidence that, even if people rise together as the
process of economic expansion proceeds, when they fall, they
tend to fall very divided. The Asian economic crisis of 1997–1999
made it painfully clear that even a very successful history of
‘growth with equity’ (as the Republic of Korea, Thailand and many
other countries in East and Southeast Asia had) can provide very
little protection to those who are thrown to the wall when a sharp
economic down- turn suddenly occurs. The economic case
merely illustrates a general contrast between the two
perspectives of expansion with equity and downturn with security.
For example, while the foundational demand for expanding
regular health coverage for all human beings in the world is
tremendously important to advocate and advance, that battle has
to be distin- guished from the immediate need to encounter a
suddenly growing pandemic, related to HIV/AIDS or malaria or
drug-resistant tuberculosis. Insecurity is a diﬀerent – and in some
ways much starker –problem than unequal expansion. Without
losing any of the commit- ment that makes human development
important, we also have to rise to the challenges of human

There is a similar complementarity between the concepts of
human rights and human security. Few concepts are as frequently
invoked in contemporary political debates as human rights. There
is something deeply attractive in the idea that every person
anywhere in the world, irrespective of citizenship or location, has
some basic rights that others should respect. The moral appeal of
human rights has been used for varying purposes, from resisting
torture and arbitrary incarceration to demanding the end of
hunger and the unequal treatment of women. Human rights may
or may not be legalized, but they take the form of strong claims in
social ethics. The idea of pre-legal ‘natural’ or ‘human’ rights has
often motivated legislative initiatives, as it did in the US
Declaration of Independence or in the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man in the 18th century, or in the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in
the 20th century. But even when they are not legalized,
aﬃrmation of human rights and related activities of advocacy and
monitoring of abuse can sometimes be very eﬀective, through the
politicization of ethical commitments. Commitments underlying
human rights take the form of demanding that certain basic
freedoms of human beings be respected, aided and enhanced.
The basically normative nature of the concept of human rights
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leaves open the question of which particular freedoms are crucial

can take the form of ‘perfect obligations’, which constitute

enough to count as human rights that society should

specific demands on particular persons or agents, or of

acknowledge, safeguard and promote.

‘imperfect obligations’, which are general demands on anyone in

This is where human security can make a significant contribution:
by identifying the importance of freedom from basic insecurities –
new and old. The descriptive richness of the considerations that
make security so important in human lives can, thus, join hands
with the force of ethical claims that the recognition of certain
freedoms as human rights provides. Human rights and human
security can, therefore, fruitfully supplement each other. On the
one hand, since human rights can be seen as a general box that
has to be filled with specific demands with appropriate

a position to help. To give eﬀectiveness to the perspective of
human security, it is important to consider who in particular has
what obligations (such as the duties of the state to provide certain
basic support) and also why people in general, who are in a
position to help reduce insecurities in human lives, have a
common – though incompletely specified – duty to think about
what they can do. Seeing human security within a general
framework of human rights can, thus, bring many rewards to the
perspective of human security.

motivational substantiation, it is significant that human security

To conclude, it is important, on one side, to see how the distinct

helps to fill one particular part of this momentous box through

ideas of human security, human development and human rights

reasoned substantiation (by showing the importance of

diﬀer, but also to understand why they can be seen as

conquering human insecurity). On the other, since human security

complementary concepts. Mutual enrichment can go hand in

as an important descriptive concept demands ethical force and

hand with distinction and clarity.

political recognition, it is useful that this be appropriately obtained
through seeing freedoms related to human security as an
important class of human rights. Far from being in any kind of
competition with each other, human security and human rights
can be seen as complementary ideas.
One of the advantages of seeing human security as a class of
human rights is the associative connection that rights have with
the corresponding duties of other people and institutions. Duties

Other related ideas
The Millennium Development Goals
Another development idea that has been at the forefront of policy
agendas for the past decade has been the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). At the Millennium Summit held in
New York in September 2000, 189 UN member states adopted
the Millennium Declaration, which consisted of eight goals that
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have to be achieved by the year 2015. These goals are divided

developing countries, which must face numerous problems

into 21 targets with 60 indicators against which progress is

simultaneously, but have limited resources and capabilities. Third,

tracked.7 When possible, indicators are disaggregated according

they establish relatively realistic objectives and a time-line in

to male/female, urban/rural and other variables, such as ethnicity

which to achieve them. In addition, they are accompanied by a

or language. The MDG targets and indicators can thus be seen as

set of homogenous monitoring indicators, which facilitate the

a partial roadmap for human development.

analysis and comparison of country and regional performances.

Unlike policy ideas that are first introduced to the wider public by
a community of like-minded academics, the MDGs were
designed by an international political community as a tool to
monitor development progress. The campaign received a lot of
media attention, especially with the ‘Global Call to Action’ in
2005, which was better known in Europe as the ‘Make Poverty
History’ campaign. Unlike human development, the MDGs do not
include concerns for empowerment and participation (except in
relation to gender empowerment), equity and distributional
issues, and the sustainability of development advances across
time. The MDGs also lack explanatory value and analytical power.

Fourth, MDGs reaﬃrm the commitment of developed countries to
support the developing world. The flow of international aid is
necessary if these countries are to overcome poverty and
increase the well-being of their respective populations. The MDG
framework encourages worldwide cooperation and solidarity. It
highlights that governments are accountable not only for reducing
poverty or promoting basic health and education, but also for
promoting gender equality and empowering women, ensuring
environmental sustainability, providing access to aﬀordable and
essential drugs, making available the benefits of new
technologies, and providing universal access to reproductive
health. Another positive aspect of this is that civil society has

Despite these weaknesses, the MDGs remain useful for the

stepped into this public discourse to demand the achievement of

human development approach.8 First, MDG indicators enable us

these goals, giving them greater agency and contributing to the

to analyse the reality and evolution of a country’s development

overall empowerment of society as a whole.

within a broader frame than the one oﬀered by income or GDP
per capita. MDGs are related to the human development

Sustainable development

approach but are limited to the most basic aspects of human

Another idea that has been prominent in the past two decades

well- being. Second, MDGs oﬀer a frame of high-priority and

has been sustainable development, that is, an economic

limited interventions. This aspect is essential for public policies in

development that is compatible with the capacity of natural
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resources to sustain such development in the long run – Ghandi

would be something distinctly odd if we were deeply concerned

famously said that the world would need six planets if it were to

for the well-being of the future – and as yet unborn – generations

sustain consumption levels similar to those of the US. The 1987

while ignoring the plight of the poor today.’ Putting the concern

Brundtland Commission Report, Our Common Future, coined

for inter-generational equity above the principle of intra-

sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs

generational equity would amount to ‘a gross violation of the

of the present without compromising the ability of future

universalist principle’. Human development ‘certainly demands

generations to meet their own needs.’ The two key concepts (p.

such impartiality’.

43) are: (1) needs (the essential needs of the world’s poor should
be given overriding priority); and (2) limitations (the ability of the
environment to meet present and future needs is however
limited).

Another point that Anand and Sen insist on is that the market
cannot be the only solution for ensuring sustainable development.
The concern for universalism ‘demands that the state . . . serve as
a trustee for the interests of future generations’. There is a wide

In a paper that compares the idea of human development with

role for the state, through taxes, subsidies and regulation to

that of sustainability, Anand and Sen (2000) argue that human

‘adapt the incentive structure in ways that protect the global

development brings to sustainable development, in addition to its

environment and resource base for people yet to be born’.

concern for equity between generations, an equal concern for
equity within generations. The demand for sustainability is part of
the universal character of human development. Human
development is about promoting the freedoms that people have
reason to choose and value in both future and present
generations. This universalism entails that deprivations and
suﬀerings of both current and future generations be given equal
attention. As Anand and Sen (2000) write, ‘that universalism also
requires that in our anxiety to protect … future generations, we
must not overlook the pressing claims of the less privileged today.
A universalist approach cannot ignore the deprived people today
in trying to prevent deprivation in the future.’ They continue, ‘there

As with human rights and human security, sustainable
development therefore shares many similarities with the human
development and capability approach. Indeed, the principle of
sustainability is a core human development principle. But the
human development and capability approach oﬀers a much
broader framework for analysis and action, such as evaluative
and institutional tools to address the challenges of development
and sustainability.
The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Ebook Central Academic Complete.
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Section 2

Human development reports & global human development
indicators
Tap on this link to see the United Nations’ website for human
development reports.

Tap on this link to see the United Nations’ website for global
human development indicators.
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Chapter 5

Democracy

Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Understand concepts of democracy.
• Understand and critically think about state's political
systems.
• Identify characteristics of democratic states.
• Analyze states and their overall democracy.
• Analyze the causes and eﬀects of why states are
democratic or authoritarian.

Section 1

State classifications
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Section 2

Democracy
Introduction

criteria of political legitimacy, is itself liable to be a persistent
feature of democratic politics. For this reason, this chapter will

The concept of democracy is central to our contemporary

begin by considering a recent minimalist view of democracy,

political vocabu- laries, yet agreement on how to conceptualise

before going on to consider two important contemporary models

democracy is far from wide- spread.1 As Adam Przeworski has

of democracy: the interest aggregating model and the

recently remarked: ‘Perusing innumerable definitions, one

deliberative model. It will then briefly consider a supplement to

discovers that democracy has become an altar on which

each of these models in the form of ‘contestatory’ democratic

everyone hangs his or her favorite ex voto.’2 Certainly we can

mechanisms. The chapter will conclude by indicating what is

say that democ- racy is a form of government that appeals to an

arguably the main contemporary challenge to democratic theory

idea of popular sovereignty and, hence, an answer to the

and practice in the era of globalisation.

question ‘who rules?’ – but to flesh out this answer will very
quickly mire us in controversy. This point is of more than merely
academic interest for two reasons. First, how we understand the
con- cept of democracy guides our practical reflections on how
to design or reform democratic institutions, it generates criteria
governing what we can reason- ably expect from democratic
government and it animates our debates con- cerning political

Perhaps the best known minimal view of democracy is that
advanced by Schumpeter as ‘a system in which rulers are
selected by competitive elections’,3 where such elections are
held on a regular basis and under conditions of universal
suﬀrage. The main question that arises here is this: why should
we value democracy understood in this minimalist way?

legitimacy. Second, in so far as reasonable disagreement is an

Przeworski has argued that we do have good reasons to value

abiding circumstance of politics and democratic rule is a

democracy on a minimal understanding of it; even if it is the

condition of political legitimacy, it follows that disagreement

case, as he also argues, ‘that choosing rulers by election does

concerning the nature of democratic rule, and hence of the

not assure either rationality [of decision-making], or
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representation [of the interests or will of the people], or equality

of these conditions, as the current state of aﬀairs in Zimbabwe

[of cit- izens]’.4 He advances this argument on two main grounds:

illustrates, democratic rule may become very fragile.

first, ‘the mere possibility of being able to change governments

Przeworski’s second point turns on the fact that we do not

can avoid violence’ and, sec- ond, ‘being able to do it by voting

actually toss coins but vote:

has consequences of its own’.5
With respect to the first point, Przeworski puts his argument thus:
assume that governments are selected by a toss of a, not

Voting is an imposition of a will over a will. When a decision
is reached by voting, some people must submit to a
decision diﬀerent from theirs or to a decision con- trary to

necessarily fair, coin . . . the very prospect that governments

their interests . . . Voting generates winners and losers, and

would alternate may induce the conflicting political forces to

authorises the winners to impose their will, even if within

comply with the rules rather than engage in violence, for the

constraints, on the losers. This is what ‘ruling’ is.7

following reason. Although the losers would be better oﬀ in

This fact has consequences not because voting imposes an

the short run rebelling rather than accepting the outcome of
the current round, if they have a suﬃcient chance to win and

it

a

suﬃciently large payoﬀ in the future rounds they are better oﬀ
continuing to comply with the verdict for the coin toss
rather than fighting for power. Similarly, while the winners
would be better oﬀ in the short run not tossing the coin

obligation to respect the results of voting (although it may,
Przeworski is more sceptical of this claim that I am) but because
‘voting does reveal information about passions, values and
interests’:
If elections are a peaceful substitute for rebellion, it is

again, they may be better oﬀ in the long run peaceably

because they inform every- one who would mutiny and

leaving oﬃce rather than provoking violence to their

against what. They inform the losers – ‘Here is the

usurpation of power.6

distribution of force: if you disobey the instructions

Notice that this argument suggests that the chances of
maintaining democratic rule are increased in having at least two
relatively matched political parties and where political loyalty is
primarily to political parties rather than individuals. In the absence

conveyed by the results of the election, I will be more likely
to beat you than you will be able to beat me in a vio- lent
confrontation’ – and the winners – ‘If you do not hold
elections again or if you grab too much, I will be able to put
up a forbidding resistance.’8
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In other words, voting not only provides a mechanism, like coin-

tions will, at least to a significant extent, be shaped by

tossing, that avoids violence but also provides current rulers and

commitments to ensur- ing the political equality of citizens (in

possible future rulers with information concerning the political

terms of, for example, public and private rights) and to facilitating

constitution of those subject to their rule, information which (given

‘collective self-rule’, where this phrase implies not simply a right

their interest in re-election and election, respectively) is likely to

to the periodic selection of one’s rulers by way of competitive

inform the character of their rule.

elections but also that ‘important decisions on questions of law

These are, I think, compelling arguments for the value of
democracy even on a minimal view. But that we should value
democracy on these grounds does not imply that we cannot
reasonably and plausibly expect more – at least from rel- atively
mature and relatively wealthy democracies – than simply the
avoidance of internal violence and the provision of informational
constraints on rational rulers. What more can and should we
expect? The reflections oﬀered in this chapter will begin from the
delineation of a formal concept of democracy as: a mode of

and policy depend . . . upon public opinion formally expressed by
citizens’.9 How we under- stand these commitments (and the
obligations that they impose), however, will hang to a large extent
on the way in which we conceptualise democracy. For this
reason, the next two sections of this chapter examine two
diﬀerent models— or, more strictly, regulative ideals – of
democracy, tracing the distinct ways in which these commitments
are cashed out.

The interest-aggregating model

government in which the members of the unit of rule are equal
consociates and have collectively an eﬀective capacity to govern,

This first model begins with the intuitively simple and appealing

either directly or via intermedi- aries, matters of common interest

thought that the basic substance of political reflection and action

(or concerning the common good) qua member- ship of this unit

is interests, where these interests are expressed by political

of rule.

actors as preferences. This basic thought orients the justification

This formal concept highlights two features which are typically
taken to be basic to any substantive account of democracy: the
political equality of citizens and the idea of collective self-rule.
Hence on any more than minimal view of democracy, it is
suggested, we can and should expect that democratic institu-

and conceptualisation of democracy as a mode of political
government. The argument for democracy on this understanding
runs as follows:
If the good or interests of everyone should be weighed
equally, and if each adult person is in general the best judge
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of his or her good or interests, then every adult member of

following five ideal standards as the core normative commitments

an association is suﬃciently well qualified, taken all around,

of democracy:

to participate in making collectively binding decisions that
aﬀect his or her good or interests, that is, to be a full citizen
of the demos. More specifically, when binding decisions are

1

Eﬀective participation

2

Equality in voting

3

Gaining enlightened understanding

4

Exercising final control over the agenda

5

Inclusion of adults.11

made, the claims of each citizen as to the laws, rules,
policies, etc. to be adopted must be counted as equal and
equally valid. Moreover, no adult members are so definitively
better qualified than the others that they should be
entrusted with making binding collective decisions. More
specifically, when binding decisions are made, no citizen’s
claims as to the laws, rules, and policies to be adopted are
to be counted as superior to the claims of any other citizen.
10

Why these criteria? Dahl’s response is that, given the assumption
that democ- racy is to be understood in terms of interests, ‘each
is necessary if the members. . . are to be politically equal in
determining the policies of the association’.12 This establishes

To argue against democracy on this view requires that one reject

(1), since to deny any citizen the opportunity to express their

either or both of the conditional statements at the beginning of

preferences, place questions on the agenda or give reasons for

Dahl’s remarks. Hence, the anti-democrat must argue that the

endorsing or rejecting a given proposal is to mute their political

interests of everyone should not be weighed equally and/or that

voice; it justifies (2), since to weigh votes unequally is to weigh

each adult person is not in general the best judge of his or her

interests unequally; it implies (4), since oth- erwise the agenda

interests. Although historically both of these anti-democratic

may not represent the full range of interests of the citizens; and it

arguments have been made, it is not clear that they can easily be

establishes (5), since otherwise the interests of some competent

sustained.

persons are not counted. But what of (3)? Dahl’s point here is that

Given this interest-oriented argument for democracy, what ideal
standards are appropriate to a democracy? Dahl suggests the

citizens must have an adequate and equal opportunity ‘for
discovering and validating (within the time permitted by the need
for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would
best serve the citizen’s interests’,13 since otherwise some
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citizens may be disad- vantaged relative to others in terms of

choices where there are more than two options and no option

being able to accurately determine the choice which best

receives an absolute majority of the votes cast? Here determining

expresses their fundamental interests with respect to a given

the collective interest may be harder than it immediately appears

decision. Essentially the democratic idea expressed here involves

to be.

two elements. First, that what count as matters of collective
interest (that is, matters on which political decisions may be
appropriate) should be determined by equal citizens as a
collectivity within the constraints imposed by the conditions of
democratic rule. Second, that what is held to be in the collective
interest (that is, what is the best course of action for the polity to
adopt) in relation to a given issue should be decided by equal
citizens collectively in accordance with the principles of
democratic rule. This is why Dahl stresses the importance of both
the collective ability of citizens as political equals to set the
agenda and to decide what to do. Any form of government that
fails to meet both of these conditions subjects citizens, in one
way or another, to the rule of guardians.

Consider that there are numerous ways in which an aggregation
of these votes might be accomplished. On the one hand, there
are majoritarian decision- making rules such as the plurality rule
(whichever option gets the most votes wins) and the Condorcet
rule (the winning outcome is the option which defeats each of the
others in a vote on every pair of alternatives). The problem here is
that the plurality rule implies that a choice is simply that of the
largest minor- ity, while the Condorcet rule is incomplete in that
for a given distribution of votes there may not be a Condorcet
winner. On the other hand, there are positional decision-making
rules such as the Borda count (the winning outcome is
determined by scoring each option according to its place in a
voter’s ranking, thus the top option gets n points, the second n–1

But how are decisions concerning what is in the collective interest

points, etc., and then aggregating the point for each option

to be deter- mined? The aim of democracy, as David Miller noted,

across all votes cast). The problem here is that ‘it may make the

‘is to aggregate individual preferences into a collective choice in

decision among quite popular options depend on the way that

as fair and eﬃcient a way as possible’.14 Now in so far as these

some voters rank way-out or eccentric options if these are on the

collective choices take the form of a single-issue choice between

ballot paper’16 and, for just the same reasons, this decision rule

option A and option B, such aggregation is straightforward and,

is highly vulnerable to strategic voting. Things get worse! As

for issues which are not constitutionally basic, it seems

Arrow has demonstrated in his famous Impossibility Theorem,

reasonable to adopt the principle of majority rule, that is, that the

given certain reasonable conditions which we might wish a

option with the majority of votes wins.15 But what of collective

decision rule to satisfy,17 ‘if there are more than two alternatives,
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any method for making social decisions that ensures transitivity in

capacity to govern itself be subject to the dogmatic convic- tions

the decisions must be necessarily either dictated by one person

of every member. However, since unanimity is the only way of

or imposed against the preferences of every individual’.18 The

avoiding the problems concerning majority rule raised by social

implication drawn from this and related social choice theorems is

choice theory, we are thrown once more back on to the task of

that no rule for collective decisions can be discovered that does

making sense of this notion. One way to avoid this problem would

not produce arbitrary or meaningless outcomes and hence both

be to adapt the unanimity principle so that what requires

(a) there is no deci- sion rule for aggregating preferences which is

unanimity is not a proposal but a choice between two proposals –

clearly fair and rational and hence superior to other possible rules

and then decide between these proposals on the basis of a

and (b) diﬀerent rules may produce diﬀerent outcomes. In this

majority vote. This would avoid the most obvious diﬃculty with

context, Riker has argued that it makes no sense to speak of

the unanimity principle while ensuring that all decisions can be

discovering the ‘popular will’ at all.19

unproblematic expressions of majority rule. However, although

This is clearly in principle a very serious challenge to this model of
democracy and it is one that might encourage us to give up trying
to make sense of the notion of majority rule. We might, then,

such an adapted unanimity principle would avoid the problems
raised by social choice theory, it is diﬃcult to see how such a
demanding principle would be practicable.

instead adopt a principle of unanimity in which each citizen has a

But does the arbitrariness of decision rules really matter that

right of veto over laws, policies, etc.20 The main objection to this

much? Recall that the problem is this:

proposal by Buchanan and Tullock is that it is unfeasible, making government (to all intents and purposes) impossible.21 This
conclusion is a little quick since, under conditions in which each
of us knows that any of us can veto a given proposal, it seems
likely that we will rapidly develop a political culture of bargaining,
compromise and trade-oﬀs such as characterises exist- ing
political contexts in which decisions are subject to this rule (for
example, treaty negotiations). Still although the conclusion drawn

The problem of arbitrariness arises because it is not clear
which of the many pos- sible rules best matches our
intuitive sense of ‘finding the option which the voters most
prefer’, or to put the point another way, for any given rule it
is possible to give examples where using the rule produces
an outcome that seems repugnant to our sense of what a
democratic decision should be.22

by Dahl is hasty, it is the right one – under contemporary

It was for this reason that Riker insisted that the notion of

conditions, it makes little sense to propose that a community’s

‘popular will’ is just an empty phrase. But to reach this conclusion
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Riker would need to assume that the fact that diﬀerent decision

thought of strategic voting, they might choose to introduce a

rules produce diﬀerent results or expressions of the ‘popular will’

meta-rule to the eﬀect that the decision rule will be chosen ran-

vitiates the notion of the ‘popular will’ and this does not follow:

domly once the votes are cast. This would have the advantage of

the popular will (or collective interest) is just whatever is the result

blocking attempts at the strategic manipulation of the outcome.)

of the decision rule that we take to be authoritative for a given

But does not this pro- posal suﬀer from the same disadvantage

decision, that other rules may produce other results is neither

as the proposal of unanimity as a deci- sion rule? No. The

here nor there. The real question is how, knowing that diﬀerent

problem there was that where unanimity is used as a decision rule

rules may produce diﬀerent results, we decide which rule to

for specific issues, any member who had particularly strong or

employ for a given decision. Now it might seem that this simply

dogmatic convictions on that issue could veto any proposal that

pushes the whole problem back one stage but it does not. From a

did not conform with their convictions. But in this case unanimity

democratic point of view, what matters is not that a given

is being used as a decision rule for deciding between decision

decision rule may produce results which conflict with our

rules and not for deciding between proposals on con- crete

intuitions concerning what a democratic decision would be but

topics – and this means that no member of the community will be

that the democratic community has determined what the

in a position to know (in more than very general terms) whether or

authoritative rule is for a given class of decisions – and this is the

not the choice of decision rule x for treating decisions of type y is

point at which the principle of unanimity has a role to play. In

likely to work out in ways that tend to favour them and hence

other words, what matters democratically is not that the rule may

members will have no interest-based motive to veto the proposal

produce counter-intuitive outcomes but that the choice of the

of particular decision-rules. (Note that if this turned out to be

rule is not arbitrary – and the only way to secure this is to adopt
the principle of unanimity. It is, in other words, to treat the choice
of decision rule (or rules, where diﬀerent rules may be used for
diﬀerent decisions) as if it were analogous to a treaty – or
contract! – in which all parties are required to agree. Indeed, this

false, it would provide a general incentive for adopting the
randomising meta-rule suggested above.) In this respect, it
seems to me that we can talk intel- ligibly of the popular will or
collective interest, and hence that the apparent threat posed by
social choice theory to this model of democracy is dissolved.

is, I think, why Rousseau insisted that the contract to form a

To conclude this section, let us return to the question of what

political commu- nity must be unanimous. (Moreover, if the

more we might expect from democracy in terms of cashing out

members of a community are par- ticularly troubled by the

the principles of political equal- ity and ensuring an eﬀective
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capacity for collective self-rule. In terms of this interest-

of free public reasoning among equals who are governed by

aggregation model, it is clear that what we can and should expect

the decisions. In the deliberative conception, then, citizens

is a commitment to realizing as fully as practicable the five ideal

treat one another not by giving equal consideration to

standards which Dahl sketches and thus, most importantly, to

interests . . . but by oﬀering them justifications for the

measures which seek to ensure our equal freedom to form and

exercise of collective power framed in terms of

identify our own interests, our equal freedom to express these

considerations that can, roughly speaking, be

interests at all stages of the democratic process from agenda-

acknowledged by all as reasons.23

set- ting to final decision-making and the equal weighting of our
interests in deter- mining our collective decision. Our democratic
institutions are to be evaluated in terms of their design and
performance against their satisfaction of, and com- mitment to,
such measures.

The deliberative model

The deliberative argument for democracy, thus, emerges from a
claim about the political equality of citizens as grounded on their
equal moral status as autonomous individuals capable of giving
and exchanging reasons – and, hence, on what Rainer Forst has
called their basic moral right of justification, that is, the basic right
to have exercises of collective power over their free activ- ity as
citizens justified by reasons that are acceptable to them as

Whereas the first model takes interests as the basic currency of
politics, the sec- ond model takes public reasons as occupying
this position. Joshua Cohen has helpfully summarized the
distinction thus:
According to an aggregative conception of democracy . . .

citizens.24
Given this argument for democracy, what ideal standards does it
invoke? On Cohen’s account, these standards can be given by
presenting ‘an idealized pro- cedure of political deliberation,
constructed to capture the notions of free, equal and reason that

decisions are collective just in case they arise from

figure in the deliberative ideal’.25 We can summarise this ideal

arrangements of binding collective choice that give equal

procedure thus:

consideration to . . . the interests of each person bound by
the decisions. According to a deliberative conception, a
decision is collective just in case it emerges from arrange-

1

All citizens acknowledge the freedom of each citizen to

participate.

ments of binding collective choice that establish conditions
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2

Citizens are formally equal in that each has the same rights

to propose issues and solutions, to oﬀer reasons for or against
proposals, and to have an equal voice in deciding the outcome.
3

Citizens are substantively equal in that each has an equal

opportunity to exercise their rights of participation.
4

Citizens are reasonable ‘in that they aim to defend and

interest-aggregation model since it requires that citizens exercise
a form of
democratic self-restraint, namely that they reflect as citizens and
not in terms of their private interests.
At this stage, we can turn to the issue of what it means to talk of
‘collective self-rule’ in this context. Ideally, of course, collective

criticize institutions and programs in terms of considerations that

self-rule here refers to the generation of a consensus such that for

others, as free and equal, have rea- son to accept, given the fact

any given law or policy, it can be justi- fied to all citizens in terms

of reasonable pluralism and on the assumption that those others

that they could not reasonably reject. (This does not require that

are themselves concerned to provide suitable justifications’.26

the justification is the same for all citizens; an overlapping

The standards invoked by this idealised procedure are
interestingly analogous to those proposed by Dahl in that this
procedure ensures the opportunity for eﬀective participation
(proposing issues, solutions and oﬀering reasons), equal- ity of
voting (each has an equal say and each counts as one in a vote),
gaining enlightened understanding (where this now implies the
opportunity to con- sider and determine, within the time available,
the reasons that one considers best concerning the issue at
hand), exercising final control over the agenda (equal rights to
propose issues) and inclusion of adults (all persons with the
deliberative capacities). In addition, this model also invokes the
standard of reasonableness, namely, that citizens acknowledge
the fact of reasonable pluralism and seek to oﬀer reasons that
other reasonable citizens could not rea- sonably reject.27 In this
respect, the deliberative model is more demanding than the

consen- sus will do as well as a common consensus.) However,
since it is unlikely that such a consensus will emerge on most, if
not all, issues, it is clear that most deci- sion-making will require
the use of some decision-rule in this same way as required for the
interest-aggregration model.28 The deliberative model is, however, arguably better placed with respect to the issues raised by
the need to select a decision-rule. Thus David Miller has argued
that the interest-aggregation model is exposed to social choice
dilemmas in part because it posits choosing a decision rule
independently of consideration of the content of the citizens
views, whereas because the deliberative model sees the content
of citizens’ judgements concerning the collective interest as
emerging in the course of reasonable delib- eration, it is less
vulnerable to these problems in three ways.29 First, we may plausibly expect that the deliberative process may produce voters’
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rank orderings that are ‘single-peaked’, that is, ‘the alternatives

deliber- ative model is better placed, however, depends on

can be arranged on a continuum such that if, say, a voter ranks

whether or not citizens do in fact exhibit the commitment to

the alternative on the left highest, he does not rank the alternative

reasonableness that this model calls for, and that, in turn, hangs

on the left above that in the centre’.30 This matters because in

to a significant extent on whether the claim that involvement in

cases where such single-peaking occurs, there is always a

deliberation with free and equal others has transformative eﬀects

Condorcet winner. We can expect this because in many cases the

on individual citizens, that is, cultivates a disposition to

policy options represent a choice between two values and voters’

reasonableness.

ranking reflect their weighing of these values. Second, where
such single-peaking does not occur, it is likely to be the result of
more than one dimension of disagreement emerging in the
deliberative process

In considering the question of what more we might expect from
democracy in terms of cashing out the principles of political
equality and ensuring an eﬀective capacity for collective self-rule,
we can note that the deliberative model involves a commitment to

– but precisely because the dimensions of disagreement become

realising as fully as practicable a framework of social and

apparent through deliberation, it may be possible to disaggregate

institutional arrangements that ‘facilitate free reasoning among

the original choice sce- nario into components such that for each

equal citizens . . . while ensuring that citizens are treated as free

component there is single-peaking. Third, if we consider

and equal in that discussion; and tie the authorization to exercise

majoritarian (for example, Condorcet) and positional (e.g., Borda

public power – and the exercise itself – to such public

count) types of decision-rule, we can note that whereas the

reasoning’.31 It is against such criteria that our democratic polity

former aim to satisfy as many people as possible, the latter aims

is to be judged.

to satisfy everyone collectively as much as possible and,
consequently, which of these aims is best may hang on the nature
of the issue over which we are seeking to come to a decision.
Miller’s point is that deliberative democracy will be well placed to
choose decision-rules that are appropriate to the issue at hand
since the nature of this issue will be revealed in deliberation,
whereas the interest-aggregating model of democracy will not be
so well placed. Whether or not it is actually the case that the

Contestatory democracy
Given the above account of the two models of democracy, we
might still rea- sonably be concerned by the potential problem
posed by the tyranny of the majority. While both models provide
eﬀective arguments for liberal freedoms such as freedom of
speech and freedom of association as intrinsic to democratic rule,
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it remains plausible that, under non-ideal conditions, the interests

There is an enormous gulf between being subject to a will

or rea- sons expressed by minority groups may be ignored or, at

that may interfere in your aﬀairs without taking your

least, not granted equal status within the decision-making

perceived interests into account and being subject to a

process. In the practical context of democratic rule by way of

process such that, while it takes your interests and those of

representative government, addressing this problem ‘would

others equally into account, it may deliver a result – for

require not just that the majority are heard in determining what

reasons you can understand – that favours others more than

com- mon, perceived interests ought to be pursued by

you.34

government, but also that the relevant minorities get a hearing,
‘So the question is whether there is any way of subjecting
government to a mode of distributive or minority control in order
to balance the electorally established mode of collective or
majority control.’32

Consequently, under non-ideal conditions, a concern with
promoting demo- cratic stability in the sense of a strong
identification of citizens with their dem- ocratic institutions entails
that we have good reasons to adopt a contestatory supplement
to our basic democratic fora and that this is the case whether our

Pettit’s suggestion is to introduce contestatory mechanisms.

democratic understanding is primarily informed by either of the

These are mech- anisms through which a minority group who

two main models considered.

hold that the decision reached has not adequately acknowledged
their political voice can contest the decision through ‘a procedure
that would enable people, not to veto public decisions on the
basis of their avowable, perceived interests, but to call them into
question on such a basis and trigger a review; in particular, to
trigger a review in a forum that they and others can all endorse as
an impartial court of appeal’.33
This supplement to both the major models is important not least
because it contributes to maintaining an eﬀective sense of
political belonging among minority groups. After all, as Pettit
notes:

Globalisation & democracy
In this final section, I want to mention a significant contemporary
issue for democratic theory, namely, the problem of the
embeddedness of democratic polities within networks of
transnational governance.
It is increasingly becoming a commonplace that democratic
polities in the form of the sovereign nation-state are situated
within, and subject to, forms of regional and/or global governance
by way either of regional organisations such as the European
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) (which
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may or may not be polities themselves: the EU is a polity but

democratic rule cannot be restricted to the level of the sovereign

NAFTA is not) or the multilateral institutions of global governance

state but must track the levels of governance to which we, as

such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International

peoples, are subject.35 This raises a plethora of theoretical and

Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In this context, recall

practical issues for democracy but the challenges posed by these

our basic formal definition of democracy as a mode of

diﬃculties need to be met if we are to maintain our practical

government in which the members of the unit of rule are equal

identities as democratic citizens.

consociates and have collectively an eﬀective capacity to govern,
either directly or via intermedi- aries, matters of common interest
(or concerning the common good) qua membership of this unit of
rule. Up to this point we have been considering the issue of
citizens possessing ‘an eﬀective capacity to govern’ in terms of
the internal arrangements and conditions of a polity, but it is
equally clear that such an eﬀective capacity can be undermined
by virtue of being subject to external forms of governance such
that, for example, policies concerning the subsidisation of
manufacturing industry within the polity are politically
disconnected from public opinion on this topic and subject to the
authority of the WTO. The dilemma, therefore, is that a polity
which has the form of a democratic polity may only exhibit the
appearance of democratic rule rather than the reality of such rule
– or, more strictly, may only exhibit the reality of such rule in
externally limited and con- strained contexts. In this real world
contemporary context, maintaining the claim that a polity is
democratic requires either a highly implausible and impracticable reassertion of its autonomy or a democratisation of the
forms of transna- tional governance to which it is subject. In this

Conclusion
This chapter began with reference to a minimalist view of
democracy and it did so because reflecting on this view should
remind us of a point which needs to be borne in mind when
considering the concept of democracy. This is that the more we
demand from democracy, the more we are likely to be
disappointed by our democratic institutions and, in our
disappointment, to lose sight of the very real benefits which
democracy delivers even on a minimalist view. With this warning
in mind, however, it has been argued that we can, at least in some
circumstances, expect more from democracy than the minimalist
view admits and I have tried to sketch what more we might
reasonably expect by reference to the two major contemporary
models – or regulative ideals – of democracy as well as
suggesting that contestatory mechanisms can play an important
sup- plementary role with respect to these models. Finally, the
chapter has indicated the central issue for the future of
democratic theory and practice, namely, our subjection to forms

respect, as David Held has powerfully argued, a concern with
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of transnational governance over which, at present, we can
exercise little or no eﬀective democratic control.

The previous section is provided by Lynn University
Library’s use of Ebook Central Academic Complete.
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Section 3

Forms of government
Government

individuals who control and exercise control over political
decision-making. Their function is to make and enforce laws and

Government is the means by which state policy is enforced, as

arbitrate conflicts. In some societies, this group is often a self-

well as the mechanism for determining the policy of the state. A

perpetuating or hereditary class. In other societies, such as

form of government, or form of state governance, refers to the

democracies, the political roles remain, but there is frequent

set of political institutions by which a government of a state is

turnover of the people actually filling the positions.

organized (synonyms include “regime type” and “system of
government”). Governments consist of two broad interplaying
elements that generally determine how a government is coded:
the power source and the power structure. Power source refers
to the individuals and institutions that exercise governing
authority over a state and the means by which they obtain their
power, while power structure refers to the system by which they
are organized.

Forms of government
Governments with Aristarchy attributes are traditionally ruled by
the “best” people. Aristocracy refers to the rule by elite citizens;
a system of governance in which a person who rules in an
aristocracy is an aristocrat. It has come to mean rule by “the
aristocracy” who are people of noble birth. A meritocracy refers
to rule by the meritorious; a system of governance where groups

In the case of its broad definition, government normally consists

are selected on the basis of people’s ability, knowledge in a

of legislators, administrators, and arbitrators. Government is the

given area, and contributions to society. Finally, a technocracy

means by which state policy is enforced, as well as the

refers to rule by the educated; a system of governance where

mechanism for determining the policy of the state. States are

people who are skilled or proficient govern in their respective

served by a continuous succession of diﬀerent governments.

areas of expertise in technology would be in control of all

Each successive government is composed of a body of

decision making. Doctors, engineers, scientists, professionals
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and technologists who have knowledge, expertise, or skills,

In an absolute monarchy, the ruler has no limits on their wishes or

would compose the governing body, instead of politicians,

powers. In a constitutional monarchy a ruler’s powers are limited

businessmen, and economists.

by a document called a constitution.

Governments with autocratic attributes are ruled by one person

Governments with oligarchic attributes are ruled by a small group

who has all the power over the people in a country. The Roman

of powerful and/or influential people. These people may spread

Republic made Dictators to lead during times of war. In modern

power equally or not equally. An oligarchy is diﬀerent from a true

times, an Autocrat’s rule is not stopped by any rules of law,

democracy because very few people are given the chance to

constitutions, or other social and political institutions. After World

change things. An oligarchy does not have to be hereditary or

War II, many governments in Latin America, Asia, and Africa were

monarchic. An oligarchy does not have one clear ruler, but several

ruled by autocratic governments.

powerful people. Some historical examples of oligarchy are the

Governments with democratic attributes are most common in the
Western world and in some countries of the east. In democracies,
all of the people in a country can vote during elections for
representatives or political parties that they prefer. The people in
democracies can elect representatives who will sit on legislatures
such as the Parliament or Congress. Political parties are
organizations of people with similar ideas about how a country or
region should be governed. Diﬀerent political parties have
diﬀerent ideas about how the government should handle diﬀerent
problems. Democracy is the government of the people, by the

former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Apartheid in South
Africa. Fictional oligarchic examples include the dystopian society
of Oceania displayed in the book Nineteen Eighty-Four, the
stratocracy government of Starship Troopers, and the kritarchic
“Street Judges” of Judge Dredd.
Democratic governments
Democracy is a form of government in which all eligible citizens
have an equal say in the decisions that aﬀect their lives.
Introduction

people, for the people.
Democracy is a form of government in which all eligible citizens
Governments with monarchic attributes are ruled by a king or a

have an equal say in the decisions that aﬀect their lives.

queen who inherits their position from their family, which is often

Democracy allows people to participate equally—either directly or

called the “royal family. ” There are at two opposing types of

through elected representatives—in the proposal, development,

monarchies: absolute monarchies and constitutional monarchies.

and creation of laws. It encompasses social, economic, and
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cultural conditions that enable the free and equal practice of

The earliest known direct democracy is said to be the Athenian

political self-determination. The term originates from the Greek

Democracy in the 5th century BCE, although it was not an

word: δημοκρατία (dēmokratía), which translates to “rule of the

inclusive democracy; women, foreigners, and slaves were

people”. This term was used around 400 BCE to denote the

excluded from it. In the direct democracy of Athens, the

political systems then existing in Greek city-states, notably

electorate did not nominate representatives to vote on legislation

Athens.

and executive bills on their behalf (as in the United States

A democratic government contrasts two forms of government
where power is either held by one, as in a monarchy, or where
power is held by a small number of individuals, as in an oligarchy
or aristocracy. Nevertheless, these oppositions, inherited from
Greek philosophy, are now ambiguous because contemporary
governments have mixed democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic

Congress), but instead voted on these items in their own right.
Participation was by no means open, but the in-group of
participants was constituted with no reference to economic class
and they participated on a large scale. The public opinion of
voters was remarkably influenced by the political satire performed
by the comic poets at the theaters.

elements. Several variants of democracy exist, but there are two

Also relevant is the history of Roman republic, beginning circa

basic forms, both of which concern how the whole body of

449 BCE. The ancient Roman Republic’s “citizen lawmaking”—

citizens executes its will: direct democracy and representative

citizen formulation and passage of law, as well as citizen veto of

democracy.

legislature-made law—began about 449 BCE and lasted the

Direct democracy

approximately 400 years to the death of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE.
Modern-era citizen lawmaking began in the towns of Switzerland

Direct democracy is a form of democracy in which people vote on

in the 13th century CE. In 1847, the Swiss added the “statute

policy initiatives directly. This is diﬀerent from a representative

referendum” to their national constitution. Currently in

democracy, in which people vote for representatives who then

Switzerland, single majorities are suﬃcient at the town, city, and

vote on policy initiatives. Depending on the particular system in

canton level, but at the national level, double majorities are

use, it might entail passing executive decisions, making laws,

required on constitutional matters. The intent of the double

directly electing or dismissing oﬃcials, and conducting trials. Two

majorities is simply to ensure any citizen-made law’s legitimacy.

leading forms of direct democracy are participatory democracy
and deliberative democracy.
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Representative democracy
Direct democracy was very much opposed by the framers of the
United States Constitution and some signatories of the

rights and the rule of law—are 85 in number and represent 38
percent of the global population. In 2010 the United Nations
declared September 15 the International Day of Democracy.

Declaration of Independence. They saw a danger in majorities
forcing their will on minorities. As a result, they advocated a

The previous section is provided by Lumen’s

representative democracy in the form of a constitutional republic

Boundless Political Science.

over a direct democracy. For example, James Madison, in
Federalist No. 10, advocates a constitutional republic over direct
democracy precisely to protect the individual from the will of the
majority. Representative democracy is a variety of democracy
founded on the principle of elected people representing a group
of people. For example, three countries which use representative
democracy are the United States of America (a representative
democracy), the United Kingdom (a constitutional monarchy) and
Poland (a republic). It is an element of both the parliamentary
system and presidential system of government and is typically
used in a lower chamber such as the House of Commons (UK) or
Bundestag (Germany).
Democracy in the contemporary world
According to Freedom House, in 2007 there were 123 electoral
democracies – up from 40 in 1972. According to World Forum on
Democracy, electoral democracies now represent 120 of the 192
existing countries and constitute 58.2 percent of the world’s
population. At the same time, liberal democracies—countries
Freedom House regards as free and respectful of basic human
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Chapter 6

Authoritarianism

Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Understand concepts of authoritarianism.
• Understand and critically think about state's political
systems.
• Identify characteristics of authoritarian states.
• Analyze states and their overall democracy or lack of
democracy.
• Analyze the causes and eﬀects of why states are
democratic or authoritarian.

Section 1

Countering democratic norms
Since the great financial meltdown of 2008, it has become

to understand these trends and how to classify stagnating

commonplace to think of the West as being in normative retreat.

polities and decaying institutions—also requires us to examine

The melt- down has undercut the perception that Western

the broader global political changes and systemic shifts that

economic systems are superior, touched oﬀ an ongoing crisis in

have produced new counternorms and counterpractices.1

the Eurozone, and seen the sitting prime minister of an EU
country (Hungary’s Viktor Orbán) openly doubt whether liberal
democracies can remain globally competitive. In parallel,
revelations about NSA surveillance and the release of the U.S.
Senate report on CIA torture have reinforced perceptions that the

Policy makers and academics have been hesitant to
acknowledge some of these recent cross-regional trends. Many
deeply held and still highly in- fluential assumptions about the
nature of the liberal political order, the nor-

United States acts hypocritically and applies double standards

mative fabric of global governance, and the diﬀusion of

when it comes to so-called values issues.

democratic norms are products of the years just after the Cold

Beyond vocal criticism of the West as a problematic champion of
demo- cratic norms, a larger international backlash against
liberal democracy has grown and gathered momentum. Over the
past decade, authoritarians have experimented with and refined
a number of new tools, practices, and insti- tutions that are
meant to shield their regimes from external criticism and to erode
the norms that inform and underlie the liberal international
political order. The important debate about whether there has
been a democratic recession over the last decade—about how

War. Back then, in the 1990s, when the Soviet Union had just
collapsed and former communist countries had begun economic
and political transitions, liberal-democratic values ap- peared
triumphant and free of significant ideological competition. At
the same time, U.S. power was unrivaled, U.S. control of global
institutions was strong, and there was a broad perception that a
U.S.-led liberal world or- der would continue to set the rules,
standards, and norms for international interactions. In light of the
“pushback” that authoritarian regimes are now carrying out,
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upbeat assumptions about liberal democracy’s eﬀortless dom-

Counternorms versus liberal democracy

inance require careful scrutiny.
The truth is that norms privileging state security, civilizational
diversity, and traditional values over liberal democracy now enjoy
significant backing, and they are reshaping the international
environment. The eﬀects are most visible in the narrower political
space that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are facing, the
shifting purposes that regional organizations are embracing, and
the rising influence of non-Western powers as international
patrons. Together, these eﬀects reveal an international political
climate that has made the work of spreading democratic norms
far more diﬃcult than it was two decades ago.

Just as the backlash against liberal democracy spans diﬀerent
regions and countries, it also contains various alternative
narratives and norms. The most commonly voiced critiques
stress the primacy of state sovereignty and security, while
charging that liberal-democratic governments and international
organizations are too prone to meddle in the domestic aﬀairs of
other countries. Liberal democracy’s universalism—its claim to be
the sole legitimate form of human governance—comes under
challenge, with lib- eral-democratic discourse said to be serving
as cover for U.S. and Western geopolitical interests.
Counternorms are thus grounded in changing power balances, as

Perhaps most disturbingly, authoritarians have pursued these

the post–Cold War era of U.S. hegemony gives way to a more

tactics and counterpractices because they are proving eﬀective:

multipolar world—a shift often summed up (not without irony) as

The activities of NGOs can be successfully restricted; regional

the “de- mocratization of international relations.”

organizations can be repurposed to support the political agendas
of authoritarian member states; and interna- tional investment
and assistance can be procured from new donors with- out
accompanying political conditions. Success breeds imitation, and
more authoritarian regimes (plus some backsliding democracies)
across Eurasia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa are
beginning to emulate these practices.

The single most powerful source of counternorms has been the
post-9/11 turn toward counterterrorism and security. Since the
2001 terror attacks, there has been a collective acceptance,
stretching well beyond the confines of the United States, that the
tradeoﬀ between security and individual lib- erty should be
rebalanced in favor of the former. As Kim Lane Scheppele has
observed, this “international state of emergency” has empowered
gov- ernments to expand executive authority, increase areas of
secrecy and state privilege, set up exceptional legal
procedures, expand domestic surveil- lance, bypass national
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asylum procedures, and establish forms of cooper- ation between

accepting each other’s decisions to list this group or that as

security services that escape transnational oversight.2 While the

“terrorist.”4

1990s saw the steady expansion of global civil society and
transnation- al networks, the 2000s witnessed the globalization of
anticonstitutionalist measures for purposes of fighting terrorism
and strengthening state security. Among the most powerful
counterterrorist norms to arise thus far has been the widespread
acceptance of organized blacklisting of suspected terrorists
and their supporters. The legal basis for this practice dates from
almost two years before 9/11, when UN Security Council
Resolution 1267 of October 1999 created a committee that
became charged with compiling a sanctions list aimed at all alQaeda aﬃ

Resolution 1373, adopted on 28 September

2001, required states to criminalize terrorist fi

and

A related concern, heightened by blacklisting, has been the
growing abuse of the red-notice system that the International
Criminal Police Or- ganization (Interpol) uses to ask states to find,
apprehend, and extradite individuals wanted for prosecution or
the serving of a criminal sentence elsewhere. According to the
legal watchdog Fair Trials, the governments of Belarus,
Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Venezuela have
played a large role in driving up the number of red notices issued
from 1,277 in 2002 to 8,132 a decade later.5
Appeals to “civilizational diversity” and the principle of
noninterference in the domestic aﬀairs of sovereign states form

authorized govern- ments to establish their own domestic

another class of emerging counternorms. The People’s Republic

blacklists. According to scholars and legal advocates,

of China is the leading supporter of this manner of critiquing

international blacklisting has had ill eﬀects on political rights

liberal democracy’s universalism as well the polit- ical

worldwide.3 With no clear criteria for listing and no procedure for

conditionality that international institutions adopt to further

delisting, the “terrorist” designation has become a weapon that

universal democratic norms.

authoritarians can wield against political foes. It has also
spawned the rise of “parallel” systems of ad- ministrative

The “respect for civilizational diversity” counternorm is the

interventions that supplant the criminal-justice system and

operating principle of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

weaken the rule of law. Moreover, blacklisting appears to have

(SCO), a regional group founded in 2001 by China, Russia, and

generated a type of intergovernmental “logrolling” in which states

four Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and

do each other favors by readily

Uzbekistan). Chinese oﬃcial statements and commentary
repeatedly refer to the group’s embodiment of the foundational
“Shanghai Spirit,” a norm that enshrines respect for state
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sovereignty and noninterference, promotes the “democratization

passed in 2011. Kyrgyzstan’s unicameral parliament, widely

of international relations,” and rejects the imposition of political

thought to be one of the region’s more pluralistic, in October

and econom- ic conditionalities by global-governance

2014 overwhelmingly approved a bill criminalizing “propaganda

institutions.6 As David Lewis has observed, in Central Asia the

for nontraditional sexual relations” and banned information

SCO’s norms have displaced the liberal-dem- ocratic principles

alleged to promote “homosexual lifestyles.” The Senate of

that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

neighboring Kazakhstan passed a similar draft bill in February

(OSCE) has traditionally promoted across the former Soviet

2015. With Almaty a candidate city for the 2022 Winter Olympics,

space, and have even prompted the OSCE to water down its

activists and athletes have intensively lobbied the International

regional projects that deal with “democratic values.”7

Olympic Committee to pressure the government of Kazakhstan to

A third distinct group of counternorms concerns the defense of

reject the legislation.

“tradi- tional values.” Here, Russia is the main backer. Proponents

Outside the region, Russia has acquired partners willing to

of the “values” school of thought, which is rooted in strands of

introduce the traditional-values agenda in international fora. On

neo-Eurasianist thinking and fueled by Russia’s stand against

27 September 2012, a resolution of the UN Human Rights Council

what the Kremlin sees as Western en- croachment, maintain that

cosponsored by Russia called for “a better understanding and

Western individualism has gone over the edge into a state of

appreciation of traditional values” to be applied in human-rights

crisis and moral decay. This accounts for the challenge now being

work. The vote was 25 for and 15 against, with 7 countries

posed to Western decadence worldwide by a turn toward sources

abstaining.9 In a sharp criticism of the text, the EU aﬃrmed that

of national culture, heritage, and religion.

human rights are “universal and inalienable” while warning that

The Kremlin is pushing the traditional-values agenda as normative
cement for the new economic and security architecture that it is
seeking to build across Eurasia.8 As part of these eﬀorts, LGBT
communities and civil society representatives have found
themselves targeted by stigmatization campaigns and legislative
restrictions. Eurasian countries are introducing bans on
“homosexual propaganda” similar to the one that Russia

tra- ditional values are “inherently subjective and specific to a
certain time and place.” The EU’s statement went on to worry that
introducing “the concept of ‘traditional values’ into this discourse
can result in a misleading inter- pretation of existing human rights
norms, and undermine their universali- ty.”10 Although
emphasizing diﬀerent goals, the counterterror, civilization- aldiversity, and traditional-values agendas all question the
feasibility or desirability of liberal democracy’s universal
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aspirations. Basic changes in the international order over the last

decisive role. Whatever the case may be, a broad perception

two decades have powered the rise of each of these sources of

arose that Western democracy promoters were using NGOs as

counternorms.

political weapons. “Color revolution” became a synonym for

Goodbye NGOs, hello zombies
Nowhere is the contrast between the relatively democratizationfriendly world of twenty years ago and today’s harsher
international environment more apparent than in the NGO realm.
In the 1990s, academics and policy makers heralded the rise of
NGOs. These independent actors in international politics, it
was said, were achieving a new prominence and fueling a shift
away from traditional state power. The most influential scholarly
study of the topic claimed that NGOs regularly “boomeranged”
around recalcitrant governments to eﬀect positive change,

“foreign-sponsored regime change,” and governments began to
treat de- mocracy monitors as potential security threats. Within
eighteen months of the March 2005 “Tulip Revolution” in
Kyrgyzstan, all five former So- viet Central Asian republics
enacted restrictive NGO-registration laws. In 2011, the Arab
Spring drew more attention to the role that foreign-fund- ed civil
society groups (and social media) might play in political unrest.
Three years after that, the EuroMaidan protests in Ukraine
brought down a Russian-backed president and again heightened
the anxiety felt in certain quarters about the political weight of
foreign-backed civil society groups.

exerting pressure via transnational networks that include other

In response, governments across the world have developed a

NGOs, international organi- zations, and like-minded states.11 In

“counter- revolutionary playbook” that targets NGOs and

hindsight, this celebratory account appears clearly premature.

democracy monitors. The common charge is that they act on

Such optimistic studies assumed that NGO campaigns and

behalf of outside interests eager to infl - ence domestic political

activities would enjoy a clear field indefinitely, while the severity

outcomes. New legal restrictions limit NGOs’ access to foreign

and eﬀectiveness of future state responses went unanticipated.

funds and even stigmatize the groups as Trojan horses that

The turning point came after the so-called color revolutions that
flared in the former USSR during the first half of the 2000s. In
Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), street
protests following flawed elections swept regimes from power.
Experts still debate whether West- ern-funded NGOs played a

covertly serve the West. In addition to the best-known cases in
Eurasia and the Middle East, countries including Ecuador,
Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Mexico, Paki- stan, Sudan, Venezuela,
Vietnam, and even Canada have moved over the last ten years to
put a squeeze on the activities of foreign-funded NGOs within
their borders. Measures range from outright bans on foreign
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funding (Er- itrea, Saudi Arabia), to restrictions on foreign funding

In the case of Ethiopia, a pioneering study exploring the eﬀects of

of political work, to burdensome mandates that force NGOs to

a re- strictive 2009 NGO law found that 90 percent of domestic

secure government approval of any outside funding and to meet

NGOs concerned with political or human-rights issues either

stringent reporting requirements.12 Darin Christensen and Jeremy

folded or shifted to work in less contentious areas such as

Weinstein’s 2013 study of 98 countries found that 12

economic development or social services.17 Gov- ernments have

governments had prohibited the foreign funding of the third

learned that they will face few international consequences for

sector, while 38 had imposed restrictions on outside funding (20

cracking down on NGOs, and that such “sovereignty-preserving”

of them since 2002).13 An- other recent academic survey identifi

eﬀorts have the encouragement of China, Russia, and other non-

45 countries that have imposed laws restricting foreign funding of

Western powers.

domestic NGOs since 1993, noting that 38 of them have adopted
these restrictions since 2003.14 Demonstration eﬀects also seem
to be important: Studies suggest that countries carefully pay
attention to and emulate the normative practices of their
neighbors.15 Far from being a temporary measure, the
clampdown on NGOs is a growing global trend.

Even as they ramp up their repression of independent NGOs,
govern- ments have been promoting pseudo-NGOs and fake
democracy monitors that emulate the form but not the substance
of true civil society groups. The proliferation of governmentorganized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs) has been
especially striking: Unhappy with a civil society that

Evidence from the latest crackdowns strongly suggests that these

independently monitors and challenges them, authorities have

new restrictions are accomplishing their political objectives. In

been busy building their own tame simulacrum of it that

Russia, ground zero of the NGO backlash, a 2012 law required

collaborates with power rather than criticizing it. In like manner,

NGOs receiving outside funds to register as “foreign agents” on

governments have begun funding youth movements, such as the

pain of fines. Few chose to regis- ter at first, so the law was

Russian group Nashi, that stress themes of national pride and

amended to allow the Russian Justice Ministry to decree whether

sovereignty.

a group qualifies as independent or not. The ministry has since
formally warned twenty groups that they must register, while at
least six groups—including election watchdogs, legal societies,
and LGBT organizations—chose to close rather than accept the
stigmatizing label of “foreign agent.”16

The rise of what I call “zombie” election monitors oﬀers another
dramatic case in point. Traditionally, election monitoring has been
the mission of a few skilled NGOs and international organizations
such as the OSCE, acting through its Oﬃ for Democratic
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Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). These groups bring to

It may be tempting to dismiss zombie monitors as laughably

their work extensive experience, technical expertise, and a code

phony and hence powerless to undermine international standards

that lays out the best practices to be followed in observing and

with their bogus as- sessments, or to reverse general international

evaluating elections, including measures such as long-term

impressions of an election’s poor quality. Yet, critically, zombies

monitoring. Over the last decade, many authoritarian

are not meant to function as perfect substitutes for Western

governments and ruling parties have con- tinued to avow their

democratic watchdogs. Instead, their role is less ambitious, and

acceptance of external election observation as a norm, but have

thus easier to play: Regimes use zombies to confuse and distract,

undercut it in practice by using “zombie” monitors. Zombie mon-

to sow uncertainty by promoting progovernment “narratives,”

itors try to look like democratic observers, but serve autocratic

and to boost the plausibility of government complaints that

purposes by pretending that clearly fl

critical foreign observers are biased.19 What is more, zombies are

elections deserve

clean bills of health.
Authoritarians have increasingly hired or deployed zombies on
election days without regard to their expertise, competence, or
credibility. Azerbai- jan’s 9 October 2013 presidential election
appears to have marked a wa- tershed in the practice—of the 42
invited organizations that were there to observe the elections,
many had never been heard of before. The process ended with
incumbent president Ilham Aliyev claiming a third term (he has
been free to run indefinitely since engineering a 2009

allowing authoritarians to attempt a gradual redefinition of the
very purpose and role of outside election observation. Instead of
being a neutral activity that evaluates the quality of electoral
processes objectively and openly, even if this might “undermine” sovereignty, election observation becomes in
authoritarian eyes a “sovereignty-enhancing” partnership
between invited observers and the governments that summon
them.

The new authoritarian regionalism

constitutional change that erased term limits) on the basis of
almost 85 percent of the vote. The process began with the

Another international development that has fostered the rise of

national election commission accidentally releasing a “result”—

counter- norms involves various regional organizations and the

before voting had even started—that showed Aliyev as the win-

new legal frameworks and activities that they have been fostering.

ner with nearly 73 percent. Of the reports that observer groups

As had been the case with NGOs, scholars who studied regional

issued on the electoral process, only the ODIHR’s was critical.18

organizations in the wake of the Cold War be- lieved that on the
whole they would assist democratic consolidation.20 The ex201

pansion of the EU and its adoption of the strict Copenhagen

For instance, the SCO’s 2009 Anti-Terrorism Treaty and the 2012

criteria for mem- bership spread an impression that deeper

Joint Security Agreement of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

regional integration would reinforce democratic consolidation and

give execu- tive authorities and security services a number of

institutional transformation. The EU standards, for instance, gave

extraterritorial powers that bypass traditional domestic legal

democrats in such then-aspirants as Slovakia and Romania a

checks and international norms. Each compact provides for a

basis for criticizing the democratic shortcomings of their own

common blacklist of suspected terrorists and “extremists,” and

governments. There was scholarly criticism of this view, but it

each allows any member state to extradite suspects to any other

stopped short of questioning the basic idea that regional

member state on the basis of a mere accusation, with no clear

organizations would by and large promote the dif- fusion of

standards of evidence. The security services of member states,

democratic norms.21

meanwhile, may conduct investigations on one another’s territory,

Yet their political agendas seem to be drifting away from reaﬃ
dem- ocratic principles, and may even be veering toward new
practices that serve to shield their authoritarian members from
outside criticism of what they do at home. As Latin America
expert Christopher Sabatini has observed regard- ing the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA, founded in 2004) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR,
founded in 2008), these new organizations rely on “antiimperialist” sentiment plus what he calls “the vague basis of
norms of regional solidarity.”22
Of particular concern are the agreements and treaties that some
regional organizations have been forging, often in the name of
new norms of regional security, stability, or counterterrorism.
These compacts are creating legal frame- works that could serve
to institutionalize authoritarian and anticonstitutional practices.

with information about suspects and targeted individuals to be
shared upon request.23 Not surprisingly, human-rights watchdogs have criticized both of these treaties for undermining
political rights in member countries.24 Kuwait’s legislature
delayed ratification of the GCC pact amid worries—voiced by
lawmakers and civil society groups—that it would undermine the
country’s constitutional principles. After Kuwait finally ratified the
pact in 2015, these concerns appeared justified as three
prominent Kuwait activists were reportedly detained at the
request of Saudi authorities.25
When not dreaming up agreements that embed authoritarian
practices, regional organizations have been busy diluting
democratic standards and incubating fresh “zombie monitors.” In
Eurasia, the Commonwealth of In- dependent States (CIS)
Election Monitoring Observers (founded 2005) like to associate
themselves with international standards and Western organi202

zations such as the OSCE. In fact, however, the CIS observers

of the African Union’s rotating presidency by Zim- babwe, for

have oﬀered an assessment opposite to the ODIHR’s in every

example, has given that country’s nonagenarian strongman

regional election that both have observed save one—the 2010

Robert Mugabe a welcome new platform from which to repeat his

balloting that made Viktor Yanukovych president of Ukraine. In

denunciations of “imperialists and colonialists.”28

Latin America, UNASUR wants its monitors to “accompany” host
governments throughout the electoral process and to reach
accommodation with the results. It does not expect monitors to
assess either the political environment that precedes the voting or
the conduct of the election itself.26 And even the African Union,
which in other ways has embodied democratic principles—it has
a policy against according recog- nition to coups, for instance—
has proven too accommodating in its as- sessments. Thus its
observation team was quick to declare the Democratic Republic
of the Congo’s November 2011 presidential election a success
even as EU and U.S. observers were reporting chaotic conditions
and irreg- ularities that had damaged the quality of the vote.27
Why do regional organizations so often fail to show fi

when

uphold- ing democratic standards? A major and perhaps
surprising role in the failure is played by leading regional powers.
States such as Brazil and South Africa are preoccupied with
leveraging their newfound prominence in regional or- ganizations
to cement coveted status as regional bellwethers and “emerging”
global powers. They seem to fear that criticizing neighboring
governments will arouse unwanted resentment, while embattled
authoritarians are practiced in the art of using appeals to regional
solidarity to defl international opprobri- um. The 2015 assumption

None of this means that regional organizations are playing a
solely neg- ative role, of course. On the contrary, groups such as
the African Union and ASEAN in Southeast Asia openly reflect on
democratic issues and conduct regular outreach to civil society.
And yet the broader analytical point re- mains: Regional groups
themselves have become institutional arenas where democratic
norms are contested and counternorms introduced. Indeed, even
the OSCE, long the embodiment of the 1975 Helsinki Accords’
normative “human values” agenda, has come under siege as a
group of Eurasian states led by Russia has proposed to reduce
the ODIHR’s budget and autonomy.

New patrons & providers
A third international trend that has reinforced the rise of
counternorms is the advent of alternative providers of
international public goods. Since the 2008 fi

crisis, it has

become commonplace to speak of the West’s eco- nomic
retrenchment and the rise of emerging powers as major players in
the world economy. Although obituaries of the Western-led liberal
economic order seem premature—overall world trade recovered
by 2010, and in 2013 U.S. dollars constituted more than 60
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percent of global reserve holdings and over 80 percent of foreign

the SCO. That organization, he says, “is better and more powerful

exchange—the one area where Western economic hegemony has

[than the EU], and we have common values with them.”29

markedly waned is that of providing development aid, including
project stabilization assistance, and concessionary loans.

The rise of alternative patrons is transforming the development
land- scape. Over the last four years, China has lent more money

Emerging donors, especially China and the Gulf states, have

in Latin Amer- ica than have the World Bank and the Inter-

transformed the dynamics of international development lending.

American Development Bank combined. In Africa, China has

China now has the world’s second-largest economy, smaller only

doubled its development financing, going from US$10 billion lent

than that of the United States (by some reckonings, China’s may

from 2009 through 2012 to twice that amount for the period from

even have recently nosed into fi place). Beijing’s stock in trade is

January 2013 to February 2015.30 Beijing has also become the

to oﬀer packages that defy traditional distinctions between aid

leading lender to Central Asia, and is playing a major role in the

and investment, often accepting as security for its loans access

Ca- ribbean as well as the island states of the Pacific. Together

to host-country energy resources, commodities, or other assets.

with this, a shift from grants to loans secured by concessions has

Whatever China’s intentions, its influence as a political model is
linked unavoidably to its growing economic engagement and
international pa- tronage. The availability of alternative donors

raised further concerns about repayment terms, political
conditions, and the demands that Beijing might make on its
debtors in the future.

who demand fewer demo- cratic conditions and good-

In other cases, emerging donors have stepped in to aid

governance guarantees, makes it easier for state recipients

countries not serviced by the Western-led aid community. Since

throughout the developing world to reject Western funding if the

the instability of the Arab Spring, the oil-rich Gulf states have sent

prodemocratic “strings” attached to it are considered too

tens of billions of dollars abroad, and now provide the lion’s share

constricting. The prestige of these economically successful

of development aid to Egypt, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and

authoritarians gives other leaders who are bent on deviating from

Yemen. Other cases suggest that in postconflict settings,

liberal-democratic norms a plausible al- ternative to having to

governments that have been shunned or sanctioned by the West

submit to liberal values and Western criticism. Thus Turkish

can now readily find new patrons as alternatives to the liberal

president Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an has repeatedly brought up the

peace-building com- plex. After the Sinhalese-dominated Sri

idea of dropping talks with the EU in order to seek membership in

Lankan government launched its ruthless and successful 2009
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military oﬀensive against Tamil insurgents, it bypassed Western

other Western countries have continued to whittle down their

donors and their human-rights concerns by turning to China and

presence in international news-gathering (few U.S. newspapers

India for postconflict assistance.31 Angola, Sudan, and Tajiki-

maintain permanent foreign bureaus or correspondents anymore),

stan can also be seen as part of this growing new “illiberal”

Russia and China have been pouring state funds into news and

peace-building complex.

broadcasting operations. As of 2013, according to one report,

In 2014, Beijing strongly backed and indeed capitalized two new
lending organizations in order to challenge the West’s monopoly
of control over oﬃcial international financial institutions. The New
Development Bank (or NDB, originally called the BRICS

China Central Television (CCTV) had set up seventy international
bureaus, including twenty in Africa and a dozen in Latin America,
with a plan to broadcast (in local languages) to regions and
countries where China has made big investments.32

Development Bank) and the Asian Infra- structure Investment

Russia has upped its international media presence by expanding

Bank (AIIB) are supposed to perform tasks resembling those of

the reach of its television channel Russia Today (now rebranded

the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, with an emphasis

simply as RT), and by launching (in November 2014) a state-run

on financing large-scale infrastructure projects in developing

multimedia outlet called Sputnik in 34 countries across five

countries. In- terestingly, while U.S. oﬃcials were cautiously

continents. Sputnik’s stated goal is to counter “Western

supportive of the NDB, they publicly campaigned against the AIIB

propaganda” worldwide.33 Going forward alongside these eﬀorts

to the point of lobbying allies such as Australia to forgo

are the activities of global outlets such as Iran’s Press TV, the

membership. Yet U.S. geopolitical influence now appears weak as

Venezuelan-run Telesur consortium, and several Gulf

53 states have joined, including France, Germany, and the United

broadcasters. Togeth- er, they pose a serious, amply funded

Kingdom as well as (after a change of mind) Australia. Whether

challenge across large swaths of the world in covering news,

these banks can truly devise workable lending practices without

setting journalistic standards, and editorializing about political

imposing Western-style oversight and conditions remains to be

events.

seen. Yet their political significance as alternative sources of
international financing should not be underesti- mated.

In the 1990s, the West still had a near-exclusive role as the
provider of in- ternational funding and information the world over.

Another former Western monopoly of the liberal order that has

Emerging donors and alternative patrons have changed that. In

been broken is the field of global media. As the United States and

development assistance, in project finance, and in global media,
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emerging powers are displacing the West. The upshot of these

much as possible, the issue of perceived Western political decline

trends is more contention over the normative foundations of the

from the fate of liberal democ- racy.

international order (with nonliberal voices having a bigger say
than before), more authority for counternorms such as
noninterference in coun- tries’ internal aﬀairs, and more influence
for various authoritarian alterna- tives to liberal democracy.

Handling the shock of the new

The need is to combat the rise of counterdemocratic practices
em- bodied in new regional frameworks or the proliferation of
zombies. Here, policy makers should concentrate on
benchmarking these new phenomena against existing
international standards or introducing new standards against
which the credibility of such practices and frameworks must be

As we have seen, rising new counternorms are threatening to

tested. For example, a code of standards governing election

strait- jacket liberal democracy’s power even as they chip away at

observation does exist, and longstanding UN principles undergird

its status as the most sources of norms for global governance.

it. Similarly, new regional treaties and agreements should not be

The appear- ance of these counternorms is not adventitious, but

passively accepted, but should instead be actively scrutinized in

has a basis in funda- mental changes that have been altering the

light of international human-rights laws and countries’ com-

post–Cold War international order. Changes in the legal status

mitments to such standards. Identifying best practices in election

and role of NGOs, the conversion of regional organizations into

observation, news coverage, legal development, blacklisting, and

arenas of contestation, and the rise of alter- native patrons have

data-sharing will be crit- ical to stopping the “anything goes”

turned a world that was once relatively favorable to the spread of

thinking that is too often assumed to be a natural concomitant of

democratic norms into one where authoritarians can push back—

multipolarity.

and have learned to do so in innovative ways. Whatever the exact
extent of worldwide democratic regression, it is clear that
counternorms to liberal democracy have taken root and are
helping authoritarians to retain power.

Moreover, diplomats and foreign-policy oﬃally should
reconsider how emerging powers can gain status by adopting,
rather than rejecting, standards that respect good governance
and democracy. Recent schol- arship has shown that political

What can democracy advocates and prodemocratic policy

practices such as gender quotas for leg- islatures tend to spread

makers do about all this? A key challenge is to disentangle, as

not on principled grounds, but rather because countries get the
impression that adopting them is the “high-status” thing to do.34
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In view of this, liberal democracies should do all they can to re-

political leaders and analysts in the United States and Europe,

inscribe principles such as good governance, transparency, and

integration has been a dominant foreign-policy organizing

respect for the due autonomy of civil society in the honor roll of

concept, serving as the West’s strategic lodestar over the past

“things that enhance a country’s standing in the world.” Appeals

quarter century. The democracies’ central assumption has been

to national pride and prestige are likely to have more eﬀect on

that patient engagement with authoritarian states would yield

emerging powers than will lectures about democratic

clear mutual benefits. By embracing such regimes and

shortcomings.

encouraging their integration into the glob- al economic system

Finally, Western representatives charged with public diplomacy
and re- gional engagement must resist the urge to decouple
normative from geopo- litical issues. If the West were to reduce its
support for liberal norms and a rule-based international order for
the sake of political expediency, it would only hasten the erosion
of its own normative standing and emphasize that we are now in

and key political institutions, Western powers hoped to coax the
autocracies toward meaningful political reform, leading them
eventually to become more like the democracies. Even the
tougher cases for democratization, such as Russia and China,
were expected slowly but inevitably to liberalize politically as their
economies grew and their middle classes developed.

world of competitive patronage dynamics where the high- est

But in an unanticipated twist, the authoritarian regimes, both large

bidder wins. Instead, the onset of multipolarity, when it truly

and small, have turned the tables on the democracies. Rather

emerges, should be embraced with a clear sense of liberal

than reforming, most of these repressive regimes have deepened

democracy’s purpose and unique standing in the universe of

their authoritarianism. And now they are turning it outward.

competing norms and counternorms. Without confidence in its

Although the leading authoritarian regimes are today integrated

own values, the West not only will continue to lose its global

in many ways into the global system, they have not become

appeal, but will lose itself.

more like the democracies; rather, they have developed policies

Dealing with the Authoritarian Resurgence
Since the end of the Cold War, the democratic West has
accorded particular prominence to the idea of integrating

and practices aimed at blocking democracy’s advance. Exploiting
globalization and the opportunities presented by integration with
the West, these states have set out to undermine the very
institutions and arenas that welcomed them.

nondemocratic regimes into the liberal international order. For
207

Today, authoritarian regimes are projecting power beyond their

months, it has annexed Crimea, invaded Ukraine, and plowed

borders. They are targeting crucial democratic institutions,

significant new military resources into the Middle East. Russian

including elections and the media. They use deep economic and

airstrikes in Syria, be- gun in September 2015 on behalf of Bashar

business ties to export corrupt practices and insinuate

al-Assad’s brutal regime, caught the West oﬀ guard, as did the

themselves into the politics of democracies, both new and

Kremlin’s military forays into Crimea and other parts of Ukraine in

established. They are influencing international public opinion and

2014. Iran, meanwhile, has upped its activities in Afghanistan,

investing heavily in their own instruments of “soft power” in order

Iraq, and Lebanon. Augmenting its existing presence in Syria, Iran

to com- pete with democracy in the realm of ideas.

sent ground troops into the country in October 2015, side by side

In 2014, the National Endowment for Democracy’s International
Forum for Democratic Studies launched a two-year initiative on
resurgent authori- tarianism, from which this essay and others in
this volume come. The proj- ect found that regimes in countries

with Russia in a show of solidarity. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has
undertaken a months-long bombing campaign in Yemen in an
eﬀort to contest rival Iran in a region beset with power vacuums.

The authoritarian toolkit

as diverse as China, Russia, Venezuela, and even archrivals Iran
and Saudi Arabia, despite disagreeing on many issues, broadly

The willingness of these illiberal regimes to use military power is

share the objective of containing the spread of democracy.

one sign of the changing international environment. But it is their

Moreover, these regimes are capitalizing on the benefits of

development of so-called soft power that is the most

integration to pursue this goal both domestically and

conspicuous aspect of the new au- thoritarianism. The term soft

internationally.

power is a rather uncomfortable fit for these eﬀorts, however, as

One area in which the rise of authoritarian power has been highly
visible is geopolitics. China has been exerting its influence more
forcefully in the South China Sea, for example, flexing its muscles
with an island-building spree in the Spratly Island chain and
generally adopting a more assertive military profile in the region.
Russia, although seen by some as enfeebled, has pushed into
high gear a policy of disruption: Within a span of eighteen

none measures up to Joseph Nye’s conception of such power
that emphasized states’ capacity to attract others by the
legitimacy of their “policies and the values that underlie them.”1
Even the China model, which has attracted any number of
authoritarian governments and even some Western analysts, is
fraught with problems. Yet that has not stopped the leading
authoritarian governments from hijacking the concept of soft
power as part of a broad assault on democracy and its values.
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Through authoritarian learning (for example, by adapting or

or Deutsche Welle, which operate according to a fundamentally

mimick- ing democratic forms) and by exploiting the opportunities

diﬀerent value system. Because editorial accountability for

presented by globalization, authoritarian trendsetters have

authoritarian media outlets ultimately rests with the political

created a modern antidemo- cratic toolkit that in many ways

leader- ship, the content that they produce is compromised,

serves as the mirror image of democratic soft power. Its contents

through either editorial omission or commission. Thus if CCTV

include government-organized nongovernmental organizations

reports at all about controversial topics such as the Tiananmen

(GONGOs), “zombie” election monitoring, foreign aid and

Square Massacre, Tibet, or Taiwan, it is not in a dispassionate or

investment, and both traditional- and new-media enterprises.

critical way. RT, meanwhile, unfailingly follows the Kremlin line,

The leading authoritarian governments have established a wide
constella- tion of regime-friendly GONGOs, including think tanks
and policy institutes that operate at home and abroad. Some of

rationalizing the status quo that the regime seeks to maintain by
cynically portraying all systems, whether authoritarian or
democratic, as corrupt.

these groups are benign, but many operate with the aim of

Similarly, the deepening commercial integration of the last two

subverting authentic debate, either by spreading re- gime

decades has enabled the Chinese and Russian governments to

messages in a nontransparent way or by crowding out authentic

influence political af- fairs in both young and established

voices. “Zombie” election monitoring, which allows authoritarian

democracies. These regimes have iden- tified ways to

regimes to ma- nipulate the integrity of the election process, is a

compromise the values of transparency and accountability and to

related innovation. In terms of aid and investment, China and

export corruption to the democracies. For example, under

other authoritarian governments have sunk vast sums into the

Vladimir Putin, a centerpiece of Russia’s engagement with the

developing world, enabling recipient governments to side- step

West has been the corrupt and exploitative export of

the standards of transparency and accountability required by the

hydrocarbons, which has had an impact on Western financial,

estab- lished international institutions.

legal, and political institutions.2 In short, the author- itarian toolkit

Finally, illiberal regimes are scaling up their traditional- and newmedia capabilities and broadcasting content to global audiences.

enables illiberal regimes to project their influence into the
democratic space in a variety of ways.

On the surface, these enterprises seem like soft-power

At the same time, authoritarian regimes have become adept at

instruments. But China’s CCTV and Russia’s RT are not the BBC

muﬄing voices from the democracies. Over time, Western
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universities, think tanks, and media and technology companies

propagat- ing instead norms based on “state sovereignty” and

operating in China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States

security, “civilizational diversity,” and the defense of “traditional

have become more integrated commercially with these

values” against liberal democracy.

authoritarian systems. This has sometimes enabled these regimes
to coopt their Western partners and induce self-censorship,
thereby resetting norms of free expression through what is
essentially economic coercion.
In addition, the authoritarians are trying to unmoor the institutions
that have served as the glue of the post–Cold War order. Illiberal
regimes work together within the regional and international rulesbased organizations that have been crucial to the global political
framework—the UN, the Or- ganization of American States, the
Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)—in order to neuter their human-rights
and democracy components. Meanwhile, authoritarian governments are establishing their own organizations, including the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic
Union, which are promoting alternative, authoritarian-friendly
norms.

These all enjoy signifi backing today. The eﬀects are most visible
in the narrowing of the political space for civil society, the shifting
missions that regional organizations are embracing, and the
growing clout of non-Western powers as international patrons.3

The worst get worse
In the face of this authoritarian mobilization, the democracies
have been caught....due in part to complacency but also to the
“crisis of con- fi that set in after the 2008–2009 global economic
crisis (and has been exacerbated by the European migrant crisis
that began in 2015), the estab- lished democracies so far have
had no coherent answer to the authoritarian surge. More
troublingly, the West seems to have fallen into a political torpor
that contributes to a larger “failure of imagination” in responding
to the se- rious challenges that have emerged in the new,
contested environment.4 In order to understand the growing

In a relatively short period, the leading repressive regimes have

challenges to democracy posed by the au- thoritarian surge, we

forged a formidable infrastructure for challenging the

must examine the evolution of the authoritarian toolkit since the

democracies and their values, and a real competition over norms

“backlash” against democracy began in the mid-2000s.

has emerged as the West’s normative pow- er has begun to
unravel. As Alexander Cooley observes, leading authoritarian
regimes are challenging the notion of universal human rights and

At first, the backlash was apparent only in a limited number of
coun- tries and was confined largely to the domestic level. In this
early phase, authoritarian regimes used legal, regulatory, and
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informal measures, often restricting freedom of expression and

during these years. In the MENA region, fifteen of eighteen

association, to obstruct the emer- gence of democratic pluralism.

countries have become less free over the past ten years, and in

Repression in authoritarian settings tends to exhibit an ebb and

many cases considerably so. (Tunisia, which has established a

flow in which the government’s grip is tightened and then, at

nascent democracy, is of course an exception.) Countries such as

some point, relaxed. The authoritarian backlash never eased,

Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which were already

however. Instead, it has gained momentum and deepened in

highly autocratic, have become even more so, especially since

intensity over the past decade.

the Arab uprisings.

Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report bears this out: In

Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is by most accounts

each of the past nine years, declines in political rights and civil

even more repressive than it was during the Hosni Mubarak era.

liberties have outstripped improvements. Notably, a large share of
those declines have occurred in countries already deemed Not
Free by Freedom House. In other words, countries in the worst
category have become even more re- pressive, sinking further
within that category. This deepening authoritari- anism in already
repressive environments has been a crucial driver of the decline in
Freedom House ratings often cited as evidence of a “democratic
recession.”

China, with the world’s largest population and second largest
economy, ranks among the world’s most politically repressive
states. On Freedom House’s combined 100-point scale5 for
political rights and civil liberties, China scores a paltry 17, the
same as in 2006. Out of 40 possible points for political rights,
China scores just 2, an astonishingly low number that re- flects
the systematic repression and denial of political rights in that
country. As in Russia, deepening authoritarianism in an

A big part of this story is found in the two regions that represent

increasingly internationalist China reverberates beyond its

centers of authoritarianism: the former Soviet Union (FSU)

borders.

and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In the FSU, rights
and freedoms markedly de- clined in countries such as
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan between 2006 and 2015.
Moreover, in Russia, whose intensifying authoritarianism has
implications not just for its neighborhood but for the wider
world, political rights and civil liberties worsened significantly

Above all, authoritarian rulers are preoccupied with regime
survival, and they study and learn from other authoritarian
regimes, both past and present, in order to maintain power. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has scruti- nized the collapse of
the Soviet system in order to avoid the same fate,6 while Vladimir
Putin’s Kremlin has carefully studied the durability of the Chinese
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system in the post-Tiananmen period. In the fi case, the CCP

Speakers included Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu and

seeks to draw lessons from Soviet failure; in the second, the

foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. Senior oﬃcials from

post-Soviet Kremlin, like any number of other contemporary

nondemocracies such as China, Egypt, Iran, Syria, and the United

authoritarian governments, attempts to glean what it can from

Arab Emirates attended the conference, along with oﬃcials from

China’s seeming success at repressing political opposition while

Burma, a country in the midst of a troubled transition. The

growing its economy.

Russian speakers warned attendees that “color revolutions are a

One sign of the priority given to regime security by authoritarian
gov- ernments is their massive investment in internal security,
which, tellingly, can outstrip even military and external-defense

new form of warfare invented by Western governments seeking to
remove independently-minded national governments in favor of
ones controlled by the West.”9

budgets. The Chinese and Iranian governments, for example, use

In September 2015, Russia, Belarus, and EU-aspirant Serbia took

public funds to build vast security apparatuses that are devoted

part in a military-training exercise dubbed Slavic Brotherhood

to suppressing internal dissent.7 Following the Arab uprisings in

2015, held in Novorossiysk, Russia. Army-General Valeriy

2011, Saudi Arabia increased the staﬀ of its already am- ply

Gerasimov, head of Russia’s General Staﬀ, explained that such

manned interior ministry by sixty thousand.8 These regimes have

exercises were needed because “‘so- called color revolutions’”

made the prevention of domestic dissent a cornerstone of their

are “a form of armed struggle that must be met by military force.”

national (read “regime”) security strategy.

According to Gerasimov, interpreting color revolutions as a type

Thwarting “color revolutions”
In countries where basic democratic rights are routinely denied,
the menace of a “color revolution” has become the central
organizing concept around which authoritarian regimes formulate
their security and propa- ganda strategies. For example, the May

of warfare allows for military-training adjustments and calls
for the armed forces to devise ways to thwart such popular
movements.10 Through training exercises such as Slavic
Brotherhood 2015, Russia and other authoritarian states are
developing the hard-power capacity to con- tain democratic
development and any form of organized dissent.

2014 Moscow Conference on In- ternational Security, sponsored

China has likewise devoted considerable attention to the concept

by Russia’s defense ministry, focused on the impact of popular

of color revolutions. On 13 June 2015, for example, the People’s

protest—specifically color revolutions—on interna- tional security.

Daily, a CCP mouth- piece, published fi scholarly articles
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exploring the roots of color revolutions and what China might

use and the challenge that it poses to the re- gime’s ability to

learn from the experience of the aﬀected nations. The CCP

dominate key political narratives, the CCP has undertaken a vast,

regime believes that the United States had a hand in these

multilayered set of measures to maintain control.12

protest movements and that NGOs helped to foment them.
China’s oﬃ military strategy now states that “anti-China forces
have never given up their attempt to instigate a ‘color revolution’
in this country.”11 By assigning responsibility for domestic
dissent to external forces, these governments create a rationale
for internationalizing their strategy of “democracy containment.”

The CCP’s censorship measures have also had a demonstration
eﬀect abroad. Other countries—both authoritarian and semiauthoritarian—see the “success” of Beijing’s approach to
controlling the Internet and other information and
communications technologies and realize that systematic online
censorship can be achieved. Over time, other countries have

These kinds of cross-national military and security exercises

learned by observation or direct assistance from China, and have

show the extraordinary lengths to which these regimes and others

adapted methods of Internet repression to their own contexts.

are going to stifle political pluralism. This is part of a larger eﬀort
at authoritarian learning that has also helped authoritarians to
craft more sophisticated methods for controlling civil society, the
business community, and political opposition.

In September 2013, Chinese authorities, citing the need to crack
down on what they termed “online rumors,” issued new
guidelines for social media, which serve as vital popular forums
for discussing politics. Under the new rules, Internet users who

Authoritarian learning also has played a visible role in shaping

post defamatory comments that are seen by 5,000 users or

how re- pressive regimes manage and censor the Internet, which

reposted more than 500 times could face up to three years in jail.

they see as a grow- ing threat. China is a leader in this regard,

Since its adoption, this measure has eﬀectively suppressed the

demonstrating that it is possible to expand Internet access—

most-followed civic voices in China on social media. The Kremlin

some 640 million people are now online in Chi- na—while

clearly took notice, because less than a year later, in August

maintaining eﬀective control over political content. The authori-

2014, it put into eﬀect a new set of regulations similar to the

ties in Beijing, like illiberal governments in many other capitals,

Chinese guidelines. Russia’s “blogger law” requires any person

exploit the globalization of commerce to use the most modern

whose online presence draws more than 3,000 daily readers to

technology available on the world market, often provided by

register, disclose personal information, and submit to the same

Western firms, to censor the Internet. Facing this degree of online

regulations as mass media.
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Authoritarian regimes also are learning from each other how to

describes as employing the “practices of de- mocracy to subtly

choke oﬀ independent civil society. In recent years, trendsetting

undermine democracy.”14 Beijing has moved aggressively to fill

authoritarian re- gimes have adopted a cascade of laws

the public space with GONGOs and, as part of its larger

restricting the civil society sector, and other countries, including

ambitions, seeks to develop an array of state-backed think tanks.

some democracies, have followed suit.13 Trou- blingly, the

On 27 October 2014, at the sixth meeting of the Leading Group

intensive learning that has taken place at the domestic level

for Overall Reform, Chinese president Xi Jinping, who heads the

also has been crucial to the development of the authoritarians’

group, called for the creation of a new set of CCP-directed think

methods for obstructing democracy beyond their borders. In

tanks: “Building a new type of think tank with Chinese

other words, the most influential authoritarian regimes, Russia

characteristics is an important and pressing mission. It should be

and China foremost among them, have served as incubators for

targeted [at] promoting scientific and democratic decision

the innovation of antidemocratic techniques that are now applied

making, promot- ing modernization of the country’s governing

internationally. By and large, observers in the democ- racies have

system and ability, as well as strengthening China’s soft

failed to appreciate this.

power.”15 The CCP already has taken the GON- GO concept one

The challenge from “zombie” democracy
Through experimentation and learning, authoritarian regimes have
re- fined their techniques of manipulation at the domestic level.

step further, requiring all domestic cultural, economic, and social
organizations to establish Party-organized groups (sometimes
called “PONGOs”), which will allow the authorities to assert even
greater control in this sphere.16

By constructing fake political parties, phony social movements,

As authoritarian “zombie democracy” has migrated from the

and state-controlled media enterprises that appear in many ways

domestic to the international level, China’s state-backed

to be like those of their democratic counterparts, autocrats

GONGOs increasingly in- sinuate themselves into regional and

simulate democratic institutions as a way of pre- venting

supranational rules-based organiza- tions. At sessions of the

authentic democracy from taking root.

Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a component of the Geneva-

Authoritarian regimes have coupled their harsh crackdown on
indepen- dent NGOs, for example, with a scaling up of
government-backed GON- GOs, entities that Moisés Naím

based UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) that reviews human
rights in all UN member states, Beijing-aligned
“nongovernmental” organizations take part in UN meetings in
order to push the line of Chinese authorities and harass human214

rights activists who criticize the Chinese gov- ernment in this

Similarly, the Cuban and Venezuelan governments brought

forum.

GONGOs to the April 2015 Summit of the Americas in Panama,

In October 2013, several Chinese GONGOs descended on
Geneva as Chi- na’s rights record was under review by the
UNHRC. At such UPR sessions, representatives of GONGOs,
sometimes in coordination with Chinese diplo- mats, use a variety

with the aim of present- ing regime-backed groups as authentic
civil society members. Many of these groups claim to be
autonomous, yet they dutifully advocated the positions of their
countries’ governments.

of tactics to intimidate activists, taking unauthorized pho- tos of

Meanwhile, apart from influencing the proceedings of regional

them and fi up meeting halls with regime representatives to

organi- zations, Russia sinks extensive resources into GONGOs

drown out accusations of rights abuses. According to a 2015

in countries on its periphery and beyond. Through organizations

Reuters investigation, 47 NGOs from Mainland China, Hong

such as Russky Mir and the Foundation for Defense of Rights of

Kong, and Macau are authorized to participate in UNHRC

Compatriots Abroad, the Kremlin funds many initiatives of this

meetings. Of these, at least 34 are GONGOs, ei- ther under the

kind. The Baltic states endure an especially heavy dose of

authority of Chinese government ministries or CCP bodies, or

Russian “soft power,” as Kremlin-supported GONGOs try to

headed by a current or retired government or Party oﬃals.17

influence the public debate and shape the views of these

In what has become an annual ritual at the OSCE’s Human

societies, which are home to large ethnic-Russian communities.

Dimension Implementation Meetings (HDIMs) in Warsaw, Poland,

According to a 2015 report, the investigative-journalism initiative

GONGOs from countries such as Azerbaijan, Belarus,

Re:Bal- tica found in 2013 that Russky Mir was making grants to

Kazakhstan, and Russia take part in proceedings that were

support the promo- tion of “Russian language and culture” in the

intended to allow authentic civil society groups to voice their

Baltic states, while the smaller Foundation for Defense of Rights

views about human rights and democracy in their countries.18 In

of Compatriots Abroad funded “fi

2014, Kremlin-backed GONGOs stayed true to form and sought

promote” the Russian version of twentieth-century his- tory;

to con- fuse the discussion about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In

“researchers who accuse the Baltic states and Ukraine of human

September 2015, Azerbaijani GONGOs actively confronted

rights violations”; ethnic Russians “who were tried [for]

independent Azerbaijani civil society participants and tried to

participating in the 2007 riots in Tallinn,” Estonia’s capital; and

muddy the waters regarding the country’s rights record.

“active participants of the deportation of Lithuanians to Siberia”

- ers that support and
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during and after World War II.19 While the Kremlin ruthlessly

Crimean locals called the Russian troops whose presence the

represses the activities of independent NGOs in Russia, beyond

Kremlin denied) had invaded the peninsula. During this pseudo-

its borders Russian authorities eagerly exploit the open space of

referendum, a mix of radical political fig- ures who were brought

the democra- cies, providing...political support to Kremlin-friendly

to Crimea despite lacking credentials for authentic election

GONGOs that operate unhindered in these democratic settings.

monitoring appeared in Russian-government media outlets to

Authoritarian regimes also have begun using methods of election
manipu- lation at the international level, supporting faux
monitoring groups that en- dorse fraudulent elections with the
aim of clouding the assessments made by established monitoring

pres- ent findings that went in lock step with those of the Kremlin.
Even China, a country that itself does not hold real elections, has
sent observers to recent elections in Burma and Zimbabwe.

The battle over information

organizations. These “zombie” monitors have prolifer- ated
widely. Two authoritarian-led initiatives, the Commonwealth of

The ideas and messages of zombie NGOs and election monitors

Indepen- dent States Election Monitoring Organization and the

are dis- seminated through state-backed media, which serve as

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have sent purported

instruments for ma- nipulating audiences and suppressing

monitors to recent polls across Eurasia. In October 2013,

democratic content. At home, the au- thoritarians can deploy a

Azerbaijan’s government brought in zombie monitors from abroad

potent combination of censorship and propaganda, allowing them

to sanctify its patently manipulated presidential election. A host of

to dominate the media space and create an unchallenged al-

ersatz monitoring organizations, with names such as the Observer

ternate reality for their audiences. Beijing, Moscow, and Riyadh

Mission of the Standing Conference of Political Parties of Latin

spare little expense to keep alternative ideas and information from

America and the Caribbe- an and the Observer Mission of the

entering mainstream political discussion. In a perfect example of

NGO Forum of the Organization of Black Sea Economic

the studious authoritarian avoid- ance of sensitive domestic

Cooperation, along with a motley group of fringe politicians from

issues, China’s state-run media did not report at all on the

Europe, praised this Alice in Wonderland–like pseudo-election

country’s massive stock-market collapse in August 2015.20

event.

Abroad, however, Beijing and Moscow cannot impose censorship

A similar spectacle occurred in Crimea during a “referendum”

in the same way they do at home; instead, they use other

held in March 2014 after Russia’s “little green men” (as some

techniques adapted from domestic experience and apply them to
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the international arena. In the online realm, for example, these

CCTV Amer- ica’s Washington headquarters employs about thirty

regimes rely on trolls, cyberattacks, and disinfor- mation to

journalists produc- ing Mandarin-language content and more than

achieve their objectives. While these illiberal governments are

a hundred producing En- glish-language content. CCTV also has

com- mitted to preventing the competition of ideas within their

broadcasting facilities in New York and Los Angeles. China’s

borders, they have taken big steps to make certain that their own

media presence in the developing world is grow- ing: It has

point of view is heard abroad. The best-resourced among them

twelve bureaus in Latin America and has built an enormous media

have built formidable media outlets that enable them to project

foothold in sub-Saharan Africa. In November 2015, it came to

their messages into the global marketplace of ideas.

light that China Radio International (CRI), Beijing’s state-run radio

At home, these regimes repress domestic media and increasingly
obstruct the work of Western news organizations, thereby cutting
oﬀ one of the few remaining arteries for transmitting information
on these politically closed countries. By manipulating the granting
of visas and harassing and even jailing journalists (as in the case
of Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian), these regimes set
the terms of engagement. At the same time, au- thoritarian media
outlets have exploited the openness of democracies by
increasing their presence and activities in a number of democratic
countries. Telesur, supported by Venezuela and several other

network, is operating as a hidden hand behind a global web of
stations on which the Chinese government controls much of the
content. According to a Reuters investigation, 33 stations in 14
countries “primarily broadcast content cre- ated or supplied by
CRI in the United States, Australia, and Europe.” As part of this
elaborate Chinese government eﬀort to exploit the open media
space, more than a dozen stations across the United States
operate as part of the CCP’s “borrowed boat” approach, in which
existing media outlets in foreign countries are used to project
China’s messages.21

countries, operates in Spanish-speaking Latin America. China’s

Beijing devotes elaborate eﬀorts to limiting foreign reporting that

CCTV and Russia’s RT have a large and growing presence in the

it deems unfavorable. Over the past two decades, the Chinese

United States; both have open access to dozens of cable and

government has developed tools to extend information controls

satellite systems in the United States and around the world for

to media outlets based outside of China. In many cases, Chinese

broadcasting their state-backed content.

oﬃcials directly impede indepen- dent reporting by media based

CCTV oﬀers programs in Arabic, French, Russian, and Spanish,
while China’s state news agency, Xinhua, is expanding worldwide.

abroad. More prevalent, however, and often more eﬀective are
methods of control that subtly induce self-censorship or inspire
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media owners, advertisers, and other international actors to take

real influence. Although it may be comforting to think that people

action on the CCP’s behalf.22

in the democracies have a natural resis- tance to foreign

Like CCTV, Russia’s RT has a Washington, D.C., headquarters
and broad- cast facilities in New York, Miami, and Los Angeles.
State or state-friendly media in Russia—Life News, NTV, Channel
One Russia, and Russia 24—disseminate not just the Kremlin’s

propaganda, this is not always the case. One need only look at
how warped and false arguments about Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine snaked their way into the debate in the United States and
Europe.23

narratives but also outright fakery to domestic audiences and

Authoritarian-backed media have become intertwined with the

those in the Russian-speaking space. These outlets spread the

world of normal news, especially online. Western news outlets

same stories via social media as well. RT, meanwhile, pushes this

today are picking up key narratives pushed by Russian state

manipulated content out to international audiences.

media. Slick websites with phony news and Kremlin spins appear

In addition to its English-language broadcasts, Russia’s state
media de- vote substantial attention to reaching the Balkans,
Latin America, and the Middle East. Russia, like China and Iran,
sees an opportunity to exploit the information space in the
Balkans, where the democracies’ already limited media presence
is shrinking. A large part of Russia’s editorial eﬀorts, along with

in the new democracies of Central Europe. In today’s helterskelter, fragmented media world, it is much easier for
authoritarian gov- ernments to manipulate the global
understanding of important issues, making it harder to distinguish
between authentic and phony information.

Responding to Authoritarian Internationalism

those of other authoritarian regimes, are aimed at assailing the
West, distorting perceptions of democracy, and tarnishing the

A renewed struggle between democracy and authoritarianism has

image of the United States and the EU. To the extent that these

emerged. The decade-long democratic decline reported by

regimes have agreed on any ide- ology, it is anti-Americanism.

Freedom House has been most dramatic within the ranks of

This focus is best understood as a reflection of the absence of a

already authoritarian regimes, which have become even more

positive ideology or vision of their own.

repressive. At the same time, the most infltial among them—

For a long time, the West did not worry about authoritarian
internation- al media enterprises. Over time, however, it has
become clear that outlets such as CCTV and RT are able to exert

China, Russia, and Iran—have become more internation- alist. In
doing so, they have found ways to exploit integration and to
broad- en their infl in the democratic world. Through the
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development of the antidemocratic toolkit of simulated NGOs,

not to promote authoritarianism, but rather to contain the spread

think tanks, election monitors, and news media, the autocrats

of democracy and re- shape the norms of the international order.

are actively seeking to undermine democracy from within.

It will be increasingly important for observers in the West to

Increasingly, these regimes show solidarity and coordination with
one another, at least when it comes to contesting and containing
democracy and the ideas central to it. Through this more
internationalist approach and authoritarian learning, China,
Russia, Iran, and other illiberal regimes have developed

understand the alternative (and more malev- olent) explanation for
these massive influence initiatives, because as Peter
Pomerantsev observes, “illiberal regimes across the world are
adopting sim- ilar strategies and uniting to create global networks
of pseudorealities.”25

instruments to counter the democratic West’s soft power. But the

Yet so far the democracies, whether out of complacency or

power that the authoritarians are exerting is not soft power as

willful ig- norance, have not taken seriously the prospect that

customarily understood. Indeed, the application of the term soft

these emboldened il- liberal powers could reshape the

power—a benign con- cept generally applied to eﬀorts made to

undefended post–Cold War liberal order. The challenge is

bolster a country’s image, contrib- ute to open debate, and win

particularly vexing because the authoritarians have turned

friends and allies—to the ideas-related eﬀorts of the

integration, jiu jitsu–like, against the democracies. This

authoritarians is problematic. What the authoritarian regimes are

unexpected twist requires some fresh and serious thinking about

practicing is instead a more malign mirror image of soft power.

how the democratic world should respond to the growing

This misunderstanding has led observers in the West to assume

authoritarian challenge.

that the authoritarians have established their international media

Any such renewed thinking will first require dispensing with the

outlets (CCTV, RT, and Iran’s PressTV, for example) in order to

false framing of this issue as a choice between shunning or

build prestige and gain respect from the outside world—that is, to

engaging authori- tarian regimes. Most of them are already

win hearts and minds. But this is a fundamental misapprehension.

thoroughly integrated into the international system, making some

As China, Russia, and Iran have spent vast and increasing sums

kind of engagement unavoidable. It is the nature of the

on media and other tools to exert international influ- ence, the

democracies’ engagement that must be rethought. The es-

image of all three countries has remained very low in the West,

tablished democracies must pursue a more nimble and principled

and in some cases is sinking even lower.24 Their principal aim is

approach that takes into account the new environment in which
219

authoritarian re- gimes are seeking to undermine democratic
institutions and values.
The democracies need to renew and refresh their commitment to
demo- cratic institutions, and to take steps to stop the
authoritarians from hollow- ing out the most important regional
and global rules-based organizations. As China, Russia, and Iran
scale up their media presence in places such as the Balkans,
Central Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, so too
should the United States and European democracies instead of
scaling back as they have been doing. Moreover, the democratic
states need to upgrade and modernize their international media
capacity so that they can compete and flourish in this new and
contested environment.
The democracies must pursue democratic learning—innovation
by civil society but also renewal of commitment from democratic
governments—with the same vigor that the authoritarians devote
to their pursuit of authoritarian learning. If the democracies
instead opt to pursue a reactive, status-quo policy that allows the
authoritarians to keep the initiative, we can expect the grim
prospect of an even greater erosion of democratic space in the
years to come.
The previous section is provided by Lynn University
Library’s use of Ebook Central Academic Complete.
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Section 2

Forms of government
Non-democratic governments: authoritarianism,
totalitarianism & dictatorship

An autocracy is a system of government in which a supreme
political power is concentrated in the hands of one person,
whose decisions are subject to neither external legal restraints

Unlike democracy, authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms

nor regularized mechanisms of popular control. By contrast, a

of government where an individual or a single-party concentrates

single-party state is a type of party system government in which

all power.

a single political party forms the government and no other
parties are permitted to run candidates for election. Typically,

Introduction

single-party states hold the suppression of political factions,
except as transitory issue oriented currents within the single

Authoritarianism is a form of social organization characterized by

party or permanent coalition as a self-evident good. The

submission to authority as well as the administration of said

Communist Party of China’s single-party rule of the People’s

authority. In politics, an authoritarian government is

Republic of China is a prominent contemporary example.

characterized by highly concentrated and centralized power
maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential

Totalitarianism

challengers. It uses political parties and mass organizations to
mobilize people around the goals of the regime. Authoritarianism

Totalitarianismis an extreme version of authoritarianism.

emphasizes arbitrary law rather than the rule of law, including

Authoritarianism primarily diﬀers from totalitarianism in that

election rigging and political decisions being made by a select

social and economic institutions exist free from governmental

group of oﬃcials behind closed doors. Authoritarianism is

control. By contrast, totalitarianism is a political system where

marked by “indefinite political tenure” of an autocratic state or a

the state holds total authority over the society and seeks to

ruling-party state.

control all aspects of public and private life wherever necessary.
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The term ‘an authoritarian regime’ denotes a state in which the

Dictatorship

single power holder – an individual ‘dictator,’ a committee or a
junta or an otherwise small group of political elite – monopolizes

A dictatorship is defined as an autocratic form of government in

political power. However, a totalitarian regime attempts to control

which the government is ruled by an individual: a dictator. In

virtually all aspects of the social life, including economy,

contemporary usage, dictatorship refers to an autocratic form of

education, art, science, private life, and morals of citizens. The

absolute rule by leadership unrestricted by law, constitutions, or

concept became prominent in Western anti-communist political

other social and political factors within the state.

discourse during the Cold War era in order to highlight perceived
similarities between Nazi Germany and other fascist regimes on
the one hand, and Soviet communism on the other.

For some scholars, a dictatorship is a form of government that
has the power to govern without consent of those being
governed (similar to authoritarianism), while totalitarianism

Political scientists Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski were

describes a state that regulates nearly every aspect of public and

primarily responsible for expanding the usage of the term in

private behavior of the people. In other words, dictatorship

university social science and professional research, reformulating

concerns the source of the governing power and totalitarianism

it as a paradigm for the Soviet Union as well as fascist regimes.

concerns the scope of the governing power. In this sense,

For Friedrich and Brzezinski, the defining elements were intended

dictatorship (government without people’s consent) is a contrast

to be taken as a mutually supportive organic entity composed of

to democracy (government whose power comes from people)

the following: an elaborating guiding ideology; a single mass

and totalitarianism (government controls every aspect of people’s

party, typically led by a dictator; a system of terror; a monopoly of

life) opposes pluralism (government allows multiple lifestyles and

the means of communication and physical force; and central

opinions).

direction, and control of the economy through state planning.
Such regimes had initial origins in the chaos that followed in the
wake of World War I, at which point the sophistication of modern
weapons and communications enabled totalitarian movements to
consolidate power.

The wave of military dictatorships in Latin America in the second
half of the twentieth century left a particular mark on Latin
American culture. In Latin American literature, the dictator novel
challenging dictatorship is a significant genre. There are also
many films depicting Latin American military dictatorships.
The previous section is provided by Lumen’s
Boundless Political Science.
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Chapter 7

Constitutions &
Constitutional
Design
Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:

• Identify characteristics of constitutions.
• Understand concepts of constitutions.
• Compare countries constitutions and their structure.

Section 1

The Constitution & the structure of government power
Preamble

Jennings reiterated the conventional wisdom and reinforced
public opinion about the wondrous design of American

On the day after the presidential election of 2000, the news on

government contained in the Constitution. Yet his praise of the

ABC World News Tonight was anything but routine: candidates

founders was misleading: in fact, the Constitution helped

George W. Bush and Al Gore disputed the election results.

produce the “turmoil” of the 2000 presidential election.

Victory addresses and concession speeches were postponed, as

Presidents are selected by an Electoral College, a process

the arduous process of challenging the vote in the pivotal state

whereby the winner of the popular vote in a state usually takes all

of Florida commenced.

of its electoral votes. Bush was able to win a scant majority in

As anchor Peter Jennings noted at the outset of the evening
broadcast, “Uncertainty, intrigue and partisan politics make for a

the Electoral College, even as more people voted for Gore
nationwide.

volatile mix.” But he ended the broadcast with a reassuring note,

The media have long been enthusiastic about the Constitution.

much as anchors had done following previous elections: “Finally,

They provided crucial assistance in the processes leading up to

this evening, a very brief personal note. A colleague and I who

its adoption in the 1780s. They continue to venerate it today.

have covered the transfer of power in many unfortunate parts of
the world, very often at the point of a gun, agree today on the
marvel of this democracy. For all the turmoil last night and today
and perhaps tomorrow, Americans, unlike so many others, take
the peaceful and orderly transition of power, ultimately, for
granted. A gift from the founding fathers.”

The first American political system
We can understand what the Constitution was designed to
accomplish by looking at the political system it replaced: the
Articles of Confederation, the United States’ first written
constitution, which embodied political ideals expressed by the
Declaration of Independence.
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From thirteen colonies to United States
By the mid-eighteenth century, Britain’s thirteen colonies on North

material self-interest that persisted through the adoption of the
Constitution.

America’s east coast stretched from Georgia to New Hampshire.

Among the opponents of the Stamp Act were printers who

Each colony had a governor appointed by the king and a

produced newspapers and pamphlets.

legislature elected by landholding voters. These colonial
assemblies, standing for the colonialists’ right of self-government,
clashed with the royal governors over issues of power and
policies. Each colony, and the newspapers published therein,
dealt with the colonial power in London and largely ignored other
colonies.
The Stamp Act Congress
British policy eventually pushed politics and news across colonial
boundaries. In 1763, the British antagonized the colonialists in
two important ways. A royal proclamation closed oﬀ the frontier
to colonial expansion. Second, the British sought to recoup
expenses borne defending the colonies. They instituted the first
ever direct internal taxes in North America. The most famous, the
Stamp Act, required the use of paper embossed with the royal
seal to prove that taxes had been paid.
Such taxes on commerce alienated powerful interests, including
well-oﬀ traders in the North and prosperous planters in the South,
who complained that the tax was enacted in England without the
colonists’ input. Their slogan, “No taxation without
representation,” shows a dual concern with political ideals and

The arduous technology of typesetting and hand-printing
individual pages did not permit sizable production.See Stephen
Botein, “‘Meer Mechanics’ and an Open Press: The Business and
Political Strategies of Colonial American Printers,” Perspectives in
American History 9 (1975): 127–225; and “Printers and the
American Revolution,” in The Press and the American Revolution,
ed. Bernard Bailyn and John B. Hench (Worcester, MA: American
Antiquarian Society, 1980), 11–57. Also, Charles E. Clark, The
Public Prints: The Newspaper in Anglo-American Culture (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 9; and “The Press the
Founders Knew,” in Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment in
Action, ed. Timothy E. Cook (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2005). Newspapers reached large audiences by
being passed around—“circulated”—or by being read aloud at
taverns.Thomas C. Leonard, News for All: America’s Coming-ofAge with the Press (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995),
chap. 1. Printers’ precarious financial condition made them
dependent on commissions from wealthy people and oﬃcial
subsidies from government, and thus they were eager to please
people in power. Crusading journalism against government
authorities was rare.For amplification of this argument, Timothy E.
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Cook, Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political

Once again, delegates from the various colonies met, this time in

Institution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), chap. 2.

a gathering known as the Continental Congress, to address the

The Stamp Act, however, was opposed by powerful interests and

diﬃculties with Britain. But this congress’s petitions, unlike those

placed financial burdens on printers, so it was easy for

of the Stamp Act Congress, were rebuﬀed. Repressive policies

newspaper printers to oppose it vigorously with hostile stories.

were kept in place. The Continental Congress launched a boycott

During the Stamp Act crisis, news began to focus on events
throughout the thirteen colonies. Benjamin Franklin, postmaster
of the British government for the colonies, developed a system of
post roads linking the colonies. Printers now could send
newspapers to each other free of charge in the mail, providing
content for each other to copy. Colonial legislatures proposed a
meeting of delegates from across the colonies to address their
grievances. This gathering, the Stamp Act Congress, met for two
weeks in 1765. Delegates sent a petition to the king that
convinced British authorities to annul the taxes.
The Continental Congress
In 1773, the British government awarded the East India Company
a monopoly on importing and selling tea to the American
colonies. This policy, too, hurt powerful interests: colonial traders

of British products, initiated the Revolutionary War, and passed
the Declaration of Independence.See Jack N. Rakove, The
Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the
Continental Congress (New York: Knopf, 1979).
The Declaration of Independence
The Declaration of IndependenceThe document drafted by
Thomas Jeﬀerson and adopted by the Continental Congress in
revised form in 1776, which declared the independence of the
thirteen colonies from Britain., issued on July 4, 1776, announced
that the thirteen colonies were independent of Britain. It was
designed to be read aloud in public and to be sent to international
audiences. Its point-by-point charges against British rule give
equal weight to how the king damaged America’s economic
interests and how he ignored principles of self-government.

and merchants. Rebellious Bostonians ransacked the East India

The Declaration is a deeply democratic document.Staughton

Company’s ships and pushed cartons of tea overboard. The

Lynd, The Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism (New York:

British reacted harshly to this “Boston Tea Party”: they closed the

Vintage, 1969); Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jeﬀerson’s

port of Boston, deported rebels to England for trial, and restricted

Declaration of Independence (New York: Vintage, 1979); and

settlement in and trade to the west of the country.

Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of
Independence (New York: Knopf, 1997). It is democratic in what it
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did—asserting the right of the people in American colonies to

raise taxes and relied on revenues from each of the states. There

separate from Britain. And it is democratic in what it said: “We

was no president to enforce the laws and no judiciary to hear

hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created

disputes between and among the states.

equal” and have inviolable rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.” The Declaration concludes that the people are free to
“alter or abolish” repressive forms of government. Indeed, it
assumes that the people are the best judges of the quality of
government and can act wisely on their own behalf.
The Articles of Confederation

Each state delegation cast a single vote in the Continental
Congress. Nine states were needed to enact legislation, so few
laws were passed. States usually refused to fund policies that
hampered their own interests.
Changes in the Articles required an all-but-impossible unanimous
vote of all thirteen delegations. The weakness of the Articles was

Drafted in 1777, the Articles of ConfederationThe first American

no accident. The fights with Britain created widespread distrust of

written constitution, adopted by the Continental Congress in

central authority. By restricting the national government,

1777, ratified in 1781, and superseded when the Constitution was

Americans could rule themselves in towns and states. Like many

ratified by nine of the thirteen states in 1788. were the first

political thinkers dating back to ancient Greece, they assumed

political constitution for the government of the United States.

that self-government worked best in small, face-to-face

They codified the Continental Congress’s practices and powers.

communities.

The United States of America was a confederation. A political

Creating & ratifying the Constitution

system in which a government acts as a unit superior to the
states but is dependent on their consent. of states. Although the
confederation was superior to the individual states, it had no
powers without their consent.

The Constitution was a reaction against the limitations of the
Articles of Confederation and the democratic experiments begun
by the Revolution and the Declaration of Independence.

Under the Articles, the Continental Congress took over the king’s
powers to make war and peace, send and receive ambassadors,

The case against the Articles of Confederation

enter into treaties and alliances, coin money, regulate Indian
aﬀairs, and run a post oﬃce. But the confederation could not
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The Articles could not address serious foreign threats. In the late

Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle (Philadelphia:

1780s, Britain denied American ships access to British ports in a

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). Led by Captain Daniel

trade war. Spain threatened to close the Mississippi River to

Shays, it began in 1786, culminated with a march on the federal

American vessels. Pirates in the Mediterranean captured

arsenal in Springfield, Massachusetts, and wound down in 1787.

American ships and sailors and demanded ransom. The national
government had few tools to carry out its assigned task of foreign
policy.A synopsis is Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics
and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (New York: Knopf,

The Continental Congress voted unanimously to raise an army to
put down Shays’s Rebellion but could not coax the states to
provide the necessary funds. The army was never assembled.

1996), 25–28. More generally, see Max M. Edling, A Revolution in

Leaders who supported national government portrayed Shays’s

Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the

Rebellion as a vivid symbol of state governments running wild

Making of the American State (New York: Oxford University Press,

and proof of the inability of the Articles of Confederation to

2004).

protect financial interests. Ordinary Americans, who were

There was domestic ferment as well. Millions of dollars in paper
money issued by state governments to fund the Revolutionary
War lost their value after the war.Gordon S. Wood, “Interests and

experiencing a relatively prosperous time, were less concerned
and did not see a need to eliminate the Articles.
Calling a Constitutional Convention

Disinterestedness in the Making of a Constitution,” in Beyond
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National

The gathering of delegates from twelve of the thirteen states who

Identity, ed. Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C.

met in Philadelphia from June to September of 1787; originally

Carter II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987),

authorized by the Continental Congress to consider amendments

69–109. Financial interests were unable to collect on debts they

to the Articles of Confederation, they ultimately drafted the

were owed. They appealed to state governments, where they

Constitution that replaced it. was convened in 1787 to propose

faced resistance and even brief armed rebellions.

limited reforms to the Articles of Confederation. Instead, however,
the Articles would be replaced by a new, far more powerful

Newspapers played up Shays’s Rebellion, an armed insurrection

national government. Twelve state legislatures sent delegates to

by debt-ridden farmers to prevent county courts from foreclosing

Philadelphia (Rhode Island did not attend). Each delegation would

mortgages on their farms.See Leonard A. Richards, Shays’s

cast a single vote.
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Who were the delegates?
The delegates were not representative of the American people.
They were well-educated property owners, many of them wealthy,

Constitution, The Federalist was widely republished in book
format. Scholars now regard it as the fullest explication of the
logic underlying the Constitution.

who came mainly from prosperous seaboard cities, including

Madison drafted the first working proposal for a Constitution and

Boston and New York. Most had served in the Continental

took copious notes at the convention. Published after his death in

Congress and were sensitive to the problems faced by the United

1836, they are the best historical source of the debates; they

States. Few delegates had political careers in the states, and so

reveal the extraordinary political complexity of the deliberations

they were free to break with existing presumptions about how

and provide remarkable insight into what the founders had in

government should be organized in America.

mind.The standard edition of Madison’s notes is in The Records

The Constitutional Convention was a mix of great and minor
characters. Exalted figures and brilliant intellects sat among

of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max Farrand, 3 vols. (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1937).

nonentities, drunkards, and nincompoops. The convention’s

Once the Constitution was drafted, Madison helped write and

driving force and chief strategist was a young, bookish politician

publish a series of articles in a New York newspaper. These

from Virginia named James Madison. He successfully pressured

Federalist papers defend the political system the Constitutional

revered figures to attend the convention, such as George

Convention had crafted.

Washington, the commanding oﬃcer of the victorious American
revolutionaries, and Benjamin Franklin, a man at the twilight of a

Interests & the Constitution

remarkable career as printer, scientist, inventor, postmaster,

In the early twentieth century, historian Charles Beard asserted

philosopher, and diplomat.

that the Constitution was “an economic document for economic

The unassuming and slight James Madison made an unusual
teammate for the dashing, aristocratic ex-soldier Alexander
Hamilton and the august diplomat John Jay. But despite these
contrasts and some political divides, they merged their voices in
the Federalist papers, published in New York newspapers under
the pseudonym “Publius.” Soon after the ratification of the

ends,” pushed by investors and industrialists who would profit
more from a national economic and political system than from
one favoring small-scale agricultural interests.Charles A. Beard,
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States (New York: Macmillan, 1913). Research has not upheld
Beard’s stark division of reaction to the Constitution into well-oﬀ
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supporters and poor, democratic adversaries. Many local, well-to-

pursue their self-interest or individual preferences above the

do patriarchs opposed the Constitution; many small merchants

public good., groups pursuing their self-interest above the public

wanted a national government.

good. For Madison, factions were inevitable. His worst nightmare

But Beard’s focus on economic and social interests is revealing.
Paper money, debt relief, and Shays’s Rebellion concerned those
committed to existing economic and social orders. Consider
Federalist No. 10, the most famous of Madison’s Federalist
papers. In it, he decried the dangers of democracy; he started
with “a rage for paper money” and “an abolition of debts,” then
the specter of “an equal division of property,” all of which he
found an “improper or wicked project.” Madison paid attention to
the right to acquire and maintain property, which the Declaration
brushed aside. He claimed that political systems were created to
maintain liberty—including the liberty to accumulate wealth.
Political equality meant only that each person had a right to
express himself or herself.
Ideas & the Constitution
The Constitutional Convention responded to ideas, not just
interests. Delegates doubted that the people could wisely rule.
They sought to replace democracy with a republic, in which
oﬃcials would be chosen to act on the people’s behalf. Federalist
No. 10 makes the case.

was of a faction becoming a political majority, trampling on the
rights of its helpless opponents, and quickly enacting its program.
He favored a large republic, which, he believed, would discourage
a faction’s rise to power. Madison expected that in a republic, the
number of locally oriented interests would increase and diversify,
which would make it harder for any one of them to dominate.
Minority factions could pass legislation by forming temporary
majorities, Madison reasoned, but these diverse majorities would
not be able to agree on a single project long enough to be
oppressive.
Drafting the Constitution
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention first gathered on May
25, 1787, in what is now called Independence Hall in
Philadelphia. Their goal was to devise a constitutionA system of
fundamental laws and principles that prescribe the structure and
functions of the government., a system of fundamental laws and
principles outlining the nature and functions of the government.
George Washington presided. Delegates worked in an intimate
setting without committees. The structure of power created by
the Constitution in Philadelphia resulted from a deeply political

Madison was concerned with threats to order and stability from

process.Political scientists have revealed the degree to which the

what he called factionsJames Madison’s term for groups that

Constitutional Convention and the ratification conventions can be
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understood to be the result of manipulation of parliamentary

Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787

rules, strategic voting, shifting coalitions, and the “agenda-

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1937), vol. 1, 17. The

setting” and “framing” use of mass communication. Our analysis

delegates feared that exposure through newspapers would

draws on these authors, especially John P. Roche, “The Founding

complicate their work. The delegate who is today regarded as the

Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action,” American Political Science

great defender of civil liberties, George Mason, wrote to his son

Review 55 (December 1961): 799–816; Calvin C. Jillson,

approvingly: “This I think myself a proper precaution to prevent

Constitution Making: Conflict and Consensus in the Federal

mistakes and misrepresentation until the business shall have

Convention of 1787 (New York: Agathon Press, 1988); and William

been completed, when the whole may have a very diﬀerent

H. Riker, The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American

complexion from that in the several crude and indigested parts

Constitution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).

might in their first shape appear if submitted to the public

The Secrecy of the Constitutional Convention
Deliberations took place in secret, as delegates did not want the
press and the public to know the details of what they were
considering (Note 2.16 "Comparing Content"). Newspapers
hardly mentioned the convention at all, and when they did, it was
in vague references praising the high caliber of the delegates.See
John K. Alexander, The Selling of the Constitutional Convention:
A History of News Coverage (Madison, WI: Madison House,
1990).

eye.”Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1937), vol. 3, 28.
This gag rule was rigorously enforced. One day the presiding
oﬃcer, George Washington, noticed that an inattentive delegate
had dropped his notes on the floor when leaving the hall.
Washington broke his usual silence and rebuked the unknown
infractor: “I am sorry to find that some one Member of this Body,
has been so neglectful of the secrets of the convention as to drop
in the State House a copy of their proceedings, which by accident
was picked up and delivered to me this morning. I must entreat

Comparing Content: the Convention’s Gag Rule

Gentlemen to be more careful, least [sic] our transactions get into

Press coverage of the Constitutional Convention cannot be

speculations.”

compared because one of the first decisions made in the
Constitutional Convention was that “nothing spoken in the House
be printed, or otherwise published or communicated.”Max

the News Papers, and disturb the public repose by premature

Throwing the notes on the table, Washington exclaimed, “I know
not whose Paper it is, but there it is, let him who owns it take it.”
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Delegate William Pierce, who recorded this tale, noted that

The membership of the Constitutional Convention was so small—

Washington “bowed, picked up his Hat, and quitted the room

never more than fifty on a given day—that they could proceed

with a dignity so severe that every Person seemed alarmed.”Max

largely in “a committee of the whole.” This size enabled them to

Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787

continue their discussions in private at their preferred

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1937), vol. 3, 86–87.

boardinghouses and taverns—and to keep a tight lid on public

The founders were not unanimous about the threat posed by the
press. Thomas Jeﬀerson was in Paris as an ambassador. In
August 1787, he wrote to his counterpart in London, John Adams,
that there was no news from the convention: “I am sorry they
began their deliberations by so abominable a precedent as that of
tying up the tongues of their members. Nothing can justify this
example but the innocence of their intentions, & ignorance of the
value of public discussions. I have no doubt that all their other

discussion.
The cross-cutting divides
The delegates immediately discarded the Continental Congress’s
mandate that they recommend amendments to the Articles of
Confederation. They agreed to draft a new Constitution from
scratch in order to create a national government superior to and
independent of the states.

measures will be good & wise.”Max Farrand, ed., The Records of

This crucial decision was followed by disagreement about exactly

the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven, CT: Yale University

how to create a national government. The states varied widely in

Press, 1937), vol. 3, 76.

economic bases, population sizes, and numbers of slaves.

In 1787, the powers of the press were identified in ways we

Three cross-cutting divides existed among the states:

recognize in the twenty-first century. Washington was concerned
that news about the political process might produce rumors,

1. Large states versus small statesThe terms “large state” and

confusion, worry, and public opposition to worthwhile policies.

“small state” are misleading. Some small states had larger

But as Jeﬀerson recognized, the news can also lead to productive

populations than large states. The small states all shared

public debate, dialogue, and deliberation.

economic vulnerability and an inability to grow, usually
because they were boxed in by other states on their western
edge, which made it impossible to hope for westward
expansion.
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2. Cosmopolitan, centrally located states (Connecticut to Virginia)
versus parochial states on the northern and southern borders
3. Southern states, reliant on slavery in their economies, versus
Northern states, which were not
The powers and structures of the Constitution resulted from a
series of compromises designed to bridge these three divides.
Large & small states

The Grand Convention (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 361–63 and
369–71.
Cosmopolitan, centrally located states, provided strong initial
support for the Virginia Plan against scattered opposition from
border states. But Madison could not hold this coalition behind
both a strong national government and a legislature allocated by
population. Delegates from the small states of New Jersey,
Delaware, and Maryland liked a strong national government, but
they feared being overpowered. Delegates from populous

The most threatening split in the convention emerged initially

Massachusetts and three fast-growing Southern states joined the

between large and small states.

two largest states, Virginia and Pennsylvania, to support

Large states fired the first salvo. The Virginia PlanJames
Madison’s initial working draft at the Constitutional Convention,

legislative districts based on population, but they disliked the
Virginia Plan’s sweeping powers for the national government.

containing strong national powers, a popularly elected bicameral

On June 15, the small states proposed an alternative. The New

legislature, and a weak executive elected by the legislature.,

Jersey PlanThe alternative to the Virginia Plan, oﬀered by William

drafted by Madison, foresaw a strong national government that

Paterson of New Jersey, with reduced national powers and a

could veto any state laws it deemed contrary to the national

single legislative body representing the states. enhanced the

interest. The central institution was a bicameral (two-chamber)

national government’s powers to levy taxes and regulate

legislature. The people would elect the lower house, which would

commerce but left remaining powers to the states. The plan had a

in turn select the members of the upper house; the two chambers

federal executive, elected by the legislature, to enforce states’

together would then elect the executive and judiciary. Breaking

compliance with national law, and a federal judiciary to settle

with the Articles of Confederation’s equal representation of states,

disputes among the states and between the states and the

the Virginia Plan allotted seats to both chambers of the legislature

national government. Any national law would become “the

by population size alone.The text of the Virginia Plan (and its main

supreme law of the respective States.” The New Jersey Plan

rival, the New Jersey Plan) can be found in Clinton Rossiter, 1787:

preserved the core of the Articles of Confederation—equal
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representation of states in a unicameral (single-chamber)

how the new government would be empowered to deal with

legislature.

slavery. Northerners feared the South’s growth and room for

Only three states voted for the New Jersey Plan, but the Virginia
Plan’s vulnerability was exposed. Facing an impasse, delegates
from Connecticut suggested a compromise. Borrowing the

expansion. Southerners worried that the North would threaten the
practice of slavery, which, although legal in all states, was a
central part only of Southern economies.

Virginia Plan’s idea of a bicameral legislature, they proposed that

Northern interests in a strong national government acceded to

one chamber, the House of Representatives, be made up of

Southern demands on slavery. Southerners argued that slaves

representatives from districts of equal population, while in the

should be counted when allocating legislative seats. Eventually,

Senate each state would be equally represented with two

the convention settled on a three-fifths clauseConstitutional

senators.

provision that, for purposes of representation, only 60 percent of

This Connecticut Compromise (also known as the Great
Compromise)The solution worked out by delegates from
Connecticut to create a bicameral legislature, with one chamber
(the Senate) representing states, and the other (the House of
Representatives) representing the people in districts of equal

the enslaved population would be counted.: 60 percent of the
enslaved population would be counted for purposes of
representation. Northern delegates, convinced that the largest
slave-holding states would never have a majority in the Senate,
gave in.

population size. was adopted by the convention with only Virginia

As the convention considered the national government’s powers,

and Pennsylvania in opposition. Thus the configuration of today’s

an alliance of delegates from New England and the Deep South

Congress emerged not so much from principled deliberations

emerged to defend local control and their states’ economic self-

between the Constitution’s founders as from the necessity for

interest. Southerners sought to maintain slavery, while New

compromise between competing state interests. In essence, the

Englanders wanted national tariﬀs to protect their commerce.

founders decided to split the diﬀerence.

They struck a deal that resulted in New England delegates voting

North and South
After this vote, North versus South displaced the divide between
large and small states. The convention became preoccupied by

to require the return of fugitive slaves and to prevent Congress
from regulating the slave trade until 1808.
The delegates did not confront slavery head on (indeed, the word
“slavery” is not directly mentioned in the Constitution). As a
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result, the issue of slavery would overshadow much of federal

by population, as the number of electors is equal to the total of

politics until its bloody resolution in the Civil War of the 1860s.

representatives and senators. If the Electoral College did not

The executive

produce a majority result, the president would be chosen by the
popularly elected House, but with one vote per state delegation.

By now, the Constitutional Convention could not break down,

The quoted phrase comes from John P. Roche, “The Founding

because the document had something for everybody. Small

Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action,” American Political Science

states liked the security of a national government and their equal

Review 55 (December 1961): 810. With all sides mollified, the

representation in the Senate. The Deep South and New England

convention agreed that the oﬃce of president would be held by

valued the protection of their economic bases. Pennsylvania and

one person who could run for multiple terms.

Virginia—the two most populous, centrally located states—
foresaw a national government that would extend the reach of
their commerce and influence.
The convention’s final sticking point was the nature of the
executive. The debate focused on how many people would be
president, the power of the oﬃce, the term of the oﬃce, how
presidents would be elected, and whether they could serve
multiple terms.

Bargaining, compromise & deal making
The Constitutional Convention began with a principled consensus
on establishing a stronger national government; it ended with
bargaining, compromise, and deal making. State delegations
voted for their political and economic self-interests, and often
worked out deals enabling everyone to have something to take
home to constituents. Some complex matters, such as the
structures of the executive and judicial branches, were left up to

To break the logjam on the presidency, the convention created the

the new congress. As one scholar writes, the Constitution is “a

Electoral CollegeThe body of electors chosen by states to select

patch-work sewn together under the pressure of both time and

the president and vice president of the United States. as the

events by a group of extremely talented…politicians.”

method of electing the president, a political solution that gave
something to each of the state-based interests. The president

Ratifying the Constitution

would not be elected directly by the popular vote of citizens.

The signing of the Constitution by the delegates on September

Instead, electors chosen by state legislatures would vote for

17, 1787, was just the beginning. The Constitution would go into

president. Small states got more electoral votes than warranted
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eﬀect only after being approved by specially elected ratifying

the Constitution’s lack of a Bill of RightsConstitutional sections

conventions in nine states.

guaranteeing specific liberties from infringement by the new

Ratification was not easy to win. In most states, property
qualifications for voting had broadened from landholding to
taxpaying, thereby including most white men, many of whom
benefited from the public policies of the states. Popular opinion
for and against ratification was evenly split. In key states like
Massachusetts and Virginia, observers thought the opposition
was ahead.
The opposition to ratification
The elections to the ratifying conventions revealed that
opponents of the Constitution tended to come from rural inland
areas (not from cities and especially not from ports, where
merchants held sway). They held to the ideals of the Declaration
of Independence, which favored a deliberately weak national
government to enhance local and state self-government.See
Herbert Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988). They thought that the national
government’s powers, the complex system of government,
lengthy terms of oﬃce, and often indirect elections in the new
Constitution distanced government from the people
unacceptably.
Opponents also feared that the strength of the proposed national
government posed a threat to individual freedoms. They criticized

government; more precisely, the first ten amendments to the
Constitution, passed by Congress in 1789 and ratified by 1791 to
fulfill the Federalists’ campaign promise during the state
conventions ratifying the Constitution.—clauses to guarantee
specific liberties from infringement by the new government. A few
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, notably George
Mason of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, had
refused to sign the document in the absence of a Bill of Rights.
The campaign for ratification
Despite such objections and obstacles, the campaign for
ratification was successful in all thirteen states.Pauline Maier,
Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010). The advocates of the
national political system, benefiting from the secrecy of the
Constitutional Convention, were well prepared to take the
initiative. They called themselves not nationalists but
FederalistsThe name adopted by those favoring the ratification of
the Constitution.. Opponents to the Constitution were saddled
with the name of Anti-FederalistsThe name applied to those who
opposed ratification of the Constitution., though they were
actually the champions of a federation of independent states.
By asking conventions to ratify the Constitution, the Federalists
evaded resistance from state legislatures. Federalists
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campaigned to elect sympathetic ratifiers and hoped that

H. Riker, The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American

successive victories, publicized in the press, would build

Constitution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 26–28.

momentum toward winning ratification by all thirteen states.

Printers followed the money trail to support the Federalists. Most

The Federalists’ media strategies included images, too. A famous
woodcut at the start of the Revolution was of a serpent cut into
thirteen sections with the admonition “Join or Die.” Federalists
provided a new twist on this theme. They kept track of the
ratification by an edifice of columns, elevated one by one as each
state ratified. The next state convention on the list would be

newspapers, especially those whose stories were reprinted by
others, were based in port cities, if only because arriving ships
provided good sources of news. Such locales were dominated by
merchants who favored a national system to facilitate trade and
commerce. Newspapers were less common in rural interior
locations where Anti-Federalist support was greatest.

represented by a hand lifting the column, often accompanied by

Federalists also pressured the few Anti-Federalist newspapers

the confident motto “Rise It Will.”

that existed. They wrote subscribers and advertisers and urged

Anti-Federalists did not decry the process by which the
Constitution was drafted and ratified. Instead, they participated in
the ratification process, hoping to organize a new convention to
remedy the Constitution’s flaws.
Newspapers & ratification

them to cancel. Anti-Federalist printers often moved to other
cities, went out of business, or began reprinting Federalist
articles. Federalists hailed such results as the voice of the people.
When an Anti-Federalist paper in Philadelphia halted publication,
Federalists exulted, “There cannot be a greater proof that the
body of the people are federal, that the antifederal editors and
printers fail of support.”More specifically, see Robert A. Rutland,

The US newspaper system boosted the Federalist cause. Of the

“The First Great Newspaper Debate: The Constitutional Crisis of

approximately one hundred newspapers being published during

1787–88,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society

the ratification campaign of 1787–88, “not more than a dozen…

(1987): 43–58. These examples come from Robert Allen Rutland,

could be classed as avowedly antifederal.”Robert Allen Rutland,

The Ordeal of the Constitution: The Antifederalists and the

The Ordeal of the Constitution: The Antifederalists and the

Ratification Struggle of 1787–1788 (Norman: University of

Ratification Struggle of 1787–1788 (Norman: University of

Oklahoma Press, 1966), 73–74, 135–38, 265–66; and John P.

Oklahoma Press, 1966), 38. Anti-Federalist arguments were rarely

Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds., Commentaries on the

printed and even less often copied by other newspapers.William
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Constitution, Public and Private (Madison, WI: State Historical

escaped unharmed. The tale implied that divine intervention had

Society of Wisconsin, 1981), vol. 1, xxxii–xxxix.

ensured Washington’s leadership by “the providential

Today the most famous part of this newspaper campaign is the
series of essays (referred to earlier) written by Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, and published in New
York newspapers under the collective pseudonym “Publius.” The
authors used their skills at legal argumentation to make the

preservation of the valuable life of this great and good man, on
his way home from the Convention.”John P. Kaminski and
Gaspare J. Saladino, eds., Commentaries on the Constitution,
Public and Private (Madison, WI: State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, 1981), vol. 1, 243.

strongest case they could for the document that emerged from

Not all states were eager to ratify the Constitution, especially

the Constitutional Convention. These Federalist papersA series of

since it did not specify what the federal government could not do

essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James

and did not include a Bill of Rights. Massachusetts narrowly

Madison, published in New York newspapers during the debate

voted in favor of ratification, with the provision that the first

over the ratification of the Constitution; they are generally

Congress take up recommendations for amending the

understood to oﬀer the fullest logic behind the creation of the

Constitution. New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York followed

Constitution., steeped in discussion of political theory and history,

this same strategy. Once nine states had ratified it, the

oﬀer the fullest logic for the workings of the Constitution.

Constitution was approved. Madison was elected to the first

However, they were rarely reprinted outside New York and were a

Congress and proposed a Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments

minor part of the ratification campaign.

to the Constitution. Only after the Congress had approved the Bill

Newspapers instead played on public sentiment, notably the
adulation of George Washington, presiding oﬃcer of the
convention, and his support of the Constitution.On the most

of Rights did North Carolina and Rhode Island ratify the
Constitution.

Constitutional principles & provisions

commonly reprinted articles, see William H. Riker, The Strategy of
Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), chap. 6, esp. table 6.1.
The most widely disseminated story concerned his return trip
from Philadelphia to Virginia. A bridge collapsed but Washington

The principles underlying the Constitution
While the Constitution established a national government that did
not rely on the support of the states, it limited the federal
government’s powers by listing (“enumerating”) them. This
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practice of federalism means that some policy areas are exclusive
to the federal government, some are exclusive to the states, and
others are shared between the two levels.

Checks & balances
At the same time, each branch lacks full control over all the
powers allotted to it. Political scientist Richard Neustadt put it

Federalism aside, three key principles are the crux of the

memorably: “The Constitutional Convention of 1787 is supposed

Constitution: separation of powers, checks and balances, and

to have created a government of ‘separated powers.’ It did

bicameralism.

nothing of the sort. Rather, it created a government of separated

Separation of powers

institutions sharing powers.”Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential
Power (New York: Wiley, 1960), 33. Of course, whether the

Separation of powersThe doctrine whereby legislative, executive,

founders intended this outcome is still open to dispute. No

and judicial powers are placed in distinct, at least partially

branch can act eﬀectively without the cooperation—or passive

autonomous, institutions. is the allocation of three domains of

consent—of the other two.

governmental action—law making, law execution, and law
adjudication—into three distinct branches of government: the
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. Each branch is
assigned specific powers that only it can wield.

Most governmental powers are shared among the various
branches in a system of checks and balancesThe Constitution’s
approach whereby every branch is equipped with powers at least
partially countervailing those of the other two branches., whereby

In perhaps the most abiding indicator of the separation of

each branch has ways to respond to, and if necessary, block the

powers, Pierre L’Enfant’s plan of Washington, DC, placed the

actions of the others. For example, only Congress can pass a law.

President’s House and the Capitol at opposite ends of

But the president can veto it. Supreme Court justices can declare

Pennsylvania Avenue. The plan notes the importance of the two

an act of Congress unconstitutional through judicial reviewThe

branches being both geographically and politically distinct.

power of the Supreme Court to render acts of Congress or
decisions of the executive null and void on the basis that they

This separation is in the Constitution itself, which divides powers

violate the Constitution.

and responsibilities of each branch in three distinct articles:
Article I for the legislature, Article II for the executive, and Article

The logic of checks and balances echoes Madison’s skeptical

III for the judiciary.

view of human nature. In Federalist No. 10 he contends that all
individuals, even oﬃcials, follow their own selfish interests.
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Expanding on this point in Federalist No. 51, he claimed that

from France, sits down for coﬀee with Washington. Jeﬀerson

oﬃceholders in the three branches would seek influence and

inquires why Congress will have two chambers. Washington asks

defend the powers of their respective branches. Therefore, he

Jeﬀerson, “Why did you pour that coﬀee into your saucer?”

wrote, the Constitution provides “to those who administer each

Jeﬀerson replies, “To cool it,” following the custom of the time.

department the necessary constitutional means and personal

Washington concludes, “Even so, we pour legislation into the

motives to resist encroachments of the others.”

senatorial saucer to cool it.”

Bicameralism

The bias of the system

Government is made yet more complex by splitting the legislature

The US political system is designed to prevent quick agreement

into two separate and distinct chambers—the House of

within the legislature and between the branches. Senators,

Representatives and the Senate. Such bicameralismThe practice

representatives, presidents, and Supreme Court justices have

of having two separate chambers within the legislature; in the

varying terms of oﬃces, distinctive means of selection, and

Constitution, this means that Congress is made up of a House of

diﬀerent constituencies. Prospects for disagreement and conflict

Representatives and a Senate. was common in state legislatures.

are high. Accomplishing any goal requires navigating a complex

One chamber was supposed to provide a close link to the people,

obstacle course. At any point in the process, action can be

the other to add wisdom.Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the

stopped. Maintaining the status quo is more likely than enacting

American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina

significant changes. Exceptions occur in response to dire

Press, 1969), chap. 6. The Constitution makes the two chambers

situations such as a financial crisis or external attacks.

of Congress roughly equal in power, embedding checks and
balances inside the legislative branch itself.
Bicameralism recalls the founders’ doubts about majority rule. To
check the House, directly elected by the people, they created a
Senate. Senators, with six-year terms and election by state
legislatures, were expected to work slowly with a longer-range
understanding of problems and to manage popular passions. A
story, possibly fanciful, depicts the logic: Thomas Jeﬀerson, back

What the Constitution says
The text of the Constitution consists of a preamble and seven
sections known as “articles.” The preamble is the opening
rhetorical flourish. Its first words—“We the People of the United
States”—rebuke the “We the States” mentality of the Articles of
Confederation. The preamble lists reasons for establishing a
national government.
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The first three articles set up the branches of government. We

Article V specifies how to amend the Constitution. This shows

briefly summarize them here, leaving the details of the powers

that the framers intended to have a Constitution that could be

and responsibilities given to these branches to specific chapters.

adapted to changing conditions. There are two ways to propose

Article I establishes a legislature that the founders believed would

amendments. States may call for a convention. (This has never

make up the heart of the new government.

been used due to fears it would reopen the entire Constitution for

Article II takes up the cumbersome process of assembling an
Electoral College and electing a president and a vice president—a
process that was later modified by the Twelfth Amendment. The

revision.) The other way to propose amendments is for Congress
to pass them by a two-thirds majority in both the House and
Senate.

presidential duties listed here focus on war and management of

Then there are two ways to approve an amendment. One is

the executive branch. The president’s powers are far fewer than

through ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures.

those enumerated for Congress.

Alternatively, an amendment can be ratified by three-fourths of

The Constitutional Convention punted decisions on the structure
of the judiciary below the Supreme Court to the first Congress to
decide. Article III states that judges of all federal courts hold
oﬃce for life “during good Behaviour.” It authorizes the Supreme
Court to decide all cases arising under federal law and in disputes
involving states. Judicial review, the central power of the
Supreme Court, is not mentioned. Asserted in the 1804 case of

specially convoked state conventions. This process has been
used once. “Wets,” favoring the end of Prohibition, feared that the
Twenty-First Amendment—which would have repealed the
Eighteenth Amendment prohibiting the sale and consumption of
alcohol—would be blocked by conservative (“dry”) state
legislatures. The wets asked for specially called state conventions
and rapidly ratified repeal—on December 5, 1933.

Marbury v. Madison, it is the ability of the Court to invalidate a law

Thus a constitutional amendment can be stopped by one-third of

passed by Congress or a decision made by the executive on the

either chamber of Congress or one-fourth of state legislatures—

basis that it violates the Constitution.

which explains why there have been only twenty-seven

Article IV lists rights and obligations among the states and
between the states and the national government.

amendments in over two centuries.
Article VI includes a crucial provision that endorses the move
away from a loose confederation to a national government
superior to the states. Lifted from the New Jersey Plan, the
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supremacy clauseClause in Article VI of the Constitution stating

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

that the Constitution and all federal laws are “the supreme Law of

This amendment provides the basis for civil rights, and further

the Land.” states that the Constitution and all federal laws are

democratization of the electorate was guaranteed in subsequent

“the supreme Law of the Land.”

ones. The right to vote became anchored in the Constitution with

Article VII outlines how to ratify the new Constitution.
Constitutional evolution

the addition of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments, which stated that such a right,
granted to all citizens aged eighteen years or more, could not be
denied on the basis of race or sex, nor could it be dependent on

The Constitution has remained essentially intact over time. The

the payment of a poll tax.

basic structure of governmental power is much the same in the
twenty-first century as in the late eighteenth century. At the same
time, the Constitution has been transformed in the centuries since
1787. Amendments have greatly expanded civil liberties and
rights. Interpretations of its language by all three branches of
government have taken the Constitution into realms not imagined
by the founders. New practices have been grafted onto the
Constitution’s ancient procedures. Intermediary institutions not
mentioned in the Constitution have developed important
governmental roles.
Amendments

Constitutional interpretation
The Constitution is sometimes silent or vague, making it flexible
and adaptable to new circumstances. Interpretations of
constitutional provisions by the three branches of government
have resulted in changes in political organization and practice.The
power of all three branches to develop the vague language of the
Constitution is well documented in Neal Devins and Louis Fisher,
The Democratic Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004).
For example, the Constitution is silent about the role, number, and

Many crucial clauses of the Constitution today are in the

jurisdictions of executive oﬃcers, such as cabinet secretaries; the

amendments. The Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments ratified

judicial system below the Supreme Court; and the number of

by the states in 1791, defines civil liberties to which individuals

House members or Supreme Court justices. The first Congress

are entitled. After the slavery issue was resolved by a devastating

had to fill in the blanks, often by altering the law.

civil war, equality entered the Constitution with the Fourteenth
Amendment, which specified that “No State shall…deny to any
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The Supreme Court is today at center stage in interpreting the

Article II’s brevity would be turned to the oﬃce’s advantage by

Constitution. Before becoming chief justice in 1910, Charles

President Theodore Roosevelt at the dawn of the twentieth

Evans Hughes proclaimed, “We are under a Constitution, but the

century. He argued that the president is “a steward of the

Constitution is what the Court says it is.”Hughes was then

people…bound actively and aﬃrmatively to do all he could for the

Governor of New York. Quoted in Edward S. Corwin, The

people.” So the president is obliged to do whatever is best for the

Constitution and What It Means Today (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

nation as long as it is not specifically forbidden by the

University Press, 1954), xiii.

Constitution.Jeﬀrey K. Tulis, “The Two Constitutional

By examining the Constitution’s clauses and applying them to
specific cases, the justices expand or limit the reach of
constitutional rights and requirements. However, the Supreme
Court does not always have the last word, since state oﬃcials
and members of the national government’s legislative and
executive branches have their own understanding of the
Constitution that they apply on a daily basis, responding to,
challenging, and sometimes modifying what the Court has held.
New practices
Specific sections of the Constitution have evolved greatly through
new practices. Article II gives the presidency few formal powers

Presidencies,” in The Presidency and the Political System, 6th
ed., ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 93–
124.
Intermediary institutions
The Constitution is silent about various intermediary
institutionsInstitutions that have, largely informally, arisen to
bridge the gap between the government and the people or the
gaps among the three branches.—political parties, interest
groups, and the media—that link government with the people and
bridge gaps caused by a separation-of-powers system. The
political process might stall in their absence.

and responsibilities. During the first hundred years of the republic,

For example, presidential elections and the internal organization

presidents acted in limited ways, except during war or massive

of Congress rely on the party system. Interest groups represent

social change, and they rarely campaigned for a legislative

diﬀerent people and are actively involved in the policy process.

agenda.See Jeﬀrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton,

The media are fundamental for conveying information to the

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

public about government policies as well as for letting
government oﬃcials know what the public is thinking, a process
that is essential in a democratic system.
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The Constitution in the Information Age

Let us return to our discussion at the beginning of this chapter.
The news declared a “constitutional crisis” during the aftermath

We have seen that the Constitution is a political document

of the 2000 presidential election. The covers of Time, Newsweek,

adopted for political reasons in a highly political process. Yet the

and US News & World Report all displayed the manuscript of the

text of the Constitution, and the structure of power it created, are

Constitution and its boldly emblazoned preamble, “We the

almost entirely above political controversy. It is an object of pride

People.” The stories reported the 4–3 vote by the Florida

for almost all Americans.

Supreme Court, which ordered a statewide recount of that state’s

The Constitution as a sacred document

vote (the vote that would decide the national outcome), and the
US Supreme Court’s 5–4 order to halt the recount and hear the

The oﬃcial presentation of the Constitution in public buildings

Bush campaign’s appeal. Both Newsweek and US News & World

show it as a sacred documentA revered manuscript given exalted

Report superimposed the word “CHAOS” on the Constitution;

status; applied to the Constitution., demonstrating its exalted

Newsweek showed the word looming menacingly beneath the

status. The original document is ensconced in what is called a

torn, seemingly fragile document.

“Shrine” at the National Archives.

All three news magazines lamented that the Constitution was

Not far from the “Shrine” in the National Archives, the twentieth-

threatened by unscrupulous, self-interested politicians intruding

century re-creation by Howard Chandler Christy hangs in the US

into the realm of dispassionate principle. To quote Newsweek,

Capitol. The eye is carried toward the beatific glow around the

“The endless election has not been a grand contest of famous

document itself, George Washington standing proudly as its

legal gladiators contesting broad constitutional principles…[but] a

guardian. The atmosphere is of nobility, grandeur, and calm, not

local fight, a highly personal shoving match driven by old grudges

base self-interest and conflict—though the latter characterized

and vendettas.”Evan Thomas and Michael Isikoﬀ, “Settling Old

the convention at least as much.

Scores in the Swamp,” Newsweek (December 18, 2000), 36–44,
quotations on 38. Yet it was the complex electoral and federal

The media rarely show the Constitution or the structure of the

system devised in the Constitution itself that caused much of the

political system as a cause of political problems. However, media

crisis.

depictions of the politicians charged with fulfilling the
Constitution’s vision in public life are far less positive.
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Entertainment media occasionally present stories about the

father, a crusading editor, and has sold out to the state’s political

Constitution and the structure of power it created. Consider the

boss. At Paine’s urging, Smith submits a bill proposing a national

familiar tale of a lone individual bravely fighting to restore a

boys’ camp but later learns that the site has been bought by the

wayward political system to its virtuous roots. In the 1930s,

boss to sell at a huge profit to the government for a dam Paine is

Director Frank Capra perfected the genre in a series of Hollywood

proposing. Smith refuses to back down, and a fake corruption

movies that reached its height in the classic 1939 film Mr. Smith

charge is launched against him with devastating results. About to

Goes to Washington.

resign in disgrace, Smith visits the Lincoln Memorial. Sustained

Mr. Smith Goes to Washington

by the love and political know-how of Saunders, Smith fights
back by a filibuster on the Senate floor. The Washington reporters

James Madison’s portrayal in the Federalist papers of sacrosanct

who had earlier scorned his innocence are transformed into his

institutions and fallible politicians finds its movie version in Frank

supporters by his idealism. But his home state hears little of this:

Capra’s Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.Insightful analyses of the

the boss controls all radio stations and newspapers and brutally

film include Brian Rose, An Examination of Narrative Structure in

quashes any support. Smith faints in exhaustion when confronted

the Films of Frank Capra (New York: Arno Press, 1980), chap. 3;

with baskets full of trumped-up hate mail, but is saved when the

and Charles J. Maland, Frank Capra (Boston: Twayne, 1980),

guilt-ridden Paine tries to shoot himself and confesses to the

chap. 4. Upon its 1939 release, it was hugely popular and a

corrupt scheme. The movie ends in a blaze of jubilation as the

critical success, second only to Gone with the Wind in box-oﬃce

Senate president, apparently satisfied with Smith’s vindication,

receipts and Oscar nominations. The title alone has recurred

gives up gaveling for order.

repeatedly in political talk across the decades ever since.

Many observers see the message of Mr. Smith as reassuring: the

Mr. Smith begins when a senator dies. The governor, pushed to

system works, preserved by the idealist individual American hero.

appoint either a party hack or a reformer, picks instead his sons’

The founders and their handiwork are viewed as above criticism.

“Boy Ranger” leader, resonantly named Jeﬀerson Smith (James

During the climactic filibuster, Smith reads the Declaration of

Stewart). The naive Smith heads to the capital under the wing of

Independence and the Constitution, lecturing the senators, “Great

the state’s senior senator, Joseph Paine (Claude Rains), who

principles don’t get lost once they come to light—they’re right

entrusts Smith to the dead senator’s cynical secretary, Clarissa

here.”

Saunders (Jean Arthur). Paine is a onetime associate of Smith’s
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The film endures because it is richly challenging: Mr. Smith is both

continuing sagas that reporters narrate across days, months,

a celebration in theory and an indictment in practice of the

even years.

American political system.

The Constitution also gives the media an easy symbol with which

Mr. Smith has been a template for media depictions of the

they can display their idealism, a perhaps unattainable (and un-

American political system. The Reese Witherspoon vehicle

Madisonian) political system in which oﬃcials work eﬃciently,

Legally Blonde 2: Red, White and Blonde (2003) follows the same

cooperatively, and selflessly in the public interest.

formula of an idealistic individual going to Capitol Hill and
redeeming the promise of the political system against crooked
politicians.
Media interactions: why the media love the Constitution

Media consequences
This positive media portrayal of the Constitution encourages
reverence for the political system even when there is much
criticism of the oﬃcials in that system.See Samuel P. Huntington,

Why do the media today present a rosy picture of the Constitution

American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA:

and the political system it created? One historic reason is that

Harvard University Press, 1981). Typical are the results of a public

opposition to the Constitution collapsed after the Bill of Rights

opinion poll conducted during 1992, a year marked by high public

was added to it in 1791. Within a few years, the Constitution was

unhappiness with government. Not surprisingly, the survey

no longer an object of political controversy. Even during the Civil

showed that the public was highly critical of how the president

War, the ultimate “constitutional crisis,” both sides were faithful to

and members of Congress were handling their jobs. But the

the cherished principles of the Constitution—at least as each side

public did not criticize the institutions of Congress and the

read them.

presidency themselves. Ninety-one percent said they approved of

The Constitution is the essential framework for the work of

“the constitutional structure of government.”

reporters as well as politicians. Reporters rely on order and

Political scientists John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse who

regularity to perform their job day in, day out. The procedures

conducted the research concluded, “People actually see two

established by the Constitution—such as how presidents are

quite diﬀerent political systems…Anything associated with the

elected; how a bill becomes a law; how the president, Congress,

constitutional system elicits a positive response…To the extent

and the Supreme Court vie for power—are the basis for

there are problems with the political system it is because we have
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deviated from what was outlined in the Constitution, not because

An unusual example is provided by Gregory Watson.This example

that outline was flawed.”

is taken from Richard B. Bernstein and Jerome Abel, Amending

Yet many of the media’s indictments against politicians are for
behaviors encouraged by the Constitution. Reporters and the
mass media often criticize American politicians for “squabbling”
and “bickering.” But the separation of powers, as the founders
designed it, is supposed to encourage conflict within the
legislature and between the three branches.
The Constitution is a remarkably terse document. Generations
have worked to evolve its meanings in over two centuries of
politics and policies. Americans may rarely question the
Constitution itself, but they surely disagree and debate over how
its principles should be applied. In the chapters to follow, we will
see many contemporary examples of politics around the
Constitution in the information age—from constitutional
amendments, to disputes between the branches over the powers
of each, to the meanings of the Constitution’s clauses when
applied in public policy.

America: If We Love the Constitution So Much, Why Do We Keep
Trying to Change It? (New York: Times Books, 1993), chap. 13. In
1982, as a sophomore at the University of Texas at Austin,
Watson found a stimulating topic for a government class essay:
The Bill of Rights, as drafted by Madison and passed by
Congress, originally included twelve amendments. Only ten were
ratified by the states and included in the Constitution.
In 1982, congressional pay raises were controversial, and Watson
concluded that this issue made one of the two unratified
amendments pertinent: “No law, varying the compensation for the
services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take eﬀect,
until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.” Only
six of the thirteen states had ratified this amendment by 1791.
But Watson noticed that the amendment had no time limit. In his
essay, he laid out the history of the amendment and urged that it
be ratified by thirty-two more states. His instructor, dubious that a
constitutional amendment could be revived after almost two

Civic education

hundred years, gave Watson’s paper a C.

The message of civic education is the relevance and importance

Undeterred, Watson launched a campaign to get state

of politics. If the workings of the American political system are not

legislatures to pass this congressional compensation

what we like, there are ways to change structures, policies, and

amendment. His first successes were with Maine in 1983 and

political practices.

Colorado in 1984. The news media began paying attention. The
story of legislators voting themselves pay raises and news of
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scandals over congressional perks of oﬃce resonated with the
public; the momentum shifted in Watson’s favor. In 1992,
Michigan became the thirty-eighth state to ratify the amendment.
Congress recognized Watson’s eﬀorts in what became the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution—203 years after
their congressional forebears had passed it.

The previous section is provided by Saylor.org’s The
Constitution and the Structure of Government Power.
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Section 2

Constitution building
Tap on this link to visit the Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance’s Constitutional Building: A Global Review.
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Chapter 8

Executives,
Interest Groups,
Political Parties
& Systems
Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Identify characteristics of interest groups, political
parties and political systems.
• Understand interest groups, political parties and party
systems.
• Analyze the causes and eﬀects of roles that interest
groups and political parties play in the government.

Section 1

Political executive
The political executive consists of those institutions formally

accountability have become institutionalized through the

responsible for governing a political community—that is, for

acceptance and use of regular procedures.

applying its binding decisions, which may be formulated, to a
greater or lesser extent, by the executive institutions themselves.
The structure, function, and character of the executive have
varied widely over time, and no single conceptual framework can
disclose all these variations and their consequences. Yet, certain
fundamentals are clear, and on these we can concentrate our
attention. The two most prevalent structural forms of the
executive are the presidential and the cabinet systems. The
source of executive power has shifted from hereditary right, cooptation, and the use of force to election, either direct or indirect.
The legitimacy of executive power has become secularized;
“tradition,” divine origin, and other forms of appeal to occult
forces have given way to rational criteria of achievement and
popular approbation. The principal functions of the
contemporary political executive are increasingly being carried
out by specialized structures; these functions are representation
and integration, leadership, deliberation and decision making,
control and supervision of subordinate decision-making and
enforcement organs. Finally, executive responsibility and

The above generalizations may be valid for mature and
developed political systems, but they hardly apply to the new
nations, which are in a period of transition. Force continues to
play an important role in their political life, and the legitimization
of mechanisms of nomination, selection, and decision making
has yet to develop. Lack of a sense of community, a low level of
industrial development and modernization, and a confused party
configuration continue to characterize the new nations: charisma
and personal relations are more important than institutions and
legitimized procedures; governmental roles and functions and
the corresponding structures, including the executive, are
undiﬀerentiated; factions often play the game of politics without
accepting general rules, and executive leadership is unstable
because of the prevalence of factional strife. There is a gap
between form and substance in the new nations, so that while
most of them have copied the formal and written constitutional
arrangements of developed societies, particularly the
organization of the executive, they have failed thus far to endow
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these arrangements with corresponding political roles and

account for a genuine collegiality of decision making and

functions. With rare exceptions, the executive is the political

responsibility. Thus, viewed from the point of decision making and

leader who has attained power and the executive structures are

responsibility and depending upon the formal constitutional

only a temporary and fluid machinery that serves his rule. It is

arrangements, the prevalent norms in the society, and such

only in a few of the developing societies—notably in India,

adventitious factors as personality and circumstance, there is a

Ceylon, and in some of the stable democracies of Latin America

continuum between genuine one-man rule and genuine

—that executive structures and corresponding roles are

collegiality. The structures are generally flexible enough to allow

beginning to be clearly diﬀerentiated.

for movement from one form to the other, within the same political

The oﬃce

system. This, incidentally, is true both for cabinet systems and for
presidential systems.

The executive oﬃce consists of a number of elected and

Under United States and French influence, the presidential

appointed oﬃcials responsible for the over-all performances of

system has been adopted in various forms and with varying

the functions associated with it. The number of oﬃcials is

degrees of eﬀectiveness in Latin America and French-speaking

generally small —twenty or, at most, thirty. If we include top civil

Africa. The cabinet system, which originated in England, has been

service personnel, heads of planning agencies and nationalized

adopted in most of the countries of the European continent, in all

industries, top scientists, and defense oﬃcials who participate in

the English-speaking dominions, in many of the former British

deliberation and decision making, the number rarely goes beyond

colonies, and in many of the totalitarian systems—notably in the

a hundred. While the executive is a collective entity, ultimate

Soviet Union and eastern Europe. The diﬀerences between the

responsibility for decision making is sometimes lodged in the

two systems are formal rather than substantive. In the presidential

hands of one man. This is notably the case in presidential

system, the president is elected by the people. He holds the

systems and in many of the cabinet systems in which a well-

highest executive oﬃce over a given period of time, during which

disciplined party controls a majority in the legislature. In

he is not politically accountable to the legislature. All top

totalitarian one-party systems the leader of the party is in law or

executive oﬃcials are nominated by him and can be removed by

in fact—and often in both —in charge of the executive. On the

him. In the cabinet system, on the other hand, the prime minister

other hand, in a number of multiparty parliamentary democracies,

and his cabinet are responsible to the legislature. They are

notably in the Scandinavian countries, the coalition cabinets

formally invested with executive power by a vote of the
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legislature, and their term can be suspended at any time by an

West Germany and France. In West Germany proportional

adverse vote.

representation was greatly modified by the requirement that half

Despite these formal diﬀerences, universal suﬀrage, the growth of
national parties, and the progressive adoption of a majority
electoral system account for striking similarities. In presidential or
cabinet systems, the immediate source of executive power is the
election and the party. In the cabinet system, the leader of the

of the members of the legislature be elected by majority vote.
Executive stability and independence were strengthened by the
provision that the chancellor cannot be removed from oﬃce by a
vote of the legislature unless it is accompanied by a vote in favor
of a successor.

majority party becomes prime minister. If the party is disciplined,

In France proportional representation in legislative elections was

it is unlikely that it will overthrow the prime minister. Thus, while

abandoned in 1958. In the presidential election, if none of the

the prime minister is technically responsible to the legislature, he

candidates receives an absolute majority on the first ballot, the

is just as immune to it as the president. In the one-party

contest is narrowed to only two candidates on the second. As for

totalitarian systems that have adopted the cabinet system— and

executive-legislative relations, parliament was “rationalized”;

we use the Soviet Union as the prototype—it is the party that

stringent restrictions were placed on the vote of censure by the

sustains executive leadership. As long as the leader controls the

national assembly, the executive was given control over legislative

party ( as Stalin did) or is accepted by the higher party echelons

business and legislation; the committee system was simplified

(the Central Committee and the Politburo), he also controls the

and the powers of the committees drastically reduced; and the

legislature and is technically immune to legislative scrutiny. If

president was given the right to dissolve the National Assembly

there are dissensions within the party or if the leader loses his

and call for an election. The trend has been the same,

support in the Politburo and the Central Committee, he can no

significantly, in Great Britain, where the control of the executive

longer hold his position.

over Parliament is made eﬀective through the control of the

Many trends since World War ii account for the reinforcement of
the political executive. Among them, the most significant ones are
the widespread adoption of the majority electoral system and

majority party, and in the United States, where legislative initiative
has passed into the hands of the president and party discipline in
Congress has been tightened.

constitutional reforms establishing the ascendancy of the

From an organizational viewpoint, all executives display striking

executive over the legislature. The two most notable cases are

similarities. The prime minister or president is surrounded by
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concentric circles of advisers and staﬀ and line agencies: the first

and economic development through planning. This may also be

is the immediate circle of personal advisers and liaison agents;

one reason for the rapid turnover of executives and, in general,

the second consists of specialized coordinating agencies with

for executive instability. The loads upon executive management

functions that cut across departmental or ministerial

decision making and enforcement have been too heavy, and the

responsibilities (economic planning, national security, atomic

corresponding supports, in the form of party systems or interest-

energy, space programs, administrative reorganization, etc.); the

group organizations, too weak. There is also a contradiction

third is the cabinet, consisting of top oﬃcials responsible for

between the roles associated with political unification and

policy making and administration of functionally defined

community building, on the one hand, and those related to policy

governmental activities (foreign aﬀairs, trade, labor, welfare,

making and enforcement, on the other. The first tasks require

defense, etc.); a fourth circle consists of an increasing number of

personal leadership, the appeal to national symbols, and

independent or semi-independent agencies with regulatory and

ideology, while the second call for rational skills, organizational

supervisory responsibilities, some of which operate or control

talents, and a pragmatic assessment of goals and available

economic services. To gain a comprehensive view of the political

means.

executive, however, we must further expand our circles to include
other forces in the political system. There are the political parties
and the party leaders, who must be persuaded or placated; the
legislature, whose compliance to policy measures is
indispensable; interest groups that must be taken into account;
the press and the public at large, from which support is ultimately
to be derived; and, finally, other nations, various international
organizations and the international community at large.

Functions of the political executive
The political system can be seen as a mechanism through which
interests and demands are translated into decisions. The
decision-making mechanism must be widely accepted by the
community—that is, it must have legitimacy. Since the political
executive plays an important role in transforming interests and
demands into decisions, it has, first and foremost, output

In the new nations the lack of stable structures sharply contrasts

functions. However, since it also represents and accommodates

with the leadership and decision-making tasks imposed upon the

major social and interest groupings, it plays an integrative role as

executive. Diﬃculties in creating a viable political community,

well. In addition to being the central policy-making organ, it also

providing unity where there was factionalism and tribalism, are

supervises and controls all the subordinate deliberative and

augmented by the immediate and urgent needs of a rapid social

enforcement organs.
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Integration & representation
The integrative and representative function of the political
executive is both ceremonial and eﬃcient. The executive
embodies the political community and represents it internally and
externally. It provides eﬀective links between the members of the
community and the state. In some political systems the
ceremonial and symbolic role is played by a politically
irresponsible head—the monarch or the president of the republic.
In other instances, mostly in presidential systems, the ceremonial
and eﬃcient functions are combined in the same oﬃce and man.
It is, of course, the eﬃcient functions of integration on which
depends the durability of the eﬀective ties that link the community
with its ceremonial head. By integrative functions, we mean
representing demands and interests and making decisions
accordingly. This is the ultimate test of performance. It links the
executive with the party, the legislature, and the public. It is the
“hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens” the community to
the executive. To play this integrative role, the executive must
provide for leadership, decision making, and enforcement.
Leadership
The crux of executive power is leadership. Yet, leadership is a
phenomenon not well understood. It varies from one system to
another and from one period to another. A leader must have the
ability to organize, deliberate, decide, and execute and the
capacity to arouse trust and aﬀection and to gain support.

Charisma—a personal magic of leadership arousing special
popular loyalty or enthusiasm—is an indispensable ingredient of
leadership. This aspect of leadership is closely related to the
ability to take a determined stand and to express a belief without
equivocation. As John Stuart Mill remarked, “a great part of
political power consists in will. … One person with a belief is a
social power equal to ninety-nine who have interests.” If we
combine the rational and charismatic traits, leadership must: (a)
provide for representation and identification within the
community; (b) foresee common problems and suggest policy
solutions; (c) provide, at the executive level, a strong following of
loyal oﬃcials; and (d) receive popular support. Thus, the political
executive has significant input functions to perform. By injecting
new demands and expectations or by proposing solutions, it can
manufacture supports. While it acts within a given structure of
political forces, it can rearrange these forces and create new
reference groups to gain support.
Decision making & deliberation
Political theory has long distinguished between legislative and
executive acts. This formal distinction is no longer adequate.
First, the political executive can perform the leadership functions
traditionally assigned to the legislature. Second, it possesses
independent powers—for instance, in foreign policy and defense.
Third, the practice of delegated legislation has given vast, albeit
subordinate, legislative powers to the executive. Finally, the law
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enacted by the legislature is initiated, prepared, and drafted by

regulation and international conflict has emphasized coordination

the political executive—policy initiation has become an executive

and preparedness for quick action. It also reflects a concomitant

prerogative. The legislative process tends to be increasingly one-

trend in favor of developing new procedures to provide for

sided. In the totalitarian systems that have adopted cabinet

deliberation prior to a decision. Given the sheer bulk of matters

government, legislative scrutiny is of no significance, and this is

that call for decisions and the need of specific knowledge and

virtually the case in all cabinet systems that have a strong,

information in order to make them, decision making becomes a

disciplined party system. Only in the United States does the

matter of following deliberative and consultative processes.

legislature continue to have genuinely independent power of

Increasingly, it becomes a matter of process rather than

legislative scrutiny and initiative. Even so, Congressional initiative

substance. In turn, the basis of the authority of the executive

tends to be limited to scrutiny and amendment of proposals

shifts from the personal to the procedural. The appeal of

already submitted by the executive.

charisma becomes limited, and tradition is no longer invoked. The

In order to initiate, decide, and act, the executive must deliberate.
As a result, intelligence, fact finding, liaison, and staﬀ agencies
have mushroomed. This has particularly been the case with new
governmental activities that do not fit the traditional organization
of the executive into departments and ministries: economic
planning and supervision; coordinating the preparation of
budgetary policy; providing administrative reform to create new
structures that can cope with new functions; and considering
national security matters from a variety of governmental points of
view. Thus, new layers of agencies and oﬃces have developed to
comprise what may be called the oﬃce of the president or the

basis of executive authority begins to coincide with its ability to
act on the basis of rationalized procedures. It is only in the new,
underdeveloped nations that the charismatic leader has played,
and may continue to play, an important role. Crisis situations,
however, often account for the emergence of personal
government in developed societies. The emerging leader either
bypasses the existing procedures or sets them aside in an eﬀort
to establish new ones. In all cases the eﬀective invocation of
personal government and the successful appeal to new political
institutions are closely related to the legitimacy of the political
system.

oﬃce of the prime minister.

Supervision & enforcement

The trend is universal, but it is especially clear in developed

While the classic distinction between deliberation (legislature) and

societies, in which industrialization has created the imperative of

execution (executive) is no longer tenable, it is still true that the
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political executive is the agency of execution in the narrow sense.

totalitarian ones, of persuading the elite. Second, there are

It supervises and controls all subordinate organs. However,

systemic restraints —no leader can attempt a synthesis of policy

execution, properly speaking, is within the purview of the

objectives and goals that does not reflect, up to a certain point,

bureaucracy. Executive decisions are general and comprehensive

the existing demands and aspirations of the community. To go

in scope, and their detailed implementation is in the hands of the

too far in suggesting policy goals is to become separated from

civil service and the various subordinate agencies. The political

supporters; to stand still is to alienate the interests and the

executive, however, remains responsible for the organization and

demands that could provide support. To be eﬀective and to gain

reorganization of the machinery of government. It can create and

approbation and support, the executive must gear its actions to

reorganize departments and agencies, establish the rules of

the interests and demands within the system. As was pointed out

advancement and recruitment within the civil service, and set

earlier, the limits of initiative and freedom of action may be wide

down procedures for making subordinate decisions. Ultimate

and it is the task of leadership to discover them. But, failure to do

responsibility for lack of eﬃcient execution will be focused on the

so or miscalculation may lead to disapproval and rejection. Third,

political executive. But, it is increasingly understood that the

there are various types of constitutional and procedural limitations

political executive establishes the procedures surrounding

that trace the contours of executive power and provide for

bureaucratic decisions without assuming direct responsibility for

executive responsibility. We already mentioned the formal

implementing or failing to implement them. A division of labor

responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature. In presidential

between the political executive and the bureaucracy as a whole

systems in which the chief executive is not directly responsible to

has developed and is reflected in diﬀerent evaluations of roles

the legislature—for example, in the United States and, to a certain

and functions and diﬀering standards of responsibility.

degree, in France–separation of powers, judicial review, legislative

Executive restraints & responsibility
The growth of executive power and the increasing scope of
initiative and decision making call for a discussion of the existing
restraints and of the manner in which responsibility is
institutionalized. The restraints appear to be relatively few. First,
there is the burden, common to all political executives, including

scrutiny, and, in some instances, the direct association of one or
the other of the houses of legislature in the exercise of executive
prerogatives impose restraint.
The substance of executive responsibility, however, lies in the
party system and in periodic elections. The party is both an
instrument at the disposal of the leader to attain power and carry
out policies and a device that controls him, since without the
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support of the party, he is invariably helpless. As long as the party

forms–either through the party system, through open competitive

acquiesces or agrees, the political executive is omnipotent in

elections, or through well-articulated social grouping –have yet to

virtually all political systems, despite procedural limitations. To

develop. As a result, no matter what the constitutional

lose the support of the party is to lose power. The political

prescriptions, the top executive and his associates are often

executive is, in fact, both the leader and the prisoner of his party.

removed from oﬃce because of mob violence, factional uprisings,

The only way to overcome party control is to appeal to the

or military coups. It should be recalled, however, that executive

people. However, in totalitarian systems, there is no mechanism

responsibility and the manner in which top political leadership is

for this, and even in democratic systems, where the mechanism is

replaced or called to oﬃce did not become institutionalized in

readily available, such an occurrence is rare. Ramsay MacDonald

most countries until the end of the nineteenth century and, in

did it in 1931, and Charles de Gaulle, in 1962. But the first was

some European systems, not until the twentieth.

supported by a party other than his own, and the second
managed to overcome a badly divided and fragmented party

A typology of political executives

system. Theodore Roosevelt’s failure demonstrated the diﬃculty

A typology of the political executive requires a prior typology of

of this procedure in the United States. The appeal to the people

political systems. The two types that we discussed–cabinet and

through election provides the second type of responsibility. In

presidential–represent descriptive, rather than analytical,

democratic societies, where basic freedoms are respected, an

categories. The same is true of the widely used distinction

election is the most eﬀective instrument of control and, ultimately,

between “weak” and “strong” executives. A strong executive has

of executive responsibility. It gives the electorate the opportunity

been defined in terms of stability in oﬃce and ability to make and

to approve or disapprove of policies and to choose between

enforce decisions. This is the case when party support is

competing parties and leaderships. In totalitarian systems the

forthcoming or when specific constitutional provisions secure the

executive is responsible to the party only. In all cases, however,

stability and the independence of the executive. Weak executives,

we must consider the degree of freedom that surrounds an

on the other hand, obtain wherever the parties are many or lack

election and the role and structure of political parties in

internal discipline, so that the executive cannot rely upon a

democratic societies as opposed to the internal organization and

disciplined majority in the legislature–a situation often prevalent

the degree of discipline within the party in a one-party totalitarian

among multiparty cabinet systems. Thus, weak executives

system. We must look at the substance and not the form. This is

generally accompany multiparty or weak-party configurations,

abundantly clear in the new nations, in which institutionalized
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while strong executives can accompany either two-party or

Following Max Weber, the basis of executive legitimacy may be

disciplined-party systems. The key variable is the party, not the

classified as rational, traditional, and charismatic [seeLegitimacy].

constitutional and procedural arrangements. In fact, it may be

Rational legitimacy—the development of institutions and

argued that “executive leadership” and “strength” in West

procedures that channel executive decision making and, hence,

Germany since World War ii and in France in the Fifth Republic

legitimize it–is prevalent in both totalitarian and democratic

derive from the existence of a majority party rather than from

systems. Traditional legitimacy is generally associated with static

constitutional arrangements.

and primitive societies and is, therefore, characteristic of very few

To provide for an analytic typology, we shall use the concepts of
power, legitimacy, and decision making. In terms of power,
absolute and qualified executives can be distinguished: the first is
endowed with unlimited powers, and the second operates within
accepted and formulated restraints. Unless we refer to extinct

contemporary executives. Charismatic legitimacy is most
prevalent in intermediate stages of development–where tradition
has been exploded, but authority has not been institutionalized
and legitimized. This type includes many of the new Afro-Asian
nations.

satrapies and tyrannies, it will be diﬃcult to identify absolute

Finally, in terms of decision making, executives can be classified

executives today. Absolute power is qualified in several ways: by

as monocratic or pluralistic, personal or collegial, arbitrary or

constitutional limitations (i.e., separation of powers), by shared

limited. The obvious “syndromes” here are the “monocratic-

executive power (collegiality), and by clear procedures for

personal–arbitrary” and the “pluralistic–collegial–limited.” But,

assuring the responsibility of the political executive to the party or

these syndromes do not fit neatly in empirical situations–unless

to the people. The combination of constitutional limitations,

we limit our comparisons arbitrarily (e.g., Great Britain versus a

collegiality, and responsibility characterizes the generic category

Latin American dictatorship). Generally speaking, one can equate

of democratic executives. The absence of such characteristics or

the “monocratic–personal-arbitrary” syndrome with totalitarian

the absence of their explicit formulation and eﬀective

systems and the “pluralistic-collegiallimited” one with democratic

implementation typifies the executives in closed polities, the most

systems if it is remembered that ingredients of all six can be

prevalent of which are the modern totalitarian systems.

found in all contemporary political systems. The types suggested

[SeeTotalitarianism.]

are only analytical types; they must be carefully related to a
generalized theory of political systems in order to study the
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empirical forms they take and the conditions under which they are

and lodge them within the oﬃce of the president or the prime

likely to develop and change.

minister.

Trends & prospects

The multiplicity of the new functions and the growth of new

As we have seen, the burden of decision making thrust upon the
political executive has grown immensely. The eﬀective
performance of executive leadership calls for an unprecedented
balance between leadership and technical know-how, information
and evaluation, specialization and coordination. Political
structures must adjust to new environmental demands. The
adjustive process of the executive branch over the years,
particularly since World War I, has involved devolution,
depoliticization, and the creation of new administrative organs.
Devolution is the delegation of the power to make decisions to
subordinate organs or agencies. Every eﬀort has been made to
decongest the political executive by explicitly authorizing
subordinates or subordinate agencies and boards to make
decisions. Depoliticization is the process whereby certain issues
are removed from the realm of political controversy and executive
discretion. Collective bargaining; wage fixing on the basis of a
preagreed device that pegs wages on the cost of living index; and
the establishment of public corporations, boards for nationalized
industries, and regulatory commissions are some of the most
usual practices. Finally, an inevitable solution to the problem of
handling the new burdens is to create new agencies and oﬃces

administrative structures to cope with them account for the
emergence of two opposed developmental trends: concentration
and diﬀusion. Concentration is a constitutional and political
requirement. Even in collegial executives, one man increasingly
bears the responsibility for decision making. The growth of
powers, the multiplicity of oﬃces, and the division of tasks within
the executive have only underlined this. It has been heightened
by the considerations of defense and strategy. Institutionalized
forms such as the inner cabinet or the National Security Council
are likely to give place to restricted committees of very few
oﬃcials. Crisis government and corresponding flexible structures
to cope with crises have now become permanent aspects of
executive decision making. Yet, at the same time, the more
important a decision, the more it is contingent upon a complex
process of deliberation and consultation in which oﬃces and men
with specialized tasks participate. It is increasingly diﬀuse and
bureaucratized, while it appears to be highly concentrated and
often personal. A separation of powers that limits the ability of the
top executive to reach a decision and act is informally
institutionalized within the political executive. Divergent points of
view, varying evaluations, and conflicting information about the
same situation confront the top political leader. As decision
making becomes routinized and bureaucratized, the top political
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executive often becomes limited to ad hoc compromises and may
be reduced to immobility. This conflict, between the
concentration of decision making and the diﬀusion and
impersonality that go with the routinization of decision making,
must be resolved if the political executive is to play its role of
leadership eﬀectively.
The trends we noted above apply primarily to the developed
political systems. In the new nations the executive, along with
virtually all other governmental structures, is still in the process of
establishing itself as a legitimized instrument of decision making.
The problem ahead is not so much finding a proper balance
between personal leadership and bureaucratic mechanisms for
decision making, but rather establishing viable and stable
structures with specialized roles and eﬀective capabilities to
suggest policies and make decisions. Whether this will be
accomplished or not depends upon a great number of factors—
the development of a sense of community, agreement on the
basic rules of polity, the development of institutions with specific
tasks, and, above all, the routinization and institutionalization of
the personal government which continues to be the rule today.

The previous section is provided by
Encyclopedia.com’s Political Executive.
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Section 2

Foreign policy roles or the President & Congress
Tap on this link Saylor.org’s CRS Report to Congress: Foreign
Policy Roles of the President and Congress.
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Section 3

Interest groups
Preamble

to the microphone at the “Patriots of Tomorrow” awards
banquet, Lisa reads her revised essay, now titled “Cesspool on

The media often depict interest group lobbyists negatively in the

the Potomac.” A whirlwind of reform-minded zeal follows.

news and in entertainment. One particular episode of The

Congressman Arnold is caught accepting a bribe to allow oil

Simpsons provides an extreme example. Lisa Simpson writes an

drilling on Mount Rushmore and is arrested and removed from

essay titled “The Roots of Democracy” that wins her a trip to

oﬃce. Lisa does not win the essay contest.

Washington, DC, to compete for the best essay on patriotism
award. She writes, “When America was born on that hot July day
in 1776, the trees in Springfield Forest were tiny saplings…and

Congressman Arnold is corrupt, but the cartoon’s unpunished
instrument of corruption is the lobbyist.

as they were nourished by Mother Earth, so too did our fledgling

Interest groups are intermediaries linking people to government,

nation find strength in the simple ideals of equality and justice.”

and lobbyists work for them. These groups make demands on

In Senator Bob Arnold’s oﬃce a lobbyist proposes to raze the
Springfield National Forest. Arnold responds, “Well, Jerry, you’re
a whale of a lobbyist, and I’d like to give you a logging permit, I
would. But this isn’t like burying toxic waste. People are going to
notice those trees are gone.” The lobbyist oﬀers a bribe, which
Arnold accepts.

government and try to influence public policies in their favor.
Their most important diﬀerence from political parties is that they
do not seek elective oﬃce. Interest groups can be single entities,
join associations, and have individual members. The University of
Texas at Austin is an educational institution. Its main purposes
are teaching and research. Like other educational institutions, it
is an interest group when it tries to influence government

Lisa sees it happen and tears up her essay. She sits on the steps

policies. These policies include government funding for facilities

of the Capitol and envisions politicians as cats scratching each

and student grants, loans, and work study. It may also try to

other’s backs and lobbyists as pigs feeding from a trough. Called

influence laws and court decisions applying to research,
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admissions, gender equality in intercollegiate sports, and student

the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial

records. It may ask members of Congress to earmark funds for

Organizations (AFL-CIO).

some of its projects, thereby bypassing the normal competition
with other universities for funds based on merit.

Economic interest groups represent every aspect of our economy,
including agriculture, the arts, automobiles, banking, beverages,

Single entities often join forces in associations. Associations

construction, defense, education, energy, finance, food, health,

represent their interests and make demands on government on

housing, insurance, law, media, medicine, pharmaceuticals,

their behalf. The University of Texas belongs to the Association of

sports, telecommunications, transportation, travel, and utilities.

American Universities. General Electric (GE) belongs to over

These groups cover from head (i.e., the Headwear Institute of

eighty trade associations, each representing a diﬀerent industry

America) to toe (i.e., the American Podiatric Medical Association)

such as mining, aerospace, and home appliances.

and from soup (i.e., the Campbell Soup Company) to nuts (i.e.,

Many interest groups have individuals as members. People join
labor unions and professional organizations (e.g., associations for
lawyers or political scientists) that claim to represent their
interests.

Types of interest groups

the Peanut Butter and Nut Processors Association).
Societal interest groups
Societal interest groups focus on interests based on people’s
characteristics, such as age, gender, race, and ethnicity, as well
as religion and sexual preference. The National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People(NAACP) is one of the oldest

Interest groups can be divided into five types: economic, societal,

societal interest groups in the United States.

ideological, public interest, and governmental.
Ideological interest groups
Economic interest groups
Ideological interest groups promote a reactionary, conservative,
The major economic interest groups represent businesses, labor

liberal, or radical political philosophy through research and

unions, and professions. Business interest groups consist of

advocacy. Interest groups that take stands on such controversial

industries, corporations, and trade associations. Unions usually

issues as abortion and gun control are considered ideological,

represent individual trades, such as the International Brotherhood

although some might argue that they are actually public interest

of Teamsters. Most unions belong to an association,

groups.
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Public interest groups
Public interest groups work for widely accepted concepts of the

intervention for themselves. These groups may give rise to
additional groups.

common good, such as the family, human rights, and consumers.

Some interest groups are created in reaction to an event or a

Although their goals are usually popular, some of their specific

perceived grievance. The National Right to Life

positions (e.g., environmental groups opposing oﬀshore drilling

Committee (NRLC) was founded in 1973 in response to the US

for oil) may be controversial and challenged.

Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision earlier that year legalizing

Government interest groups
Government interest groups consist of local, state, and foreign

abortion. However, groups may form long after the reasons for
establishing them are obvious. The NAACP was not founded until
1909 even though segregation of and discrimination against black

governments. They seek to influence the relevant policies and

people had existed for many years.

expenditures of the federal government.

Interest group entrepreneurs usually are important in the creation

Life stages of interest groups

of groups. Often they are responding to events in their lives. After
a drunk driver killed one of her daughters, Candy Lightner

Interest groups commonly experience a life cycle of creation (or

founded Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) in 1980. She

birth), growth and change (or evolution), and sometimes death.

thereby identified latent interests: people who could be grouped
together and organized to pursue what she made them realize

Creation
As the United States has become more complex with new
technologies, products, services, businesses, and professions,
the US government has become more involved in the economy

was a shared goal, punishing and getting drunk drivers oﬀ the
road. She was helped by widespread media coverage that
brought public attention to her loss and cause.
Evolution & demise

and society. People with common interests organize to solicit
support and solutions to their problems from government.

Interest groups can change over time. The National Rifle

Policies enacted in response to the eﬀorts of these groups aﬀect

Association (NRA) started out as a sports organization in the late

other people, who then form groups to seek government

nineteenth century dedicated to improving its members’
marksmanship. It became an advocate for law and order in the
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1960s, until its oﬃcial support for the 1968 Gun Control Act

and have little input when the leaders decide policy

brought dissension in its ranks. Since the election of new leaders

objectives. Their participation is limited to sending in dues,

in 1977, the NRA has focused on the Second Amendment right to

expressing opinions and, if membership is voluntary, leaving

bear arms, opposing legislation restricting the sale or distribution

when dissatisfied.

of guns and ammunition.
Interest groups can also die. They may run out of funds. Their
issues may lose popularity or become irrelevant. Slavery no
longer exists in the United States and thus neither does the
American Anti-Slavery Society.

How interest groups are organized
Interest groups have leaders and staﬀ. They control the group,
decide its policy objectives, and recruit and represent members.

Voluntary membership
People join membership interest groups voluntarily or because
they have no choice.
When membership is voluntary, interest groups must recruit and
try to retain members. Members help fund the group’s activities,
legitimize its objectives, and add credibility with the media.
Some people may not realize or accept that they have shared
interests with others on a particular issue. For example, many

Leaders & staﬀ

young adults download music from the Internet, but few of them

Leaders and top staﬀ usually run the interest group. They do so

ways to do this legally. Others may be unwilling to court conflict

because they command its resources and information flow and

by joining a group representing oppressed minorities or

have the experience and expertise to deal with public policies

espousing controversial or unpopular views even when they agree

that are often complex and technical. Almost a century ago,

with the group’s views.

Robert Michels identified this control by an organization’s leaders
and staﬀ and called it “the iron law of oligarchy.”

have joined the Future of Music Coalition, which is developing

People do not need to join an interest group voluntarily when they
can benefit from its activities without becoming a member. This is

This oligarchy, or rule by the few, applies to single-entity interest

the problem of collective goods. Laws successfully lobbied for by

groups and to most associations. Their leaders are appointed or

environmental organizations that lead to cleaner air and water

elected and select the staﬀ. Even in many membership

benefit members and nonmembers alike. However, the latter get a

organizations, the people who belong do not elect the leaders

free ride.
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There are three types of incentives that, alone or in combination,

Public Interest (CSPI) is a consumer organization that focuses on

may overcome this free-rider problem.

food and nutrition issues, produces quality research, and has

A purposive incentive leads people voluntarily to join and

media savvy. It is a valuable source of expertise and information

contribute money to a group because they want to help the group

for journalists. The frequent and favorable news coverage it

achieve its goals. Membership in the American Civil Liberties

receives brings the group and its activities to the public’s

Union (ACLU) increased by one hundred thousand in the eighteen

attention and encourages people to support and join it.

months following the 9/11 attacks as the group raised concerns
that the government’s antiterrorism campaign was harming civil
liberties. [10] In addition, people may join groups, such as
the Union of Concerned Scientists, because of
a solidary incentive. The motivation to join the group stems from
the pleasure of interacting with like-minded individuals and the
gratification of publicly expressing one’s beliefs.
People may also join groups to
obtain material incentives available only to members. AARP,
formerly the American Association of Retired Persons, has around
thirty-five million members. It obtains this huge number by
charging a nominal annual membership fee and oﬀering such
material incentives as health insurance and reduced prices for
prescription drugs. The group’s magazine is sent to members and
includes tax advice, travel and vacation information, and
discounts.
Recruitment

News coverage of an interest group does not always have to be
favorable to attract members. Oftentimes, stories about the NRA
in major newspapers are negative. Presenting this negative
coverage as bias and hostility against and attacks on gun owners,
the group’s leaders transform it into purposive and solidary
incentives. They use e-mail “to power membership mobilization,
fund raising, single-issue voting and the other actions-in-solidarity
that contribute to [their] success.”
Groups also make personalized appeals to recruit members and
solicit financial contributions. Names of people who might be
sympathetic to a group are obtained by purchasing mailing lists
from magazines, other groups, and political parties. Recruitment
letters and e-mails often feature scare statements, such as a
claim that Social Security is in jeopardy.
Interest groups recruit members, publicize their activities, and
pursue their policy objectives through the new media. The Save
Our Environment Action Center consists of twenty national

One-way interest groups recruit members is through media

environmental groups pooling their databases of supporters and

coverage. The appealingly named Center for Science in the

establishing a website. Through this network, people can receive
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informational newsletters via e-mail, sign petitions, and contact

Strikes are the union action most often shown in the news. These

their representatives.

are usually framed not as legitimate collective tactics to improve

Required membership

wages and working conditions, but as hurting or inconveniencing
consumers by disrupting services (e.g., suspending classes in

Employment in most automobile plants requires that workers are

elementary and high schools) and causing the cancellation of

members of the International Union, United Automobile,

events (e.g., professional sporting games).

Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW).
Workers fought to establish unions to improve their wages,
working conditions, and job opportunities. One way of achieving
these objectives was to require all workers at a plant to be union
members. But union membership has plummeted as the United
States has moved from a manufacturing to a service economy
and employers have eﬀectively discouraged unionization. Many
jobs do not have unions for workers to join whether they want to
or not. Today only about 12 percent of workers belong to a union
compared to a high of 35.5 percent in 1945. Only 7 percent of
private sector workers belong to a union. A majority of union
members now work for the government.
Media depictions of unions
One reason for the decline of unions is their mainly negative
portrayal in the mass media. There are hardly any labor-beat
reporters in the news media, so union oﬃcials are infrequently
used as sources and are consequently unable to frame union
news to their advantage.

Unions are rare in movies. Norma Rae (1979), Matewan (1987),
and the documentary Harlan County, USA (1977), favorably
portray workers’ struggles to organize and strike for better
working conditions, wages, and security, against exploiting
employers. But in the classic union film, the Academy Award–
winning On the Waterfront (1954), the union is corrupt, violent,
and linked to organized crime; the union leaders exploit members
to enrich themselves.
Representation
Groups claim to represent the interests of their members or
constituents, but these interests may conflict. In an extensive
study, Dara Z. Strolovitch found that civil rights organizations
prioritized the interests of their middle-class members over the
interests of the poor and working class. For example, they
pushed for aﬃrmative action rather than welfare and antipoverty
policies.
A problem for AARP is that, aside from being fifty or over, its
members may have little in common. In 1988, AARP supported
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legislation setting up a catastrophic health insurance plan in

voters in several states, including Arkansas, West Virginia, and

Medicare to provide insurance for elderly people faced with huge

Gore’s home state of Tennessee. Had any of these states gone for

medical bills for major illnesses. After the plan went into eﬀect,

Gore, he would have won the election.

many seniors objected to the increase in their Medicare premiums
and an annual surtax of as high as $800. Their complaints were
widely covered in the media. Congress repealed the program the
next year.

Interest groups can promote candidates through television and
radio advertisements. During the 2004 presidential election, the
NRA ran a thirty-minute infomercial in battleground states
favoring President George W. Bush and calling his opponent “the

Even when members share a group’s general goals they may

most anti-gun presidential nominee in United States history.” In

reject some of its policy proposals or tactics. In 2009, Apple quit

2008, the NRA issued ads endorsing Republican presidential

the US Chamber of Commerce because the chamber opposed

candidate John McCain and his running mate, Sarah Palin.

global-warming legislation.
Interest groups & elections
Interest groups become involved in elections to influence
policymakers. They may contribute funds, make independent
expenditures, advocate issues, and mobilize voters. Wealthy
groups help pay for the presidential nominating conventions and
the presidential inauguration. They give funds to political parties
because “by helping party leaders retain or regain control of the
House or Senate, policymaking rewards…follow.”
Endorsing candidates
Interest groups may endorse candidates for oﬃce and, if they
have the resources, mobilize members and sympathizers to work

Endorsements do carry risks. If the endorsed candidate loses, the
unendorsed winner is likely to be unsympathetic to the group.
Thus relatively few interest groups endorse presidential
candidates and most endorsements are based on ideology.
Funding candidates
Made possible by the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA),political action committees (PACs) are a means for
organizations, including interest groups, to raise funds and
contribute to candidates in federal elections. Approximately onethird of the funds received by candidates for the House of
Representatives and one-fifth of funds for Senate candidates
come from PACs.

and vote for them. President Bill Clinton blamed the NRA for Al

However, in January 2010 the Supreme Court ruled that the

Gore losing the 2000 presidential election because it influenced

government cannot ban political spending by corporations in
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candidate elections. The court majority justified the decision on

legislators. A businessman defending his company’s PAC is

the grounds of the First Amendment’s free speech clause. The

quoted as saying, “Talking to politicians is fine, but with a little

dissenters argued that allowing unlimited spending by

money they hear you better.”

corporations on political advertising would corrupt democracy.

Much better. The Center for Responsive Politics shows

Many interest groups value candidates’ power above their

correlations between campaign contributions and congressional

ideology or voting record. Most PAC funds, especially from

voting. After the House of Representatives voted 220–215 in 2003

corporations, go to incumbents. Chairs and members of

to pass the Medicare drug bill, the organization reported that

congressional committees and subcommittees who make policies

“lawmakers who voted to approve the legislation have raised an

relevant to the group are particularly favored. The case of Enron,

average of roughly twice as much since 1999 from individuals and

although extreme, graphically reveals such funding. Of the 248

PACs associated with health insurers, HMOs [Health Maintenance

members of Congress on committees that investigated the 2002

Organizations] and pharmaceutical manufacturers as those who

accounting scandals and collapse of the giant corporation, 212

voted against the bill.”

had received campaign contributions from Enron or its
accounting firm, Arthur Andersen.

Interest Groups & the political system

Some interest groups do fund candidates on the basis of ideology

In the book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, John J.

and policy preference. Ideological and public interest groups base

Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt argue that the activities of

support on candidates’ views even if their defeat is likely. Pro-life

interest groups, notably the American Israel Public Aﬀairs

organizations mainly support Republicans; pro-choice

Committee, are one reason why, since World War II, the United

organizations mainly support Democrats.

States has provided more direct economic and military support to

The interest group–candidate relationship is a two-way street.
Many candidates actively solicit support from interest groups on
the basis of an existing or the promise of a future relationship.
Candidates obtain some of the funds necessary for their

Israel than any other ally and pursues a policy of preserving and
enhancing Israel’s security. This raises the question of why
interest groups succeed or fail to achieve their policy objectives.
Why Interest Groups Are (or Are Not) Successful

campaigns from interest groups; the groups who give them
money get the opportunity to make their case to sympathetic

The main factors determining an interest group’s eﬀectiveness are
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its assets, objectives, alliances, the visibility of its involvement in
policy decisions, and its responses to political change and crises,
plus, of course, the media’s depiction of it.
Assets
Successful interest groups have prestige, respected leadership,
political skills, and ample finances. The Business Roundtable,
composed of the chief executives of the two hundred leading
corporations, has them all and thus has access to and influence
on policymakers. Monetary assets allow groups to contribute to
political campaigns through their political action committees
(PACs).
The status and distribution of an interest group’s members also
contribute to its success. Automobile dealers are influential and
live, as do their employees, in congressional districts across the
country. After President Barack Obama proposed putting
automobile loans under the oversight of a new federal consumer
authority aimed at protecting borrowers from abusive lender, the
dealers’ lobbying arm, the National Automobile Dealers
Association, organized opposition, including trips to Washington
for some of the eighteen thousand dealers to meet and plead
their case with their legislators. Congress exempted auto dealers
from the regulation.

Objectives
The ease or diﬃculty of achieving a group’s goals can determine
its success. Preventing legislation from being enacted is usually
easier than passing it. In a comprehensive study of interest group
activities during the last two years of the Clinton administration
and the first two years of the George W. Bush administration,
researchers found that although some advocates succeed
eventually in changing policy, “[t]he vast bulk of lobbying in
Washington has to do not with the creation of new programs, but
rather with the adjustment of existing programs or with the
maintenance of programs just as they are.”
Moreover, legislation enacted over the opposition of powerful
interest groups, tends to be watered down. Or the political costs
of its passage are so heavy that its proponents in the presidential
administration and Congress are discouraged from challenging
the groups again.
Alliances
Interest groups sometimes cooperate with other groups to help
them achieve a policy objective they could not accomplish alone.
A coalition expands resources, broadens expertise, and adds to
the credibility of the policy objectives. Alliances are often of
natural allies such as the National Restaurant Association,
the American Nursery and Landscape Association, and
theNational Council of Agricultural Employers, who united to
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oppose restrictions on immigration and penalties on businesses

benefits provided for veterans. In general, the news media pay

that employ illegal immigrants. But they can be made up of

little attention to iron triangles in the absence of conflict and

strange bedfellows, as when the American Civil Liberties Union

controversy, and interest groups are likely to achieve many of

(ACLU) and the National Rifle Association (NRA) allied to oppose

their objectives.

the US Department of Justice putting raw, unsubstantiated data
into a national computer network. For the ACLU, it was a violation

Political change & crises

of people’s right to privacy; for the NRA, it was a move toward

Whether interest groups defend what they have or go on the

denying people the right to bear arms.

oﬀense to gain new benefits often depends on who is in control

Visibility of policy involvement

of the government. Some interest groups’ goals are supported or
opposed far more by one political party than another. A new

Interest groups are often most successful when their activities are

president or a change in party control of Congress usually

unreported by the media, unscrutinized by most policymakers,

benefits some groups while putting others at a disadvantage. The

and hidden from the public. Opposition to a group’s activities is

Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in the 2010

diﬃcult when they are not visible. As one lobbyist observed, “A

election put a brake on new regulation of business by Congress,

lobby is like a night flower, it thrives in the dark and dies in the

reduced funds for regulators to hire staﬀ and enforce regulation,

sun.”

and limited investigations of industry practices.

In what are called iron triangles, or subgovernments, policy on a

Crises, especially ones extensively depicted by the media, often

subject is often made by a relatively few people from Congress,

involve politicians and interest groups trying to achieve or prevent

the bureaucracy, and interest groups. A classic iron triangle has

policy changes. Looking to exploit the horrific BP (British

been veterans’ aﬀairs policy. Members of Congress chairing the

Petroleum) oil spill of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico (which was

relevant committees and subcommittees and their aides, key

widely covered in the media and replete with images of the oil-

agency administrators from the US Department of Veterans

infested waters and oil-coated beaches and wildlife),

Aﬀairs, and representatives from interest groups such as the

environmentalists and their congressional allies worked for

American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) have

“measures to extend bans on new oﬀshore drilling, strengthen

interacted and dominated policymaking. This policymaking has

safety and environmental safeguards, and raise to $10 billion or

taken place with low visibility and very little opposition to the

more the cap on civil liability for an oil producer in a
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spill.” Opposing them were the oil and gas industry, which,

The relationships between interest groups and policymakers vary

according to the Center for Responsive Politics, spent $174.8

depending on the administration in power. Energy companies had

million on lobbying in 2009, and its allies in Congress from such

a close political support and referral relationship with the George

oil states as Texas and Louisiana.

W. Bush administration but primarily a pressure relationship with

Relations between interest groups & policymakers
When viewed overall, there is a hierarchy in the influence of
relations between interest groups and policymakers.

the Obama administration. Relationships also vary by subject. For
example, a Democratic president’s choice to head the US
Department of Labor may have to be acceptable to the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO), but the union organization has little influence over

• At the top, the interest group makes policy. This is uncommon.

other cabinet appointments.

• More common, the group maintains close political relations with

Who Benefits from Interest Groups?

policymakers.
• The group has an unchallengeable veto status over some

In Federalist No. 10, James Madison warns of the dangers of
factions: “[A] number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority

governmental decisions, for example, over a presidential

or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some

appointment.

common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights

• The group receives some attention from policymakers but
mainly has a pressure relationship with them.
• The group has only a potential reprisal relationship with
policymakers; it can threaten to oppose a member of Congress
at the next election.
• At the bottom of the ladder, rejected by policymakers, the group
is left to agitate and resist; its public demonstrations usually

of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community.” Madison believed that factions were inevitable,
because their causes were “sown in the nature of man.”
Madison’s factions are not exactly today’s interest groups.
Indeed, interest groups, by representing diverse segments of
society, oﬀset one of Madison’s concerns—the domination of the
majority. Nonetheless, his warning raises important questions
about the eﬀects of interest groups.

signify its inability to achieve its objectives by less visible
means.
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Pluralism: Competition among Groups
Briefly stated, pluralism is the theory that competition among
interest groups produces compromise and balance among
competing policy preferences. For pluralists, the abundance of
interest groups, the competition between them, and their

economics. A corporation can deploy multiple lobbyists and
obtain access to various policymakers by joining several trade
groups, belonging to business associations such as the US
Chamber of Commerce, and using its CEO and other personnel
from headquarters to lobby.

representation of interests in society are inherent in American

Business and trade associations make up approximately 70

democracy. Bargaining between groups and ever-changing group

percent of the organizations with representation in Washington,

alliances achieve a desirable dispersion of power or at least an

DC. Add interest groups representing professionals, and they

acceptable balancing of the various interests in society.

account for approximately 85 percent of total spending on

Pluralists acknowledge that some groups might dominate areas

lobbying.

where their interests are paramount. But they believe two factors

Quite often a policy appears only to aﬀect specific corporations

rectify this situation. Inoverlapping membership, people belonging

or industries and therefore does not receive much media or public

to several interest groups encourage negotiation and

attention. The Walt Disney Company’s copyright on Mickey

compromise. And underrepresented people will in time establish

Mouse was due to expire in 2003 and those on Pluto, Goofy, and

groups to assert their interests.

Donald Duck would expire soon after. In 2000, after lobbying and

The Advantage of Business
An argument against pluralism is that business has an advantage
over other segments of society, particularly the poor and the
working class. These Americans lack the disposable income and
political skills to organize. The issues that concern them are often
absent from the policy agenda. Business sponsors political
advertisements, gives campaign contributions through PACs,
donates to political parties, hires law and public relations firms,
and funds research advocacy groups promoting free-market

well-placed campaign contributions by Disney, Congress
extended all copyrights for twenty more years.
Business is not monolithic. Interests conflict between and among
industries, individual corporations, and organizations representing
professionals. Large businesses can have diﬀerent objectives
than small businesses. The interests of manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers can clash. Moreover, even when
business is united, its demands are not necessarily gratified
immediately and absolutely, especially when the issue is visible
and the demands provoke opposition.
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Negative Depictions of Business
The media often depict business interest groups negatively, which
can limit the groups’ influence. Witness, for example, stories
about the dubious dealings and bankruptcy of corporations such
as Enron, the trials of corporate leaders who have pillaged their
companies, and the huge salaries and bonuses paid in financial
and related business sectors.

However, the negative view of business is incarnated in the
enduring image of the chairman of the seven leading tobacco
companies testifying before Congress
Enduring image
On April 14, 1994, the chief executives of the leading tobacco
companies stood up, raised their right hands, and swore before
members of the subcommittee on Health and the Environment of

Corporations and their executives are commonly the villains in

the House of Representatives’ Committee on Energy and

popular films including RoboCop (1987), Wall Street (1987), The

Commerce that nicotine was not addictive. The photograph of

Naked Gun 2 and ½: The Smell of Fear (1991), and the

this moment, prominently featured in the US and foreign media,

documentaries of Michael Moore, particularlyRoger and

has become an enduring image of business executives who place

Me (1989). Television news stories oftentimes portray the big

the interests and profits of their corporations above the public

business sector as buying access and favors with lavish

interest even if it requires them to engage in self-deception, defy

campaign contributions and other indulgences, wielding undue

common sense about the dangers of their products, and give

influence on the policy process, and pursuing its interests at the

deceptive testimony under oath.

expense of the national interest. [18] Newspapers similarly frame
business interest groups and their lobbyists as involved in
dubious activities and exercising power for private greed. Typical
is the New York Times’ headline: “Vague Law and Hard Lobbying
Add Up to Billions for Big Oil.”

Had one sat through the several hours of hearings, watched them
on television, or read the transcript, the executives would have
come across as less defiant and more reasonable. They agreed to
give Congress unpublished research documents, acknowledged
that cigarettes may cause various health problems including

These stories could frame business interest groups more

cancer and heart disease, and admitted that they would prefer

positively. They could point out that business lobbyists favor

that their children not smoke. [20] But the photo and its brief

essential and deserving objectives, present information and valid

explanatory caption, not the complicated hearings, are the

arguments to policymakers, and make their proposals in a

enduring image.

political arena (i.e., Congress) in competition with other groups.
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Why does this image of venal, almost criminal, tobacco

may be suitable for advertisements. The Lockheed Martin

executives endure? Simply put, television news’ continuing

Corporation has advertised in the policy-oriented National

coverage of the litigation by state attorneys general against the

Journal in order to reach Washington insiders and policymakers.

tobacco companies required vivid video to illustrate and
dramatize an otherwise bland story. What better choice than the
footage of the seven tobacco executives? Thus the image
circulated over and over again on the nightly news and is widely
available on the Internet years later.

Interest groups in the Information Age

Some interest groups engage in public relations campaigns.
Walmart paid $10 million annually in order to counter lobbying
groups that were funded by two unions. These unions were
critical of the retail giant’s low wages, inadequate health care, and
discrimination against women. The public relations campaign
promoted the company’s positive activities and responded to
criticisms.

Media Interactions

Public relations is not confined to American interest groups.

Many business interest groups try not to interact with the news

Approximately 160 foreign governments have US public relations

media at all. They avoid media attention, particularly when it is

consultants or lobbyists representing them in communicating with

likely to be negative. They prefer to pursue their policy

the US media, policymakers, and the public. The firms instruct

preferences out of the media’s and the public’s sight and scrutiny.

their clients on how to deal with the media, arrange meetings for

Public relations

them with journalists, set up editorial briefings, pitch stories to
reporters and editors, and try to create newsworthy events. These

Other interest groups have the need or the resources to strive for

tactics usually succeed in increasing and improving the countries’

a favorable image and promote themselves and their policy

news coverage and images.

preferences. One way is through advertising. They place
advertisements on the television networks’ evening news shows
in policymakers’ constituencies, such as Washington, DC, and
New York, where opinion leaders will see them and in prominent
newspapers, such as the New York Times, Washington Post,
and Wall Street Journal. Even media outlets with tiny audiences

Occasionally, the media expose this public relations activity.
The New York Times revealed that, in part because fifteen of the
nineteen terrorists involved with the attacks on 9/11 were Saudi
Arabian, the Saudi “government has spent millions of dollars on
well-connected lobbyists and national television advertisements
since 9-11 in a drive to improve its image among Americans.”
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Advocacy Campaigns

Attracting Media Attention

A few interest groups engage in advocacy campaigns through the

Most interest groups do not engage in advocacy campaigns.

media. A notable example took place during the 1994 attempt by

Indeed, they lack suﬃcient funds to advertise at all. Yet coverage

the Clinton administration to change the US health-care system.

in the news media is essential, especially for many public interest

Some $60 million was spent on advertising, with opponents

groups, if they are to recruit members, raise funds, improve their

outspending supporters two to one.

access to policymakers, and obtain public support for their

The Health Insurance Association of America (now
named America’s Health Insurance Plans), representing small to
medium-sized insurance companies, waged the most eﬀective
public campaign. Under the appealing name of the Coalition for
Health Insurance Choices, it spent around $14 million creating
and showing television ads in which a woman (Louise) and her

objectives. So they hold news conferences, issue press releases,
release research studies, give interviews to journalists, and try to
have their spokespeople appear on talk radio and television
public aﬀairs shows. Their problem is that there are far more
groups seeking news coverage than the media can or do
accommodate.

spouse (Harry) critically comment on alleged defects in the

Interest groups deploy several techniques to attract media

president’s health-care proposal. “Having choices we don’t like is

coverage. Among them are the catchy phrase, the telling statistic,

no choice at all,” says Louise in one ad. No direct reference was

the scorecard, and the poll. Charlton Heston embodied the

made to the health insurance industry behind the ad.

catchy phrase. While he was president and spokesperson of the

The ads were aimed at members of Congress and thus aired
mostly in Washington, DC, and on CNN. They attracted news
coverage, which amplified awareness about, attributed influence

National Rifle Association (NRA), he held up a musket during its
annual meeting and told members that the only way he would
give up his gun is when they pry it “from my cold dead hands.”

to, and enhanced their eﬀects. This attention increased even

This media-attention-getting phrase became his trademark, which

more when the Clintons made a parody version of the ad. By

he repeated with other guns at subsequent conventions. They

framing the administration’s proposal in terms of high cost and

were the last words he uttered before he oﬃcially stepped down

big government, the ads contributed to its defeat in Congress. It

from the NRA’s presidency in 2003.

would not be until 2010 that reform of health care would be
achieved.
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Another technique is the telling statistic. A report titled City

“California family farmers” (the word “family” encouraged a

Slickers: How Farm Subsidy Checks End Up in Big Cities from

positive response), the phrase “financial responsibility” is quite

the Environmental Working Group achieved widespread and

vague, and the 71 percent figure was achieved by adding the 44

prominent publicity when it revealed that $1.2 million per year in

percent “definite yes” response to the 27 percent “probably yes”

agricultural subsidies was going to people living in the 90210 zip

response.

code, which is, as most Americans know from the television show
of the same name, urban and aﬄuent Beverly Hills. Because farm

Disproportionate Coverage

subsidies are traditionally justified as preserving and protecting

Most news coverage of societal and public interest groups goes

family farms, the report persuasively reframed the issue as

only to a few. According to an article by Lucig H. Danielian and

government subsidies of wealthy corporate farm interests.

Benjamin Page, “The media seize upon a few prominent

Some interest groups issue scorecards that enable journalists

individuals or groups to speak for broad sets of interests.”

easily to report how policymakers have voted on issues of

Witness a study of 244 interest groups in fourteen major

concern to the group’s members and the public. The League of

newspapers, two news magazines, and the top three television

Conservation Voters has released a list to the press during

networks. The single most-covered group in each of four policy

election years of the “Dirty Dozen” members of Congress with the

areas received around 40 percent of all the coverage in that area.

supposedly worst records on the environment. The legislators

These were the Sierra Club on the environment, theCouncil on

targeted are usually in close races and some 60 percent of them

Foreign Relations on national security and foreign policy,

have been defeated.

theAmerican Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for civil rights, and

Interest groups also pay for or conduct public opinion polls,
sometimes with questions that frame the issue to push the public
toward their point of view. During the California water shortage of
2001, the California Farm Bureau released a poll showing that 71
percent of those polled believed “that the federal government has
a financial responsibility to help keep California’s farmers in
agriculture production.” The actual question asked about

the Christian Coalition of America on broad matters of public
policy. The figure reaches approximately 68 percent when the
number of groups is raised to twelve (5 percent of the total
number) to include the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP), Greenpeace, and a few others. In
contrast, 34 percent of the interest groups did not appear in a
single story.
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The larger a group’s budget, the more likely it is to be covered.

Disproportionate coverage of a few societal and public interest

These groups have staﬀ to communicate with the media, hold

groups enhances their importance and the impression that each

regular press conferences, provide the press with dependable

one represents a policy area. Instead, there is often a spectrum of

information, stage events with dramatic visuals and symbolism,

interest groups across areas. Sparse or nonexistent coverage of

and make news by suing the government. They also are covered

these interest groups means that the media do not bring their

because reporters return repeatedly to sources that are familiar to

demands, activities, and policy perspectives to the attention of

them and their audiences.

policymakers and the public.

Most news organizations are not inclined to incur the expense of

Unfavorable media depictions of labor unions reinforce their

investigating interest groups’ organization and claims of

negative stereotypes. This coverage reduces public support for

accomplishments. Nor are they able to obtain easy access to the

unions’ organizing eﬀorts and discourages people from voluntarily

groups’ records. For ten years, the Christian Coalition was the

joining unions. It discredits striking as a desirable or even

most prominent interest group of the religious right. Journalists

appropriate way for unions to achieve their objectives.

took the claims of its leaders at face value. Only later did former
national leaders who had left the group reveal to the press that
the number of members had been inflated.
Media Consequences
Media depictions matter. Favorable coverage of public interest
groups seeking to protect the environment and consumers has
helped get their issues on the policy agenda and some of their
proposals enacted. The breast cancer lobby is far more
successful at shaping media coverage and thus influencing public
opinion and determining public policy (including government
funding) than the prostate cancer lobby, even though the
diseases have almost identical morbidity and mortality rates.

Media coverage of business interest groups conveys their power.
It limits this power by framing it as excessive and adverse to the
public interest and by exposing some of it as greed and
exploitation. This coverage aﬀects public opinion. Of the people
polled about “the power of diﬀerent groups in influencing
government policy, politicians, and policymakers in Washington”
and which groups had “too much” influence, 86 percent selected
“big companies,” 83 percent chose “political action committees
which give money to political candidates,” and 71 percent picked
“political lobbyists.” Overwhelmingly, people have the impression
that government is run by a few big interests. In November 2005,
90 percent of respondents to a Harris poll (up from 83 percent the
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previous year) said big companies had too much influence on
government.
No wonder interest groups become issues in elections. Each
party accuses the other of being beholden to “special interests”
and of unsavory relationships with lobbyists. The media pursue
stories about interest group contributions and of lobbyists holding
prominent staﬀ positions in candidates’ campaigns. Democratic
presidential candidate Barack Obama refused in the 2008
presidential election to accept contributions from registered
lobbyists and political action committees (PACs). Republican
nominee John McCain established a conflict-of-interest policy
that resulted in the resignation or dismissal of several members of
his campaign staﬀ who were registered as lobbyists.

The previous section is provided by Saylor.org’s
Interest Groups.
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Section 4

Political parties
Preamble

prognosis for the Democratic Party was more pessimistic.
Clymer quoted a Democratic Party leader as saying, “God knows

A favorite pastime of political journalists is periodically assessing

we need help” and another who observed that his party had “run

the state of political parties, usually in conjunction with national

out of gas.” [1] He argued that the Democrats lacked a unified

elections. Journalists are rarely optimistic or complimentary

message or a clear leader, and quoted a party activist: “Our party

when describing parties’ present status or forecasting their

has so many disparate points of influence that we can never

future. However, history has shown that the Democratic and

focus enough to achieve our programs.” [2]

Republican parties are amazingly enduring institutions, even
when the mass media have sold them short.

In hindsight, Clymer’s predictions are not entirely accurate,
especially after the victory of Democratic president Barack

Reporters routinely take stock of the parties, and their prognosis

Obama in 2008, and illustrate the pitfalls of speculating about the

is typically bleak and filled with foreboding. In 2003, New York

future of political parties. However, his observations raise

Times political reporter Adam Clymer took stock of the

important ideas about American parties. Political parties are

Democratic and Republican parties in a series of front-page

enduring and adaptive institutions whose organization and

articles. “With the Congress thinly divided along partisan lines,

functions change in response to diﬀerent political and historical

another presidential election taking shape, and the rules of

circumstances. [3] The two major American political parties, the

campaign finance in limbo, the two national political parties are

Republicans and the Democrats, each have gone through

at crucial turning points,” he wrote. Clymer described a

periods of popularity, decline, and resurgence.

revitalized Republican Party that was looking forward to an era of
political dominance after having had “one foot in the grave” for
more than twenty years since the Watergate scandal in 1974. His

The Democratic and Republican parties have dominated for over
150 years because of their ability to adapt to changing political
and cultural circumstances. In the early decades of the republic,
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when voting rights were limited to male landowners, parties

argue initiated a period of decline. The renewed parties of today

formed around charismatic leaders such as Thomas Jeﬀerson

are service-oriented organizations dispensing assistance and

and John Adams. When voting rights were extended, parties

resources to candidates and politicians. [3]

changed to accommodate the public. As immigrants came to the
United States and settled in urban areas, party machines
emerged and socialized the immigrants to politics.
Parties also have adapted to changes in the media environment.
When radio and television were new technologies, parties
incorporated them into their strategies for reaching voters,
including through advertising. More recently, the Republican and
Democratic parties have advanced their use of the Internet and
digital media for campaigning, fundraising, and issue advocacy.

History of American Political Parties

Fear of Faction
The founders of the Constitution were fearful of the rise of
factions, groups in society that organize to advance a political
agenda. They designed a government of checks and balances
that would prevent any one group from becoming too influential.
James Madison famously warned in Federalist No. 10 of the
“mischiefs of faction,” particularly a large majority that could seize
control of government. [4] The suspicion of parties persisted
among political leaders for more than a half century after the
founding. President James Monroe opined in 1822, “Surely our
government may go on and prosper without the existence of

Political parties are enduring organizations under whose labels

parties. I have always considered their existence as the curse of

candidates seek and hold elective oﬃces. [1] Parties develop and

the country.” [5]

implement rules governing elections. They help organize
government leadership. [2] Political parties have been likened to
public utilities, such as water and power companies, because

Despite the ambiguous feelings expressed by the founders, the
first modern political party, the Federalists, appeared in the

they provide vital services for a democracy.

United States in 1789, more than three decades before parties

The endurance and adaptability of American political parties is

1798, the United States has only experienced one brief period

best understood by examining their colorful historical

without national parties, from 1816 to 1827, when infighting

development. Parties evolved from factions in the eighteenth

following the War of 1812 tore apart the Federalists and the

century to political machines in the nineteenth century. In the

Republicans. [7]

developed in Great Britain and other western nations. [6] Since

twentieth century, parties underwent waves of reform that some
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Parties as Factions

The Federalists & the Republicans

The first American party system had its origins in the period

The Federalist Party originated at the national level but soon

following the Revolutionary War. Despite Madison’s warning in

extended to the states, counties, and towns. Hamilton used

Federalist No. 10, the first parties began as political factions.

business and military connections to build the party at the

Upon taking oﬃce in 1789, President George Washington sought

grassroots level, primarily in the Northeast. Because voting rights

to create an “enlightened administration” devoid of political

had been expanded during the Revolutionary War, the Federalists

parties. [8] He appointed two political adversaries to his cabinet,

sought to attract voters to their party. They used their newfound

Alexander Hamilton as treasury secretary and Thomas Jeﬀerson

organization for propagandizing and campaigning for candidates.

as secretary of state, hoping that the two great minds could work

They established several big-city newspapers to promote their

together in the national interest. Washington’s vision of a

cause, including the Gazette of the United States, the Columbian

government without parties, however, was short-lived.

Centinel, and the American Minerva, which were supplemented

Hamilton and Jeﬀerson diﬀered radically in their approaches to
rectifying the economic crisis that threatened the new
nation. [9] Hamilton proposed a series of measures, including a

by broadsheets in smaller locales. This partisan press initiated
one of the key functions of political parties—articulating positions
on issues and influencing public opinion. [11]

controversial tax on whiskey and the establishment of a national

Disillusioned with Washington’s administration, especially its

bank. He aimed to have the federal government assume the

foreign policy, Jeﬀerson left the cabinet in 1794. Jeﬀerson urged

entire burden of the debts incurred by the states during the

his friend James Madison to take on Hamilton in the press,

Revolutionary War. Jeﬀerson, a Virginian who sided with local

stating, “For God’s sake, my Dear Sir, take up your pen, select

farmers, fought this proposition. He believed that moneyed

your most striking heresies, and cut him to pieces in the face of

business interests in the New England states stood to benefit

the public.” [12] Madison did just that under the pen name of

from Hamilton’s plan. Hamilton assembled a group of powerful

Helvidius. His writings helped fuel an anti-Federalist opposition

supporters to promote his plan, a group that eventually became

movement, which provided the foundation for the Republican

the Federalist Party. [10]

Party. This early Republican Party diﬀers from the present-day
party of the same name. Opposition newspapers, the National
Gazette and the Aurora, communicated the Republicans’ views
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and actions, and inspired local groups and leaders to align

Infighting soon caused the Republicans to cleave into warring

themselves with the emerging party. [13] TheWhiskey Rebellion in

factions: the National Republicans and the Democratic-

1794, staged by farmers angered by Hamilton’s tax on whiskey,

Republicans. [16]

reignited the founders’ fears that violent factions could overthrow
the government. [14]

Establishment of a Party System

First Parties in a Presidential Election

A true political party system with two durable institutions

Political parties were first evident in presidential elections in 1796,
when Federalist John Adams was barely victorious over
Republican Thomas Jeﬀerson. During the election of 1800,
Republican and Federalist members of Congress met formally to
nominate presidential candidates, a practice that was a precursor
to the nominating conventions used today. As the head of state

associated with specific ideological positions and plans for
running the government did not begin to develop until 1828. The
Democratic-Republicans, which became the Democratic Party,
elected their presidential candidate, Andrew Jackson. The Whig
Party, an oﬀshoot of the National Republicans, formed in
opposition to the Democrats in 1834. [17]

and leader of the Republicans, Jeﬀerson established the

The era of Jacksonian Democracy, which lasted until the outbreak

American tradition of political parties as grassroots organizations

of the Civil War, featured the rise of mass-based party politics.

that band together smaller groups representing various interests,

Both parties initiated the practice of grassroots campaigning,

run slates of candidates for oﬃce, and present issue

including door-to-door canvassing of voters and party-sponsored

platforms. [15]

picnics and rallies. Citizens voted in record numbers, with

The early Federalist and Republican parties consisted largely of
political oﬃceholders. The Federalists not only lacked a mass
membership base but also were unable to expand their reach
beyond the monied classes. As a result, the Federalists ceased to
be a force after the 1816 presidential election, when they received

turnouts as high as 96 percent in some states. [18] Campaign
buttons publically displaying partisan aﬃliation came into vogue.
Thespoils system, also known as patronage, where voters’ party
loyalty was rewarded with jobs and favors dispensed by party
elites, originated during this era.

few votes. The Republican Party, bolstered by successful

The two-party system consisting of the Democrats and

presidential candidates Thomas Jeﬀerson, James Madison, and

Republicans was in place by 1860. The Whig Party had

James Monroe, was the sole surviving national party by 1820.

disintegrated as a result of internal conflicts over patronage and
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disputes over the issue of slavery. The Democratic Party, while

paramilitary power group in the city.” [21] The idea of a “balanced

divided over slavery, remained basically intact. [19] The

ticket” consisting of representatives of diﬀerent groups developed

Republican Party was formed in 1854 during a gathering of

during the machine-politics era. [22]

former Whigs, disillusioned Democrats, and members of the FreeSoil Party, a minor antislavery party. The Republicans came to
prominence with the election of Abraham Lincoln.
Parties as Machines
Parties were especially powerful in the post–Civil War period
through the Great Depression, when more than 15 million people
immigrated to the United States from Europe, many of whom
resided in urban areas. Party machines, cohesive, authoritarian
command structures headed by bosses who exacted loyalty and
services from underlings in return for jobs and favors, dominated

Because party machines controlled the government, they were
able to sponsor public works programs, such as roads, sewers,
and construction projects, as well as social welfare initiatives,
which endeared them to their followers. The ability of party
bosses to organize voters made them a force to be reckoned
with, even as their tactics were questionable and corruption was
rampant. [23] Bosses such as William Tweed in New York were
larger-than-life figures who used their powerful positions for
personal gain. Tammany Hall boss George Washington Plunkitt
describes what he called “honest graft”:

political life in cities. Machines helped immigrants obtain jobs,

My party’s in power in the city, and its goin’ to undertake a lot of

learn the laws of the land, gain citizenship, and take part in

public improvements. Well, I’m tipped oﬀ, say, that they’re going

politics.

to lay out a new park at a certain place. I see my opportunity and

Machine politics was not based on ideology, but on loyalty and
group identity. The Curley machine in Boston was made up
largely of Irish constituents who sought to elect their
own. [20] Machines also brought diﬀerent groups together. The
tradition of parties as ideologically ambiguous umbrella
organizations stems from Chicago-style machines that were run
by the Daley family. The Chicago machine was described as a

I take it. I go to that place and I buy up all the land I can in the
neighborhood. Then the board of this or that makes the plan
public, and there is a rush to get my land, which nobody cared
particular for before. Ain’t it perfectly honest to charge a good
price and make a profit on my investment and foresight? Of
course, it is. Well, that’s honest graft.[24]
Enduring Image: Boss Tweed Meets His Match

“hydra-headed monster” that “encompasses elements of every
major political, economic, racial, ethnic, governmental, and

The lasting image of the political party boss as a corrupt and
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greedy fat cat was the product of a relentless campaign by

the election of a governor, a mayor, and the speaker of the

American political cartoonist Thomas Nast in Harper’s

assembly.

Weekly from 1868 to 1871. Nast’s target was William “Boss”
Tweed, leader of the New York Tammany Hall party machine, who
controlled the local Democratic Party for nearly a decade.

The New York Times, Harper’s Weekly, reform groups, and
disgruntled Democrats campaigned vigorously against Tweed and
his cronies in editorials and opinion pieces, but none was as

Nast established the political cartoon as a powerful force in

successful as Nast’s cartoons in conveying the corrupt and

shaping public opinion and the press as a mechanism for

greedy nature of the regime. Tweed reacted to Nast’s cartoon,

“throwing the rascals” out of government. His cartoons ingrained

“Who Stole the People’s Money,” by demanding of his

themselves in American memories because they were among the

supporters, “Stop them damned pictures. I don’t care what the

rare printed images available to a wide audience in a period when

papers write about me. My constituents can’t read. But, damn it,

photographs had not yet appeared in newspapers or magazines,

they can see pictures.”[25]

and when literacy rates were much lower than today. Nast’s skill
at capturing political messages in pictures presented a legacy not
just for today’s cartoonists but for photographers and television
journalists. His skill also led to the undoing of Boss Tweed.
Tweed and his gang of New York City politicians gained control of
the local Democratic Party by utilizing the Society of Tammany
(Tammany Hall), a fraternal organization, as a base. Through an
extensive system of patronage whereby the city’s growing Irish
immigrant population was assured employment in return for
votes, the Tweed Ring was able to influence the outcome of
elections and profit personally from contracts with the city. Tweed
controlled all New York state and city Democratic Party
nominations from 1860 to 1870. He used illegal means to force

The Tweed Ring was voted out in 1871, and Tweed was ultimately
jailed for corruption. He escaped and was arrested in Spain by a
customs oﬃcial who didn’t read English, but who recognized him
from the Harper’s Weekly political cartoons. He died in jail in New
York.

Parties Reformed
Not everyone benefited from political machines. There were some
problems that machines either could not or would not deal with.
Industrialization and the rise of corporate giants created great
disparities in wealth. Dangerous working conditions existed in
urban factories and rural coal mines. Farmers faced falling prices
for their products. Reformers blamed these conditions on party
corruption and ineﬃciency. They alleged that party bosses were
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diverting funds that should be used to improve social conditions

The merit system, now called the civil service, was instituted in

into their own pockets and keeping their incompetent friends in

1883 with the passage of the Pendleton Act. The merit system

positions of power.

wounded political machines, although it did not eliminate them.

The Progressive Era
The mugwumps, reformers who declared their independence
from political parties, banded together in the 1880s and provided
the foundation for the Progressive Movement. The Progressives
initiated reforms that lessened the parties’ hold over the electoral
system. Voters had been required to cast color-coded ballots
provided by the parties, which meant that their vote choice was
not confidential. The Progressives succeeded by 1896 in having
most states implement the secret ballot. The secret ballot is
issued by the state and lists all parties and candidates. This
system allows people to split their ticket when voting rather than
requiring them to vote the party line. The Progressives also hoped
to lessen machines’ control over the candidate selection process.
They advocated a system of direct primary elections in which the
public could participate rather than caucuses, or meetings of
party elites. The direct primary had been instituted in only a small
number of states, such as Wisconsin, by the early years of the

[26]
Progressive reformers ran for president under party labels.
Former president Theodore Roosevelt split from the Republicans
and ran as the Bull Moose Party candidate in 1912, and Robert
LaFollette ran as the Progressive Party candidate in 1924.
Republican William Howard Taft defeated Roosevelt, and
LaFollette lost to Republican Calvin Coolidge.
New Deal & Cold War Eras
Democratic President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s New Deal program for leading the United States out
of the Great Depression in the 1930s had dramatic eﬀects on
political parties. The New Deal placed the federal government in
the pivotal role of ensuring the economic welfare of citizens. Both
major political parties recognized the importance of being close
to the power center of government and established national
headquarters in Washington, DC.

twentieth century. The widespread use of direct primaries to

An era of executive-centered government also began in the

select presidential candidates did not occur until the 1970s.

1930s, as the power of the president was expanded. Roosevelt

The Progressives sought to end party machine dominance by
eliminating the patronage system. Instead, employment would be
awarded on the basis of qualifications rather than party loyalty.

became the symbolic leader of the Democratic
Party. [27] Locating parties’ control centers in the national capital
eventually weakened them organizationally, as the basis of their
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support was at the local grassroots level. National party leaders

selected primarily by party leaders, to primary elections, which

began to lose touch with their local aﬃliates and constituents.

make it easier for the public to take part. The Republican Party

Executive-centered government weakened parties’ ability to

soon followed with its own reforms that resulted in states

control the policy agenda. [28]

adopting primaries.

The Cold War period that began in the late 1940s was marked by

The unintended consequence of reform was to diminish the

concerns over the United States’ relations with Communist

influence of political parties in the electoral process and to

countries, especially the Soviet Union. Following in the footsteps

promote the candidate-centered politics that exists today.

of the extremely popular president Franklin Roosevelt,

Candidates build personal campaign organizations rather than

presidential candidates began to advertise their independence

rely on party support. The media have contributed to the rise of

from parties and emphasized their own issue agendas even as

candidate-centered politics. Candidates can appeal directly to the

they ran for oﬃce under the Democratic and Republican labels.

public through television rather than working their way through

Presidents, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ronald Reagan, and

the party apparatus when running for election. [31] Candidates

George H. W. Bush, won elections based on personal, rather than

use social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, to connect with

partisan, appeals. [29]

voters. Campaign professionals and media consultants assume

Candidate-Centered Politics
Political parties instituted a series of reforms beginning in the late
1960s amid concerns that party elites were not responsive to the
public and operated secretively in so-called smoke-filled rooms.
The Democrats were the first to act, forming the McGovernFraser Commission to revamp the presidential nominating
system. The commission’s reforms, adopted in 1972, allowed
more average voters to serve as delegates to
thenational party nominating convention, where the presidential
candidate is chosen. The result was that many state Democratic

many of the responsibilities previously held by parties, such as
developing election strategies and getting voters to the polls.

Political Parties Today
Political parties play an important role in politics today. Whereas
observers like the Washington Post’s David Broder could write a
book in 1972 with the title The Party’s Over, such eulogies were
premature. Compared to the 1970s, party organizations today are
larger, farther reaching, and better financed. Relations among
party oﬃcials in Washington and the states have improved

parties switched from caucuses, where convention delegates are
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dramatically. Voters are still more likely to cast their votes along

who take extreme ideological positions to become prominent in

partisan lines than independently.

government, much like Madison feared at the founding.

American political parties have a number of distinctive

Ideological Ambiguity

characteristics. The two major political parties have been
dominant for a long period of time. The parties are permeable,
meaning that people are able to join or leave the party ranks
freely. The two major parties are ideologically ambiguous in that
they are umbrella organizations that can accommodate people
representing a broad spectrum of interests.
Two-Party Domination

Rather than assuming strong, polarizing ideological alignments,
the two major parties represent the core values of American
culture that favor centrist positions inherent in the liberal tradition
of liberty, democracy, and equal opportunity. [4] These values
appeal to the majority of Americans, and political parties can
advocate them without losing followers.
Former Democratic Speaker of the House Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill

A two-party system is one in which nearly all elected oﬃces are

was fond of saying, “In any other country, the Democratic Party

held by candidates associated with the two parties that are able

would be five parties.” [5]O’Neill was referring to the fact that the

to garner the vast majority of votes. The Republican Party and the

Democratic Party has no clear ideological identity and instead

Democratic Party are the major parties that have monopolized

accommodates interests from across the liberal-conservative

American politics since the early 1850s. [1] A major party runs

spectrum. Groups who both favor and oppose gun control can

candidates for local, state, and federal oﬃces in a majority of

find a home in the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party is

states and holds one of the two largest blocs of seats in the US

loosely associated with a liberal attitude toward politics, which

Congress. [2]

proposes that government should take a more active role in

Many people consider the two-party system as a uniquely
American phenomenon. Some scholars argue that this

regulating the economy, provide a social safety net, and ensure
equality in society through programs like aﬃrmative action.

acceptance of the two-party norm is a result of Americans’

Similar things have been said about the Republican

aversion to radical politics and their desire to maintain a stable

Party, [6] although the Republicans have a more unified message

democratic political system. [3] Having too many parties can

than the Democrats. The Republican agenda favors capitalism

destabilize the system by confusing voters and allowing parties

and limited government intervention in people’s lives. The
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Republican Party’s base includes fewer disparate groups than the
Democratic base. The Republican Party is associated with a
conservative outlook that advocates limited government
intervention in society and a free-market economic system.
Party Platforms
Rather than developing distinct ideological positions, parties
developpolicy platforms. Policy platforms are plans outlining party
positions on issues and the actions leaders will take to implement
them if elected. [7] Parties frequently assume middle-of-the-road
positions or waﬄe on issues to avoid alienating potential
supporters. [8] For example, party platforms may oppose abortion
—except in cases of rape or incest. [9]
Some scholars contend that American parties have become more
ideologically distinct over the last three decades. Party leaders
are expressing polarized opinions on issues, especially at the
national level. These diﬀerences can be seen in the highly
partisan debate over the health-care system. Democrats in
Congress support government involvement in the health-care

Permeability
Political parties in the United States are porous, decentralized
institutions that can be joined readily by people who choose to
adopt the party label, usually Democrat or
Republican. [10] American parties are
notmass membership organizations that require people to pay
dues if they want to belong, which is the case in many European
democracies. Instead, party membership is very loosely defined
often by state laws that are highly variable. In some states,
citizens declare a party aﬃliation when registering to vote. People
also can join a state or local party organization, or work for a
candidate associated with a particular party.
Parties are umbrella organizations that accommodate labor and
business federations, interest groups, racial and ethnic
constituencies, and religious organizations. Traditionally, the
Democratic Party has been home to labor unions, and the
Republican Party has accommodated business interests,
although these relationships are not set in stone.

system and worked to pass the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable

The fact that groups seeking to achieve similar political goals are

Care Act endorsed by President Obama in 2010. Republicans

found in both parties is evidence of their permeability. Pro-choice

sought to repeal the act in 2011, arguing that it would cost people

and antiabortion forces exist within the two major parties,

their jobs.

although the Democratic Party is far more accommodating to the
pro-choice position while the Republican Party is overwhelmingly
pro-life. The WISH List is a group supporting pro-choice
Republican candidates. The Democratic counterpart supporting
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pro-choice women candidates is Emily’s List. Democrats for Life

Party organizations take many forms. National and state parties

of America and Republican National Coalition for Life represent

are large and complex organizations. They have permanent

antiabortion constituencies.

headquarters, chairpersons, boards of directors, and full-time

Parties compete for the allegiances of the same groups in an
eﬀort to increase their bases of support. As the Latino population
has swelled to over 35 million people, the Democratic and
Republican parties have stepped up their eﬀorts to attract Latino
voters and organizations. Both parties have produced Spanishlanguage television ads and websites, tailored their messages
about health care and education to appeal to this group, and
recruited Latino candidates. [11] The parties also have increased
their appeals to Asian American voters.

Party Organization

employees with specialized responsibilities. They maintain lists of
oﬃcers and members, operate under established bylaws and
rules, and hold scheduled meetings and conventions. Local
parties range from highly active, well-organized, professional
structures to haphazard, amateur operations. [3]
National Parties
National party committees today are the power centers of the
Republican and Democratic parties. They are the ultimate
authority in the parties’ organizational hierarchy. The Democratic
National Committee (DNC) and theRepublican National
Committee (RNC) are located in Washington, DC. The DNC and

The organizational structure of political parties consists of the

RNC chairs are the leaders of the party organization and are

machinery, procedures, and rituals party leaders and

visible representatives of the parties in the press.

professionals employ so that parties operate eﬀectively in the
electoral and governing processes. [1] Party organizations
establish connections between leaders and followers so that they
can build and maintain a base of supportive voters they can
count on during elections. Parties maintain permanent oﬃces to
assist their constituencies. They engage in party-building
activities, including voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives.
They provide candidate support, such as collecting polling data

National organizations are responsible for putting on the
nominating conventions where presidential candidates are
selected every four years. Nominating conventions provide an
opportunity to rally the troops and reward the party faithful by
having them participate as delegates. They also provide an
opportunity for parties to showcase their leaders and policies in
front of a national television audience.

and running ads. [2]
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National parties adapted to the era of candidate-centered politics

volunteers and raise funds for campaigns. These committees

by becoming service-oriented organizations, providing resources

organize media appeals to promote the party’s leaders and

for candidates and oﬃceholders. They stepped up their

agenda through television advertising, press briefings, direct mail,

fundraising activities, expanded their staﬀs, and established

e-mail solicitations, and social media.[4]

stronger linkages with state, local, and candidate campaign
organizations. The DNC and the RNC have established

State Parties

multimedia strategies that include traditional mass media appeals

State party organizations operate in vastly diﬀerent environments

through press releases and staged events. They also get their

because of the political culture of individual states. There is fierce

message out using sophisticated websites, Facebook pages,

competition between parties in some states, while other states

Twitter feeds, and YouTube channels. Party websites are a one-

lean more favorably toward one party. Party competition,

stop shop for information about candidates and oﬃceholders,

however, exists in every state. According to Gallup, the two

issue positions, and voting logistics. They also provide a gateway

parties were competitive in a majority of states in 2011. Only

for people to become involved in politics by providing information

fourteen states were solidly Democratic and five states were

about volunteer activities and oﬀering opportunities to contribute

solidly Republican. [5]

to the party.
Party and election laws vary greatly among states. In Maryland,
Legislative Campaign Committees
Legislative campaign committees finance and manage legislative
elections. Members of Congress oﬃcially oversee the committee
staﬀs. The National Republican Congressional
Committee, National Republican Senatorial

voters must register and declare their party identification twentynine days before a primary election in order to participate. In
Massachusetts, independents can register with a party to vote in
that party’s primary on Election Day. In Wisconsin, party
preference is part of the secret ballot.

Committee, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,

Like their national counterparts, state parties provide candidates

and theDemocratic Senatorial Campaign Committee help

with services, such as volunteer recruitment and polling. They

candidates for the House and Senate meet the demands of

oﬀer citizens access to government leaders and information

modern campaigning. They provide survey research to determine

about issues. State parties have become multimillion-dollar

voters’ candidate preferences and stands on issues. They recruit

organizations, most of which own their headquarters, employ full292

time staﬀs, and have operating budgets of over a half-million

from opposing parties spar openly by taking diﬀerent positions on

dollars. State legislative campaign committees assist in

issues. [1]

campaigns by dispensing funds to candidates. [6]
Local Parties

Presidential Leadership
The president is the oﬃcial and symbolic leader of his party.

Local party organizations exist at the legislative district, county,

Presidents can use this position to rally members of Congress to

city, ward, and precinct levels. Some local parties are extremely

push their agendas as President Franklin Roosevelt did to get his

vital, providing the link between average people and parties. In

New Deal programs passed quickly with the help of congressional

addition to fulfilling the basic election functions, they sponsor

Democrats. President Ronald Reagan mobilized congressional

public aﬀairs programs, provide services to senior citizens and

Republicans to enact the so-called Reagan revolution of

young people, and organize community events. Some local

conservative policies, such as cutting taxes and increasing

parties are less active because many community-level positions,

defense spending. Other presidents prefer to adopt a policy of

like town council seats, are nonpartisan.

triangulation, where they work both sides of the congressional

Party in Government
The party in government constitutes the organized partisans who

aisle. [2] President Barack Obama successfully encouraged
Democrats and Republicans in Congress to pass a bill extending
tax cuts to citizens.

serve in oﬃce, such as members of the Democratic and

Since the 1990s, presidents have assumed a major responsibility

Republican parties in Congress. Parties provide an organizational

for party fundraising. President Bill Clinton made fundraising a

structure for leaders in oﬃce, develop policy agendas, and ensure

priority for the Democratic Party. He was the headliner at major

that majority and minority party opinions are voiced. The party in

events that drew big crowds and raised millions of dollars.

government seeks to represent its supporters, achieve policy

President George W. Bush became the top fundraiser for the

objectives, and enhance the prospects for reelection. It is the

Republican Party, raising a record $84 million in six months en

center of democratic action. Party coalitions of many

route to achieving a $170 million goal by the 2004 presidential

oﬃceholders can be more powerful mechanisms for voicing

election. [3]During his campaign for the presidency, Barack

opinions than individual leaders acting on their own. Coalitions

Obama raised over $600 million mostly through online appeals.
Once in oﬃce, President Obama continued to raise funds for
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Democratic Party candidates through appearances at dinners and

period before 1980, when conservative southern Democrats often

events as well as through his campaign organization’s website,

disagreed with the liberal and moderate members of their party.

Organizing for America. [4]

Republicans in Congress today are more united in taking

Legislative Parties
Legislative parties are the internal party organizations within each
house of Congress. The Speaker of the House and the Senate
Majority Leader, the highest ranking leaders in Congress, are
members of the majority party. They work closely with the
majority leader, whip, chair of the policy committee, and chair of
campaign committee in each body. The House and Senate
minority leaders head a similar cast on the opposite side of the
partisan fence. The Democratic Caucus and the Republican
Conference, consisting of all members elected from a party, are
the internal party organizations within each house of Congress.
They oversee committee assignments and encourage party
discipline by asking members to vote along party lines.
Party discipline can be diﬃcult to enforce given the diversity of
constituency interests and personalities in Congress. The extent
to which party members are willing to vote in a block varies over
time. Party unity in congressional voting rose from 40 percent in
the early 1970s to 90 percent or more since 2000.

conservative positions than in the past. [5]
Legislative parties like those in Congress are found in forty-nine
of the fifty state legislatures. Nebraska, which has a nonpartisan,
unicameral legislature, is the exception.
Divided Government
The American system of separation of powers and checks and
balances devised by the framers presents some obstacles to
elected oﬃcials using their party connections to wield
power. Divided government, which occurs when the chief
executive is of a diﬀerent party from the majority in the legislature,
is a common occurrence in American government. Divided
government can get in the way of cooperative policymaking.
Presidential vetoes of legislation passed by Congress can be
more frequent during periods of divided government. [6]
President Clinton faced the challenges of divided government
beginning in 1994, when the Republicans took control of the
House and Senate. Clinton did not use the veto power once when
his Democratic Party controlled Congress between 1993 and

Members of the same party in Congress are more similar

1994. After the Democrats lost fifty-two seats in Congress to

ideologically in recent years than in the past. The Democratic

Republicans as a result of the 1994 midterm elections, President

Party in Congress contains few conservatives compared to the

Clinton used the veto to block legislation his party opposed,
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including tax bills that were central to the Republican Party’s

Since the 1960s there has been a gradual decline in identification

platform. From 1995 to 2000, he vetoed thirty-six

with political parties and a rise in the number of independents. In

bills. [7] Democratic President Barack Obama was faced with

2000, more people identified as independents (40 percent of the

divided government in 2010 when the Republican Party won the

voting population) than aﬃliated with either the Democratic (34

majority in the House of Representatives while the Democrats

percent) or Republican (24 percent) parties for the first time in

held the Senate by a small margin. Obama used the State of the

history. [3] The proportion of people registering as independents

Union address to call for the parties to work together on key

increased 57 percent between 1990 and 1998, while those

issues, especially health care and the economy. [8]

registering as Democrats declined by 14 percent and as

Party Identification
People who identify with a political party either declare their
allegiance by joining the party or show their support through
regular party-line voting at the polls. People can easily switch
their party aﬃliation or distance themselves from parties entirely.
However, people who do not declare a partisan aﬃliation when

Republicans by 5 percent. In 2011, 31 percent of the population
identified as Democrats, 29 percent as Republican, and 38
percent as independents. [4]
Trends in Party Identification
Trends in party identification from 1932 to the present have been
compiled by the Pew Research Center in this interactive graph

they register to vote lose the opportunity to participate in primary

found at http://people-press.org/party-identification-trend.

election campaigns in many states.

As voter identification with political parties has declined, so has

Partisan Identification

dedication to the two-party system. According to a national

A person’s partisan identification is defined as a long-term

Levis, Honda, and Clorox, than in the Democrats and

attachment to a particular party. [1] Americans are not required to

Republicans. [5] Since the 1980s, Americans have become

formally join party organizations as is the case in other

skeptical about the two major parties’ ability to represent the

democracies. Instead people self-identify as Republicans,

public interest and to handle major issues facing the country,

Democrats, or members of minor parties. They also can declare

such as crime, the environment, and saving Social Security. At

themselves independent and not aligned with any political

the same time, support for third parties, like the Tea Party, has

party. [2]

increased over the last decade. [6] Still, the two-party system

survey, citizens have more trust in product brands, such as Nike,
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continues to dominate the political process as a viable multiparty

Depression. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 marked the

alternative has not emerged.

beginning of a realignment favoring the Republicans. In this

Party Coalitions
Party coalitions consist of groups that have long-term allegiances
to a particular political party. Regions of the country establish
loyalties to a specific party as a result of the party’s handling of a
war, a major social problem, or an economic crisis. Social,
economic, ethnic, and racial groups also become aligned with
particular parties. Catholics and labor union members in the
Northeast form a part of the Democratic coalition. White
fundamentalist Protestants are a component of the Republican
coalition. [7] Parties count on coalition members to vote for them
consistently in elections.

coalition, white Southerners moved away from the Democratic
Party as they favored the more conservative values espoused by
the Republicans. [9]
Partisan dealignment occurs when party loyalty declines and
voters base their decisions on short-term, election-specific
factors, such as the leadership qualities of a candidate. [10] The
inclination of people to identify as independents rather than as
partisans is evidence that a dealignment is occurring. [11] A
partisan dealignment may be occurring today, as more people are
identifying as independents and more voters select their
candidates on the basis of personal traits, such as honesty. Mass
media can contribute to partisan realignment by focusing

A major, enduring shift in coalition loyalties that results in a

attention on candidates’ personalities and scandals, which are

change in the balance of power between the two major parties is

short-term factors that can influence vote choice.

called a realignment. [8]Realignments can be sparked
by critical elections, where a minority party wins and becomes the
majority party in government following an election, and remains
dominant for an extended period of time. American parties realign
about once every thirty or forty years. A critical election in 1932
brought the Democrats and President Franklin Roosevelt to
power after a period of Republican domination dating from the
1890s. This New Deal coalition was based on an alliance of white
Southerners and liberal Northerners who benefited from the social

Minor Parties
A minor party, or third party, is an organization that is not aﬃliated
with the two major American parties—the Democrats or
Republicans. Minor parties run candidates in a limited number of
elections and they do not receive large pluralities of votes. They
arise when the two major parties fail to represent citizens’
demands or provide the opportunity to express opposition to

welfare policies of the Democratic administration during the Great
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existing policies. Citizens often form a minor party by uniting
behind a leader who represents their interests.
Functions of Minor Parties
Minor parties raise issues that the Democrats and Republicans
ignore because of their tendency to take middle-of-the road

CNBC’s Rick Santelli’s Chicago Tea Party
The national protests were prompted by a video of a rant by
CNBC editor Rick Santelli opposing government subsidies of
mortgages that went viral after being posted on the Drudge
Report.

positions. As a result, minor parties can be catalysts for

Santelli called for a “Chicago Tea Party” protest, which ignited the

change. [1] The Progressive Party backed the women’s suﬀrage

movement. The Tea Party’s eﬀorts were publicized through new

movement in the early twentieth century, which led to the

media, including websites such as Tea Party Patriots, Facebook

passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. Child labor laws, the

pages, blogs, and Twitter feeds.

direct election of US senators, federal farm aid, and
unemployment insurance are policies enacted as a result of thirdparty initiatives. [2]

Minor parties can invigorate voter interest by promoting a unique
or flamboyant candidate and by focusing attention on a
contentious issue. [3] Voter turnout increased in the 1992

More recently, the Tea Party has raised issues related to the

presidential contest for the first time in over two decades in part

national debate, government bailouts to failing industries, and the

because of minor-party candidate Ross Perot. [4] Perot, a wealthy

health care system overhaul. The Tea Party is a conservative-

businessman, was a candidate for president in 1992 for the minor

leaning grassroots political movement that emerged in 2009 when

party, United We Stand America, receiving nearly twenty million

the Young Americans for Liberty in the state of New York

votes. He ran again in 1996 as a member of the Reform Party and

organized a protest against state government “tax and spend”

earned nearly eight million votes. [5]Perot supporters were united

policies. The Tea Party–themed protest recalled events in 1773,

in their distrust of professional politicians and opposition to

when colonists dumped tea into Boston Harbor to demonstrate

government funding of social welfare programs.

their opposition to paying a mandatory tax on tea to the British
government. Subsequent Tea Party protests took place in states
across the country. Tea Party supporters participated in national
protests in Washington, DC, which drew thousands of supporters.

Minor party candidates can be spoilers in elections by taking
away enough votes from a major party candidate to influence the
outcome without winning. Minor parties collectively have
captured over 5 percent of the popular vote in every presidential
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election since 1840, although individual minor parties may win

freedoms to the extreme and oppose government intervention in

only a small percentage of votes. [6]Green Party candidate Ralph

the lives of individuals, support the right to own and bear arms

Nader was considered by some analysts to be a spoiler in the

without restriction, and endorse a free and competitive economic

2000 presidential campaign by taking votes away from

market. [10]

Democratic contender Al Gore in Florida. George W. Bush
received 2,912,790 votes in Florida compared to Al Gore’s

Single-Issue Minor Parties

2,912,253 votes. [7] If 540 of Nader’s 96,837 votes had gone to

Sometimes called ideological parties, single-

Gore, Gore might have ended up in the White House. [8]

issue minor parties exist to promote a particular policy agenda.

Types of Minor Parties
Minor parties can be classified as enduring, single-issue,
candidate-centered, and fusion parties.
Enduring Minor Parties

The Green Party is a product of the environmental movement of
the 1980s. It advocates environmental issues, such as mandatory
recycling and strong regulations on toxic waste. [11]
Candidate-Centered Minor Parties
Candidate-centered minor parties form around candidates who

Some minor parties have existed for a long time and resemble

are able to rally support based on their own charisma or

major parties in that they run candidates for local, state, and

message. Former World Wrestling Federation star Jesse “The

national oﬃces. They diﬀer from major parties because they are

Body” Ventura was elected governor of Minnesota in 1998 under

less successful in getting their candidates elected. [9]

the Independence Party label, an oﬀshoot of the Reform Party.

The Libertarian Party, founded in 1971, is
an enduring minor party, which is a type of minor party that has
existed for a long time and regularly fields candidates for
president and state legislatures. The Libertarians are unable to
compete with the two major parties because they lack a strong
organizational foundation and the financial resources to run
eﬀective campaigns. The party also holds an extreme ideological
position, which can alienate voters. Libertarians take personal

The plainspoken, media savvy Ventura made the need for an
alternative to two-party domination a core theme of his
campaign: “It’s high time for a third party. Let’s look at
Washington. I’m embarrassed. We’ve got a lot of problems that
the government should be dealing with, but instead, for the next
nine months, the focus of this nation will be on despicable
behavior by career politicians. If this isn’t the right time for a third
party, then when?” [12]
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Fusion Minor Parties

Comparing Content: The Tea Party

Fusion minor parties, also known as alliance parties, are enduring

There has been almost as much discussion about media

or single-issue minor parties that engage in the practice

coverage of the Tea Party as there has been about the

of cross endorsement, backing candidates who appear on a

organization’s issue positions, candidate endorsements, and

ballot under more than one party label. Fusion parties routinely

protest activities. Tea Party activists, such as former Alaska

endorse candidates who have been nominated by the two major

governor and Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin,

parties and support their causes. Cross endorsement allows

have lambasted the traditional news media for being tied to

minor parties to contribute to the election of a major-party

special interests and irrelevant for average Americans. Instead,

candidate and thus gain access to oﬃceholders. In addition to

Tea Party leaders have embraced social media, preferring to

giving a major-party candidate an additional ballot position, fusion

communicate with their supporters through Facebook and Twitter.

parties provide funding and volunteers.

Early Tea Party protests against government economic policies

Only eight states permit the practice of cross endorsement. The

received little mainstream press attention. Media coverage

most active fusion parties are in New York. The Liberal Party and

increased as the Tea Party staged rowdy protests against

the Democratic Party cross endorsed Mario Cuomo in the 1990

government health care reform, and public interest in the

New York governor’s race, leading him to defeat his Republican

movement grew. Stories by major news organizations focused on

Party and Conservative Party opponents handily. The

the evolution of the Tea Party, its positions on issues, its

Conservative Party and the Republican Party cross endorsed

membership, and its most vocal spokespersons. Tea Party rallies

George Pataki in the 2000 governor’s race, leading him to

garnered extensive attention from mainstream media as well as

victory. [13] During the 2010 midterm elections, the Tea Party

political bloggers. The Tea Party received the lion’s share of

cross endorsed several successful candidates running in the

media coverage on election night in 2010, as the mainstream

primary under the Republican Party label, upsetting mainstream

press framed the election results in terms of public dissatisfaction

Republican candidates. Some of the Tea Party–endorsed

with the political status quo as evidenced by victories by Tea

candidates, such as US Senate candidate Rand Paul in Kentucky,

Party–backed candidates. [14]

went on to win the general election.

Coverage of the Tea Party diﬀers widely by media outlet. CNN
reports of a Tea Party protest in Chicago featured on-site
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reporters aggressively interviewing average citizens who were

gained firsthand knowledge of the group and its goals. [17]Both

participating in the event, challenging them to defend the Tea

reports were debated widely in the press.

Party’s positions on issues. CNN and network news outlets
reported that members of Congress had accused Tea Party

Challenges Facing Minor Parties

protestors of anti-Obama racism based on racially charged

A minor-party candidate has never been elected president. In the

statements and signs held by some protestors. Fox News, on the

past five decades, minor parties have held few seats in Congress

other hand, assumed the role of Tea Party cheerleader. Fox

or high-level state oﬃces. Few minor party candidates have won

analyst Tobin Smith took the stage at a Tea Party rally in

against major-party candidates for governor, state representative,

Washington, DC, and encouraged the protestors. Reporting live

or county commissioner in the past two decades. Minor-party

from a Boston Tea Party protest, Fox Business anchor Cody

candidates have better luck in the approximately 65,000

Willard encouraged people to join the movement, stating, “Guys,

nonpartisan contests for city and town oﬃces and school boards

when are we going to wake up and start fighting the fascism that

in which no party labels appear on the ballot. Hundreds of these

seems to be permeating this country?” [15]

positions have been filled by minor-party representatives. [18]

Studies of mainstream press coverage of the Tea Party also vary

A majority of the public favors having viable minor-party

markedly depending on the source. A 2010 report by the

alternatives in elections. [19] Why, then, are minor parties unable

conservative Media Research Center found that the press first

to be a more formidable presence in American politics?

ignored and then disparaged the Tea Party. The report alleged
that ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN framed the Tea Party as a fringe
or extreme racist movement. [16] Conversely, a 2010 survey
conducted by the mainstream newspaper the Washington
Postfound that 67 percent of local Tea Party organizers felt that
traditional news media coverage of their groups was fair,
compared to 23 percent who considered it to be unfair. Local
organizers also believed that news coverage improved over time
as reporters interviewed Tea Party activists and supporters and

Winner-Take-All Elections
One major reason for two-party dominance in the United States is
the prominence of the single-member district plurality system of
elections,[20] also known as winner-take-all elections. Only the
highest vote getter in a district in federal and most state
legislative elections gains a seat in oﬃce. Candidates who have a
realistic chance of winning under such a system are almost
always associated with the Democratic and Republican parties,
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which have a strong following among voters and necessary

is an insurmountable barrier for most minor parties that lack

resources, such as funding and volunteers to work in campaigns.

established organizations in many states. [23]

In contrast, proportional representation (PR) systems, such as

Campaign finance laws work against minor parties. The 1974

those used in most European democracies, allow multiple parties

Federal Election Campaign Act and its amendments provide for

to flourish. PR systems employ larger, multimember districts

public financing of presidential campaigns. Rarely has a minor-

where five or more members of a legislature may be selected in a

party candidate been able to qualify for federal campaign funds

single election district. Seats are distributed according to the

as the party’s candidates must receive 5 percent or more of the

proportion of the vote won by particular political parties. For

popular vote in the general election. Similar barriers hinder state-

example, in a district comprising ten seats, if the Democratic

level minor-party candidates from receiving public funding for

Party got 50 percent of the vote, it would be awarded five seats; if

taxpayer-financed campaigns, although some states, such as

the Republican Party earned 30 percent of the vote, it would gain

Connecticut, are debating plans to rectify this situation.

three seats; and if the Green Party earned 20 percent of the vote,
it would be granted two seats. [21] PR was used for a short time

Lack of Resources

in New York City council elections in the 1940s but was

The financial disadvantage of minor parties impedes their ability

abandoned after several communists and other minor-party

to amass resources that are vital to mounting a serious challenge

candidates threatened the Democratic Party’s stronghold. [22]

to the two major parties. They lack funds to establish and equip

Legal Obstacles

permanent headquarters. They cannot hire staﬀ and experienced
consultants to conduct polls, gather political intelligence, court

Minor parties are hindered by laws that limit their ability to

the press, generate new media outreach, or manage

compete with major parties. Democrats and Republicans in oﬃce

campaigns. [24]

have created procedures and requirements that make it diﬃcult
for minor parties to be listed on ballots in many states. In

Lack of Media Coverage

Montana, Oklahoma, and several other states, a candidate must

Minor parties rarely receive significant media coverage except

obtain the signatures of least 5 percent of registered voters to

when they field a dynamic or outlandish candidate, such as Jesse

appear on the ballot. A presidential candidate must collect over

Ventura, or when they are associated with a movement that taps

one million signatures to be listed on the ballot in every state. This

into public concerns, such as the Tea Party. The dominant
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horserace frame employed by the media focuses on who is ahead

votes for minor-party candidates are wasted. [26]Major parties are

and behind in an election and usually tags minor-party candidates

often successful in attracting minor-party voters because major

as losers early in the process. Media treat minor parties as

parties are permeable and ambiguous ideologically. [27]

distractions and their candidates as novelty acts that divert
attention from the main two-party attractions.

After the Democrats in Congress were instrumental in passing the
Voting Rights Act in 1964, the Republican Party absorbed the

Minor parties often are unable to air televised campaign ads

southern Dixiecrats, a Democratic Party faction opposed to the

because they lack funds. Even in the digital era, television

legislation. The two major parties tried to attract Ross Perot’s

advertising is an essential part of campaigns because it allows

Reform Party supporters after his 1992 presidential bid, with the

candidates to control their own message and reach large

Republican Party succeeding in attracting the lion’s share of

numbers of voters. Minor-party candidates have diﬃculty gaining

votes. The Republican Party’s position against big government

publicity and gaining recognition among voters when they cannot

appealed to Perot supporters. [28] Even though the Tea Party

advertise.

gravitates toward the Republican Party, Republicans have not

Minor-party candidates routinely are excluded from televised
debates in which major-party candidates participate. [25] By

universally accepted it.

Political Parties in the Information Age

being allowed to participate in the 1992 presidential debates,
Reform Party candidate Ross Perot achieved national visibility

Political parties thrive when they are able to manage the media

and symbolic equality with incumbent president George W. Bush

and eﬀectively promote their candidates, leaders, and causes.

and Democratic candidate Bill Clinton.

Their goal is to use the media to publicize policy positions,

Absorption by Major Parties
When a minor-party movement gains momentum, the Republican
and Democratic parties move quickly to absorb the minor party
by oﬀering enticements to their members, such as support for
policies that are favored by the minor party. Major-party

activities, and leaders. Party organizations launch media blitzes
and provide technical communications assistance to campaigns
and government oﬃcials so that they can attract media attention.
They also use media to inform and mobilize their loyalists. Media
depictions tend to be dramatic, emphasizing infighting among
party members as well as conflicts between diﬀerent parties.

candidates appeal to minor-party supporters by arguing that
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Media Interactions
Political parties are obsessed with keeping their names and
representatives in the public eye. Publicity gives the impression
that the party is active and influential. A party with a strong media
presence can attract volunteers and financial contributors. Parties
use a variety of tactics in their eﬀorts to control the media agenda
and get their message out to the public and to journalists. They

said and to recast any misstatements. [1] Spin doctors can be
elected leaders, party oﬃcials, or interest group leaders. In 2011,
Republican Congressman Paul Ryan and Washington Governor
Gary Locke provide opposing commentary on the State of the
Union address by President Barack Obama. Minnesota
Congresswoman Michele Bachmann gave the Tea Party spin on
the address via webcast.

employ many of the same tactics as interest groups, such as

Specific media outlets are associated with spin doctors who favor

holding news conferences, issuing press releases, giving

a specific party. Conservative talk radio host Rush Limbaugh

interviews to journalists, and appearing on television and radio

favors the Republican Party and draws a large audience. Liberal

talk shows. Democratic and Republican oﬃcials provide

talk show hosts such as MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow tend to

competing commentary about issues. Party leaders participate in

support Democrats. The Fox News Network hosts spin doctors

“spin sessions” to get their views heard. Parties engage in

such as Bill O’Reilly, who calls his program a “no-spin zone”

aggressive advertising campaigns. Finally, they maintain

despite its constant promotion of Republican and conservative

significant web and digital media presences to reach their

causes.

supporters and to court the press.
Partisan Spin

Advertising
Political advertising is a way for parties to disseminate messages

Political parties seek to influence political debate on a daily basis

without having them filtered by journalists. Parties engaged

by confronting the opposition in the media. They engage in spin,

extensively in issue advocacy, advertising campaigns that focus

the practice of providing an interpretation of events or issues that

on legislative policies. They also develop ads supportive of their

favors their side. High-profile partisans make the rounds of

candidates and leaders and critical of the opposition. Online

political talk programs such as Meet the Press, and news shows

video is a cost-eﬀective alternative to television advertising,

and give interviews to print journalists to spin their views. Partisan

although many more people are reached through TV ads than via

spin doctors routinely appear on television immediately following

online ads.

candidate debates or major speeches to interpret what has been
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Websites
Party websites oﬀer a vast amount of information to average
citizens, political activists, and journalists who take the initiative
to visit them. Websites provide an eﬀective mechanism for
communicating information to citizens and can lessen the
administrative burden on party organizations. They reach a large
number of people instantaneously and have become more
eﬀective mechanisms for raising funds than the earlier method of
direct mail. The sites include general political information, such as
facts about American democracy and party history. Press
releases, platforms, and position papers give the lowdown on
issues and candidates. Party sites also host discussion boards
and blogs where party elites, including candidates, interact with
rank-and-file members. [2]Websites hype symbols that create a

for its quest to win the White House in 2012. Clicking on the link
to the Republican National Committee site led directly to page
featuring a negative ad against the Obama administration and the
opportunity to “Help Fight Back” by donating money. The
Democratic National Committee website, which represents the
party of the sitting president, focuses heavily on the
accomplishments of the Obama administration.
Media Depictions of Political Parties
In depicting political parties, the media highlight conflicts
between the two major parties and divisions within each party.
The press also focuses on the strategies parties employ in their
pursuit of political power.
Partisan Conflict

sense of identity as well as a party brand. The technical delivery
of this content is an important aspect of outreach, so developing

Parties as adversaries is an accurate characterization of one of

e-mail lists of party members, especially visitors to the website, is

their primary functions, representing opposing viewpoints and

a priority.

providing platforms for debate. The modern party has been called
“a fighting organization.” [3] Indeed, parties actively promote this

The Democratic Party’s and Republican Party’s websites have

image. Reporters consulting party websites and reading partisan

become sophisticated. In addition to the sites’ content, visitors

blogs get their fill of negative hyperbole about the opposition.

are oﬀered the opportunity to connect with the party through
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, and other social media. Some

The press coverage can exaggerate the conflicts between parties

of the material on Democratic and Republican websites consists

by employing sports and war metaphors. Parties often are

of negative, at times vicious, attacks on the opposing party. In

described as attacking, battling, fighting, jousting, beating, and

2011, the Republican Party used its website to gain momentum

pummeling one another. This type of media coverage becomes a
problem when parties genuinely try to work together while the
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press continues to frame their relations in conflict terms. When

they make large financial donations to party organizations and

the Republican congressional leadership held a meeting at the

campaigns.

White House in 1995 and agreed to work with Democratic
President Bill Clinton on public policy, Republican House Speaker
Newt Gingrich told reporters that the meeting was “great.” When
the press immediately speculated about when the cordial
relations would break down, Gingrich reacted by dressing down
reporters: “[Y]ou just heard the leaders of the Republican Party
say that the Democratic President today had a wonderful meeting
on behalf of America; we’re trying to work together. Couldn’t you
try for twenty-four hours to have a positive, optimistic message

Media depictions suggest that parties fail to live up to campaign
promises about policies they will enact if their candidates are
elected. A recurring media theme during President Obama’s
presidency is that Obama has not represented his party’s
interests, such as on the issue of tax cuts. However, press
coverage is not consistent with research demonstrating that party
leaders keep campaign promises at least two-thirds of the
time. [5]

as though it might work?” [4]

Media Consequences

Party Strategies

Political parties have had to adapt to a dynamic mass media

Media depictions often focus on the strategies parties use to win
elections and control government. The press is obsessed with
how the Republicans and Democrats manage their messages to
attract or lose supporters.

environment that at times has weakened their position in the
political process. The introduction of television in the 1950s
allowed candidates and government oﬃcials to circumvent
parties and take their appeals directly to the public. An example is
Nixon’s “Checkers” speech. Richard Nixon, who was running on a

One strategy typically portrayed by mass media is that parties

ticket headed by Republican presidential candidate General

routinely compromise the public good to achieve self-interested

Dwight D. Eisenhower, had been accused of taking money from

goals. The Democratic Party is continually criticized for catering

campaign supporters. The Republican Party was unhappy with

to organized labor, Hollywood liberals such as Barbara Streisand

Nixon and considered dropping him from the ticket. To save his

and Alec Baldwin, and feminists. The Republican Party is chided

political career, Nixon went on television to make his case to the

for favoring conservatives and corporate interests. The press

American people by detailing his personal finances and denying

argues that both parties support these privileged groups because

any wrongdoing. With his wife, Pat, by his side, Nixon declared
that there was one gift from supporters he would not return, a
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dog named Checkers that had become a beloved family pet. The

oﬃceholders, and voters. They engaged in aggressive fundraising

tactic worked as the public bought into Nixon’s impassioned

schemes so that they could aﬀord to hire the services of

television appeal. Eisenhower and Nixon went on to win the

consultants and purchase expensive advertising time on

election.

television and space in print publications. Parties have facilities

By the 1980s, party elites had less influence on public opinion
than media elites, especially journalists. [6] The press had
assumed parties’ responsibility for recruiting candidates,

where politicians do on-air television and radio interviews and
tape messages for local media markets. They invest heavily in
advertising during and between election cycles.

organizing the issue agenda, and informing and mobilizing

Today, major parties are at the forefront of innovation with

voters. [7] Journalists controlled the amount of publicity parties

communications technology as they seek ways of making the

and candidates received, which contributes to their recognition

Internet and digital media more eﬀective and exciting for party

among voters.

members. These media eﬀorts have been paying oﬀ. Seventy-

Consultants work directly with candidates to develop media
strategies, often leaving parties out of the loop. In his bid for the
2004 Democratic presidential nomination, former governor of
Vermont Howard Dean worked with consultants to develop an
innovative campaign strategy centered on using the Internet to

seven percent of the public believes that political parties are
important to them for providing political information. [9] Party
advertisements can influence the opinions of up to 4 percent of
voters, enough to sway an election, although this does not
happen in every contest. [10]

build a base of online supporters through sites including
Meetup.com and MoveOn.org, and to raise funds. The

The previous section is provided by Saylor.org’s

Democratic Party expressed concerns about Dean’s tactics

Political Parties.

because he ignored the traditional bases of the party’s support,
such as environmental activists and other liberal interest
groups. [8]Dean was successful in raising funds on the Internet
but was unable to secure the presidential nomination.
Parties responded in the 1990s by developing media strategies to
enhance their proficiency as service providers to candidates,
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Section 5

Untitled
“It begins…The power of the Executive Branch is vested in the
President of the United States, who also acts as head of state
and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The President is
responsible for implementing and enforcing the laws written by
Congress and, to that end, appoints the heads of the federal
agencies, including the Cabinet. The Vice President is also part
of the Executive.”
Tap on this link to visit the White House’s oﬃcial website and
read “Our Government: The Executive Branch.”
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Chapter 9

Revolutions

Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Identify characteristics of revolutions.
• Understand the role of revolutions for governmental
structures.
• Appreciate the economic, political and social factors
involved with revolutions.
• Analyze the causes and eﬀects that revolutions play in
the government.

Section 1

Defining revolution
This word is commonly used to refer to a sudden overthrow of

revolutionary organization. MARXIST revolutionaries typically see

the status quo and its replacement by an entirely diﬀerent state

themselves as a vanguard acting on behalf of the masses; in

of aﬀairs. That the word is also used for the turning of a wheel

other cases revolutions have been brought about by small

conveys this sense of social arrangements being turned upside-

groups in pursuit of their own interests. For example, it might be

down. Many believe in the necessity of revolution for a

argued that the English Revolution of 1642–53 merely replaced

fundamental reformation of society. The argument is that existing

monarchical rule with that of the Whig Grandees. The historian

political and social institutions must be swept away if better ones

Christopher Hill argues that the real revolutionaries of the period,

are to emerge. Democratic SOCIALISTS and the reformist left

radical groups such as the DIGGERS, RANTERS and

prefer the idea of change achieved gradually by an incremental

LEVELLERS, were initially encouraged in order to mobilize mass

transformation of society, mirrored by changes in individual

support and then ruthlessly suppressed when Whig aims had

consciousness and behaviour. Finally a revolution may be

been achieved. This has been a common fate for revolutionaries:

conceived not as a deliberate strategy so much as the emergent

many surviving Bolsheviks were purged early on in Stalin’s

eﬀect of other social, political and economic changes, as in the

consolidation of power over the SOVIET UNION.

industrial revolution.

It was the French Revolution of 1789 that provided the

Revolution has often been pursued as a part of a strategy for

archetypal model for revolutions that were to follow and that

bringing about a new society, led by revolutionaries organized

demonstrated the rising power of the middle classes as opposed

into parties dedicated to the overthrow of existing states and

to the authority of the crown and nobility. The slide of the French

institutions. LENIN’s political strategy rested upon his

Revolution into repression also provided a warning of what was

determination to turn the more radical elements of the Russian

to come in many later revolutions. The revolutions that took

Social Democratic Party into an eﬀective and dedicated

place during the long revolutionary century from 1840 to 1970
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were inspired predominantly by the UTOPIAN hopes of LIBERAL

following the establishment of a discredited liberal democratic

reformers, SOCIALISTS, ANARCHISTS and COMMUNISTS.

administration.

Following on the European industrial revolution, the rapidly
expanding middle classes demanded more political influence.
The result was a wave of largely unsuccessful ‘bourgeois’
revolutions from 1848 onwards. At the same time the newly
created industrial working classes were beginning to organize
themselves into TRADE UNIONS and revolutionary parties
inspired by the leadership of revolutionaries such as BAKUNIN
and MARX. The result was that bourgeois revolutions often paved
the way for attempts to bring about more radical social change
from below.

The Cold War between the Soviet bloc and Western capitalist
states led to a number of attempts to sponsor ‘revolutions’
throughout the developing world or to oppose such revolutions
with pro-Western counterrevolutions. Such revolutions were often
only nominally communist or liberal democratic. The concept of
‘permanent revolution’ also arose in the twentieth century to
describe a constant and dynamic transformation of society
towards full communism following partial socialist revolutions.
The phrase, most associated with Trotsky, originates in the idea
that socialism must develop on an international scale because it

In 1905 there was a failed liberal revolution in Russia that paved

could not survive within state boundaries. MAO instigated the

the way for the socialist revolution of 1917. In 1918 the Kaiser

‘cultural revolution’ from 1966 to 1976 in a bid to transform

was overthrown in Germany by a popular revolution which

Chinese society at a more fundamental level rather than simply

resulted in the establishment of the short-lived Weimar Republic.

changing the institutional and political structures of the state. In

This was followed by an abortive socialist revolution led by

retrospect this has come to be seen as a disastrous measure that

LUXEMBURG and Karl Liebknecht in 1919. The Xinhai Revolution

discredited communism both within and outside China. Since

in China overthrew the Qing Dynasty, establishing the Republic of

1960 there have been many further revolutions, some claiming an

China in 1911. By 1949 this had been overthrown by a socialist

aﬃnity with socialism and others with bourgeois liberalism,

revolution led by MAO’s peasant armies. The 1936 Spanish

particularly in the ex-colonies of the great nineteenth-century

Revolution quickly went beyond the establishment of a republic

powers. In many cases these have turned out to be no more than

as a result of the action of both anarchists and socialists, until

coup d’états, a simple replacement of one ruling élite with

crushed by Franco. The pattern was repeated again in CUBA

another. The year 1968 saw a wave of protests and near-

where the last major socialist revolution took place in 1959

revolutionary conditions in many Western states, most notably in
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France, but this seemed to mark the end of the revolutionary

political revolutions. This is partly because the political scene

decades rather than a new era of radical political change.

appears much less likely to give rise to revolutionary opportunities

This is not to argue that revolutions are no longer a feature of
contemporary politics. Revolutions in Iran (1979) and Afghanistan
(1996) established fundamentalist Islamic states. The satellite
communist parties of Eastern Europe were largely overthrown in
bloodless revolutions such as the ‘velvet revolution’ in
Czechoslovakia in 1989. Since the rise of neoliberalism it could
even be argued that MARKET capitalism has become a
revolutionary movement backed by the crusading right-wing
ideology of the US translated into military force. There are also
still some revolutionary movements on the left, such as the
ZAPATISTAS in Mexico, but most ANTI-CAPITALIST organizations
work through protest and more LOCAL forms of DIRECT ACTION.
Revolution may be seen as an emergent process that arises
naturally through other changes. The terms ‘industrial revolution’,
‘scientific revolution’ or ‘technological revolution’ all capture this
sense of the rapid transformation of everyday life, just as the
1960s have been described as a ‘sexual revolution’. Though not
entirely uninfluenced by the political aims and interests of various
groups, such revolutions tend to occur in an unforeseen way
through complex combinations of social, economic, technological
and political factors. Often this form of change interacts with
deliberate political revolutionary attempts. Those on the Left have
generally moved away from the idea of violent and sudden

and partly because the ‘failure’ of many revolutions has left many
much less confident that this is an eﬀective method to bring
about a better society. Left reformers now tend to support
engagement with existing institutions in the pursuit of incremental
political change. The problem with this strategy is familiar.
Attempts to bring about significant reform tend to be resisted by
powerful vested interests. It should be noted that revolutionary
and reformist change are not necessarily incompatible. The two
may be pursued as part of a single strategy: reforms may
produce an appetite for more radical change. However, in
practice, reforms often reduce the pressure for more significant
change. Many Marxists have argued that the rise of the welfare
state and sectional forms of trade unionism has stabilized the
capitalist system.
The desirability of revolution is one of the biggest dividing lines
between utopians. Many anarchists and Marxists would agree
that those currently in power will not let go of it without the resort
to violence. Therefore, they argue, it is a sad necessity that violent
revolution will be necessary in order to bring about any progress
towards a free society. One of the major disagreements between
revolutionary anarchists and Marxists has concerned whether a
revolution should be followed by a transitional period in which the
old institutions of the state are retained in order to achieve full
communism gradually. Anarchists, including KROPOTKIN and
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Bakunin, have worried that retaining these institutions leads to the
re-emergence of a hierarchical society. Other radical utopians
would argue that there is a close link between ends and means,
and that trying to achieve freedom through violence is always
doomed to failure. Only NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE and a
revolution in personal consciousness can hope to change society
in ways that will not lead to new forms of oppression. There is
currently no way to resolve such a debate. That future revolutions
would need to be diﬀerent from those of the past, and that the
prospects for them seem much more uncertain, is less
contentious.

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Credo Reference.
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Section 2

Further defining revolution
Political scientists are deeply divided concerning both the

be the most imaginative piece of applied political science in

meaning of the term ‘revolution’ and the true explanation of the

human history. Arendt (On Revolution, 1963) chooses to regard

phenomena denoted by it. To some extent the chosen

this example, not as exceptional, but as the prime example of a

explanation will determine the chosen meaning, so that

successful revolution. She argues that all political

theoretical discussions over whether the American Revolution,

transformations called revolutions are united by the straining of

say, was a ‘true revolution’ will not be resolved merely by a

subject peoples towards liberty, and the search for a constitution

dictionary definition. It is clear that the meaning of the term has

that will guarantee liberty. The Glorious Revolution, and the

changed, since it was first used of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ in

American Revolution, thus seem to be examples of revolutions

England of 1688. What was then meant was the ‘revolution’ to

which have achieved their ends, partly because they avoided the

some previous and lamented state of aﬀairs, the term denoting

violence and social upheaval of later revolutions, and partly

the turning of the wheel of fortune. Now it seems to mean any

because transformation occurred at the political level, while

major transformation that occurs simultaneously on the social

retaining suﬃcient social continuity to guarantee stability.

and the political level, upsetting expectations and conformities
that were suﬃciently well established to define all important
forms of association under the preceding order. The element of
violence is sometimes considered necessary – although this is
partly because those who advance this idea are influenced by a
theory of ‘revolutionary transformation’ which requires it. An
exception to such a thesis is the American Revolution, which
was relatively pacific, and culminated in the calm and reasonable
adoption of a constitution that has sometimes been thought to

Modern theorists are for the most part unpersuaded by Arendt’s
account, which, in the light of such phenomena as the ‘Islamic
Revolution’ in Iran, can only seem stipulative. They tend to argue
that violent transformations are of a diﬀerent kind from nonviolent ones. The ancestor of such a view is the theory of Marx,
which regarded the French Revolution as the paradigm; and
which was, if not obsessed, at least fascinated by the enormous
and hitherto undiscovered forces which that revolution
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unleashed. Thus there emerged the Marxian theory of revolution,

Leninist theories of revolution emphasize the role of the

which exists in two possibly compatible versions. The first version

revolutionary agent, believing that revolutions occur at least in

holds that revolutions occur when productive forces develop to

part because their ‘subjective’ conditions (and not only the

the point where production relations begin to fetter them and,

‘objective’, or what Marx had called ‘material’ conditions) are

those enormous forces having been contained only briefly, the

fulfilled. The important diﬀerence between Leninist and Marxian

fetters burst asunder, toppling all institutions along with them. The

views is that the former regard the accumulation of political power

second version says that revolution is the product of class

as an essential element in revolution, whereas the latter think of

struggle, which grows until all existing institutions are invaded by

revolution primarily in social terms. Modern theorists tend to

it, when open conflict breaks out, leading to the replacement of

recognize that the important modern events called revolutions

the ruling class by those that had been ruled by it. This second

have always involved the seizure of political power, usually by

version of the theory originates in French revolutionary thinking,

soldiers or intellectuals–hence the element of coup d’état has,

and gains some inspiration from Hegel’s diagnosis of the relation

since the Russian Revolution, come to seem indispensable (thus

between master and slave. The two theories are usually held

John Dunn, e.g.: Modern Revolutions, 1972). However, this does

together, partly because both are thought to explain revolution in

not settle the question of how the violent transformation of

terms of the existence of a contradiction within the foundations of

political power comes about, nor whether there is any single end

the social order. It is thus a fundamental thesis of Marxism that

towards which all revolutions are directed. The manifest lack of

revolutions involve the defeat of one class by another; hence

agreement among observers has a strong ideological cause: it

there are two revolutions involved in the transition from feudalism

seems to validate a coup d’état to say that it was part of an

to socialism: that in which the bourgeoisie overthrows the

inevitable, and socially based, revolution; to confess candidly that

aristocracy (‘the bourgeois revolution’), and that in which the

it was motivated by the desire for power is to suggest that its

proletariat overthrows the bourgeoisie (‘the proletarian

credentials are no better (and probably worse) than those of the

revolution’). USSR propaganda described the bolshevik coup

regime that it sought to replace.

d’état in October 1917 as the Great October Proletarian
Revolution, on the assumption that it was the natural sequel to
the ‘bourgeois’ revolution that had occurred in February.

The anti-communist revolutions that occurred across Eastern
Europe in 1989 are notable for their lack of violence – that in
Czechoslovakia going by the name of ‘The Velvet Revolution’.
Unlike the communist coups d’état which had imposed
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communism on Eastern Europe, these anti-communist upheavals
involved the whole population, expressed a longing for a free
economy, the rule of law and secure property rights, and were in
every way the opposite of revolutions as described by Lenin and
as theorised in standard works of political science. Indeed they
were the first examples in history, in which the working class rose
up in protest against the people who had enslaved it. Since these
events, Marxist and neo-Marxist thinking about revolution –
include much written about the French Revolution – has lost its
credibility.

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Credo Reference.
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Section 3

Revolutions in world history
The Mexican Revolution

thoughtfulness, at other times more with simple cunning, to
rebuild and reshape their country. It was a contentious process,

The Mexican Revolution was the first great political and social

often punctuated by violence, especially in the 1920s. Both

revolution of the twentieth century. It was also one of a cluster of

idealism and opportunism flourished. Idealism seemingly

revolutions occurring at about the same time in Russia, China,

triumphed in the 1930s, when revolutionary momentum on

the Ottoman Empire, and Iran (then called Persia). These

various levels found a leadership, personified in Lázaro

revolutions, particularly those in Russia and China, had an

Cárdenas, sympathetic to its goals. After 1940, however, the

enormous impact on the history of the twentieth century.

revolution lost its way. Opportunists, like the ones described by

The Mexican Revolution in its revolutionary decade, 1910–1920,
features bloodshed, betrayal, and cruelty, as well as class
struggle, intervention by the United States, and a colorful
assembly of larger-than-life revolutionaries. Overall, it illustrates
those characteristics of revolution discussed in the previous
chapter. Of primary importance, the revolution was a product of
Mexican history, one way of responding to the political situation
created by the regime of Porfirio Díaz. And it shaped the way

Carlos Fuentes in his brilliant novel, The Death of Artemio Cruz,
rose to the top and essentially murdered the revolution. They
embalmed the corpse of the revolution and put it on display. It
endured for the remainder of the century, mostly as form and
rhetoric. No one, even as the system began to unravel in the
1980s, found a way to move beyond the sterile politics and
social injustice that characterized Mexican life in the late
twentieth century.

politics were done for the remainder of the twentieth century.

The revolutionary decade (1910–1920)

In the twenty years that followed the chaos and dislocation of the

The revolutionary decade began with the problems experienced

revolutionary decade, those Mexicans who had gained power in

by the regime of Porfirio Díaz. Long-lived (1876–1910) and

the revolution used that power, sometimes with great
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successful for most of its existence, the Díaz regime emphasized

policies also created two problems. The first was the expansion

economic growth and a strong central government.

of foreign investment. Foreigners held approximately one-third of

It grew, however, increasingly dependent on foreign investment
and the global market.

the land in Mexico at the turn of the century. They dominated
industry and held important stakes in mining and timber.
American holdings in both agriculture and industry were

While economic problems and the development of a Mexican

particularly large. Secondly, in the last few years of the Díaz

nationalism lessened the popularity of the regime in the first

regime, developments in the world economy damaged important

decade of the twentieth century, it floundered initially on the issue

sectors of the Mexican economy, especially agriculture, mining,

of continuismo, i.e. the modification of constitutional

timber, and textiles. Unemployment was high in industry and

arrangements to allow Díaz to continue in oﬃce. Liberals in

mining. Small businessmen also suﬀered from the economic

Mexico spent the first decade of the twentieth century calling for

downturn. Bad harvests in 1908 and 1909 led to famine and food

free elections and a constitution that worked. Organized in the

riots.

Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) in 1906, they worked in Mexico
and in exile in the United States to end the Díaz regime. Franciso
Madero, a member of the Coahuila provincial elite, landowner,
industrialist, and banker, who was often called “The Apostle of
Democracy,” challenged continuismo with a book entitled The
Presidential Succession of 1910 (1908). He later campaigned
against Díaz in 1910. To the extent that ideology helped to bring

Economic contraction, in turn, influenced two other aspects of
the revolution. One was nationalism, in particular, the belief that
foreigners had undue influence on Mexican politics. The second
was the vulnerability of regional elites (Coahuila and Sonora in
particular), who found their economic interests jeopardized by the
policies of a regime on which they had little or no influence.

about the revolution, the ideology that initially influenced the

In the spring of 1910 the Anti-Re-electionist Party nominated

Mexican Revolution was an older liberal one that called for

Madero as a candidate for president. Arrested by Díaz, he spent

constitutions, representative bodies, and free elections.

Election Day in prison in San Luis Potosi. Diaz was, not

Although the constitutional challenge was important, there were
other factors behind the challenge to the regime. The regime had
long been concerned with economic growth and with its role in
the emerging world economy. The very success of the regime’s

surprisingly, re-elected. In September, Díaz celebrated his
eightieth birthday and the centennial of Mexican independence.
The following month, Madero, released on bail, escaped to San
Antonio, Texas. There he issued the first of the many plans in the
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revolution, the Plan of San Luis Potosi. Primarily a political

the Díaz regime. While clearly interested in what political

document, it promised democracy and federalism but also

arrangements the revolution might produce, they emphasized

mentioned the right of workers to bargain collectively and

social and economic issues. In part, they stressed the defense of

agrarian reform.

the traditional. This could be seen especially in the followers of

The combination of a regime experiencing heavy criticism and
open challenge and the disintegration of the social consensus of
the elites opened the floodgates to a torrent of ideas, aspirations,
and schemes. Centers of revolution developed in
Chihuahua under Pascual Orozco, Jr. and in Morelos under
Emiliano Zapata. Other ideologies, in particular anarchosyndicalism, a radical movement emphasizing the power and
influence of trade unions, and a kind of agrarian populism among
the peasants, gained prominence.
Over the next few years, the revolution existed essentially on two
levels. The first level involved the elites. They emphasized politics,
nationalism, and the revival of a stagnant economy. They
gathered support from the middle and lower middle classes,
including businessmen, merchants, the intelligentsia, bureaucrats,
and local oﬃcials. Aware of the needs of the working class and
the peasantry, they were, however, not willing to venture far in the
direction of social reform. Early on, the most prominent
representative of this group was Madero.
The second level included mostly workers and peasants, those
most directly aﬀected by the economic problems associated with

Zapata. They wished to regain their communal lands from those,
Mexicans and foreigners alike, who had used the legal system to
gain ownership, and to re-establish largely autonomous
municipalities. They did not, however, simply wish to turn the
clock back. They recognized, for example, the importance of
collective bargaining rights for the working class.
Luis Cervantes, the representative of the intelligentsia in Mariano
Azuela’s novel The Underdogs (Los de abajo), waxes eloquent on
the motives of the revolutionaries:
It is not true you [Demetrio Macias, the protagonist of The
Underdogs] took up arms simply because of Señor Monico. You
are under arms to protest against the evils of all the caciques
[political bosses] who are overrunning the whole nation. We are
the elements of a social movement which will not rest until it has
enlarged the destinies of our motherland. We are the tools Destiny
makes use of to reclaim the sacred rights of the people. We are
not fighting to dethrone a miserable murderer, we are fighting
against tyranny itself.
The reality, of course, is that motives were mixed. Some saw the
revolution as a grand struggle for justice in the face of tyranny.
Many, perhaps most, had more concrete aims.
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Madero gained broad support in 1911 and defeated Díaz. In the

of the former dictator, had already rebelled once against Madero

fall he took oﬃce as president. Although aware of the need for

and had been defeated and arrested. Gaining release from prison,

land reform, his initial measures seemed designed more for

he rebelled again in February 1913. This rebellion also failed and

speculators than for campesinos. In less than a month after

Felix Díaz found himself besieged in an old fortress in Mexico

Madero took oﬃce, he faced the opposition of Zapata. Zapata

City. The commander of the federal troops, Victoriano Huerta,

was a trainer of horses and a stable master. Elected to local oﬃce

came to an agreement with Díaz. He also concluded the Pacto de

in 1909 in the village of Anenecuilco, Morelos, he was deeply

la Embajada with the American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson.

sympathetic to the problems of the peasants. In his own plan, the

The main idea of the agreement with the American ambassador

Plan of Ayala (November 1911), Zapata advanced a radical

was to remove Madero from power in favor of Felix Díaz. Huerta,

agenda for land reform. He called for land redistribution in the

however, managed to make himself president. In the process he

form of communes and cooperatives and also for the return of

had President Madero and José María Pino Suarez, his vice-

municlpal autonomy. He also advocated democracy and

president, murdered.

collective bargaining rights for the working class.

Huerta’s cynical opportunism led to a civil war that engulfed large

Pascual Orozco, who had combined cowboys, miners,

portions of Mexico from 1913 to 1917. Huerta gained the backing

lumberjacks, Indians, and farmers in Chihuahua into a force that

of Orozco, but he was opposed by many of the elites. The most

was originally Maderista, emerged as the major opponent of

important of these, Governor Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila,

Madero. He, too, issued a radical plan of social reform, the Plan

detested Huerta’s regime and issued his own plan in response to

Orozquista (March 1912). Zapata and Orozco, although unable to

it, the Plan of Guadalupe (1913), a document almost exclusively

coordinate their individual eﬀorts eﬀectively, nonetheless were a

concerned with politics. Zapata, of course, still looking for

formidable opposition to Madero by 1913. In the meantime,

support for land reform, opposed Huerta even more strongly than

Madero failed to win support from the industrial workers who

he had Madero. Pancho Villa, who had fought in 1910–1911

formed the Casa del Obrero Mundial, a workers’s council in

under Orozco, emerged as an important new opponent in

Mexico City in 1912.

Chihuahua, where he gathered cowboys, sharecroppers, miners,

The greatest danger to Madero, however, came from
reactionaries, opportunists, and foreigners. Felix Díaz, a nephew

and lumberjacks into a first-class fighting unit, the Division del
Norte, the most powerful rebel force in the revolution. Where
Zapata was the leader of a community, Villa seemed more the
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man on horseback (he was a superb horseman). Brave,

country. In the summer of 1914, even though Huerta had left the

charismatic, dedicated to his men, and an excellent organizer and

revolutionary stage, Carranza was still no match for Villa and his

manager, he was not all bravado, however. He believed in the

ally Zapata, neither in terms of military strength nor political

redistribution of income from the rich to the poor and noted the

following.

importance of education. Most of all, he seemed interested in a
return to the autonomy enjoyed by what had been frontier
communities in Chihuahua. In this respect, both he and Zapata
wanted to return to a world that governed itself with minimal
interference from Mexico City. Like Zapata, too, he was a
regionalist, uncomfortable on the national stage.

Alvaro Obregón Salido, who had not participated in the Maderista
revolt of 1910–1911, was on the fringes of the elites socially. He
soon, however, became the indispensable man for Carranza and
the Constitutionalists. Obregón not only wanted to liberalize
politics, he also presented an extensive social agenda that
included agrarian and industrial reform. He could step outside the

In the chaos of warring factions, American intervention once

elite view of the world and understand the needs of other social

again forced the revolution in a particular direction. In April 1914

groups in Mexico. He eventually became the most important

the US Navy launched an attack on the Mexican port of Veracruz.

figure in the first, most violent phase of the revolution. Obregón

After a naval bombardment, the US Army secured and occupied

made two significant contributions to the Constitutionalist

the city. In November 1914 the American government decided to

position in 1914. First, he courted the working class, organized in

back Carranza’s Constitutionalist army as the faction most likely

the Casa del Obrero Mundial, and the urban intellectuals. The

to respect American interests in Mexico. It used its position in

workers provided important support for the army. When

Veracruz to equip Carranza’s army. The army received some

Carranza’s stance on land reform, which stressed the importance

12,000 rifles and carbines, over three million rounds of

of observing property rights, was widely denounced by Villista

ammunition, machine guns, barbed wire, cars, trucks, and

and Zapatista leaders, Obregón arranged a meeting between the

artillery. These supplies were crucial in the eventual

two sides at Aguascalientes in

Constitutionalist defeat of Villa’s forces.
Between the American occupation of Veracruz and the resupply
of Carranza’s s troops, Villa had repeatedly defeated Huerta’s
forces, forcing Huerta to give up the presidency and flee the

October.
The convention at Aguascalientes brought the followers of Villa
and Zapata closer together and made clear their diﬀerences with
Carranza. It also made plain the radical nature of their ideas,
320

eﬀectively pitting them against Carranza and Obregón. Stunned

While Obregón defeated Villa, Zapata continued to hold the south

American observers made the fateful decision to support

and the center of Mexico. At the same time, working-class

Carranza and Obregón.

radicalism, centered on the Casa del Obrero Mundial, formed a

At the end of the year, Villa and Zapata met for the first time at
Xochimilco. As an American agent (quoted in John Womack’s fine
biography of Zapata) described the scene, Villa was “tall, robust,
weighing about 180 pounds… wearing an English [pith] helmet, a
heavy brown sweater, khaki trousers, leggings and heavy riding

growing threat to the Constitutionalist movement. A strike in May
1916 resulted in victory for the Casa. When few of the promises
made in May were kept, a renewed strike in July found the
government better prepared. It used the army to break the power
of the anarcho-syndicalist unions.

shoes.” Zapata was much shorter than Villa, “weighing probably

Villa, despite defeat by Obregón, continued to be troublesome.

130 pounds…[and wearing] a short black coat, a large light blue

His raid on Columbus, New Mexico, early in 1916, resulted in the

silk neckerchief, pronounced lavender shirt…d} a pair of black,

“Punitive Expedition” led by General John J.Pershing. Villa

tight-fitting Mexican trousers with silver buttons down the outside

became an almost legendary figure, but could not translate this

seam of each leg.” The two chiefs, at first at a loss for words,

into eﬀective political power.

eventually found common ground in their dislike of Carranza.
They were unable, however, to eﬀectively coordinate their armies.
While the nation saw them as a united force, they continued to
fight largely separate campaigns, which weakened each of their
positions greatly.

While the fighting continued, the Constitutionalists staged a
meeting in 1916 at Queretaro. This was a very diﬀerent aﬀair from
the meeting two years prior at Aguascalientes. Fewer military
leaders were present. Instead there were more people with
university educations and professional backgrounds. Out of the

In 1915 Obregón’s reorganized and well-equipped armies

meeting came the Constitution of 1917, the most important

defeated Villa’s forces in a series of battles from April to June.

document in twentieth- century Mexican history.

Obregón applied the lessons the Great War was teaching the
world and used barbed wire and carefully placed machine guns to
good eﬀect. He also had the use of modern artillery provided by
the Americans.

The Constitution of 1917 created a series of reforms that
would lay the foundation for a new Mexican government. It called
for separation of church and state, the right to education through
public schools, the regulation of working conditions, and the right
of workers to form unions and to strike. It also empowered the
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government to redistribute land. This meant not simply restoring

also to the urban middle classes and the workers. It had done the

land illegally seized from the peasantry. It also made possible the

least for the majority of the population, the peasants. But even for

expropriation of land that was not serving a useful purpose.

them it had made promises and created a constitutional basis for

Finally, it also asserted that the nation owned the subsoil

action on those promises. The Constitution of 1917 had set an

resources. Nearly every group in the Mexican Revolution found

agenda that was basically democratic and progressive. The

something in the Constitution it had been fighting for. The

revolutionaries had seized and reconstituted power. It now

Constitution, a clear repudiation of laissez-faire liberalism, owed

remained to be seen how eﬀectively they would use it.

much to the plans, especially the Plan Orozquista and the Plan de
Ayala. It was, however, a document of reform, not of revolution.

Using power (1920–1940)

The costs of the revolution were enormous. In a nation with a

Reconstruction was the most important task of the 1920s. This

population of roughly 15 million, between 1.5 and 2 million died.

was, however, no easy task given the lack of institutions and

Many of the leaders of the revolution were assassinated. The first

governmental processes, the absence of consensus as to how to

was Emiliano Zapata in April 1919-He became a martyr. Carranza

proceed, and the continuing tendency to use violence to resolve

was held responsible for Zapata’s death and lost a great deal of

diﬀerences of opinion. The Constitution of 1917 provided a basic

popularity. The following year Carranza attempted to

plan for reconstruction, but in 1920 it oﬀered little more than

handpick his successor. To many, workers, peasants, and even

promises. To what extent could the government turn those

the Americans, this could only mean a continuation of a regime

promises into realities?

that seemed unable to address the basic problems of the country.
His former lieutenant, Obregón, who had resigned after the

Obregón brought with him from Sonora people with

assassination of Zapata, led a march on Mexico City that

administrative experience and political skills. He, Adolfo de la

deposed the isolated Carranza. Carranza was assassinated later

Huerta, and Plutarco Elías Calles counted themselves as

that year.

hardheaded realists. They were eager to repeat on a national level
what they had been able to accomplish in Sonora.

The Mexican Revolution, while occurring at the same time as the
Great War and revolutions all around the world, had followed and

The new government emphasized reconciliation. It negotiated the

continued to follow itsown path. It had broadened the practice of

retirement of Pancho Villa in 1920 and ended the conflict with the

politics and given voice not only to provincial and local elites but

Zapatistas and other regional rebels. It also welcomed the return
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of former opponents of Carranza to political life. Members of the

A massive rebellion nonetheless broke out in December 1923.

government saw themselves as successors to Madero, as the

The government, backed by organized labor and the peasants,

true representatives of the Mexican Revolution. The new slogan

put down the rebellion by March the following year. A by-product

was “The Revolution transformed into government” (“La

of the failed rebellion was a smaller, less dangerous military.

Revolucion hecha gobierno”).

President Calles had a reputation of being more radical and more

Obregón reached out as well to diﬀerent interest groups. He had

nationalistic than Obregón. During his term in oﬃce, he continued

already formed an alliance with the Regional Confederation of

Obregón’s policies, maintaining a good relationship with labor,

Mexican Workers (CROM), the most important organization for

extending land redistribution, expanding the railroad system, and

workers for most of the 1920s. He also sponsored land

building rural schools. Overall, however, presidential power grew

redistribution in areas where peasant unrest was most

at the expense of increasingly dependent states.

pronounced.

In the course of the 1920s, the United States came to view

Although Obregón was acknowledged as the undisputed caudillo

Mexico with suspicion. Influenced by the emergence of Soviet

or political boss in Mexico, he had to contend with regional

Russia, some in Washington considered the Calles government a

leaders and with the large revolutionary army. Mass politics

Bolshevik government and talked about “Soviet Mexico.”

served as a counterweight to the ambitious politicians and

Internally, the passage of anticlerical legislation in 1926 led to the

generals.

Cristero Rebellion in west-central Mexico. It began with the

As the end of his term neared, Obregón worked to organize a
peaceful transition. Relations with the United States had
improved, leading to formal recognition of the Mexican
government in 1923. Earlier, in the spring, Villa’s assassination
removed any possibility he might take advantage of the transition
period. Calles announced as his candidacy for the presidency.
The beneficiary of Obregón’s support, Calles won the election.

declaration of a strike by the Roman Catholic Church on July 31,
1926. For three years, priests did not celebrate mass, baptize
babies, or give the dying the last rites. Between 1927 and 1929,
bands of Cristeros attacked the government under the slogan of
“Viva Christ the King!” (“Viva Cristo Rey!”). Tens of thousands of
Mexicans died in a renewal of a civil war with a distinctive
religious basis.
At the end of Calles’ term, whether Obregón would return to
oﬃce became the major political question. The Constitution had
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been amended in 1927 to permit one nonconsecutive re-election,

nomination of Cardenas. He likely endorsed him with the idea in

and in 1928 the presidential term extended to six years. Obregón

mind he could use Cardenas, a friend and loyal supporter in the

ran for oﬃce and won re-election in July 1928.

past, as he had used previous presidents.

Obregón survived two assassination attempts but he did not

Even though Cardenas’s election was assured, he campaigned

survive the third. Calles, in an attempt to head oﬀ chaos, resisted

throughout Mexico. He apparently sought a popular mandate for

the idea of re-election and instead handed the presidency to a

a continuation of the revolution. Elected in July 1934, he took

candidate acceptable to both his supporters and those of

oﬃce the following December and began what essentially formed

Obregón. In all, there were three presidents between 1928 and

a second revolution, a period of rapid and radical change. In

1934, a period known as the Maximato. Calles, the most powerful

several ways, it resembled the Stalin Revolution in the Soviet

man in the country despite his lack of oﬃce, became known as

Union, also in the 1930s. It featured a reorganization of

the Jefe Maximo (Supreme Chief).

agriculture, although one that had very diﬀerent results from the

Under the first of the three presidents, the government negotiated
an end to the Cristero Rebellion and improved relations with the
United States. In 1929 both the Callistas and the Obregónistas
cooperated to form a federation of the state and regional
revolutionary parties, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR).
Within the PNR, a revitalized agrarian movement became
increasingly influential. Calles could not counterbalance it with
CROM, the labor movement, in that CROM was excluded from
the PNR because of its opposition to Obregón’s re-election.
In 1933 the agrarian forces established the National Peasant
Confederation and called for the renewal of agrarian reform.
Working within the PNR, they supported the nomination of Lazaro
Cardenas as candidate for president in 1934. Calles did not
oppose the will of the party he had created and agreed to the

Soviet eﬀort. It solidified a political system that endured for the
next few decades, again a very diﬀerent system from that of the
Soviet Union. Finally, it emphasized the creation of a Mexican
identity and encouraged a feeling of national pride in Mexico,
again superficially similar to Stalin’s eﬀorts to create the new
Soviet man and woman and pride in the Soviet Union. Cardenas’s
eﬀorts, however, while revolutionary, were far more moderate and
involved relatively little violence. Still, Mexico at the end of the
1930s was quite diﬀerent from what it had been at the beginning
of the decade.
The initial problem the government faced was what to do with the
Jefe Maximo. Calles expected to continue to manage political
aﬀairs from behind the scenes, but Cardenas worked in the first
year to retire or replace army generals and state governors allied
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with Calles. He also accelerated land reform and tolerated the

must always keep in mind that it is people and their happiness

strike movement, gaining the support of agrarian and labor

and not the production of wealth that matters.” The governments

organizations. When Calles began to criticize government policy

that followed soon altered this radical perspective.

in 1935, Cardenas purged his cabinet of Calles’s supporters. The
Cardenistas took over the PNR, the Congress, and the
governments of a number of states.

Cardenas also courted labor. The PNR’s Six-Year Plan called for
increased state intervention in the economy and Cardenas gave
the labor movement free rein to strike, particularly against foreign

It took several additional months for the game to play out.

firms. In 1936 a number of unions came together to create the

Cardenas had Calles put on a plane for the United States in April

Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM). Vicente Lombardo

1936 and sent into what was in eﬀect exile. Unlike so many of the

Toledano, the major figure in the CTM, worked to gain CTM

other leaders of the Mexican Revolution, Calles was not

endorsement of the policies of the government. The

assassinated. The Maximato ended peacefully.

confederation also participated with the PNR in electoral politics.

The main thrust of Cardenas’ policy concerned the welfare of the

The alliance between government and labor led to the most

average Mexican. Two interconnected activities were necessary

dramatic event of the Cardenas government, the expropriation of

for his policy to work. One involved a reduction of the power of

the foreign-owned petroleum industry in March 1938. After a local

the hacienda or large estate. The other called for the construction

federal arbitration board ruled in favor of

of the ejido, communally owned land that could be worked either
communally or by individuals.

an increase in wages and improved social benefits for workers, oil
companies appealed to the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration

In 1935 land grants quadrupled. The next year, with the end of the

Board. When it ruled in favor of the workers, the oil companies

Maximato, even more dramatic actions took place. Cardenas

again balked and Cardenas acted. It was, in eﬀect, a declaration

expropriated many of the richest zones of commercial agriculture

of economic independence and was wildly popular in Mexico. It

in the country and provided funding for tractors and other

echoed one of the main themes of the Mexican Revolution and

equipment through the National Ejidal Credit Bank. During his

might justly be considered a high point of the second phase of

administration some fifty million acres were distributed to about

the revolution.

800,000 peasants. More than 11,000 ejidos were established. At
the end of the decade, one of Cardenas’s ideologues wrote: “We
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In line with the social and economic changes, Cardenas also

Education (SEP) commented in 1926 that “Our little rural school

transformed Calles’s party into a party based on the CTM and the

stands for Mexico and represents Mexico in those far-oﬀ corners

newly created National Peasant Confederation (CNC). Other

—so many of them that belong to Mexico but are not yet

sectors of the new party included the military and a unit

Mexico.”

composed largely of state employees. The 1938 party convention
accepted these changes and gave the party a new name: the
Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM).

The cultural revolution accelerated in the 1930s. In particular, the
Cardenista policy and ideology of indigenismo took root.
Indigenismo opposed the older idea of civilizing the Indians.

Cardenas’s government also instituted a cultural revolution. The

Rather, it called for the promotion of the social, economic, and

cultural revolution in Mexico aimed primarily at the creation of a

spiritual emancipation of Indians while at the same time it

new Mexican national identity. This meant, first of all, fighting the

preserved the best of native culture. Those in charge of the work

influence of the Catholic Church. More positively, like the great

of preservation often made unfounded assumptions about Indians

social revolutions in Russia and later in China, revolutionaries in

and their heritage, which often produced representations of that

Mexico wanted to create new revolutionary men and women.

heritage that were not authentic. Nonetheless, the intention was

They wanted to bring Mexicans from all regions and classes

to improve the life of Mexico’s Indians and to preserve their

together in a process that might be termed “Mexicanization.” The

culture. Indian heritage received new prominence and

battleground for Mexicanization, the creation of a republican and

acceptance.

secular outlook, was the school. One person in particular, José
Vasconselos, made the cultural revolution of the 1930s possible
through his educational reforms in the 1920s. He created a
system of rural primary schools, which by 1936 included some
11,000 schools, 14,000 teachers, and more than 700,000
children. It was an impressive accomplishment although not
nearly enough. Estimates were that twice as many rural
schoolteachers were needed. This educational reform was
reminiscent of educational eﬀorts in the French Third Republic in
the era before World War I. One oﬃcial in the Ministry of Public

Mexico’s cultural revolution shocked some, while disappointing
others by not going far enough. By the 1940s, however, it had
created a somewhat diﬀerent Mexico, one in which most young
people had learned to read and write. The Mexico heavily
influenced by France that many had criticized during the Porfiriato
had been Mexicanized. Mexicans now saw themselves and
their country diﬀerently. This was portrayed artistically in the
stunning murals of José Clemente Orozco and Diego Rivera.
While Orozco painted what the revolution had been, Rivera
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painted what it should have been. Both glorified Mexico, its

agricultural aﬀairs shifted from the ejidos to commercial

people, customs, and history. In many ways, however, Mexico’s

agriculture and the private sector. The Cardenista project of a

cultural revolution, while bringing the country together, obscured

rural Mexico of prosperous ejidos remained uncompleted. It may

the importance of the several regions into which Mexico was then

have been a utopian approach in many respects, and its attempt

still divided.

at social engineering ran counter to the economic trends of the

The “death” of the revolution
In the 1940 presidential race, the PRM faced a choice between a
Cardenista candidate, the radical Francisco Mugica, and a more
moderate figure, General Manuel Ávila Camacho, Cardenas’s
defense minister. Cardenas believed the PRM was “a
revolutionary instrument” that would continue the revolution and
did not try to influence the choice of the PRM’s candidate. It
chose Avila Camacho.
Although Ávila Camacho promised “to consolidate the gains of
the Cardenas regime,” his government took Mexico in another
direction. This could be seen plainly in the lack of attention paid
to land reform and the ejido. Land redistribution slowed to a crawl
during Ávila Camacho’s time in oﬃce. Even more important, the
government failed to make available to the ejidos the necessary
financing and the other kinds of assistance farmers needed.
Not coincidentally, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican
Ministry of Agriculture established the Mexican Agricultural
Project in 1943. Its work formed the basis for the “Green
Revolution” of hybrid grains. The emphasis in Mexican

twentieth century.
The government under Ávila Camacho also emphasized
industrialization. Taking advantage of the demand created by
World War II, Mexican industry grew by an average of 10 percent
a year between 1940 and 1945. Labor, in the form of the CTM,
went along with the policy of industrialization. In the postwar
period, the CTM was strengthened at the expense of the labor
movement more generally in an eﬀort to keep wages low and
make foreign investment attractive.
Finally, Ávila Camacho changed Cardenas’s “revolutionary
instrument,” the PRM, to oﬀset the power of the labor and
peasant sectors. In 1946 it was reconstituted as the Party of the
Institutional Revolution (PRI) and the authority of the leadership
strengthened.
The government and its supporters in the PRI established a vision
of a modern Mexico reminiscent of the vision of the cientificos,
the supporters of industrialization, foreign investment, and
technological progress in the Porfirean era. Essentially, they
brought the revolution to an end. It had served its purpose. Now
industry, commerce, science, technology, foreign capital, all these
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were to be used to create a vibrant, urban, modern state and

stable political system worked with only the occasional hitch until

society.

the 1980s, when a slow unraveling of the economy began.

In itself an appealing vision, it obscured the reality of Mexico in
the post-World War II period. That Mexico was a society in which
small numbers of people owned and controlled industry,
commerce, communications, and finance. Similarly, a few
landowners and agricultural companies dominated agriculture.
Workers and peasants lost ground economically. Politics was
organized for the benefit of a few powerful individuals and
groups. In a sense, politics became a game in which those few
privileged players earned a rich reward. The majority were not
players and gained only occasional scraps, generally around
election time.
In 1947 the economist Daniel Cosío Villegas published an article
called “The Crisis of Mexico,” in which he announced the “death”
of the Mexican Revolution. There seems little doubt that it did die,
or rather was murdered by the real life counterparts of Carlos
Fuentes’s eponymous fictional creation, Artemio Cruz, in the
1940s and 1950s. What is striking, though, is the manner in which
those who murdered it embalmed the revolution and put it on
display in much the same way Lenin’s corpse was displayed in
the mausoleum in Red Square. Mass politics continued to be a
feature, largely ritualistic, of Mexican life. Educational
opportunities led to the growth of a middle class. Labor unions
continued to seek, within limits, a better life for their members. A

Revolutionary institutions, symbols, and rhetoric imperfectly
disguised the hollowing out of the revolution.
Conclusion
In many respects the long reign of the PRI was a brilliant, if deeply
flawed, achievement. It provided stability and continuity for
decades. Insiders in the system lived well. Those outside the
system received handouts. It is ironic that the Mexican Revolution
in its institutionalized form became the basis for a highly sterile
political life for several decades. In this sense, the use of power
led nowhere or only back to a new version of the Porfirean era. In
that regard, it must be regarded as a failure.
The Mexican Revolution was not, of course, the only revolution to
be embalmed and put on display. It was, however, perhaps the
one most skillfully used for that purpose in the twentieth century.
As will be seen, both the Russian and the Vietnamese, after far
more bloodshed and violence, also embalmed their revolutions in
systems that mocked the original ideals of the revolutions. The
same could be said of revolution in China and Cuba. The Mexican
Revolution managed to reach a kind of halfway house with the
idealism and radicalism of the Cardenas era of the 1930s. Had
Carlos Salinas de Gotari resembled Mikhail Gorbachev more
closely in his reform-mindedness, perhaps the revolution might
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have finally achieved a stage allowing for indefinite political
evolution.
It remains to be seen whether the institutions and arrangements
now in place in Mexico after the election of Vicente Fox in 2000
as president will lend themselves to any kind of evolutionary
refashioning of politics and economics. Perhaps Mexico in the
twenty-first century can recapture a useful version of the Mexican
Revolution of the twentieth century or perhaps it will find a way to
leave behind the corpse of that revolution in the creation of some
new basis for politics and government.
The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Ebook Central Academic Complete.
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Chapter 10

Nationalism

Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Identify characteristics of nationalism.
• Understand the role of nationalism for the state and its
government structures.

Section 1

Defining nationalism
1. The sentiment and ideology of attachment to a nation and to

attempts at European government an association of nationalism

its interest.

and legal and political ideals of the nation-state. These ideals

2. The theory that a state (perhaps every state) should be
founded in a nation, and that a nation should be constituted as a
state. Hence, the attempt to uphold national identity through
political action. National identity is something more than
nationhood: it involves, not only the territorial integrity, common
language, custom and culture noted above as essential to the
idea of a nation, but also consciousness of these, as determining
distinct rights and duties. This consciousness is held to render

attempt to find the ingredients of political obligation and political
identity in allegiances which are in some sense less than wholly
political–matters of geographical, cultural and ethnic association.
The motive is to find some binding force between people that is
stronger than any revocable agreement to be governed, wider
than any merely personal aﬀection, and suﬃciently public to lend
itself to the foundation of political institutions and laws. (See prepolitical order.)

intelligible and to justify the habits of association among

Some oppose nationalism to patriotism. Any number of contrasts

neighbours. (In its extreme form nationalism might involve the

might be intended; for example, that between a sentiment of

emergence of an ethnocentric or even racist ideology.)

attachment (patriotism), and an ideology of national superiority

Nationalism has often been thought to be a political reaction to
the Napoleonic conquest of Europe, and to the break-up over
the centuries of the Empire in Central Europe. However, that is
misleading, if it is meant to imply, e.g., that the ideology of
national self-determination neither preceded Napoleon in
Europe, nor occurred independently elsewhere. It is more
plausible to say that there emerged from the Napoleonic

(nationalism); or that between a respect for political institutions
and laws (patriotism), and an attachment to race, language and
custom (nationalism). Modern nationalism is often decried, on
account, e.g., of its attempt to found political obligation in purely
social allegiances, or its alleged irrationalism, or its opposition to
universalist doctrines, or its nascent belligerence or xenophobia.
Patriotism might then be proposed as a beneficent alternative, a
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sentiment which fills the gap between obligations incurred and

Perhaps the matter can be put in more simple terms: in the

obedience required, without having recourse to a bellicose fiction

communist state, they are in charge. After the overthrow of

of national integrity. However, both ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’

communism, we are in charge. But who are we? This is the

are used loosely, and, as defined in this dictionary, they are clearly

question to which nationalism provides the easiest and the most

compatible.

emotive answer.

The defence of a politics of national identity is part of the legacy
of Central European romanticism, and found early expression in

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s

the writings of Herder and Fichte. In the UK nationalism is

use of Credo Reference.

confined to the Celtic fringes, where, it has been associated with
movements for home rule in Ireland, Scotland and – to some
extent – Wales. English nationalism is virtually unknown, at least
under that description. The same could be said of American
nationalism, although the US has defined itself successfully as a
nation, has attached itself firmly to a cherished territory, and
generated the strongest form of contemporary patriotism.
Perhaps the greatest rise in nationalism in recent years has been
in post-communist Europe – especially in the provinces of the
former Yugoslavia and the republics of the former USSR. The
emergence of nationalist movements in these places is commonly
attributed to one or other or both of two causes: first, the
existence of ethnic, religious and social conflicts which the
communist system had suppressed but not resolved, and which
have suddenly come to the surface; second, the need to find
grounds for the legitimacy of a new social and political order
without relying on the discredited search for a unifying ideology.
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Section 2

Further defining nationalism
Nationalism is more than a description of a political movement. It

Nationalism and the State

also describes a field of study concerned with the configuration
of identity with contemporary state and society, including the

The study of nationalism is complicated because of the ways in

provenance and implications of those identities, and so spans

which it is coupled with a study of societies more broadly, and

questions of sociology, history and politics.

how this is related to the processes and structures of the state in

Nationalism, argues Hearn (2006: 11), is best conceived as ‘the
making of combined claims, on behalf of a population, to an
identity, to jurisdiction and to territory’. This definition is put
forward in a manner that emphasises the processes (e.g. ‘making
of’) nationalism, rather than its objective content per se. Yet it is
a definition that is also sensitive to how nationalism can entail a
meaningful reflection of people's ‘consciousness’ too, and the
dialectical interactions these may reflect. As such Hearn's
definition is a useful means of delineating what is often portrayed
as either ‘natural’ phenomena, or as something cynically
engineered by elites. And yet there remain good reasons for Hall
(1998: 1) to insist that ‘no single, universal theory of nationalism
is possible. As the historical context is diverse, so too must be
our concepts.’

particular. While the state can take a dynamic form (and so is not
a monolithic entity), the mass state – as opposed to the city
states described in the discussion of Athenian citizenship – is a
product of modernity in so far as it came into being during a
period of relatively rapid social, economic, political development
(from the end of the fifteenth century onwards) (Gellner, 1983).
One of the things this led to, and which is crucial for an
understanding of nationalism, was the emergence of a political
body – a government and wider bureaucracy – with enough
authority to govern over a given territory, and in turn expect
people in that territory to owe their allegiance to it (in contrast to,
say, owing allegiances to a monarch or other ruler) (Smith, 1986).
The point is that the state bases its very legitimacy (the very right
to rule over populations) on being able to represent the people in
it. While citizenship describes this relationship between people
and the state – a relationship that grants certain ‘rights’ (such as
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voting, legal protection and free education) as long as citizens

could be a ‘nation’, when Tuscany (a region of Italy), which was

adhere to certain ‘duties’ (e.g. obey the law, pay taxes, even

much more homogeneous, was not. He wondered therefore how

participate in jury service if asked, or undertake national military

the idea of nationality diﬀered from that of a nation. Renan's

service where this is mandatory) – the modern type of state is

answer was that nations are not ‘eternal entities’ – by which he

also meant to be made up of people who share a similar

meant that they have a beginning and an ending. Like another

language, culture and history. This is what makes it a nation-

French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, he argued that a nation is a

state, and an important part of a nation-state is a sense of

large-scale solidarity, one made up of a desire to continue a

national identity: an identity that reflects some of the

common life:

characteristics shared across other people in their country, and
which diﬀerentiates them from people in another country.

A nation is not therefore about objective criteria such as ethnic,
linguistic, geographical bonds, but instead a belief in a common

The criteria of national identity are not always easy to list and

past as well as an ability to ‘forget’ which means that national

often end up being intuitive and psychological. Hearn (2006: 6–7)

identities are actually an outcome of imagined shared history.

registers this and places it amongst other ways of conceiving

(Renan, 1990: 16)

nationalism (including nationalism as identity, ideology, a social
movement, and historical process). That is to say, nationalism as
a feeling in a manner that is intuitive, can be psychologically
charged, or is at least emotionally ‘non-rational’ (ibid.). This,
however, is not the only way of thinking about nationalism, and to
take in a broad perspective it would be fruitful to begin with the
first part of the concept – that of the nation.
What is a Nation?

So Renan emphasises the importance of a ‘will to nationhood’
that seeks a consensus (on historical memory) on which to rest
present-day consent through a ‘daily plebiscite’. This is the aim,
and societies may well fall short of it, but nonetheless appeal, in
Renan's terms, to consenting participation in a ‘discourse on
society that performs the problem of totalizing a people and
unifying the national will’ (Bhabha, 1994: 160–1).
Importantly, Renan makes a conceptual contrast with ethnicity, in

The title of this section comes from a lecture given by the French

a manner that has political implications that take us back to

writer Ernest Renan in the late nineteenth century. Renan could

Hearn's definition discussed at the outset. Calhoun (1993: 229)

not understand how it was that Switzerland, which had three

elaborates this in his observation that a ‘crucial distinction

languages (French, German and Italian) and a variety of religions,

between ethnicities and nations is that the latter are envisioned as
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intrinsically political communities, as sources of sovereignty, while

state gave rise to nationalism (Gellner's position as above), or

this is not central to the definition of ethnicities’. That is not to say

whether a modern cultural movement gave rise to a mass identity.

that conceptions of the nation cannot (or do not) significantly
overlap with ethnicity, that they are not, à la Hobsbawm (1991: 4),

Imagined Communities

‘diﬀerent, and indeed non-compatible, concepts’. Nor indeed

A highly influential elaboration of the former view comes from the

should this suggest that all nations have sovereignty, but it is

historical sociologist Benedict Anderson (1991) in his book

instead to open up the ways in which the ethnic basis of

Imagined Communities, which has emerged as a central account

nationhood is often disputed. Those who hold this view are often

in the field. Anderson argues that nationalism emerged in Europe

grouped as ‘modernists’, and a trailblazing account was provided

in the eighteenth century and created nations as ‘imagined

by Ernest Gellner's (1983) Nations and Nationalism. For him:

political communities’ that are both ‘limited and sovereign’ (ibid.:

It is not the case that the ‘age of nationalism’ is a mere
summation of the awakening and political self assertion of this,
that, or the other nation. Rather when general social conditions
make for standardised homogeneous, centrally sustained high
cultures, pervading ethnic populations and not just elite
minorities, a situation arises in which well defined educationally
sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only
kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify
with. (Ibid.: 55)

6). By this he means two things. First, it is imagined in so far as all
members of even the smallest nation will never meet each other,
and yet in the minds of each lives an image of their connection to
each other. In this regard nations ‘only fully realize their horizons
in the mind's eye’ (Bhabha, 1994: 293). Second, it is ‘limited’
because each nation has finite borders beyond which live other
nations. Third, nations are ‘sovereign’ because they were created
in an age of modernity when the ideas of rule by monarchies
seemed less rational. Lastly, he argued that regardless of the
actual inequality the nation is always conceived as a deep and

It is important to remember, however, that there are a variety of

horizontal comradeship. The latter passes over an often ‘turbulent

positions amongst modernists who may otherwise find agreement

and contested history’ to give an emphasis to ‘tradition and

with Gellner, and who oﬀer a diﬀerent historical timing of the

heritage, above all on continuity so that our present political

emergence of nationalism, as well as its key influences. Perhaps a

culture is seen as the flowering of a long organic

core distinction concerns whether the creation of the modern

evolution’ (Schwarz, 1986: 155).
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It is really important, however, not to confuse the term imagining

was particularly evident in the circulation of newspapers in which

with fabrication because Anderson argues that just because we

news stories were simultaneously consumed by an increasing

imagine our social and political order as a ‘national’ one, this

number of reading masses who began to share the same

does not mean it is not ‘real’. What he says is that ideas can

language, and the widespread availability of these in the same

become a powerful basis for social action. Indeed, it is worth

language allowed the reader to have much in common with their

bearing in mind that Gellner's (1983) position was also alive to

co-reader. One implication is that these newspapers contained a

this distinction. For the latter:

‘calenderical symmetry’ – by this he meant that because the date

The idea of man without a nation appears to impose strain on the
modern imagination. A man must have a nationality as he must
have a nose and two ears. All this seems obvious, though, alas, it
is not true. But that it should come to seem so very obviously true
is indeed an aspect, perhaps the very core, of the problem of
nationalism. Having a nation is not an inherent attribute to
humanity, but it has come to appear as such. (Ibid.: 6)

was at the top of newspapers it placed everybody in the country
in the same time frame. The important thing to notice here is that
he argues that nations and states are the result of a recent
cultural artifact (so nationalism creates nations, not the other way
around).
Ethnies and Pre-Modernity
Not everybody shares the view that nations are an outcome of a

Anderson seeks to illustrate this with reference to his discussion

relatively modern imagined identity, however, and detractors often

of the relationship between national vernaculars and identity. To

point to what they see as a key flaw in the modernist augment:

this end he identifies the emergence of the printing press – giving

why does nationalism persist in the modern (and modernised)

rise to what he called ‘print capitalism’ – as something which did

world? The most prominent opposing view comes from a cluster

more than anything else to allow people to imagine themselves as

of work around ‘ethno-symbolism’ which says that pre-modern

a nation. Why would this be important?

ethnic ties have been important in creating ethnic cultures that

Well, first, it allowed for the development of commercial book
publishing on a wide scale at a time when there was a serious
decline in the use of Latin as the main European script. This
meant that more and more regional languages – or ‘vernaculars’ –
were used and provided the basis for a national language. This

forge a nation. For example, in his book The Ethnic Origin of
Nations, Anthony Smith (1986) argues that modernists, in their
determination to reveal the invented or constructed nature of
nationalism, ignore the continuing persistence of myths, symbols,
values and memories over time, and the significance that these
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things can have for large numbers of people. He argues: ‘the
“roots” of these nations are to be found, both in a general way
and in many specific cases, in the model of ethnic community
prevalent in much of the recorded history of the globe’ (ibid.: x).
More precisely, he argues that modern nation-states have
emerged out of a complex mixture of social and ethnic ties all the
way back from pre-modern times. He calls these ‘ethnies’ which
he says modernity has transformed but not erased. In so doing he
seeks to link ‘the consequences of modernity with an
understanding of the continuing role played by cultural ties and
ethnic identities which originated in pre-modern epochs’ (Smith,
1995: 47).

The Bad and the Banal
You may have already noticed that nowhere has this discussion of
nationalism dwelt on the obviously bad kinds. You only need to
think about some of the many conflicts that have scarred Europe
in the last one hundred years. The Nazism of Hitler's Germany
and the Holocaust, the Fascism of Franco's Spain and
Mussolini's Italy – or even much more recently the ethnic
cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia – are all illustrations of an extreme
and terribly violent nationalism. Clearly very few academics would
characterise these as other than what they are – racist
movements that grasp and exploit part of a national story that
supports their political cause. This is true of all the kinds

The analogy he makes is that when it comes to thinking about

mentioned above, the best known perhaps being Hitler's fantasy

nations we should regard the modern era as a scroll that has

that the German people descended from racially superior ‘Aryans’

been re-used and on which are recorded the experiences and

who had many mythical qualities but were principally white and

identities of diﬀerent ethnic cultures in the past: the earlier

Christian.

influencing and being modified by the latter, to produce layers of
collective cultures which we call ‘the nation’. In Smith's view this
would explain which populations are likely to start a movement of
nationalism; what the content of this would be (role of memories,
myths and symbols in languages, public holidays, sacred sites);
and most importantly why nationalism is able to generate such
widespread national appeal.

The reason for not dwelling on these types of nationalism is that
they are today much less valid – though they have not gone away
– and are diﬃcult to sustain. But more importantly, by focusing on
extreme nationalisms we push our own nationalism to the
periphery of social life, making it something that happens
elsewhere and not here, amongst us. In his book Banal
Nationalism Michael Billig (1995) argues that we tend to think
about our everyday nationalism as ‘patriotism’, something which
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is good and beneficial rather than irrational or dangerous.

preserve of white Christians. What the focus on headscarves also

Reflecting on his account, Billig (2009: 349) states:

highlights is how central gender and women are to our ‘banal

Banal nationalism attempted to look beyond the dialogues of
conscious sense-making towards a psychology of the unnoticed.
The flags hanging in the street, or attached to the lapels of
politicians, carry no propositional message for the ordinary citizen
to receive passively or consciously argue against. Yet, such
symbols help us to maintain the everyday world as belonging to
the world of nation-states.

nationalism’. If we stop and think about it the nation is often
imagined as a big family, and the homeland as a vulnerable
woman needing protection – the nasty aspect of this is that rape
is frequently used as a weapon of war. Reflecting on this Nira
Yuval-Davies (1997) has argued that gender is a key part of
nationhood because women are often seen as biological
reproducers of members of ethnic groups and, by extension, as
reproducers of national groups. This means that while men are

He argues that this encourages the view that nationalism has

more likely to monopolise its political and military representation,

gone away and then returns – that it is a latent force that

it is women who come to ‘embody’ the nation as such (Meer et

manifests itself like a natural disaster which strikes spontaneously

al., 2010).

and unpredictably. This is referred to as the ‘Sleeping Beauty’
syndrome which only sees nationalism as sometimes spectacular

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s

but misses its more subtle manifestations and ignores how we all

use of Credo Reference.

participate in sustaining it for diﬀerent ends. Symbols in this way
can act as ‘border guards’, and are ‘linked to specific cultural
codes and function to identify people as members or nonmembers of the specific national collectivity’ (May, 2001: 61).
Thus in Why the French Don't Like Headscarves, John Bowen
(2006) says this is precisely what happens because even though
the Muslim headscarves and mosque are not objectively more
visible than other religious diﬀerence or the cathedral, they are
subjectively shocking because they force French people to think
about how being French is no longer – if it ever was – the
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Section 3

Views of nationalism
Nationalism refers to a sense of devotion to a nation and to the

Centralized monarchies established their feudal states,

consciousness of seeking to promote a national culture or

identifying acceptable regional languages, separate economies,

national interests. The sentiment of loyalty toward a nation is

and even distinct art forms associated with that “national” group

widespread and global. Nationalism is a powerful force that for

that divided as well as created conflicts among peoples.

centuries has brought people together. At the same time, it has
divided them and also sparked and brought violent conflicts.

However, the scholarly examinations of the division of humanity
into nations appeared in the latter half of the eighteenth century

It has been noted that “the national idea has become the central

(Grosby, 2005). There are three important stages or phases

principle according to which modern society structures inclusion

associated with the study of nationalism: First is the idea of

and exclusion, not only in the sphere of culture and identity, but

nationalism, which was born before World War I; second is the

also in the legal, political, military, and social domains” (Wimmer,

period between 1918 to 1945 when nationalism became a

2002, p. 57). Given its significance, nationalism is a critical issue

subject of academic inquiry; and third is between 1945 to the

that needs to be studied by addressing its causes and impacts

late 1980s when the debates and research on nationalism

on social conflicts in a multicultural and globalized world.

became more diversified (Özkirimli, 2000). Since then,

Historical Overview
The elements of nationalism can be traced back to ancient times.
A sense of pride and community was expressed among ancient

scholarship in this area has expanded to include the connection
of transnationalism as well, reflecting the “multiple national
residences, identities and loyalties” in this era of migration and
globalization (Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002, p. 4).

Greeks, who, oftentimes, as a people, felt superior in relation to

The interest, among classical scholars and researchers, in

others. Some of the features of nationalism and cultural

nationalism grew significantly in the twentieth century. There are

superiority also appeared in the Roman Empire and elsewhere.

many reasons for increased scholarly attention on the problem of
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nationalism and its impact around the world. One was the

functionalist perspective on nationalism (Wimmer, 2002). Gellner

“attempt to come to terms with the brutality of World War

stated,

I” (Grosby, 2005, p. 117). During this war, millions of people were
killed. Nationalism served as a vehicle for mass mobilization in
which one nation fought against another. Nationalism and
ideology had also played a critical role in the rise of Italian
fascism and German Nazism, which brought death and
destruction in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, World War II further
expanded the attention of various scholars to study and tackle

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an
inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth;
nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and
turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often
obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or
worse, and in general an inescapable one. (p. 49)

the problem of nationalism and its domestic and international

Hobsbawm gave credence to the role of political and social

dimensions. After World War II and later, there were emerging

transformations in his analysis of nationalism. According to

political movements in Asia and Africa that aimed at ending

Hobsbawm, “Both nations and nationalism are products of social

colonization. These decolonization movements were inspired, in

engineering” (Özkirimli, 2000 p. 116). He also understood how the

part, by nationalism, the desire for freedom, and the rejection of

past, and history, are used to justify the actions of nationalists

the European presence in the region. Also, leaders of national

and to maintain group cohesion. Benedict Anderson (1990), in his

self-determination were becoming strong and gaining momentum

book Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and

in other parts of the world, especially those who wanted to gain

Spread of Nationalism, described the nation as an imagined

independence.

political community, noting that the “members of even the

Scholars’ Views on Nationalism
Scholars who wrote and researched diﬀerent aspects or angles of
nationalism include: Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, John
Armstrong, Eric Hobsbawm, Anthony D. Smith, and more. For
instance, Gellner (1990) saw nationalism as a primarily political
principle, implying that the political and national unit should be
congruent. He expressed what could be considered a

smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members,
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives
the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1990, p. 15). He
asserts that both “nation” and “nationalism” are socially
constructed. It is important to understand that people who
perceive themselves as a member of a nation base that sense of
belonging without face-to-face interaction with their fellow
community members. In addition, Anderson understood the
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connection between nationalism, printed literature, and other

exclusions of those that are perceived or identified as “others”

resources that often are disseminated to promote and advance

within the country (e.g., immigrants, minorities, and more). Two

nationalism.

faces of nationalism are worth mentioning and discussing here.

Smith (2001) has also greatly contributed to nationalism studies.
He argued that the central question in our understanding of

One is negative nationalism, and the other positive nationalism
(Reich, 2001).

nationalism is the role of the past in the creation of the present. In

Negative nationalism can exclude people in the so-called

addition, Smith supported the idea that nationalism has its

“homeland.” This includes the exclusion of certain groups despite

tradition, and that its roots are found in premodern times.

the fact that they are living and working within the nation's

According to what has been called a neoromantic view of

borders. Some national extremists may perceive minorities, and

nationalism (Wimmer, 2002), kinship, belief systems, common

others, unjustly, as not truly being part of the national community.

identity, and associated myths are elements of nationalism. Smith

In addition, they also see other nations, or the world, as a zero-

suggested that while nationalism may be an old phenomenon, it

sum game, or win-lose situation, in which nationalist gains come

is often reinforced, energized, and promoted by those who bond

at other nations’ expense. Usually champions of negative

and have feelings of solidarity among themselves. Today the

nationalism turn away from global responsibilities (Reich, 2001).

members of the nation do not need to be alike to join the national

On the other hand, those espousing positive nationalism promote

cause; however, they have to share some type of real or imagined

and value their own national heritage, including the diversity of

solidarity that they believe in.

the nation's population, and seek justice for all. This perspective

Two Faces of Nationalism
Nationalists have a tendency to believe that the nation, or
country, they belong to or identify with should come first. They
may make divisions of people (“us” versus “them”) based on
national identity; those who are inside the nation's borders can be
placed in the category of “us” and those outside national borders

of nationalism is more inclusive and promotes the expansion of
opportunities for all members of the community inside the
national borders as well as for members of other nations.
Furthermore, it is more likely for the society to be open and
tolerant toward the rest of the world. Here, people would be able
to learn from other cultures as well as instill habits of good
citizenship and social justice.

are classified as “them,” although there is room for divisions and
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Major Paradigms of Nationalism

roots to antiquity; however, they are the products of human social
organization (Puri, 2004).

There are four main paradigms, among others, that have been
widely used by scholars and pundits to understand nationalism
and what causes it. One is called primordial, which has a long
history. This paradigm makes an attempt to describe and explain
the phenomenon of nationalism, from the biological or
evolutionary perspective, by seeing humans that aﬃliate, belong,
and organize themselves based on their aﬃnity of birth. For
primordialists, “nations are the foundations of human history,
extension of primitive kinship groups with common ancestry and
clear social and territorial boundaries” (Puri, 2004, p. 44).
Proponents of this paradigm also place importance on language,

Instrumentalist theorists pay more attention to nationalist beliefs
that are critical in order to understand nationalism and its causes.
These national beliefs, or perceived sense of community among
its members, often are the result of human manipulation.
Instrumentalists don't ignore the kinship and other aﬃnity ties of
members of the nation. However, they place an emphasis on
elites and their opportunity to manipulate the masses for their
own interests. Indeed, they make an argument that nations and
nationalism are made up by social elites who advance or
maximize their interests.

race, religion, custom, and identity. All these factors, they argue,

Modernist proponents “saw nations as communities of action and

make people or members of the nation identify and aﬃliate with

purpose” in which individuals and groups work and live within the

one another. However, this paradigm or theory has been widely

community (Smith, 2009, p. 7). In other words, nationalism is an

criticized by scholars as too narrow and just based on biological

ideology of dynamic collective eﬀort as well as sacrifice on behalf

accounts of nations (Puri, 2004). In other words, according to the

of the nation (Smith, 2009). Modernists also see nation building

opponents, this theory leaves out, or does not tackle, the cultural

and nationalism as something that can develop and flourish out of

and political aspects of nationalism.

the condition of modernity. In addition, modernists acknowledge

The perennialist paradigm, and its proponents, are closely related
to primordialist because of their fundamental emphasis on
nations. However, according to perennialists, nations are not

that the nation is also a modern phenomenon. It is a product of
national ideologies that continue to be evident in the modern and
industrial societies.

“natural” as primordialists proclaim. Those who are in the camp of
perennilists assert that contemporary nations may trace their
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The Role of Symbols in Nations and Nationalism

and members are more likely to unite due to common imagery,
shared myths, values, and memories (Smith, 2001).

The common denominator is that all nations use some type of
national symbol and ceremony that, to them, have a value. These

Hypernationalism

symbols make sense and are considered important for

It is the extreme form of nationalism that claimed over one

nationhood and independence. Many scholars and policy
analysts have paid attention to the meaning of a nation's symbols
and found them to have a significant role in the nation's formation
and in nation building (Elgenius, 2011). Of course, a nation's
symbols and flags, in some instances, but not always, have been
introduced, adopted, altered, tested, and established over a
period of time and also during the most pivotal times of nation
making (Elgenius, 2011). Thus, for some people of a particular
nation, the flag is meaningful and may even represent pride,
identification, sacrifice, or freedom. However, national flags, on
the other hand, have sometimes contributed to conflicts, carnage,
and divisions among people.
People seem to come together when they celebrate and identify
with national holidays, making use of flags, ceremonies, anthems,
emblems, war memorials, and more. All of this, in itself, creates a
visible image that nationalists connect to. In addition to this,
“flags are political symbols because they authenticate boundaries
between those who belong and those who do not” (Elgenious,
2011, p. 3). Furthermore, national symbols, and particularly the
flag, represent and reinforce people's attitudes toward a nation,

hundred million deaths in the twentieth century. It also continues
to divide the human race along the lines of nationality, territorial,
and identity boundaries that have been created over the
centuries. This type of nationalism is often characterized by
authoritarianism. Leaders and their followers often are able to
manipulate the masses by using propaganda, and other forms of
persuasion, to buy into this exclusionary ideology. Those in
leadership positions may use various forms of propaganda to
appeal to the ordinary citizens. Three nations—Japan, Italy, and
Germany—who initiated World War II, were all led by leaders who
stressed unmet nationalist goals and grievances in the years
leading up to the outbreak of fighting in 1939 (Hauss, 2003). The
ordinary citizens who took up arms in those conflicts may have
shared the same kind of deeply rooted emotions and the sense of
patriotism that, at least, was portrayed by their leaders as a
worthy cause to join. This was based on ideology and
nationalism. The ordinary Germans were bombarded with
messages that were aimed against other groups. In addition,
respected local leaders also served the Nazi ideology, and this
served to deepen their resentments and hate. Hitler had to rely on
newspapers, mass organizations, public meetings, and primitive
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radio and film technologies. Today's nationalist (and often

what they call historical rights (Gans, 2003). It seems that, to

demagogic) leader has the full range of mass media technologies

some, territory and land are vital to national sentiments and

to draw on, and in some of the most destructive conflicts in

feelings. It is critical to mention that there is “cultivation of

recent decades (e.g., in Rwanda and Serbia), they did just that.

emotions toward the nation as a physical place,” and this can be

Also, social media has been used to manipulate and portray the

considered by nationalists as important to them (Hogan, 2009, p.

“other” as a threat or evil. One example is that of the Rwanda

102). Finally, territorial nationalism still is alive and well globally

conflict. There was the Hutu “hate radio” station that encouraged

due to nationalist claims. Countries or states may contest such

genocide against Rwanda's Tutsi minority (Snyder & Ballentine,

claims. As a result, these self-determination movements may

2001).

create new countries or states, but at the same time spark and

It is critical to understand the role that leaders have to play in
today's world. They remain very important in the nation-state
organized system. Of course, they have a responsibility to resist

cause conflicts. Thus, the issue of nationalism will remain a
significant social and political concept with lasting influence and
impact in the years ahead.

and fight hypernationalist ideas and the various forms of
propaganda that goes with them. However, this is not always the

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s

case. Especially in the age of social media, extremist groups and

use of Credo Reference.

demagogic leaders have a tendency to use them, and other
channels, to get their messages out. Thus, hypernationalism
tendencies are still present in today's world and can bring chaos
and carnage on a mass scale.
Territorial Nationalism
Even in contemporary times, territory and sovereignty often play a
critical role in nationalism. This type of nationalism presumes that
all inhabitants of a nation, whether they like it or not, owe
allegiance to their nation or country. And national groups quite
often make demands for territorial sovereignty in the name of
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Section 4

Nationalism : a very short introduction
The problem

I [the Egyptian Pharaoh Ka-mose] should like to know for what
purpose is my strength . . . I sit here [in Thebes] while both an

What is so important about the existence of nations? Throughout

Asiatic and a Nubian have his slice of Egypt . . . A man cannot

history, humans have formed groups of various kinds around

dwell properly when despoiled by the taxes of the savages. I will

criteria that are used to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘them’. One such

grapple with him, and rip open his belly. My wish is to save Egypt

group is the nation. Many thousands, indeed millions, have died

and to smite the Asiatics. —From a speech of Pharaoh Ka-mose

in wars on behalf of their nation, as they did in World Wars I and
II during the 20th century, perhaps the cruelest of all centuries.
This is one of the reasons why it is so important to understand
what a nation is: this tendency of humanity to divide itself into
distinct, and often conflicting, groups.
Evidence of humans forming large, territorially distinct societies
can be observed from our first written records. Writings from the
Sumerian civilization of the area of the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers from approximately 2500 BCE record beliefs that
distinguished the ‘brothers of the sons of Sumer’, those of
Sumerian ‘seed’, from foreigners. During the 16th century BCE,

In the Qin and Han Periods (221 BCE to 220 CE), distinctions
were drawn between the self-described superior Chinese and
those who were viewed by them to be less than human aliens,
the Di and the Rohn. In the tenth chapter of the book of Genesis,
there is recognition of territorial and linguistic divisions of
humanity into what the ancient Israelites called gôyim.
These are the sons of Shem according to their clans and
languages, in their lands according to their nations (gôyim). These
are the clans of the sons of Noah according to their lineage in
their nations (gôyim). —Genesis 10:31–32

Egyptians thought themselves to be distinct from both the

In the 5th century BCE, the historian Herodotus asserted a

‘Asiatics’ to their east and the Nubians to their south.

‘common Greekness’ among the Hellenes.
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Then there is our common Greekness: we are one in blood and

those societies designated by such terms as the biblical Hebrew

one in language; those shrines of the gods belong to us [both the

gôy and the Greek génos? These societies have something to do

Spartans and the Athenians] all in common, and the sacrifices in

with birth, territory, and being related in some way, a kinship of

common, and there are our habits, bred of a common upbringing.

some kind.

—Herodotus, The History

Were these ancient societies ‘nations’?

Plato and Aristotle divided humanity between Hellenes and
bárbaroi, the barbarian peoples from Asia Minor. The Greek
‘bárbaros’ may have its origin as an onomatopoeic designation

Such divisions, where one group diﬀerentiates itself from and

for the foreign speech of the peoples from Asia Minor that was

opposes another, continue at the beginning of the 21st century:

incomprehensible to the Hellenes. However, in the aftermath of

both Chechens and Ukrainians consider themselves to be

Greek wars with Persia, it acquired a tone of contempt that

diﬀerent from Russians; Kurds distinguish themselves from both

continues to this day in our use of the term ‘barbarian’. Moreover,

Iraqis and Turks; the Taiwanese seek an existence separate from

in his description of the ideal republic,

mainland China; Slovaks and Czechs have separated, forming

Plato described a familiarity that bound together all those born as
Hellenes, as if they were all members of the same familial
household. As a consequence, he thought the barbarians were
not only foreign to the Hellenes but also their enemies by ‘nature’.
I assert that the Greek stock (génos) is, with respect to itself, its
own [as if of the same household] and akin; and with respect to
the barbarian, foreign and alien. Then when Greeks fight with
barbarians and barbarians with Greeks, we’ll assert that they are
at war and are enemies by nature. —Plato, The Republic
Plato used the term génos to refer to this familiarity that bound
together all those born as Hellenes. What is the character of

distinct national states; Kashmir is considered by some not to be
part of India; and so on. The goal of this book is to examine this
tendency of humans to separate themselves from one another
into those distinct societies that we call nations.
Having recognized this, it must also be acknowledged that human
beings exhibit another tendency, when they engage in activities in
which it seems not to matter who were their parents, where they
where born, or what language they speak.
These activities, rather than asserting divisions within humanity,
bring people together. For example, scientists are concerned with
understanding the physical facts of the universe, such as the
nature of light. Light itself is not English, French, or German; and
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there is no English, French, or German scientific method. There is

character; thus, for any nation there will be diﬀerent and

only science. To speak of a supposedly racial or national scientific

competing beliefs about it that often manifest themselves as

method, as when the Nazis insisted that there was an ‘Aryan

political diﬀerences. Some may view their nation as standing for

science’, is to betray the character of science by introducing

individual liberty, while others may be willing to sacrifice that

considerations that have no place in understanding the physical

liberty for security. Some may welcome immigrants, and support

aspects of the universe. Other notable examples of activities and

policies that make it easy for them to become citizens; while

their corresponding conceptions that bring humans together are

others may be hostile to immigration. To take another example,

the monotheistic religions and commerce. Furthermore,

consider disputes today in India. Some members of that nation

throughout history, empires, such as the Roman and Ottoman,

have a narrow, intolerant view of their country by insisting that it

have sought to unify their peoples as a political alternative to

should have only one religion, Hinduism; while others think that

nations. Thus, while an individual often understands himself or

there should be freedom of religion such that Muslims, Sikhs, and

herself as a member of a particular nation, one may also

Christians are rightly members of the nation.

recognize oneself as a part of humanity.

Distinctive of nationalism is the belief that the nation is the only

If a proper examination of the question ‘what is a nation?’

goal worthy of pursuit – an assertion that often leads to the belief

requires consideration of the tendency of humans to assert

that the nation demands unquestioned and uncompromising

distinctions, then it must also take into account those activities

loyalty. When such a belief about the nation becomes

that unify humanity. To fail to do so will only result in a

predominant, it can threaten individual liberty. Moreover,

misapprehension of the significance of the nation in human

nationalism often asserts that other nations are implacable

aﬀairs; and it is precisely an inquiry into that significance that is

enemies to one’s own nation; it injects hatred of what is perceived

the focus of this book. We are concerned, above all, with the

to be foreign, whether another nation, an immigrant, or a person

question ‘what does the existence of nations tell us about human

who may practise another religion or speak a diﬀerent language.

beings?’ But what is a nation, and what is nationalism?

Of course, one need not view one’s own nation and its relation to

Many wrongly use the term ‘nationalism’ as a synonym for

other nations in such a manner.

‘nation’. Nationalism refers to a set of beliefs about the nation.
Any particular nation will contain diﬀering views about its
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In contrast to nationalism, the nation is a particular kind of

There are a number of complications to this definition of the

society. But what kind of society is the nation?

nation that require careful examination.

However, clarifying further what we mean by the terms ‘nation’

Time, memory, and territory

and ‘nationalism’, and addressing the other questions raised
briefly in this first chapter, involve other related problems: what is
a social relation?; what is a territory?; what is kinship?; the
appearance of the nation in history; the relation of the nation to
religion; and the tendency of humanity to divide itself into diﬀerent
nations. Each of these problems will be taken up in the chapters
that follow.

What is a nation?

Nations emerge over time as a result of numerous historical
processes. As a consequence, it is a pointless undertaking to
attempt to locate a precise moment when any particular nation
came into existence, as if it were a manufactured product
designed by an engineer. Let us examine why this is so. All
nations have historical antecedents, whether tribe, city-state, or
kingdom. These historically earlier societies are important
components in the formation of nations. For example, the English
nation emerged out of the historically earlier societies of the

The nation is a territorial community of nativity. One is born into a

Saxons, Angles, and Normans. However, these historical

nation. The significance attributed to this biological fact of birth

antecedents are never merely just facts, because key to the

into the historically evolving, territorial structure of the cultural

existence of the nation are memories that are shared among each

community of the nation is why the nation is one among a

of those many individuals who are members of the nation about

number of forms of kinship. It diﬀers from other forms of kinship

the past of their nation, including about those earlier societies.

such as the family because of the centrality of territory. It diﬀers
from other territorial societies such as a tribe, city-state, or
various ‘ethnic groups’ not merely by the greater extent of its
territory, but also because of its relatively uniform culture that
provides stability, that is, continuation over time.

There would, for example, have been no nation of ancient Israel
had there not been memories about the past, such as the exodus
from Egypt, Moses and his bronze snake (which was kept in the
Jerusalem Temple until the reign of King Hezekiah (714–686
BCE)), and the reigns of David and Solomon. There would have
been no nation of England had there not been memories about
the Saxon King Alfred (849–899 CE) and the ‘good old law’.
Likewise, memories about the Piasts (10th–12th centuries CE)
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and their kingdom were components in the emergence of Poland

conception, one is then both related to those other individuals,

as a nation, as were those about the Yamato Kingdom (4th– 7th

and aware of the relation. The relation itself, for example living in

centuries CE), with its worship of the sun goddess Amaterasu at

the same geographical area or speaking a common language, is

Ise, for the Japanese nation.

what is meant by the term ‘collective consciousness’. This term in

The events described by such memories may not be factually
accurate: for example, the ten plagues in the ancient Israelite
account of the exodus from Egypt, or that the Japanese emperor
is a descendant of Amaterasu. Every nation has its own
understanding of its distinctive past that is conveyed through

no way implies the existence of a group mind or a combination of
biological instincts, as if humans were a colony of ants. Rather, it
refers to a social relation of each of a number of individuals as a
consequence of those individuals participating in the same
evolving tradition.

stories, myths, and history. Whether historically accurate or not,

The main sanctuary of the Japanese sun goddess Amaterasu at

these memories contribute to the understanding of the present

Ise

that distinguishes one nation from another. This component of
time – when an understanding of the past forms part of the
present – is characteristic of the nation and is called ‘temporal
depth’.
These memories also form a part of the conception that one has
of oneself. As the mind of the individual develops within various
contexts, such as the family or diﬀerent educational institutions, it
seeks out those various and fluctuating traditions that are ‘at
hand’. The child learns, for example, to speak the language of his
or her nation and what it means to be a member of that nation as
expressed through its customs and laws. These traditions
become incorporated into the individual’s understanding of the
self. When those traditions that make up part of one’s self-

When those individuals not only participate in the same tradition
but also understand themselves as being diﬀerent from those
who do not, then there exists a self-designating shared belief,
which is called a ‘collective self-consciousness’,
that is, a distinctive culture. Properties or qualities of a tradition
are recognized which distinguish it from any other; they are the
boundaries of the social relation that allow us to distinguish ‘us’
from ‘them’. To return to our examples, those who accept, and by
doing so participate in, the tradition of the Israelite exodus from
Egypt distinguish themselves from those who do not. Those who
worship the Japanese sun goddess Amaterasu distinguish
themselves from those who do not.

conception are shared by other individuals as part of their self349

Those who speak one language understand themselves to be

born in that territory, even if they were born before you. In such a

diﬀerent from those who speak a diﬀerent language. The nation is

situation, there exists a territorially formed ‘people’ that is

a social relation of collective self- consciousness.

believed to have

This distinguishing, shared self-awareness is expressed in and

existed over time; and this is what is meant by the term ‘nation’.

influenced by the everyday conduct of the individuals who make

This relation is conveyed by variation of a term that

up the social relation of the nation, for example the clothes one

simultaneously refers to both the territory and its population, for

wears, the songs one sings, the language one speaks, or the

example England-English, France-French, Germany- Germans,

religion one observes. It is sustained by various institutions, such

Canada-Canadians, Kurdistan (literally, ‘land of the Kurds’)-Kurds,

as the Jerusalem Temple for ancient Israel, or the shrine at Ise for

and so forth. This variation implies the following conception: a

Japan, or the Parliament for England, that bear those traditions

people has its land, and a land has its people. The nation is a

around which the social relation of the nation is formed. Those

social relation with both temporal depth and bounded territory.

institutions provide a structure for the nation. Thus, the nation is
formed around shared, self-designating beliefs that have such a
structure.

The act of seeking out and laying a claim to a past and its
location establishes continuity between that past and its location
with the present and its location. This continuity is viewed as

However, the nation is formed around shared traditions that are

justifying the order of the present because it is understood as

not merely about a distinctive past, but a spatially situated past.

necessarily containing that past. For example, during the early

Where there is a spatial focus to the relation between individuals,

20th century, many Jews thought that modern Israel could only

then place becomes the basis by which to distinguish one person

be located in the area of the eastern Mediterranean because that

from another. The inhabitants of a location understand

was where their past – ancient Israel – had existed. The belief in

themselves to be related to those whose self-understanding

such a continuity provides an understanding of the self and its

contains a reference to that location. The location, thus, is no

place in the world. When one says, ‘I am English’, one

longer merely an area of space; it has

recognizes, perhaps often implicitly, various characteristics about

become a space with meaning: a territory. Usually this selfunderstanding revolves around birth in a territory. One thereby

oneself, for example having been born in the territory of England,
which makes one English.

recognizes oneself to be related to those who have also been
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However, the characteristics (and the traditions that bear them)

the Israelites were descendants of Abraham, the belief that the

that contribute to the self-image of the individual are many and

Japanese are descendants of the first emperor, the Romanian

varied. Clearly, not all aspects of the self and the many social

belief that the Romanians are descendants of the ancient

relations one forms are about being a member of a nation. If one

Dacians, and, for China, the belief that there is a Han race. Such

is a scientist, one understands oneself as participating in a world

beliefs in a supposedly common descent are in many cases

community of scientists pursuing physical, biological, or

without factual basis; yet they appear repeatedly throughout

mathematical truths. If one is an adherent to a monotheistic world

history. What accounts for their persistence; and how do such

religion such as Christianity or Islam, then one may understand

beliefs help us to understand what is a nation?

oneself in terms of universal brotherhood. However, central to the
existence of the nation is the tendency of humanity to form
territorially distinct societies, each of which is formed around its
own cultural traditions of continuity. The nation is a territorial
relation of collective self- consciousness of actual and imagined
duration.

The nation, kinship, and community

Humans are preoccupied with vitality; that is, a concern with the
generation, transmission, sustenance, and protection of life itself.
The obvious social relation formed around this preoccupation is
the family. However, the numerous individual families of the nation
understand themselves to be just that; thus, the continuation of
the nation into the future is understood as entailing the
continuation of the families into the future. From everything we
know historically and anthropologically about humans, they have

There are usually other understandings of the nation that support

always formed not only families, but also larger groups of which

the belief in its continuity. It may be understood as having to do

families are a part. Parents transmit to their own oﬀspring not only

with the eternal, hence continuous, order of the universe, usually

their ‘flesh and blood’, but also their own cultural inheritance –

as an act of the gods, for example the Sinhalese belief that Sri

their language, customs, and so forth – of the larger group, of the

Lanka is uniquely sanctified as a Buddhist land because of the

nation. This cultural inheritance is usually viewed by the parents

acts of the Buddha on the island, or that the United States of

as being quite precious to their existence. This inter-generational

America embodies the order of God’s nature as proclaimed in the

transmission of one’s culture may be part

Declaration of Independence. Often the continuity of the nation is
thought to be a result of a supposed descent from a common
ancestor, examples of which are the ancient Israelite belief that

of the reason for the tendency to view the nation as a form of
kinship, because what is being transmitted is a part of one’s self
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to one’s descendants. However, there is another reason for this

This focus on birth places the nation within the continuum of

tendency.

groups of kinship. It is this element of kinship that the prolific

As discussed, birth within the territory is also recognized to be the
criterion for membership in the nation. There is thus a
commingling of recognition of two lines of descent: descent in the

scholar of nations and nationalism Anthony Smith has rightly
sought to capture in his argument for the existence of what he
characterizes as the ‘ethnic’ element in the nation.

territory of the nation and descent from parents who are members

Similar to the nation, one is born into an ethnic group. Because of

of the nation. This criterion of birth, and the traceable relations

this characteristic of birth, both the ethnic group and the nation

formed as a result, is why the nation is a form of kinship.

are often perceived as being ‘natural’ relations. Despite this

Kinship refers to recognized traceable lines or relations of
biological descent, for example a child is related to his or her
parents because the child is recognized as being descended from
them through birth. Broader relations of descent are also
perceived, resulting in, for example, the acknowledgement of
aunts, uncles, and cousins.

perception, both of these forms of kinship incorporate other
cultural traditions, such as language and religion, as boundaries
of the social relation. While it is sometimes diﬃcult to distinguish
clearly an ethnic group from a nation, ethnicity tends to
emphasize beliefs in descent from a supposed common ancestor
or ancestors, as if the ethnic group were an extended family,
while the focus of the nation is territorial descent. Important to

This fact is not to lend credence to beliefs such as that the

realize is that kinship is an ambiguous relation, as it is a

Germans are descended from ancient Teutonic tribes, or that the

consequence of the perception of being related. Usually any

Japanese are descended from the emperor, or that there is a Han

nation contains within it numerous ethnic groups.

race. All nations are formed over time out of a combination of
diﬀerent populations, and all nations have immigrants. Although
for those immigrants to become members of the nation, they
must usually undergo a legal process of ‘naturalization’; that is,
they must be transformed as if they had been born in the national
territory.

The nation is a community of kinship, specifically a bounded,
territorially extensive, temporally deep community of nativity. The
term ‘community’ refers to a level of self- consciousness of the
individual such that one recognizes oneself to be necessarily and
continually related to others, as occurs, for example, through
birth. The obvious example of a community is the family, where
one is always related to other members of the family, irrespective
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of disagreements between those members. Important for

been in his power to defend that fortress, would have

understanding the nation is to recognize that relations that are

sacrificed his life a thousand times rather than, through his

perceived to enduringly bind one individual to another are

fault, have let it fall into the hands of the enemy.

possible not only within a family, but also within the territorially
extensive, modern nation.
There have been those who have thought, because of these
enduringly binding relations, that the nation designates an idyllic
condition of a conflict-free unity. Such a romantic view of the
nation can be found in the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder in
the 18th century and Johann Gottlieb Fichte in the 19th century.

The problem is how to account for the combination of sentiments
of self-interest and self-sacrifice.
There appear to be a number of incomparable purposes of
human conduct, or even areas of understanding to which the
concept of usefulness does not apply, for example ‘beauty’.
Nonetheless, one can still agree with Aristotle that ‘every
partnership is constituted for the sake of some good’ and thus

However, no community is free from conflict. Even within the

isolate the defining purpose of the nation. However, the isolation

family, there are jealousies and resentments. In the village – often

of that defining purpose is an abstraction that obscures the

appealed to as a romantic example of a community – there exist

unavoidable presence of many diﬀerent factors in the formation

many diﬀerent kinds of attachments as cause for conflict. There

and continued existence of any social relation, such as the pursuit

are friendships and animosities, groupings distinguished by

of power over another. Having noted this qualification, the

economic activities and their corresponding interests, for example

character of the nation revolves around the classificatory

farmers and traders, and usually competing families.

distinction of a ‘we’ in contrast to a ‘them’ arising from the

In contrast to the romantic view of the nation, the actions of the
members of the nation involve many diﬀerent, even contradictory,
pursuits. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith
caught well these contradictory pursuits when he observed:
There is many an honest Englishman, who, in his private
station, would be more seriously disturbed by the loss of a

significance attributed to the circumstances of birth: the relations
formed as a consequence of being born in the nation’s territory.
Thus, that ‘we’
has attributed to it a relation of kinship that indicates a shared
locational preoccupation with the generation and sustenance of
life, and its transmission over time.

guinea, then by the national loss of Minorca, who yet, had it
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Patriotism

attachments. Thus, it may be more helpful to distinguish the love
for one’s paramour or children from the ‘love’ for one’s nation by

The preoccupation with vitality involves establishing diﬀerent

understanding patriotism as signifying attachments of loyalty to a

kinds of limits or boundaries to respectively diﬀerent kinds of

territorial community. There are often diﬀerent aspects to the

relations of vitality. Humans draw a distinction between their own

patriotic attachments that one forms to one’s nation, as a

children and those of another. One usually does not love

consequence of the diﬀerent factors involved in the historical

another’s children as if they were one’s own. And one does not

formation of a particular nation. One may, for example, be loyal to

usually love another nation as if it were one’s own. Such a

one’s nation because of its laws, or its customs, or its religion.

limitation on the recognition of, and the love for, what is

There are usually many and diﬀering, even conflicting, views of

understood to be one’s own is a consequence of the

the nation that correspond to these diﬀerent factors. However,

preoccupation with the continuation of the self, both its biological

inescapable is the fact that the individual often shows a

and cultural components. The love that one has for one’s nation is

preference for his or her fellow nationals.

designated by the term ‘patriotism’.

This preference need not take the form of a prejudice against, or

The widely used term ‘love’ as an expression of the attachments

hatred of, those who are not members of one’s nation. Patriotism

that the individual has to his or her nation is not altogether

need not deny varying and diﬀerent pursuits by the members of

satisfactory because we also employ the same term to describe

the nation. It need not reject diﬀering conceptions of the nation

the attachments one has to one’s paramour, children, friends, and

held by members of the nation, as nationalism often does.

god. Indeed, some individuals have genuinely loved all of

Indeed, in so far as patriotism implies a commitment to the well-

humanity.

being of one’s country, it provides the basis for working out the

What such a wide use of the term indicates is that, in each of
these instances, the individual puts aside, or ‘transcends’, his or
her own self-interest for the sake of others. However,
understanding properly the character of such attachments should
take into account not only the act of self-transcendence common
to all of these attachments, but also the diﬀerent objects of those

diﬀerences, involving reasonable compromise, between the
individual members of the nation and their diﬀering conceptions
of what the nation should be out of a concern for promoting that
well-being. The process of working out these diﬀerences through
compromise is politics. The concern for the well-being of the
nation that includes the willingness to compromise is central to
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the civility between the members of the nation that makes politics

The formation of a nation

possible.
When one divides the world into two irreconcilable and warring
camps – one’s own nation in opposition to all other nations –
where the latter are viewed as one’s implacable enemies, then, in
contrast to patriotism, there is the ideology of nationalism.
Nationalism repudiates civility and the diﬀerences that it tolerates
by attempting to eliminate all diﬀering views and interests for the
sake of one vision of what the nation has been and should be. For
example, a French nationalism might consist of the belief that to
be a good member of the French nation, one must hate
everything English and German; and anyone who does not, isn’t
‘truly’ French.
Nationalism knows no compromise; it seeks to sweep aside the
many complications that always are part of life as it actually is. As
a systematic, uncompromising, and unrealistic view of the world,
the ideology of nationalism is relatively recent, appearing, for
example, in the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s
Addresses to the German Nation (1808) and later in the writings
of such authors as the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke
(1834–96) and the French journalist Charles Maurras (1868–1952).
One may perhaps observe anticipations of it in much earlier
periods, for example in the Roman Cato the Elder’s (234–149
BCE) reported hatred of all things Greek.

The relatively greater territorial extent of the nation indicates the
search for, and the establishment of, a medium between, on the
one hand, the precarious isolation of the tribe or city-state, which
can be dominated by a larger society; and, on the other, the
imperial rule of empire that apparently inescapably involves
bureaucratic despotism. The territorial community of the nation
indicates an area of cultural familiarity and loyalty between these
two alternatives that allows for self-rule. Its existence implies, as
Ernest Renan observed in his essay ‘What is a nation?’, a coming
together over time of previously distinct populations that have
much in common; it implies a bounded territorial community of
custom and law.
There is thus, as the French sociologist Dominique Schnapper
observed, a duality to the nation. On the one hand, there is the
appeal to the temporal continuity of a territory and a significance
attributed to territorial relations as a consequence of birth, both of
which account for the character of the nation as a territorial
community of kinship. We may formulate this part of the duality
as the acceptance of a limiting tradition that distinguishes one
nation from another. On the other hand, there is the uneven
coming together of previously distinct localities into a national
territory and their respective populations into a nation that is
abetted by numerous factors, such as: a developing selfunderstanding conveyed through history, a law of the land, a
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common religion, usually a common language, and an

For example, seemingly somewhat amorphous ‘ethnic groups’

authoritative centre with institutions capable of sustaining the

that lack a culturally unifying centre or institutions, such as the

nation over time (for example, London as the centre of England

Aramaeans of the ancient Near East or the Vandals, Avars, and

with the institution of Parliament). This part of the duality

Picts of the early Middle Ages, and even culturally more cohesive

represents innovative, expansive tendencies of human conduct in

societies, such as the ancient Hellenes or Sumerians, are to be

the sense that previously local customs are supplanted, rarely

distinguished from the culturally relatively uniform nation. While

entirely, by a law of the land, a common culture, and a loyalty –

there is merit to these distinctions, one should resist pursuing

patriotism – to the nation with its national territory. The nation

them too far because historically the processes involved in the

represents an uneasy balance of tradition and innovation.

formation of the nation are always complicated, making such

A nation will territorially encompass a number of diﬀerent
localities. While the spatially smaller village, city, and region
continue to exist, they are understood by their inhabitants to be
parts of the nation. Thus, the common culture of the nation is only
relative; it is rarely complete such that the inhabitants of the

distinctions diﬃcult in any particular instance. For example, what
is one to make of Great Britain, which contains England,
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland? Should Kurdistan or
Kashmir or Quebec be designated as regions, ethnic groups,
‘proto-nations’, or nations?

village, city, and region within the nation cease to recognize

The complications suggested by these questions indicate that we

themselves as inhabitants of such localities. However, during

are dealing with uneven processes of an understanding of the self

periods of intense patriotic enthusiasm, such as during a war, the

involved in the always historically complex formation of a shared

attachments of the inhabitants of the local village, city, or region

self-understanding, a collective self- consciousness.

to the nation may become dominant; but such a situation can
only be episodic.

Nonetheless, our use of the term ‘nation’ implies the continuation
over time of a relatively uniform territorial culture. Thus, a number

Because the nation exhibits only a relative cultural uniformity, it is

of developments that allow for such a continuation and culture

often diﬃcult to distinguish it from other territorial societies. It is

may be ascertained. A nation requires a relatively extensive,

tempting to avoid this diﬃculty by formulating categories that are

bounded territory or an image of such a territory, the existence of

diﬀerentiated by degrees of cultural uniformity, thereby

which usually involves the following: a self-designating name, a

distinguishing one form of territorial relation from another.

centre (with institutions), a history that both asserts and is
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expressive of a temporal continuity, and a relatively uniform

the nation. For example, the imperial states of the Austro-

culture that is often based on a common language, religion, and

Hungarian Empire and the Soviet Union contained many diﬀerent

law. Still, it is more faithful to the historical evidence to realize that

nations. Furthermore, nations have existed in the absence of a

each of these characteristics is rarely found to be absolute or

state, as did Poland during the 19th century and as does

complete; rather, they are processes in the development of

Kurdistan today.

interests, practices, and institutions, all of which are beset with
ambiguities and tensions.

Nation, state, and empire

The necessity for distinguishing nation from state does not imply
that there does not exist a complex connection between these
two forms of social relation. On the one hand, nations have been
consolidated through a state’s exercise and extension of

The recognition by the individual that he or she is a member of a

sovereignty over time; for example, the expansion of what was

nation is but one among a number of the parts of the image that

becoming the French nation during the 12th through 16th

one has of oneself. Described graphically, it is but one layer of a

centuries from the Capetian Île de France to encompass today

multi-layered self-consciousness. The layer that represents the

the territory of France from the Atlantic Ocean, on its western

recognition of being a part of a territorial kinship may or may not

border, to the Pyrenees, on the southern border, with the northern

coincide with the recognition that one is a citizen of the political

and eastern borders fluctuating over the years depending upon

and legal relation of the state.

the outcome of war, the latter being often an important factor in

Kurdistan, designated by areas that contain a Kurdish
majority but which spans sections of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey
The state may be loosely defined as a structure that, through
institutions, exercises sovereignty over a territory using laws that
relate the individuals within that territory to one another as
members of the state.
The legal and political relation of the state is analytically distinct

the formation of both a nation and a state.
The consolidation of the nation, in this case of the French nation,
does not eclipse the various, at times pronounced, regional
attachments. Indeed, it is historically rare for one nation to have a
state and for one state to have a nation; many of the world’s
states are sharply divided by regions that sometimes appear to
be ‘proto- nations’, such as Quebec in Canada or the Basque
region in Spain.

from the cultural community of the territorial relation of kinship,
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The regions of France
Nevertheless, the state’s exercise of sovereignty entails the
promulgation of law throughout the area being governed, thereby
incorporating various regions into the legal regulation of the state.
Furthermore, the eﬀectiveness of ruling is dependent upon the
standardization of communication, language and script,
throughout the area under the authority of the state. Thus, for
example, certainly one factor in territorially extensive China, with
its diverse regions, becoming ‘Chinese’ was the standardization
of Chinese script throughout what was becoming China as early
as 221 BCE, under the direction of the chancellor Li Ssu.
Similarly, an Armenian script was created around 405 CE.
The 36 letters of the Armenian alphabet, created by Mesrop
Mashtots around 405 CE
Other cultural policies of the ruling centre of the state, such as the
adoption of a particular religion and its propagation throughout
the area being ruled, have often contributed mightily to the
relative cultural uniformity of a territory. This is apparent in
Eastern Orthodoxy, a tradition in which each nation has its own

by the ruling centre of the state over a formless population. On
the contrary, acceptance of such policies often requires an
appeal by the ruling centre to pre-existing traditions, whether to
language, religion, or legal code. Thus, the particular policy that
the ruling centre chooses to propagate is rarely one capriciously
chosen as if it were invented out of thin air, even if that policy
represents an audacious transformation of a previously existing
tradition. For example, in 1501 CE the Safavid Isma‘il appealed to
the previously existing tradition of Shi‘ite Islam to distinguish
Persia from the Ottoman Empire, which observed the Sunni form
of Islam. The history of the consolidation and stable existence
over time of every state reveals this appeal to, and transformation
of, previous traditions in the eﬀective exercise of sovereignty over
a territory. In other words, the state, although distinct from the
nation, generates a territorial community of kinship such that
what emerges over time is a national state.
The exception to this phenomenon of the convergence between
two forms of human relation, the state and the nation, is the
empire, which contains many nations. We may, today, be
witnessing the emergence of the empire of the European Union.

saint and church, such as Saint Sava for the Serbian Orthodox

There are no culturally obvious limitations to the expansion of an

Church.

empire. Its boundaries arise often out of military concerns, as, for

However, the consolidation of a relatively uniform territory and
culture of a national community is rarely exclusively the result of a
particular policy or set of policies being adopted and propagated

example, the construction of the Great Wall of China, begun
under the direction of General Meng T’ien in 221 BCE; Hadrian’s
wall as a demarcation of the northwestern boundary of the
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Roman Empire in Britain; or the defeat of the Muslim forces under

protection and preservation in the world. If the national state fails

the command of Amir ‘Abd-al-Rahman by Charles Martel in 732

to fulfil this purpose (through military defeat or other means), then

CE near Tours that checked the expansion of Islam. The protest

it risks the possibility of breaking up, because the attachments of

to this more or less limitless extension of the sovereignty of an

the members of the nation to that nation may be withdrawn. New

empire has been the assertion of cultural distinctiveness and

loyalties may then emerge, thereby undermining the existence of

political independence by various national communities of

the nation. Be that as it may, the determination as to whether the

territorial kinship within, or threatened by, an empire, for example

nation forms the state or the state forms the nation is beside the

the Judaeans, from 66 to 72 CE and again from 132 to 135 CE

point, as, to varying degrees, depending upon the nation in

against the rule of the Roman Empire, and, in the 20th century,

question, both complicated processes are involved.

India against Great Britain. The explicitly political objection to
empire has been that it denies nations the freedom to determine
their own aﬀairs, as expressed by the claim to the right of selfdetermination. However, it may not always be clear exactly the
nature of the ‘self’ that seeks independence, because such a
‘self’ is in the process of being formed, as is occurring today in
Northern Ireland, the Kashmir, Macedonia, and Eastern Turkestan.

The formation of a national state, whether historically a
development from state to nation or from nation to state, is
burdened with the complications of innumerably diﬀerent
attachments and processes. As was observed, one consequence
of these complications is that many national states contain
pronounced regional attachments or even other nations. Once
again, the territorial relation of the nation is culturally only

The development of cultural distinctiveness through political

relatively uniform. Why this is so requires a discussion of the

sovereignty leads us to consider historically the relation between

character of the social relation.

state and nation from the opposite direction: namely, when the
nation seeks to become a state. How is this movement from
nation to national state to be understood, and, crucially, why does
it tend to happen?

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Ebook Central Academic Complete.

The nation seeks a state out of the necessity to protect and
preserve the lives of its members; that is, so that the nation,
through its representatives and institutions, can act to secure its
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Chapter 11

Race, Ethnicity
& Gender

Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Identify characteristics of race, ethnicity and gender.
• Understand and critically think about race, ethnicity, and
gender.
• Analyze current issues with race, ethnicity, and gender.

Section 1

Defining race
While racial categories and ethnic identities are part of our

However, this is too simple an approach. In fact, what makes

everyday discourse, it is hard to say what a ‘race’ actually is.

racial discrimination especially troubling is the fact that this set of

Genetic diﬀerence does not map to racial categories – there is no

characteristics does constitute and help to determine the

‘racial gene’ that allows us to read oﬀ racial categories.

individual’s life chances across a very wide range of variables:

However, race is obviously a major source of self- and otheridentification and a way in which the world is carved up,
conceptually, socially and economically. Races are groupings of
human beings into categories according to morphology and

housing, healthcare, education, job opportunities and so on. The
more these cleavages coincide on racial grounds, the less
satisfactory it is to dismiss racial groups as arbitrary and simply
irrelevant from the moral point of view.

genetics. Groups are characterised as ‘white’, ‘black’ and so on,

In so far as diﬀerence-blind liberalism fails to take into account

on the basis of skin colour and facial features.

the background conditions, structures, hierarchies and patterns

Race is largely a social construction, which selects certain
characteristics and clusters groups around them. This
contingency is one way of understanding – and undermining –
the idea of a racial hierarchy. Racial hierarchies mean that
advantageous and disadvantageous treatment is distributed
depending on membership of a racial group. But, since the
characteristics that determine membership of a racial group are
clustered together on an arbitrary basis, discrimination on the
basis of race is itself arbitrary (and consequently unjust).

of oppression and domination, it will, to that extent, risk
reflecting them and leaving them in place. In so far as diﬀerenceblind liberalism fails to reflect the idea that individuals are
essentially constituted by racial identity, then it fails properly to
represent them in its decision procedures. This is the sort of case
made by critical race theorists against diﬀerence-blind liberalism.
The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Credo Reference.
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Section 2

Defining ethnic group
An ethnic group refers to a socially recognized set of people who

origin and/or cultural practices. Broadly defined ethnic groups

have a common heritage or background who may share the

are identified by a collective body of individuals who share the

same country of origin, cultural practices (e.g., religious beliefs,

same country of origin, cultural practices, and/or racial

primary language, socially transmitted customs), or racial

characteristics. In either case, at least one of the corresponding

characteristics (e.g., skin color, facial structure, hair color). The

facets must be met for each of the respective definitions. Ethnic

interconnection between ethnic groups and other socially

groups, and membership within an ethnic group, may be self-

distinguished groups, such as cultural and racial groups,

defined (i.e., socially distinguished by members of the group

introduces sociocultural complexity when defining and

itself) or objectively defined (i.e., socially distinguished by people

classifying ethnic groups. Cultural groups are socially

outside of the group and usually based on external, observable

diﬀerentiated based on shared practices, beliefs, and values held

ethnic features such as skin color and facial structure).

by a collection of people. Racial groups are socially diﬀerentiated
based on observable physical characteristics, such as skin color
and hair texture. Ethnic groups may be interconnected with
cultural and racial groups because people within the same ethnic
group often engage in similar cultural activities and often display
similar racial characteristics.

The shared practices, beliefs, and values of an ethnic group
contribute to a sense of cohesion. In addition, the characteristics
that diﬀer from one ethnic group to another often further
distinguish these groups and contribute to views among group
members that their ethnic group is unique from other ethnic
groups. The diﬀerences between ethnic groups, real or

Theorists suggest that an ethnic group can be broadly or

perceived, may sometimes contribute to tension and hostility

narrowly defined based on the primary characteristics

between members of diﬀerent ethnic groups. These hostile

considered (Yang, 2000). Ethnic groups can be narrowly defined

perceptions or interactions are more likely to occur when group

if a collective body of individuals shares the same country of

diﬀerences are viewed in a negative light, or when there is a lack
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of understanding of the nature of the diﬀerences between ethnic

representation within a population may be used to identify the

groups. However, the diﬀerences between ethnic groups

social, political, and health needs of the groups and to ensure the

generally pale in comparison to the commonalities that can be

provision of equal opportunities (e.g., employment, education)

found across members of certain ethnic groups, and the

and appropriate services (e.g., health care) (Sandefur, Campbell,

diﬀerences that do exist do not play a fundamental role in

& Eggerling-Boeck, 2004). At times, the classification of ethnic

defining human nature.

groups may be disadvantageous when the categories used are

Classification of Ethnic Groups
Ethnic groups are generally classified through the use of labels
that represent some aspect of their shared characteristics or
heritage. The label used varies based on how the term ethnic
group is defined. For example, when “ethnic group” is linked to
racial characteristics, names such as white or black may be used
to identify specific ethnic groups. In other cases, when the

too limited, heterogeneous, or nonrepresentative. Other issues
that may arise from classifying ethnic groups for the purpose of
identifying needs of specific groups is that, for certain aspects
(e.g., education and employment), there may be more similarities
between members of diﬀerent groups than there are similarities
among individuals within an ethnic group. In addition, some of the
diﬀerences that are attributed to ethnic group status may actually
be due to other socioeconomic influences.

conceptualization of an ethnic group is linked to country of origin

Self-defined identification has become the more prevalent option

or nationality, labels such as European or African American may

for classifying ethnic groups due to the subjectivity of ethnic

be used.

group membership. However, although this approach supports

There are several benefits to classifying ethnic groups. Ethnic
group membership contributes to a social connection that is
subjectively meaningful to many individuals. Members often base
part of their identity on their ethnic group aﬃliation. This
identification often has strong implications on an individual's
psychological adjustment and social well-being. The classification
of ethnic groups is also intended to provide information on the
characteristics of a population. Information on the ethnic group

the saliency of personal aﬃliation with one's ethnic group(s), it
may adversely aﬀect the ability to adequately ensure equal
opportunities and service provision. As noted by Waters (1990),
while ethnic identity (i.e., how much an individual feels that he/she
is a part of an ethnic group) is generally purely based on selfdefinition, being viewed by society as a member of an ethnic
group is usually not solely based on self-defined classification.
Many individuals have certain features or characteristics that
associate them with a particular ethnic group. As a result, these
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individuals are often viewed by society as belonging to that ethnic

and health research), ethnic enumeration generally relied on

group, which in turn influences the possible social implications

observer-selection. Toward the turn of the century, most Western

(e.g., unequal treatment) associated with being perceived as

nations began to shift to systems that allowed individuals to

belonging to the ethnic group. Thus, objectively defined

choose the ethnic group with which they felt most aﬃliated.

identification of group members may be more useful in situations
that concern the social consequences of ethnic group
membership (Aspinall, 1997).
Defining and Classifying Ethnic Groups across Time
In industrialized Western nations, such as the United States,
approaches to describing ethnic groups have varied across time
(Sandefur et al., 2004). During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, ethnic and racial groups were essentially considered
identical and predominantly biologically based, suggesting that
individuals were born into a specific ethnic group, and ethnic
group membership was permanent. Classification of ethnic group
members was generally based on observable ethnic features.

There is now a growing movement toward using the terms ethnic
and racial interchangeably due to a converging conceptualization
of the terms (American Anthropological Association, 1997). There
is also an emergent trend toward deemphasizing the use of the
words race or racial, and using classifications based on ethnic
groups instead. As suggested by the American Anthropological
Association, ethnic enumeration allows for the classification of
more specific social categories, is more relevant for empirical
purposes (e.g., is a better predictor of health and social
outcomes), and generally holds less negative connotations than
the concept of race. In addition, there is a need to better account
for the increasing representation of individuals with multiple
ethnic backgrounds. In response to this, many ethnic group data

During the second half of the twentieth century, the

collection systems have begun to include opportunities for

characteristics considered when defining ethnic groups became

individuals to select more than one ethnic background.

predominantly socially distinguished (e.g., based on heritage and
cultural practices), rather than biologically determined. Choices

Defining and Classifying Ethnic Groups across Countries

about ethnic group membership also reflected a dynamic process

Using global data on the “2000 round” (1995–2004) of

that involved an interconnection between one's heritage, country

government census data collected by the United Nations

of origin, racial characteristics, and cultural practices. Previously,

Statistical Division, Morning (2008) documented variability in

when ethnic group information was gathered through most data

categories used for ethnic enumeration in over 140 countries. The

collection systems (e.g., census data collection, social science

overview revealed that over 60 percent of the countries used
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some form of ethnic enumeration in their government census. Of

The social-cultural complexities involved in the process of

these countries, some used question-and-answer formats that

defining and classifying ethnic groups has led to variability in the

better reflected ethnic characteristics based on country of origin

conceptualization of the construct. Current understanding

or racial characteristics, whereas other countries used formats

suggests that ethnic groups are primarily socially distinguished

that defined and classified ethnic groups based on the diﬀerent

and are defined based on an interconnection between a variety of

languages or dialects spoken by the inhabitants. In comparison to

sociocultural factors, such as nationality, cultural practices, and

the other countries that did include some form of ethnic

racial characteristics. Existing lines of inquiry call for better

enumeration, the United States was the only one that categorized

representation of the term ethnic group, especially when used for

ethnic and racial group membership separately. The United

ethnic enumeration, so that information gained through the use of

States was also the only country that included just one ethnic

the term will have empirical value and personal significance for

aﬃliation (Hispanic or non-Hispanic) in the single question

members of identified ethnic groups.

pertaining to ethnic group membership. The other nations that
incorporated some type of ethnic enumeration used the terms
ethnic and racial interchangeably, refrained from using the terms
race or racial altogether, and/or included a wider range of

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Credo Reference.

possible aﬃliations in their questions directed at ethnic
enumeration. Despite these diﬀerences, the approach to ethnic
enumeration used by other nations with comparable demographic
composition to the United States was conceptually similar to the
approach to racial enumeration used by the United States (e.g.,
both approaches included similar response categories such as
white, black, Chinese, and Korean). Similar to the 2000 census,
the overall ethnic enumeration format used by the United States
in the 2010 census still separates the categorization of ethnic and
racial groups and includes only one option for ethnic aﬃliation
(i.e., Hispanic or non-Hispanic) (Humes, Jones, & Ramirez, 2011).
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Section 3

Defining gender
l. Feminists and others make a distinction between sex (which is

supposed, and that the distinction between man and woman is

a biological fact about the individual), and gender, which is a

at every point negotiable.

human artefact. The masculine and feminine genders are shaped
by society and culture, while male and female sexuality are,
although to some extent malleable, based in sexual diﬀerence,
which is a trans-historical fact. Not only can individuals choose
their gender, they can also work to ensure that gender is
changed – so that women, for example, are perceived diﬀerently.
Many feminists believe that their principal task is not to work for
women’s rights in a man-made world, but to create another
world, made in part by women. In this world the feminine gender
will be constructed in a new way, so that women will no longer
be perceived as child-bearing, home-building, man-dependent
creatures, but as autonomous agents who set their own agendas
and depend only on themselves.

3. Gender also refers to a distinction in grammar, more or less
defunct in the English language, between the masculine,
feminine and neuter noun, and the corresponding forms of the
adjective. Only pronouns retain gender distinctions in English
(he/she/it etc.). Some languages have no gender distinctions –
e.g. Turkish and Hungarian. Others (e.g. Arabic) allow masculine
nouns with feminine adjectives and vice versa. These facts have
not prevented feminists from seeing the generic use of the
masculine pronoun in English, to refer indiﬀerently to all human
beings, as sexist. The influence of feminism in this matter has
been so great that it is now diﬃcult to publish an article in an
American academic journal without using the feminine pronoun
when referring indiﬀerently to all human beings. This dictionary

2. Use of the term has become confused by the widespread

uses the masculine pronoun, on the grounds that the feminine

adoption – under the influence of feminist politics – of ‘gender’

pronoun makes a loud political statement in a context where

as the word for sex, perhaps in order to indicate that sexual

political statements (as opposed to reports of them) should be

diﬀerences are not as absolute as they have traditionally been

kept to the minimum.
The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Credo Reference.
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Section 4

One hundred years of racial politics
Race is above all a matter of politics. The assignment and

1903 the imperial system was at its height, racial slavery was

acceptance of racial identity, the configuration of racially

very much a living memory (and indeed a continuing reality in

demarcated groups, the "logic of collective action" as practiced

some places), and the world's racial hierarchy was taken for

by members of these groups, and the stratification (imposed and

granted, at least by the "lords of humankind" (Kiernan 1969), the

opposed) of society along racial lines are but some of the main

rulers of the system. But from other standpoints this structure

dimensions of racial politics. The state is a central player in racial

was entirely unacceptable: exploitative, tyrannical, and

matters: the modern state carries out racial classification,

boundlessly brutal. Because racial rule, white supremacy, had

surveillance, and punishment of the population; it distributes

provided a structure of domination since its origins in the

resources along racial lines; it simultaneously facilitates and

fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it had also (always) drawn

obstructs racial discrimination; and it is both structured and

resistance. Born out of the independent and self-reliant cultures

challenged by political mobilization along racial lines. To make

of the subordinated, resistance is an aspect of human autonomy

sense of the huge conundrum of racial politics is obviously not

that can never be fully abdicated, no matter how imprisoned or

easy. To do so on a worldwide scale, taking into account the

subjugated the resister. For many years, for centuries, racial

immense transformations that have occurred over the past

resistance was eﬀectively located outside the state. The racially

century or so, is a daunting task indeed. Yet there is no escaping

subordinate were not even recognized as human beings in many

this work, for these epochal shifts have in many ways shaped us:

cases much less as citizens. But at the turn of the twentieth

nation and society, culture and individual, world system and

century that resistance was becoming more organized, more

psyche, all bear the mark of racial politics.

articulate. The tumultuous struggles to put an end to slavery had

In this essay I proceed as follows. Initially I present an overview,
necessarily schematic, of world racial politics a century ago. In

largely ceased by then, but the experience of abolitionism—the
world's first transnational social movement (Keck and Sikkink
1998)—had provided invaluable political experience.
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Advancing industrialism was imposing new and more varied

East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" (the Japanese imperial scheme),

demands for labor, and the changing nature of the world

and Hitler's drive for Lebensraum were all justified in explicitly

economy was reshaping the parameters of empire. These

racial terms, much as the empires of "old" Europe had been. The

developments created opportunities for participation and for

following section deals with the racial "break." World War II

political opposition that had hardly existed earlier. New subaltern

reshuﬄed the political deck again, far more comprehensively than

elites were making their voices heard and generating new

the "war to end all wars" had ever done. World War II was an

organizations.

antifascist war, an antiimperial war in part, an antiracist war in

New avenues for racial politics were beginning to appear. Next I
survey racial politics in the interwar years. World War I deeply
transformed the world racial system, mobilizing millions of
soldiers and workers, prompting reassessment of the imperial
system, touching oﬀ revolution in Russia and fear of communism
everywhere, and elevating the United States to secure status
among the world powers. The upheavals that followed the war
cast a pall on the imperial system; indeed they foreshadowed its
doom after World War II. The crises of the Depression and the rise
of fascism had powerful racial undertones. The weakened
position of the dominant nations during the 1930s made empire
(and transnational spheres of influence) harder to maintain. The
rise of fascism created new diﬃculties for the imperialist powers;
fascism also revealed some discomfiting aﬃnities with the
traditional systems of empire. While it was particularly racist in its
German form, it was not free of racial dimensions in either its
Italian or Japanese versions. Fascism was an imperial project in
its own right: an eﬀort to replace the obsolescent empires with
new ones. Mussolini's quest for an African empire, the "Greater

part. By fostering resistance to the Japanese in Asia and the
Germans and Italians in Africa, World War II unwittingly lent
support to anti-imperialist movements. By casting themselves
(with some truth) as the champions of democracy, the Allies
touched oﬀ a new phase of civil rights and human rights activities
all over the world, including in their home countries. The breakup
of the Grand Alliance and the onset of the cold war made the
global South (soon to be the "third world" and the "nonaligned"
world) a vast battleground, with the forces of empire on one side,
and those of communism and nationalism on the other. All these
developments were fundamentally structured by race.
Furthermore, World War II occasioned vast population shifts. It
drove labor recruitment eﬀorts, military conscription and
subsequent demobilization, and northward migrations by millions
both during and after the hostilities. These processes vastly
transformed the colonies and hinterlands of the entire world. As
the population structures, residential patterns, and labor
dynamics of many countries were altered, so too were their
political systems. Thus did antiimperial and civil rights
movements arise; thus did these movements combine to impel a
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global "break" in racial politics that began during and continued

structures of race and racism. It was simply managing white

after World War II.

supremacy in a significantly updated and revised fashion.

Next I consider racial politics at century's end. After the

A concluding section muses theoretically on racial politics today.

movements, after the revolutions, after the empires' oﬃcial

Here I oﬀer some brief reflections on the tasks intellectuals and

retreats, there was reform. State-based racial reform took various

activists committed to racial justice face at the threshold of the

forms. Passage of civil rights laws and adoption of more inclusive

twentieth-first century. We must reassess our understandings of

immigration policies, extension of citizenship and citizenship

the meaning of race and the dynamics of racism in the aftermath

rights, repatriation of abandoned colonials like the "pieds noirs"

of the triumphs and tragedies our movements have experienced

from Algeria, and widespread oﬃcial professions of commitment

since the onset of the racial break during and after World War II.

to racial equality were some of the chief lines of racial reform.

We face a new set of tasks at present. Racial hegemony has

With the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994—an

developed in an era when outright racial domination has been

event halfway between racial reform and revolution—the post-

anathematized. Was that all we antiracist activists accomplished?

World War II break reached its limits. Well before the collapse of

Is it likely that all the blood, sweat, and tears of the postwar

apartheid (which was a late event in the cycle) the construction of

movements, the labors undertaken in the service of revolution,

a new racial hegemony was already well advanced, particularly in

"regime change," social justice, and racial reform can be

the United States. The United States had attained the status of

absorbed and contained by modest adjustments in racial policy

leading superpower and culturally hegemonic society. Yet it was

and rhetoric? Can a series of ineﬀectual eﬀorts at the

also a complex combination of the old and new racial systems.

redistribution of economic resources and political power—so

By undertaking "moderate" racial reforms in response to

ineﬀectual that they have often been characterized as "token" or

movement demands, the United States was able to derail the

symbolic—put paid to the bill for half a millennium of coercion,

more radical potential of the domestic antiracist movements that

decimation, and theft? I hardly think so.

formed a leading edge of the break and acquired huge (indeed
worldwide) political influence. Yet while it touted "color blindness"
and claimed largely to have achieved racial equality, the U.S.
racial state had hardly transformed the fundamental social

World Racial Politics a Century Ago
One hundred years ago W. E. B. Du Bois published The Souls of
Black Folk. The book was recently described by Du Bois's
369

preeminent biographer David Levering Lewis as "an electrifying

and country, looked closely at black families and black religion,

manifesto" and "a work of transcendent intellectual passion and

and situated his own experience within the odyssey of his people.

numinous prose." For those readers who were prepared to

All this history, practice, and theory he synthesized in an account

receive it and digest it, Souls oﬀered an entirely new, and in many

practical enough and resilient enough to endure for the rest of the

ways prophetic, interpretation of racial politics. Largely focusing

century and beyond.

his attention on the United States, but at pains to set his native
land in a global context, Du Bois exhorted his long-oppressed
people to mobilize and reconquer their rights and their place in
history, to take new pride in their heritage and culture, and to
understand their lives as situated in the vast historical drama of
the human quest for freedom and dignity. Souls possessed an
unparalleled emotional power and beauty: it was politics, history,
and poetry all at once; it treated black religion, psychology,
education, and music as variegated branches of a unified African
American experience. It drank deeply from the well of
Enlightenment rationality and European letters, yet gloried as well
in the enormous contributions, the unique "gifts," the
treasurehouse of African American (and of African) culture. The
book recollected the sweep of black history: the uprooting from
Africa, slavery's unrequited labor and loss of millions of lives, the
horrific bloodletting and suﬀering of the Civil War and the dashed
hopes of inclusion and justice that followed ("Of the Dawn of
Freedom"). Yet Du Bois did not despair. Instead he rejected the
accommodationism that dominated black politics at the turn of
the twentieth century ("Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others")
and set forth the key principles of a political program for black
enfranchisement and empowerment. He explored black life in city

Let us consider the global racial environment of one century ago,
the 1903 sky into which Souls was launched like a great
illuminating flare. We begin with the United States, to which the
book devoted its primary attention, and then look more broadly at
the racial world of a century ago. In the 1903 United States the
great majority of black people still resided in the South, where Jim
Crow was at its height. Most black people were peasants; debt
peonage ("sharecropping") remained the chief form of labor and
was often the only way to survive. The southern peasantry was
not exclusively black by any means, but the ubiquity of Jim Crow
continuously reinforced the near-total disempowerment of blacks,
thus shoring up status diﬀerences between them and the often
equally impoverished white "croppers" with whom they shared a
landlord. Enforced by lynching and nightriding mobs of hooded
white terrorists, southern racial "etiquette" required blacks to
remove their hats in the presence of whites, to step oﬀ the
sidewalk (where one existed) into the muddy street at the
passage of a white, and to wait in such shops as would serve
blacks until all whites had been served, no matter who had
arrived first. A thousand other rules of this type were in place,
most of them subject to the wildest interpretative variations
370

imaginable. The institutionalized manifestations of Jim Crow were

tens of thousands of years. Those who survived this holocaustit

ubiquitous: separate schools (where there were schools for

confined to native reserves (Stannard 1992).

blacks at all), separate transportation, separate accommodation
in respect to food service and lodging, separate everything.
These systems all had the sanction and force of law; to violate
them was to break the law and subject oneself to the tender
mercies of the police, courts, chain gangs, and jails of the South;
that is, if one was lucky enough to avoid the retribution of informal
enforcers active in the KKK (McMillen 1989; Litwack 1980). Jim
Crow reigned well beyond the old Confederacy: "up South" in the
old Union states discrimination was together: they were applied in
Texas and elsewhere to Mexican Americans as well as blacks. In
California elaborate racial hierarchies secured cheap labor from

But at the turn of the twentieth century the United States had
entered the imperial world, despite a significant anti-imperialist
movement at home, with the so-called Spanish-American War of
1898. Now firmly in possession of Puerto Rico and regent of
Cuba after the passage of the Platt Amendment (1902), the
United States had also secured possession of the Philippines with
its brutal suppression of that country's independence movement
and 1903 capture of nationalist leader Emilio Aguinaldo. This was
a campaign that involved 125,000 U.S. troops and took
something like 200,000 Filipino lives (Linn 2000; Stanley 1974).

immigrants and Mexicans.4 Meanwhile anti-Asian nativism,

Wherever the United States went, it took with it a racial system

though based in California, had become a nationwide movement

that had been honed in the post-Reconstruction South: in Cuba

with secure roots in the white working class. Anti-Chinese riots

and Puerto Rico it sought to impose racial segregation; in the

and constant agitation soon combined with restrictive

Philippines it assumed the white man's burden, as well as a

immigration policies toward Asians; in contrast to this Pacific

certain Christian evangelism, no small matter in a country with a

policy, Atlantic immigration was fostered until 1924 (Perlman

significant Muslim minority;5 vis-a-vis China, Japan, and the

1950, 52; Saxton 1996; Almaguer 1994).

Philippines it alternatively trolled for superexploitable labor and

That was the domestic racial panorama in 1903. But the United
States was also a racial power outside its own borders. The
United States had always had internal colonies; it was after all a

erected barriers against the "yellow peril"; and in Latin America it
embarked on a series of interventions on behalf of various
corporate predators.

settler nation. It had slaughtered and evicted those indigenous

Let us look now at the 1903 world from a wider angle. By the turn

peoples whose presence had been established in its territories for

of the twentieth century European imperialism had completed its
transition to a new form of colonial rule. Not only the African slave
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trade but slavery internal to the continent was on the wane: the

more widespread among the masses of imperial subjects (Scott

Belgian genocide had been a vast alchemical eﬀort to forge gold

1986; Bhabha 1994). In particular the pan-African call began to

(or in this case, rubber) directly out of human flesh. Peonage and

echo across the imperial world: the first of five important pan-

even industrial labor was replacing slavery. As export-oriented

African congresses was held in England in 1900. Throughout the

agriculture and mining became the key imperial activities in

colonial world there were strikes and labor union activity (Cooper

Africa, railroads and ports had to be built, and urban centers

1987; Wallerstein 1976; Chatterjee 1993). There were religiously

developed. Having carved up the continent at the Congress of

based movements, sometimes millenarian (Fields 1985; Ranger

Berlin (1885), the imperial powers had fallen into discord by the

1967); there were the stirrings of nationalism.

century's turn, as later arrivals at the African table tried to secure
a heaping plate of spoils for themselves.

Latin America had undergone most of its anticolonial upsurge
over the course of the nineteenth century, yet the Americas were

Imperialism in Africa around 1900 was a very diﬀerent system

hardly free of North American and European domination. This was

than it had been just half a century earlier. It was no longer

a relationship that remained quite racially inflected. The United

expansive; it was now developmentalist. Drained of administrative

States had declared the Americas its sphere of influence in 1832

and tutelary zeal (especially after the economic downturns of the

and had intervened thereafter in pursuit of a series of goals: to

1870s and 1890s), the empires now relied more on indirect rule

defend slavery in the first half of the century, to dominate sea-

and native elites than they had in the past. They maneuvered to

lanes, where possible to shape terms of trade, and to "manifest

maintain their comparative advantages vis-a-vis each other and

destiny." The mid-nineteenth century had seen war with Mexico

sought stability rather than total control in the colonies. As the

and a series of proslavery interventions in Central America. By the

century turned, though, their imperial subjects began to stir in

time of the "Spanish- American" war and the construction of the

new ways. Schooled by abolitionism and generations of

Panama Canal, the Caribbean was perceived in Washington as a

enterprising missionaries, trained by their own colonial masters to

North American lake, to the dismay of nationalists throughout

administer the empire locally—the British principle of indirect rule

Central and South America.

was the best example of this—the natives began to grow restless,
to mobilize politically. Elites questioned colonial rule in the
language and style of their colonial rulers. Subversion and
noncompliance— always present as resistance tactics—became

Still, for much of the nineteenth century the United States could
not do more than impede European influence: Europe still
constituted the major export market and provided Latin American
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elites with their key cultural reference points. By the turn of the

groundwork for the 1911 overthrow of the Qings and the

century, though, the United States was far more interventive. At

establishment of the republic, as well as reinforcing the

the same time, nationalism was sweeping Latin America, and the

nationalism that was to bring forth the May 4th Movement after

continent was entering a crisis of identity that was highly racial.

World War I and the Communist Party a few years later (Preston

On the one hand the "whitening ideal" remained in force; on the

2001).

other the national character (typically mestizo) was being
venerated: in Os Sertoes, the epic account of a millenarian
rebellion in the backlands of Brazil (Cunha 1995; Levine 1992), in
the eﬀorts of Cuban revolutionary Jose Marti to define an America
independent of the big bully to the north, and most
comprehensively in the revolution that convulsed Mexico after
1910, a new Latin American nationalist politics was being defined.
Though contradictory and uncertain, Latin American political
insurgencies of this period were uniformly concerned to
distinguish their societies' racial practices from those on view in
North America.10 These diﬀerences would acquire greater
definition and significance as the twentieth century progressed. In
Asia anti-imperialism was also on the increase. I have already
mentioned the Philippines. In China the Boxer Rebellion of 1900

In India opposition to British rule also began to crystallize anew
around the turn of the century. The legacy of the 1857 rebellion
and its fierce repression by the British had now receded
somewhat, and political organization was taking place through
the Congress. Gandhi's arrival from South Africa during World
War I is usually taken as the starting point for a new wave of
anticolonial mobilization, but it is obvious to all that Gandhi and
his associates did not invent that movement, however much they
were to lead it in new directions. After the war the independence
movement would take oﬀ in earnest, employing protest tactics of
an entirely new type (L. James 1998).

Racial Politics in the Interwar Years

—an explicitly nationalist, anticolonial campaign that targeted

In the carnage and aftermath of World War I the world racial

foreigners and demanded the cessation of the Qing concessions

system was deeply transformed. The war placed millions under

to the imperial powers of "spheres of influence" in Shanghai and

arms for the first time:

elsewhere—reached such a level of influence that an
expeditionary force of 19,000 soldiers—2,500 U.S. marines
among them—had to be dispatched to China to suppress it.
China was forced to indemnify the colonial powers for the losses
they had suﬀered in the rebellion. These events laid the

not only Europeans and white Americans, but Africans, African
Americans, South Asians, and Caribbeans as well. Although it
was not the fully cataclysmic, truly global confrontation that World
War II would prove to be—the Pacific basin, for example, was
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largely though not tot lly untouched by World War I—the war still

world in the throes of "globalization" (fully ninety years after this

shattered the former world order of the "long 19th century."

essay's appearance) as it does about the world of 1915. Note that

In a memorable 1915 essay Du Bois located the source of the war
in the contradictions and instabilities of imperial and racial rule, in
the insatiable greed of the "advanced" nations:

the mere handing up of this indictment indicated how much race
consciousness had already changed in the early twentieth century
from what it had been a few decades earlier. Granted, Du Bois
was a genius, with vastly greater cultural capital at his disposal

Whence comes this new wealth and on what does its

than had most of his contemporary brothers and sisters "behind

accumulation depend? It comes primarily from the darker nations

the veil." Yet his insights and critique cannot properly be seen as

of the world—Asia and Africa, South and Central America, the

the product of his own labors and genius alone. Rather, they

West Indies and the islands of the South Seas. There are still, we

issued from a deeper well: the fierce struggles of his people for

may believe, many parts of white countries like Russia and North

human rights and dignity. He drew from that deep well and

America, not to mention Europe itself, where the older

ultivated the territory on which it stood (to his great credit). It

exploitation still holds. But the knell has sounded faint and far,

nurtured him as well as his people.

even there. In the lands of the darker folk, however, no knell has
sounded. Chinese, East Indians, Negroes, and South American
Indians, are by common consent for governance by white folk
and economic subjection to them. To the furtherance of this
highly profitable economic dictum has been brought every
available resource of science and religion. Thus arises the
astonishing doctrine of the natural inferiority of most men to the
few, and the interpretation of "Christian brotherhood" as meaning
anything that one of the "brothers" may at any time want it to
mean. (Du Bois 1915, 645)
For a moment consider this analysis as an artifact of its time.
Step beyond the marvels of Du Bois's expressive skills, beyond
his critique of empire, which reveals as much about the present

So Russia fell to the first successful socialist revolution in history.
Russia withdrew from the war and made peace at Brest-Litovsk.
At Versailles the imperial powers could not fully grasp the
"consequences of the peace"; they contented themselves with
ratifying the prewar global order as far as possible: extracting
punitive reparations from their defeated foes; taking control of the
former German colonies in Africa; sharing out the booty of the
Ottoman world—Syria, Egypt, the newly created Iraq—among
other territories; and creating "mandates" for the victors where
outright territorial appropriation might be too embarrassing.
In the face of socialist revolution in Russia the Allies were far less
complacent. They invaded in support of the Whites in the ensuing
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civil war, and deployed the Wilsonian doctrine of "national self-

acted with the support of police and military units to destroy

determination" in the vain hope of derailing the updated

entire neighborhoods, as in the case of the Tulsa "riot" of 1921,

communist call for anticolonial revolution. In the wake of the

which razed the previously prosperous black area of Greenwood,

Russian events and as a fairly direct consequence of the war,

killing hundreds in "death squad" style and burning and looting

millions of colonial subjects gravitated toward communism. In the

indiscriminately (Madigan 2001).

United States wartime conscription and augmented economic
demand had spurred the first "great migrations" of blacks
northward from the South: now Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland,
Pittsburgh, and Detroit were much darker than they had been.
The "making of the ghetto" began in earnest. Blacks "up South"
in these cities and others began to make demands: they wanted

Meanwhile, back on the plantation, fear of communism and
racism were beginning to blend as mass deportations took place
in the early 1920s, new immigration restrictions were imposed in
1924,and eugenics was endorsed by the Supreme Court as a
constitutional social policy.

to vote and work for wages, to join unions, and end lynchings.

Just as World War I elevated the United States to secure status

They resonated to the mass appeal of Marcus M. Garvey and his

among the world powers, it also confronted the country—as

United Negro Improvement Association, which brought a pan-

much as the "old European" empires—with the political instability

Africanist and to some degree anticolonialist message to the

inherent in racial rule. Although it did not have an old-fashioned

streets of the ghetto for the first time.

empire to police in the manner of the British in India or the French

So, far from producing greater racial equality as many had hoped,
the war brought greater racial conflict. Black soldiers had
distinguished themselves in the Ardennes and elsewhere,
distressing their white American oﬃcers and winning the
admiration of the French. Their return home brought both parades
(down Fifth Avenue from Harlem) and four years of white assaults
("race riots") on black communities across the country.
Demobilized black soldiers of radical leanings formed the African
Black Brotherhood (Solomon 1998) to resist white marauders, in
some places successfully. More often, however, armed whites

in the Maghreb, the United States had developed abundant
imperial inclinations as the century dawned. By the end of World
War I there were interventions underway in Mexico, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Cuba, Panama, Honduras, and the Dominican
Republic. Those "little brown men," as McKinley might have said,
also wanted to eat and vote and run their own countries, it
seemed. Speaking of McKinley, during the years between the
wars the Philippines, his great imperial conquest, remained a U.S.
regency, under the suzerainty of two U.S. generals, the Mac
Arthurs, father and son.
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Indeed the upheavals that followed the war threatened the

In the face of this challenge, the imperial democracies wobbled:

imperial system, anticipating the break that would demolish it

they all had supporters of fascism within their own ranks, and

after World War II. The attraction of communism, especially

their policies overlapped more than a bit with those of the fascist

during the Depression, and the elective aﬃnity between the

powers, especially where race was concerned. On the one hand

communist movement and the anti-imperialist and antiracist

the United Kingdom, France, and the United States were

ones, confronted the imperial "mother countries" with enormous

democracies, flawed to be sure, but not authoritarian police

dilemmas. The rise of pan-Africanism, both in the socialist version

states (at least not at home, at least not systematically). Yet to

(which was associated with Du Bois, Padmore, and many others),

their dark-skinned subjects trapped in rural debt peonage,

and in the Garveyite version (which achieved a tremendous level

confined to native reserves, or crammed into urban slums,

of mass support and was rooted in the legacy of Booker T.

democracy seemed in short supply as well. Is it a mere accident,

Washington), was also troubling to imperial elites in the United

for example, that during the twentieth century the term ghetto

States, the Caribbean, the United Kingdom, and Africa itself.

came to characterize black slums in U.S. cities? There was

The rise of fascism further complicated the picture. Here was a
racist and imperialist political movement, equipped with power in
several industrialized nations, and endowed as well with
widespread popular support. German fascism was particularly

indeed an uncomfortable resemblance between the fascism that
Whitehall, the White House, and the Elysee deplored and
denounced, and those same "democratic" countries' racial
practices in Mississippi, Malaya, and Madagascar.

racist, but fascism as an Italian and even Japanese phenomenon

In short the crises of the Depression and the rise of fascism,

was not free of racial dimensions. Fascism was an imperial

themselves both direct "consequences of the peace," had

project as well: it sought to revive the old empires (Mussolini

powerful racial undertones. During the 1930s, as Andre Gunder

claimed to be reawakening the greatness of Rome) as well as to

Frank (1969) has famously suggested in respect to Latin America,

create new ones. Mussolini's quest for an African empire, the

the weakened position of the dominant nations made empire (and

"Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" (the Japanese imperial

transnational spheres of influence) harder to maintain. Frank

scheme), and Hitler's drive for Lebensraum were all justified in

argued that national economic autonomy grew in Latin America

explicitly racial terms, much as the empires of "old" Europe had

during the 1930s because the international imperialist regime lost

been.

a measure of its power: as it was wracked by economic crisis at
home and confronted by the rise of new and hostile powers, both
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communist and fascist, the U.S. big daddy could devote less

system" (Wallerstein 1974-89), is what I am calling the racial

attention to managing the little Latino kids down south. From the

"break"; it was a complex of sociopolitical conflicts and

perspective I am advancing here, it appears that antiracist and

adjustments that both modified and preserved the world racial

anticolonialist activity also benefited during this same period from

system in our own era.

the crisis of the ruling regimes.

The racial break was the most significant challenge to white

Few today would question the claim that the interwar years were

supremacy that had been mounted since the rise of Europe a

a particularly diﬃcult period for the big powers: the nations that

half-millennium earlier. Yet, world-shaking as it was, it could not

had triumphed in World War I now experienced new crises, new

dislodge, but only somewhat weaken, the tenacious traditions of

instabilities, a new popular disillusionment and bitterness. Their

white racist world domination. I have written at length about the

recent victory was turned inside out as bread grew scarce and

break elsewhere (Winant 2001). Here I can only begin to suggest

the rivals they had so recently humiliated rose up in terrifying

the forces that contributed to the new situation. Above all, the

strength to challenge them once again. But in all the consensus

break was an accretion of innumerable conflicts and experiences,

that permeates this account of the interwar years, has the theme

which flowed together and accumulated in a politically

of racial rule and racial insurgency received the attention it

overdetermined pattern during the post-World War II decades.

deserves? Have race and racism, continuing colonial rule and

Some of the main elements of this conjuncture, this buildup of

white supremacy been recognized as pivotal elements and

political confrontations, were the following:

central contradictions in the run-up to World War II? I think not.

The Racial "Break"

The upsurge of anticolonial and antiracist movements
The mass mobilizations that the war drove forward resulted, in its

World War II reshuﬄed the global political deck once again, far

aftermath, in the presence around the world of millions of

more comprehensively than the "war to end all wars" had ever

demobilized fighters. Armed and trained to fight against fascism

done. During and after the war the world underwent a profound

and imperialism, well-schooled in the ideologies of democracy

shift in the global logic of race, a crisis of world racial formation.

and self-determination, many veterans made a seamless

This racial metamorphosis, perhaps the most comprehensive to

transition between fighting a world war and fighting an

have occurred since the rise of the "modern world-

anticolonial war. Many who had experienced the trenches and
wartime factories of the Allies (especially in the United States) did
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not look kindly upon the segregation and second-class

directly entered into armed conflict with the United States.17 The

citizenship to which they were told to return at the war's end. Of

conflict between the superpowers was largely fought out in the

course, not only demobilized soldiers found themselves opposed

global South, where colonialism and white supremacy were

to attempts to restore the old colonial and white supremacist

(correctly) perceived as U.S. policies. The very persistence in the

system; soldiers have families, communities, friends as well.

United States proper of racial segregation, lynching,

Many colonial subjects and racially identified "others" had not

disenfranchisement, and racist practices of every type thus

fought in the war but had weathered "the war at home." They had

quickly became an international issue of the first order. The

found new jobs, moved to the cities, and so on. Such

accruing international political disadvantage of this situation,

experiences made return to antebellum conditions quite

combined with increasingly eﬀective domestic movements for

unthinkable. These patterns, themselves redolent of the end of

civil and human rights, contributed to the momentum of racial

World War I and indeed of the defeat of Reconstruction, deeply

reform initiatives at home (Dudziak 2000).

shaped postwar social movements both in the United States and
on a global level.
The consolidation of the cold war

Worldwide demographic transition
World War II brought about huge population shifts both during
and after hostilities. The war made vast labor recruitment eﬀorts

Competition between the superpowers developed quickly after

necessary; it also involved military conscription and subsequent

World War IPs end. As a neocolonial power, the United States

demobilization on an unprecedented scale. The northward

engaged in numerous wars with insurgent national liberation

migration of millions resulted both from labor demand (for both

movements, which almost always identified themselves as

military production and reconstruction) and from the hunger of the

communists as well as nationalists. Although these conflicts were

"wretched of the earth" for a better life in the postwar years. The

generally more anti-imperialist than cold war-based, in the United

old empires "struck back" as former colonial subjects— East and

States they were inevitably interpreted as great-power

West Indians, Caribenos, Maghrebines and sub-Saharans,

confrontations; opponents were branded as surrogates for the

Filipinos and Moluccans, Koreans and Chinese—set oﬀ in

USSR. The United States generally took a direct hand in these

unprecedented numbers for the northern metropoles. Migration

wars— though not always; it had surrogates as well such as

not only meant movement from South to North on a global scale;

France, Portugal, Pakistan, and Israel. In contrast the USSR never

it also meant population shifts from countryside to city within
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virtually every nation. Rural people—typically poor, less educated,

II and continued after its end for decades. World War II had been

and dark-skinned—made their way to urban shantytowns and

an antifascist war, an anti-imperial war (in part), an antiracist war

ghettos in Rabat and Rome, Sao Paulo and San Francisco, Dakar

(in part). It had schooled resistance to the Japanese in Asia and

and Diisseldorf, Capetown and Cleveland. After a few years of

the Germans and Italians in Africa, and thus advanced the causes

this in the United States, black people were no longer

of anti-imperialism and antiracism. Much of this was unwitting or

concentrated in the South, no longer mainly rural. In Europe,

at least unavoidable. The Allies had cast themselves during the

former working-class suburbs had now sprouted mosques and

war (with some truth) as the champions of democracy. In a kind of

halal butcher shops. In Africa and Latin America, in the

"blowback," then, they set in motion a new phase of civil rights

Philippines and the Arab countries, the shantytowns on the urban

and human rights activity all over the world, including in their

periphery became hotbeds of despair, criminality, and political

home countries. At home they were compelled to undertake racial

opposition. All this migration meant that an enormous cultural

reforms and engage in more inclusive practices—economic,

mixing was underway: Europe's "others"—its former wogs,

political, and cultural—than ever before.

niggers, noirs, coolies, and kaﬃrs—were now inside the
"motherland" to a far greater extent than previously. The United
States became a far browner and yellower country than it had
ever been before. Yet proximity did not in general lead to
assimilation, "melting," or miscegenation (although of course it
did increase these phenomena as well), so much as it advanced
diasporic consciousness, ethnonationalism, and antiracist
politics.

The onset of the cold war made the old imperial domains (or the
"third world," or the "nonaligned nations") a vast battleground,
with the forces of empire on one side, and those of communism
and nationalism on the other. In short order, the old empires
began to collapse. The Dutch left Indonesia, after a brutal but
hopeless colonial war, in 1948. The British abandoned Malaya in
1950; the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954- Africa
was cleared of the Union Jack by the 1960s, and in 1962 the

These processes vastly transformed the colonies and hinterlands

French admitted defeat in their long and bloody campaign to hold

of the entire world. As the population structures, residential

on to Algeria. Of course, the imperial death throes were more

patterns, and labor dynamics of many countries were altered, so

prolonged than that. The Portuguese empire did not fall until

too were their political systems. Thus did anti-imperialist and civil

1975, and it took a military revolt within the colonial army to

rights movements arise; thus did these movements combine to

accomplish that feat. The world had by then moved into a

impel a global break in racial politics that began during World War

neocolonial stage (Nkrumah 1965). The waning of the old
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European empires left a power vacuum that the United States

postimperial, postcolonial, but subject to a multilateral discipline

rushed to fill, most notably in Vietnam but also in Congo, Iran,

as onerous as any that had preceded it. Ushered in by the oil

and Indonesia, as well as in its traditional backyard: Latin America

shocks and the explosion of "third world" debt during the 1980s,

and the Caribbean.

the economic unraveling of much of the global South meant an

All these developments were fundamentally aﬀected by racial
dynamics. All echoed past global tensions and conflicts over
race, such as those that occurred after Versailles. All this
contributed to the worldwide racial break.

end to dreams of "development." By the 1990s a new
postcolonial regime was in place, one of spiraling indebtedness
and seemingly eternal discipline at the hands of avaricious
creditors. This was the world economic order, administered in the
main by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was a system

Racial Politics at Century's End

controlled from the global North and fully dedicated to indirect

After the movements, after the revolutions, after the empires'

institutions and policies went by various names: the World Trade

oﬃcial retreats, there was reform. State-based racial reform took

Organization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade

various patterns: passage of civil rights laws and adoption of

(GATT), "structural adjustment policies," as well as the more

more inclusionist immigration policies, extension of citizenship

general term "globalization" and the old imperial chestnut "free

and citizenship rights, repatriation of abandoned colonials, like

trade." Something had certainly changed since the heyday of the

the "pieds noirs" from Algeria, and widespread oﬃcial professions

"old Europe's" imperial era. The United States was the new boss,

of commitment to racial equality were some of the chief lines of

for one thing. The names and acronyms were certainly diﬀerent:

racial reform. With the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa

what had once been colonial territories and then "Less Developed

in 1994—an event halfway between racial reform and revolution—

Countries" (LDCs) were now "Highly Indebted Poor

the post-World War II break reached its limits. Well before the

Countries" (HIPCs).

collapse of apartheid (which was a late event in the cycle) the
construction of a new racial hegemony was already well
advanced, particularly in the United States. In part as a
consequence of the transformed conditions that succeeded the
break, a new world economic system came into being:

rule of the global South on the behalf of transnational capital. Its

So the imperial system continued, transformed to be sure from
the pre-World War II modality of direct rule by the various "mother
countries," transformed even from the cold war setup of
competing power blocs and a certain intermediate, "nonaligned"
group of countries. Yet something remained the same at the turn
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of the twenty-first century. The North-South system was still, so

By 1998 African debt/annual GDP ratios had reached the

to speak, color-coded. It still operated a worldwide racial division

obscene level of 125 percent, and debt service in many southern

of labor. It still relied on a (updated to be sure) means of racially

countries amounted to more than 50 percent of state revenues

organized exploitation: global debt peonage.

per year. By way of contrast, consider that in 1953 the victorious

Just as in the days of African slavery, when dark-skinned workers
labored in chains to subsidize their white "owners" and
"masters," so now in the twenty-first century Africans labored in
the chains of transnational debt peonage to subsidize the great
banks, securities markets, and "developed" nations that were
their creditors, or perhaps one should say their modern slave
masters. Latin Americans ravaged their forests and abandoned
subsistence crops for cash-crop, export-oriented cultivation.
Marooned in the shantytowns and slums of hundreds of hungry
cities, Asians now toiled in sweatshops, making apparel,
televisions, circuit boards, and suitcases. Laboring under an
unimaginable weight of indebtedness, the "independent"
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America danced to the tune
played by their northern lenders. Unable to represent the interests
of their peoples, the "independent" governments of these
countries instead secured the discipline of their subjects by
means of coercion and corruption. Thus much of the world's
population was governed (indirectly, to be sure) on behalf of the

Allies cancelled 80 percent of defeated Germany's war debt, and
only insisted on a repayment rate on the remaining 20 percent of
3 to 5 percent of annual export earnings. The IMF and other big
lenders have imposed similar lenient terms on central Europe
debtors after the fall of communism. So why was Africa expected
to pay the rich countries at as much as fifteen times the interest
rates charged to European debtor countries (Sassen 2001; Stiglitz
2002; Bello 2001; Chua 2002)? The global "debt trap" now
engulfs not only impoverished nations but fairly developed ones
like Argentina, Mexico, and South Korea. Assaults on the world's
poor via the global financial system—notably the debt and its
policing by the IMF through "structural adjustment policies"—
result in the deaths of millions every year (Beneria 1999;
Weissman 2000). All this can readily be understood in terms of
racism: the world's poor are largely peasants and superexploited
workers; they are dark-skinned sharecroppers and peons of a
global corporate plantation, owned and run by white men in
business suits.

world's northern rulers. This "indirect rule" was a great

To be sure, a new transnational movement has emerged against

improvement (in the eyes of those who benefited from it, anyway),

this state of aﬀairs and has even scored some successes, notably

on nineteenth-century imperial practices that went by the same

the string of mass demonstrations that have been mounted over

name.

the past few years in Seattle, Washington, Genoa, Quebec, New
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York, and Cancun at the annual meetings of the World Trade

elites, of course, and the mass constituency for such radical

Organization, the IMF/World Bank, the Free Trade Association of

reforms was unavailable after moderate ones had been enacted.

the Americas, and similar conclaves of world economic

So after the antiracist movement's rising phase, which began

managers. The World Social Forum, which has met in Porto

during the war itself and gradually consolidated as a mass

Alegre, Brazil, since 2001, has launched a series of initiatives

movement over the 1950s and 1960s, there was a second phase

aimed at creating a transnational agenda for "globalism from

of containment that took eﬀect over several decades of fierce

below"; numerous progressive organizations and activists—

struggles. This was the accommodationist or reformist moment—

political, religious, indigenous, workers', and community groups—

the last phase of the break in the United States—which was

have signed on. There is a movement out there.

largely completed by about 1970. Although profoundly changed

Turning to U.S. racial politics after the break: during the postWorld War II decades the United States has grown used to its role
as leading superpower and culturally hegemonic society. Yet it
also remains a complex combination of the old and new racial
systems. By acceding to certain "moderate" movement demands,
by revisioning and reinterpreting long-standing racial policies in
order to incorporate their more digestible features, by co-opting
movement leaders and adopting movement rhetoric, the United
States was not only able to defuse and marginalize the radical
potential of the antiracist movements that confronted it in the

in the upheavals of the post-World War II period, the centuries-old
and deeply entrenched system of racial inequality and injustice
was hardly eliminated. Rather the postwar racial order, faced with
an unprecedented set of democratic and egalitarian demands,
was adapted over the course of a decades-long political struggle.
Through an extended interplay of conflict and compromise, a
multileveled and nuanced encounter between that which was
dying and that which was struggling to be born, the racial state
incorporated its opposition. A new racial politics developed in the
U.S.; racial hegemony replaced racial domination.

post-World War II period. It was also able to manage racial

From the standpoint of the racial state, the contentious politics

inequality and racial divisions far more eﬀectively than it could

(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) of the break were resolved by a

have done using the old-style, intransigent means. Yet while it

brokered or "pacted" racial peace. This consisted of a

sang the siren song of democracy and civil rights, the U.S. racial

combination of significant concessions to antiracist movements

state did not transform essential social structures of race and

on the one hand, with the utter repudiation of the movements'

racism; that would have required far more thoroughgoing reforms.

more radical demands on the other. Thus civil rights legislation, as

Such measures would have been undesirable to established

well as administrative and judicial intervention on its behalf, made
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no eﬀort to achieve income and wealth redistribution along racial
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lines, to enhance political participation in any substantial way on
the part of racially defined minorities, or to foster widespread

The racial politics that results from this synthesis of challenge and

cultural reorientation with respect to race and racism.

incorporation, racial conflict and racial reform, has proved neither

From the standpoint of the antiracist movements, oﬃcial white
supremacy and de jure segregation were defeated, and a
modicum of access to the mainstream institutions of the country
—economic, political, and cultural—was achieved, at least for
minority middle-classes.18 But this came at the price of having to
abandon larger hopes for more radical reforms and social
restructuring. It required the repudiation of those activists and
organizations who sought such broader social transformations,
and the abandonment of the hopes of millions of immiserated
ghetto and barrio dwellers, now labeled the "underclass."

stable nor satisfying. Both globally and locally it is a strange brew,
often appearing more inclusive, more pluralistic than ever before,
yet also filled with threats of "ethnic cleansing," resurgent
neofascism, and perhaps equally insidious, renewed racial
complacency. What conclusions, theoretical and political, can we
draw from all this about twenty-first-century racial dynamics?
First, to understand the changing significance of race at the end
of the twentieth century, the century whose central malady was
diagnosed by DuBois as "the problem of the color-line," requires
us to acknowledge the possibility that racial inequality and
injustice no longer operate so clearly through a color-line at all.

Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose. The epoch of the

This is not to deny the continuing significance of race and color; it

postwar racial break ended in the United States with the onset of

is merely to recognize the augmented flexibility, the fungibility, of

a new racial regime, one that could defuse the ferocious conflicts

racial meanings and racialized social structures after the complex

that had developed since the war, yet that could still maintain a

realignments of the post-World War II racial break.

substantial continuity with the legacies of past white
supremacism. Yes, white supremacy had been wounded, but not
mortally. It had again proven itself quite capable of
metamorphosis: absorbing and adapting much of the "dream,"
and repackaging itself as "colorblind," pluralist, nonracialist, and
meritocratic.

If the meaning of race and the logic of racism have changed, our
understandings and practices of antiracism must change too. The
inheritors of the postwar antiracist movements, from the African
National Congress in South Africa and the Movimento Negro
Unificado in Brazil, to SOS Racisme in France and a wide variety
of antiracist groups in the United States, must recognize the
obsolescence of their own concepts, at least in the following
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ways They (we) must realize that it is dangerous to assign to the

example, aﬃrmative action, reparations for slavery, and

state the task of safeguarding racial justice. Seeking redress for

cancellation of international debt).

grievances of racial discrimination, hate crimes, or
institutionalized racism tends to underestimate the extent to
which the state is already itself racialized. The exercise of racial
hegemony, the incorporation of antiracist opposition, has
demonstrated yet again that the state is a thoroughly racial
institution, just as much as it was in the days of de jure
segregation, apartheid, or colonialism. As such it is incapable of
intervening eﬀectively in racial conflicts from an outside and
putatively "neutral" position, incapable of more than palliative
antiracist action. While it may still be desirable to place such
demands on the state—for example, by seeking extension of civil
rights laws or judicial intervention against discriminatory practices
—this cannot substitute for direct political mobilization:
confrontational, negotiated, or even electoral. Indeed, casting the
state in the role of resolving racial conflict tends to discredit and
delegitimate autonomous (civil society-based) mobilization on
racial grounds. They (we) must reexamine our time-honored

Both these points draw on critical race theory (CRT) and its
understanding of the limits of rights-based politics (Delgado and
Stefancic 2001; Valdes, Gulp, and Harris 2002). I do not wish to
imply, though, (and I don't think CRT people do either) that rights
politics and egalitarian demands are entirely wrong or impractical;
rather they are inadequate in the face of racial hegemony, and
largely incapable of eﬀectively countering their rearticulation by
the political right in the aftermath of the racial break. Amid all this
analysis of racially grounded social structures, we should look
more closely at the microsocial dynamics of race: the way racial
practices operate on the experiential level. Here the whole legacy
of sociological pragmatism comes into play:22 a crucial "micro-"
legacy of the racial break is the recognition that a whole lot of
everyday life is racially interpreted, experienced in a way inflected
by race, and therefore at least potentially subject to a deep set of
democratic impulses and motivations.

reliance on egalitarianism. As the New Right and

Finally, we really must jettison our tendency to see racial matters

neoconservatives in the United States, and neofascists like the

as belonging to domestic political and policy spheres. In this

Front Nationale in France and the FPO in Austria have

essay I have attempted to address more seriously the

demonstrated,20 after the racial break it is has become possible

international dimensions of racial injustice and racial politics. As

to uphold the principle of racial equality while simultaneously

social movements, including antiracist ones, become ever more

steadfastly opposing such practical antiracist policies as income

transnational in their orientation, it becomes possible to see the

and wealth redistribution or positive antidiscrimination (for

local and national features of racism more clearly and
384

comparatively. Indeed racial dynamics can be more eﬀectively
grasped when they are understood not as deviations from
supposedly central democratic and egalitarian ideals (of the
nation, the Enlightenment, modernity, etc.), but as historically and
sociologically constitutive of nation, economy, polity, culture, and
personal experience.
One hundred years after the publication of The Souls of Black
Folk, a century after Du Bois's announcement of the "problem of
the color-line" and presentation of the first radical democratic
theory of racism, half a century after the onset of the racial break
and the prolonged invention of racial hegemony, where do racial
politics stand? In this essay I have traced, undoubtedly in all too
schematic and cursory fashion, the vast trajectory of racial
conflict over the course of the twentieth century. This vertiginous
history of triumph and tragedy has left us, on the threshold of the
twenty-first century, still far short of the racially inclusive
democracy we seek. Despite real gains achieved by enormous
eﬀort and sacrifice, racial justice still remains in short supply all
across the planet. The stigmata of race are still highly visible. The
struggle continues.

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Ebook Central Academic Complete.
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Section 5

Situating the field of gender & politics
Discipline & Field Issues
This book concerns a new body of knowledge and an emerging
set of questions that has accompanied national, cross national
and international global political movements aimed at trying to
understand and to improve the situation of women by eliminating
gender inequities and injustices. To the extent that these bodies

professionalization 3 (Norris 1997), diﬀerences among gender
and politics scholars occur not only along these lines but also
are defined by a varied recognition of the political significance of
social relationships and hierarchies that are not considered to be
“public” or related to the state by mainstream political scientists.
Four Major Themes

of knowledge, concepts and questions have become recognized,
recorded, institutionalized and legitimized, they may be
considered a field of study or, more formally, a discipline. Often,

Previous surveys of the gender and politics field have identified

because of their grass- roots origins and continuing links to

particular themes that characterize the research and the

specific communities and cultures, these ideas are dynamic and

questions being asked. This volume is organized around four

diverse. Although they remain united by their common interest in

major themes or approaches. The first oﬀers a diﬀerent and

gender and power or gender and the political, diﬀerent scholars

perhaps more fundamental perspective drawn from the point of

in the same country as well as scholars in diﬀerent countries and

view of scholars from Latin America and Africa who argue that

from diﬀerent cultures have diﬀerent views concerning what the

the crea- tion of knowledge about gender is deeply linked to

field encompasses. Just as commentators on the discipline of

global hierarchies of po- litical, economic and linguistic power

political science as a whole have noted that major diﬀerences

and show how this is manifest in their regions. A second major

exist between the discipline of political science as practiced in

theme concerns the exclusion of women from de- mocratic

the United States as opposed to Europe due to diﬀerent

political institutions (legislatures, political parties, public bureauc-

intellectual tradi- tions2 and to varying degrees of

racies, courts) and from political processes such as elections.
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The assumption of this approach is that the primary agenda is to

stage for this collection. They remind us that knowledge

improve the political representation and participation of women in

production requires power and that social movements.

political institutions – what Anne Phillips (1989) has called “the
politics of presence.” The third theme involves approaches that
include but also go beyond the traditional public/private
boundaries of state-centric political science and instead, draw on
theories, concepts and institutions more often addressed in the
fields of sociology, philosophy, economics, psychology,
anthropology, geography, women’s studies and history in addition
to the discipline of political science. The fourth theme that
characterizes the field of gender and politics focuses on
evaluating and critiquing mainstream concepts, theories and
discourse to show how these concepts and theories are gender
biased, how they exclude women and gender from consideration,
how they disempower and silence women and how they may be
reconstructed.

can be a source of such political support. In countries where
states may be weak and/or undemocratic, where universities may
be few in number and/or may exclude women, where political
science as a discipline is not well established, excludes women or
may be banned altogether, gender and politics knowledge
production continues but under diﬀerent circumstances. Nongovernmental organizations often are the centers of such
knowledge production. Global networks are extremely important.
These chapters are particularly significant to this review because
they oﬀer a valuable critique of the Eurocentricism of the political
science discipline4 and of much of the work in gender and
politics that focuses on women’s political representation in democratic nation-states. They suggest that because gender and
politics scholars and practitioners are not so wedded to the

The chapters in this volume loosely correspond to these four

dominant paradigm, yet forced to operate at least somewhat

themes al- though some chapters include more than one theme

within it, they can be a source of innovation and creative new

or approach. The chapters on Latin America and Africa (chapters

approaches. They can expand the perspective of the field of

two and three) draw our attention to the first theme, namely the

gender and politics and of political science as well. For these

ways in which knowledge production or discipline creation is

reasons, the chapters on Latin America and Africa lead this

related to power. This refers to power not only within political

collection and are crucial to defining and understanding the state

institutions, but power in terms of economic, military, cultural and

of the field.

linguistic dominance. Because this is a new perspective not often
discussed in disciplinary reviews, these two chapters set the

The chapters on Latin America and Africa also make us acutely
aware that the nature of the state, the economy, the openness of
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the society and the government, culture, religion and the

with representative political institutions. The chapters on South

prevalence and role of universities are all factors that shape the

Asia, Europe and the United States (chapters four, five and six) fall

nature of inquiry in various parts of the world and consequently

broadly into this category. The approach in these chapters

condition the study of gender and politics. Military dictator- ships,

concerns the exclusion of women from democratic political

whether in Africa, Asia, the Americas or Europe generally have a

institutions (legislatures, political parties, public bureaucracies,

dramatic impact not only on what occurs at universities but also

courts), and from political processes such as elections. They seek

on what can happen in civil society – an impact that varies with

to identify the mechanisms and causes of these forms of

the conditions of each country and region. In China, for example,

exclusion as well as policies that can improve the situation. The

the formation of the People’s Re- public of China in 1949

assumption of this approach is that the primary agenda is to

established a strong centralized government which has taken the

improve the political representation and participation of women in

lead in improving the well-being of women as part of its quest to

these institutions.

liberate labor, a model considerably diﬀerent from conditions
impacting gender and politics in other parts of the world (Han
1997). National indebtedness has had a great influence not only
on universities but also on the lives of women. Countries in civil
conflict have created situations where women have served as
revolutionary activists, as peacemakers or as peacekeepers. In
these situations, the generation of knowledge about women and
politics or gender and politics may occur primarily in grassroots
and indigenous women’s movements, in non-governmental
organizations, in networks of women activists and/or among
scholars who communicate with one another within and across
geographic boundaries.

The third theme can be found in studies that go beyond the
traditional public/private boundaries of political science and
instead draw on theories, concepts and institutions more often
addressed in the fields of sociology, philosophy, psychology,
anthropology, geography, women’s studies and history rather
than in the discipline of political science. This theme is found in
sev- eral of the chapters in the other three categories. As
illustrated in the chapters on Latin America and Africa (chapters
one and two), the field of gender and politics has developed
largely out of interdisciplinary work drawing on other social
science disciplines and methods. The chapter on gender and
politics in South Asia while focusing on women’s representation in

The second theme – in contrast with the perspective of the

political institutions, stresses the importance of family and kinship

chapters on Latin America and Africa – assumes the existence of

to this process in South Asia. The discussion of gender and

democratic nation-states or of emerging democratic nation-states

globalization, and of gender and political economy in the chapter
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on the United States and the chapter on international relations

the field of gender and politics expands the concept of the

(chapters six and seven respectively) illustrate how gender and

political beyond the confines of the nation-state to include the

politics scholars draw on other disciplines and intellectual

impact of international power hierarchies and show that the locus

approaches including economics, anthropology, history,

of knowledge pro- duction is not necessarily confined to

geography and sociology. Feminist theory al- so is informed by a

universities and established profession- alized academic

wide range of philosophical and historical knowledge in its

disciplines. The chapters on South Asia, Europe and the United

creation of new concepts and new explanations.

States review a rich literature that focuses on the representation

A fourth approach to the study of gender and politics places more
emphasis and importance on the way mainstream concepts and
policies structure thought and discourse to exclude women and
gender from consideration, a practice that disempowers and
silences women and leads to gender-biased conclusions and
policies. The agenda is to disrupt the mainstream “normal,” to
explain and challenge its gender bias and to develop new
concepts to rectify this situation. This is a primary focus for
feminist theory as explained in chapter eight. Because the field of
international relations is heavily involved with public policy
discourse, gender and politics scholars have also been
particularly active in challenging the gender biased concepts of
those in international relations within the discipline of political
science as illustrated in chapter seven.
In summary, the chapters in this volume written by authors from a
wide variety of regions in the world reflect all four of these
approaches with some chapters representing more than one
approach. The chapters on Latin Amer- ica and Africa show how

of women in democratic political institutions within the nation
state. Several chapters including those on Latin America, Africa,
South Asia, the United States, international relations and feminist
theory in whole or in part illustrate the ways in which the field of
gender and politics has moved beyond the pub- lic/private
dichotomy that characterizes much of political science research
to draw on the insights and methods of other social science
disciplines. Finally, the chapters on international relations and
feminist theory review some of the many ways that the field of
gender and politics has challenged mainstream concepts that
shape and propagate gender bias and how the field has developed new theories and new ways of viewing the world that
promote social justice, gender equality and women’s well-being.

Three Streams of Analysis
Many factors have shaped the field of gender and politics as it
exists today in the discipline of political science. The
development of the field cannot be separated from 1) the
changes in capitalism – specifically changes in labor markets – or
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from 2) the emergence of women’s movements globally during

were or- ganized either around the workplace (pensions, health

the 20th and 21st centuries. Insofar as this project concerns the

insurance) or the state (welfare programs, social security). This

development of gender and politics within the discipline of

model of production treated men and women as separate groups

political science, neither can the project be separated from 3) the

defined by law and by custom to have diﬀer- ent responsibilities

state of political science as a discipline glob- ally, especially as it

and diﬀerent roles. To the extent that women were al- lowed to

is represented in the International Political Science Asso- ciation.

work in the waged economy, they were largely crowded into low

Each of these three influences help explain the emergence and

paying gendered occupations such as clerical, retail, nursing,

devel- opment of the relatively new field of gender and politics

teaching, child care and/or domestic service. In industrialized and

and provide a frame- to situate the variety of approaches

semi-industrialized coun- tries, a few worked in low paying

represented by the subsequent chapters in this book.

manufacturing jobs such as sewing, tex- tiles, cigarette making.

Gender, Politics, Changes in Capitalism & in Labor
Markets

In non-industrialized countries, women worked in agriculture, in
the market, and/or in the home, usually confined by law and custom to subordinate roles under male supervision and control. The
changes brought on by World War II in the United States whereby

Changes in global capitalism and subsequent changes in the

women were brought into the waged labor force for the war eﬀort

gendered divi- sion of labor during the second half of the 20th

was a harbinger of what was to occur globally in the late 1960s,

century have altered the politi- cal position of women, albeit quite

the 1970s and the 1980s, as oﬀ-shore production proved to

diﬀerently in diﬀerent parts of the world. This in turn has impacted

enhance profits and contribute to what some called “the

the development of the field of gender and politics. Prior to World

deindustrialization of America (Bluestone 1982).” In the United

War II, in most parts of the industrialized world – with some

States, manu- facturing plants organized under the Fordist mode

exceptions – industrial manufacturing was organized around the

of production (with strong unions, stable employment, manual or

male wage earner. Some women worked for wages as domestics,

craft-based employment and paying family wages to long time

nannies, prostitutes, schoolteachers, nurses, clerical and retail

male employees) moved abroad where they estab- lished

workers. Some women worked in textile and other factories.

factories employing large numbers of women. As men lost their

Almost all women were expected to do unpaid work in the home

jobs in the United States, family incomes fell and more and more

or on the farm, to bear and raise children and to care for the sick

women joined the waged labor force to supplement their family

and elderly. For countries with social services, these services

incomes. In 1989, Guy Stand- ing wrote his famous article,
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“Global Feminization through Flexible Labour,” showing that the

Asia than in Latin America (Horton 1999, 576). Goldin has shown

feminization of the workforce was a global phenomenon. As

that in the United States, the shift of women out of the home and

Standing noted, his term, “feminization of the labor force,”

into the waged labor force occurred in stages beginning in the

referred not only to the increased number of women in the global

late nineteenth cen- tury and evolving through three evolutionary

waged labor force, but also to the changes in the structure of the

phases to a revolutionary phase beginning in 1970 (Goldin 2006,

jobs that were available (Standing 1989). Instead of steady life

2). Early phases of the process saw young single women entering

time jobs for primarily male waged workers, the global

the labor force. As industrialization progressed and more white

manufacturing structure had changed to one of flexible

collar jobs became available and women obtained higher levels of

production – what has since been labeled “commodity chain

education, larger numbers of married women entered the labor

production” (Gereﬃ and Korzeniewicz 1994). Flexible production

force for longer periods of time. The revolutionary phase was

refers to oﬀ-shore global produc- tion where factories (often with

marked not by any par- ticularly dramatic increase in numbers of

primarily male workers) move at will to sources of ever cheaper

women in the labor force, but rather by a more highly educated

labor and where primarily women are recruited to take low waged

female labor pool. This correlated also with a change in women’s

manufacturing jobs often in export zones set aside for for- eign

self reported life expectations, social norms concerning family

direct investment in developing countries. These jobs are

and work and individual identity (Goldin 2006). Beginning in the

generally low paid, insecure and irregular. In 1999, Standing

ear- ly 1980s, 80 percent of young women in the United States

updated his 1989 article to conclude that the global trends he

expected to work when they were thirty five years of age. Women

noted in 1989 were accelerating and that around the world,

were getting more educa- tion, getting married later, getting

women not only were being recruited into these unstable, low

divorced more often, and spending less of their lives in married

paid, part time jobs, but that these were primarily the kinds of

status. They expressed an interest in employment as part of a

jobs available to men as well under this system of post-Fordist

long term career which had equal importance to that of their hus-

production (Standing 1999).

bands (Goldin 2006, 10-12).

In the 1980s, many women in middle income developing

Another important change with regard to global capitalism in the

countries moved out of agriculture and into white collar

last half of the 20th century that impacted women as well as the

occupations such as teaching, nursing, sales, clerical and

discipline of political science has been a major shift from state

services. In general, more women participated in agriculture in

centered economies based on Keynesian beliefs to a neo-liberal
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philosophy articulated by Frederik von Hayek and Milton

resources and/or production of commodities that could be sold

Friedman. The neo-liberal view holds that the role of the state in

for foreign exchange to repay the foreign debts. These neo-liberal

the economy should be limited to maintaining a stable supply of

policies had a profound impact on many women in developing

money in proportion to the rate of growth in the economy. Capital,

countries as they experienced cuts in education, health care,

goods, services and (in theory even labor) should be allowed to

water distribution, energy, welfare and food subsidies for the

flow both within and between states with as little state regulation

purpose of servicing foreign loans. In many cases, state funded

as possible.

public services such as piped water or electricity were privatized

With the oil crisis of 1973 when the Organization of Petroleum
Export- ing Countries (OPEC) raised the price of their oil three and
then four times in one year, many oil importing developing
countries had to borrow funds from international lenders to pay
for the increased cost. For many of these coun- tries, this was the
beginning of a debt burden that forced them to restructure their
economies towards export production. The extra monies
accumulated by the OPEC countries made their way into western
banks which in turn lent them at high rates of interest to
developing countries. With the demise of the Bretton Woods
system in 1971, the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank served as the gatekeepers to global capital by requiring

and marketed. University curricula around the globe were
impacted as neo-liberalism, also known as “The Washington
Consensus,” became the new mantra. For many women in industrializing and poor countries, these neo-liberal changes were
mobilizing fac- tors, ones that brought the inequity of the global
order into sharp focus. This ideological change also impacted the
industrialized countries of Europe and North America as welfare
systems were reduced and state services were eliminated or
privatized.

The Emergence of Women’s Movements and their
Diﬀerences

those countries in need of international loans to implement neo-

The 1960s, a time of state organized (Keynesian) as opposed to

liberal policies as a condition for obtaining a loan. In exchange for

globalized or neo-liberal capitalism, marked the beginning of what

loans from these institutions and ultimately from private lenders,

is sometimes called “second wave” feminism in the United States

countries had to agree to neo-liberal structural adjustment

and Europe (as opposed to “first wave” feminism which refers to

policies (SAPs) that usually called for cutting state spending on

the suﬀrage movement). In this period,

domestic consumption and services (especially services to
women and children) in favor of investing in the extraction of raw
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states used Keynesian economic policies to organize and direct

and private), and in identities- both individual and group (Scott

investment, devise industrial policy, regulate business and use

1986). This understanding considerably broadened the study of

taxation to redistribute wealth (Fraser 2009). Gender relations

gender and politics and constitutes a major contribution of

were expected to be (and for many were) those of the waged or

gender and politics as a field to the discipline of political science

salaried male worker and the house keeping, childrearing woman.

(Hawkesworth 2006)

Authority structures and decision-making tended to be
hierarchical and dominated by males. Feminists of the 1960s and
1970s in the United States chafed against the gender inequities of
this era. They mobilized to help pass the Equal Pay Act of 1963
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 making discrimination
on the basis of sex illegal. They campaigned to enable women to
control their bodies through legalized contraception and abortion.
With momentum building in the civil rights movement and more
women in the waged labor force, unraveling and exposing
patriarchal prac- tices, campaigning for equal treatment by the
state and other institutions, consciousness raising, and trying to

As Nancy Fraser has noted, the second wave feminist struggle in
the United States against the constrictions of post World War II
state organized (Keynesian) capitalism and the gendered bias of
institutions (such as the bar- riers to women in the waged working
force, the expectation that girls should be wives and mothers
first, if not exclusively, the barriers to women in higher education,
in the professions, and in the public and political arena) ironically
coincided with the transformation of state organized capitalism
into neo- liberal capitalism as it developed in the 1970s and
1980s (Fraser 2009).

pass legislation were some of the main activities. These second

Neo-liberal capitalism brought with it a cry for the deregulation of

wave feminists eschewed authoritarian structures, challenged

busi- ness and a reduction of government spending including

traditional hierarchical authorities and attempted to build horizon-

welfare payments and state services, but it also was associated

tal democratic participatory organizations.

with a reorganization of many busi- nesses into networked rather

Some elements of second wave feminism (radical and socialist
feminist) challenged liberal conceptions of the public and the
private to argue that gen- der power was located not only in the
public arena involving the state and its institutions, but also in all
perceived relationships between men and women, be they in the
accepted norms of the society, symbols, institutions (both pub- lic

than hierarchical structures with oﬀ-shore pro- duction bringing
women of all ethnicities and nationalities into the waged
workforce. It generated dramatic changes in the family as the
two-earner family and the double or triple shift became the norm
for women. Single parale headed households. Many second wave
feminists celebrated the economic independence, increased
393

education and increased public awareness that women gained

Women Organizing Internationally

from employment outside the home, while at the same time
struggling with the recognition that unwaged care work was vital

Globally in the 1960s and the 1970s, the United Nations

and necessary and had to be valued and signifi- cantly rewarded

Commission on the Status of Women (created in 1946) was

as waged work. Most second wave feminists sought help from

moving beyond its early legal em- phasis on obtaining equal

the state in this enterprise calling for public childcare programs,

citizenship rights for women who married interna- tionally to

manda- tory pregnancy leave policies, parental leave policies and

emphasize social and economic rights for women in the world. In

more responsibility by males for care work. Meanwhile, neo-

1975, the United Nations held its First World Conference on

liberalism’s emphasis on the indi- vidual and individual self-

Women in Mex- ico, a meeting that some Mexican feminists

suﬃciency encouraged women to assume an indi- vidual identity

boycotted in a move that high- lighted their anti-imperialist

rather than a family identity. Second wave feminist scholars

resentment against the West. This reflected the negative

developing the gender and politics field were caught up in these

sentiments that developing and colonized countries often have

debates and movements.

had for the imposition of what they have considered a western

While elements of the second wave feminist movement wished to
have women recognized as diﬀerent from men and therefore to
be treated diﬀer- ently by the state, most feminists in the United
States during this era were concerned with how the patriarchy
treated all women as a class in a systemic way to maintain
women’s inferiority and subordination. They sought to oblit- erate
the diﬀerences between men and women by seeking recognition
and representation in public and private forums. Diﬀerentiating
among women according to race, class, or ethnicity was a high
priority for only a few.

imperialist femi- nism that they did not feel they had had a fair
opportunity to shape or direct. In spite of these reactions,
subsequent United Nations World Conferences on Women in
1980, 1985 and 1995 mobilized large numbers of women in many
countries in local, national and regional meetings to discuss
women’s issues in preparation for these world conferences. The
early meetings were charac- terized by splits between the Eastern
Soviet bloc countries and the West. The diﬀerences between
North and South continued in all these conferences. Conflicts
among Middle Eastern delegates characterized the 1985
conference in Nairobi, while Catholic and Muslim delegates
opposed key provisions of the agenda proposed for the 1995
conference (Bayes and Tohidi 2001). As improved
communications, especially the telephone, fax machine and ulti394

mately the internet evolved, transnational women’s non-

women from many diﬀerent geographic, social, economic,

governmental or- ganizations became more numerous.

religious, and political contexts. This development calls for a re-

Prior to 1995, United States foundations and many northern
European governments funded projects for women in developing
countries. In many cases in developing countries, this favored a
class of educated, internationally oriented women who

cognition of the diﬀerences among women, of the unique
contexts that do not unite women as sisters but rather show that
race, nationality, ethnicity, class and intersectionality require
recognition and representation.

established organizations that addressed issues that ap- pealed

As Fraser notes, women’s movements and feminism have had a

to western funding agencies such as domestic violence and

para- doxical relationship with neo-liberalism. Second wave

reproduc- tion. In contrast, local grassroots women’s movement

feminism emerged at about the same time as neo-liberalism,

organizations were concerned with survival issues such as

drew on neo-liberal ideas of individual rights to mobilize against

poverty, education, health, children, the environment and working

the gendered strictures of state organized capitalism and in many

conditions. In some countries, still a third sometimes overlapping

ways made gains for women’s equality and political recognition.

group of women emerged to run for public oﬃce.

Changes in the 1980s

As state organized capitalism has begun to erode due to
neoliberal globalization, deregulation, oﬀ-shore production, rapid
capital mobility, the growth of “too big to fail” corporations and

Another development significantly impacting the field came to

the reduction or privatization of public ser- vices, second wave

light in the 1980s and may also be associated with the transition

feminist claims for political rights and political recogni- tion have

from state capitalism based on the bounded nation state to a

been joined and sometimes criticized by women’s grassroots

more transnational neo-liberal order. This involved the publication

movements’ claims for economic redistribution to address the

of works by feminists of color which brought attention to the fact

enormous inequalities that the global neo-liberal order has

that racial, class, and imperialist colonial attitudes and structures

generated. This debate and con- flict is reflected in the field.

divide women in the women’s movement (Mohantry 1984; Spivak
1988; hooks 1981; Hurtado 1989). Since the 1990s, this
recognition has re- sulted in a concern for domestic and global
“intersectional” analysis to disen- tangle the perspectives of
395

The Discipline of Political Science and its
Development

global politics have continued to shape the organization ever
since. Today, the organization has 48 national associations as
active members – 16 are from Western Eu- rope; 9 are from

Whereas the study of politics is as old as the study of social

Eastern Europe; 6 are from Asia (China-Taipei, India, Japan,

discourse and philosophy, the field or discipline of political

Korea, Nepal, and Singapore); 4 are former Soviet Union

science is of more recent vin- tage, emerging in the latter part of

countries (Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan); 4 are from Latin

the 19th century. The founding of the American Political Science

America – (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina); 3 are from the

Association (APSA) in 1903 serves as a marker. The International

Middle East – (Israel, Lebanon, Turkey); 3 from Africa – All Africa,

Political Science Association (IPSA) was founded as a part of

Cameroon, South Africa; 2 are from North Amer- ica – (US and

UNESCO in 1949 after World War II. Originally it was an

Canada); and one from Oceana – Australasia. (Since 1952, IP- SA

association of national political science associations. Reflecting

has also been open to individual membership and now has over

the global political hierar- chy of the world at that time, most of

1500 in- dividual members.)

the founding members of IPSA were from North American,
European or British Commonwealth countries. The founding
members included the American, Canadian, French and Indian
po- litical science associations. In the 1950s, most Western
European nations (Sweden, the United Kingdom, Austria,
Belgium, Greece, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Switzerland) joined; two Eastern Europe national
associations became members (Poland and Yugoslavia), and two
Middle Eastern organizations joined – (Israel, Lebanon). Finally,
the Soviet Union; two additional Asian countries – (Japan,
Ceylon); and two Latin American associations (Brazil and Mexico)
were members by 1960.
Not all of these associations have remained as IPSA members.

John Trent notes in his summary of findings from the first seven
books in the IPSA World of Political Science book series, of which
this volume is a part, that political science as a discipline has
been “Western dominated” (Trent 2009, 4, 14) and mainly “male
and white” (ibid., 14). Trent reports that globally, barely a third of
political scientists are female (ibid., 13). Fur has flourished in
democratic regimes with an “open educational system,
prosperity, foreign exchanges, returning exiles, research models
and theories, leading scholars and educators, professional
associations, and above all, relatively independent universities
and stable sources of funding” (ibid., 8). Because political science
has tradi- tionally had a state-centric frame and because women
have generally been excluded from the state and its activities,

Just as global politics influenced the creation of the IPSA, so too,
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scholars in political science depart- ments have tended to ignore

volume, attempts to reach across borders combined with

gender.

critiques of western Eurocentrism have made many aware of and

The essays in this volume confirm and elaborate on these
findings with regard to the study of gender and politics.

more sensitive to the western, Eurocentric bias of politi- cal
science as a discipline and of the biases of western feminism in
relation to the field of gender and politics in political science.

Gender and Politics within the Discipline of Political

Within the International Political Science Association, the IPSA

Science

Re- search Committee on Sex Roles and Politics was first created
as a study group in 1976 at the IPSA meetings in Scotland and

Until recently, political science has been a male dominated

made a permanent Re- search Committee in 1979. The objectives

discipline even in Western industrialized nations. Establishing the

of those involved in the creation of the research committee at the

field of “women and poli- tics,” which has subsequently become

time were to address “a broad array of issues involving gender

“gender and politics,” as a “field” in the discipline has been a

and politics focusing on the political participation of wom- en;

struggle supported by and dependent upon women’s movements

women and public policy in comparative perspective; women in

outside the academy primarily in the last part of the 20th century.

public world countries; women, religion and politics; the role of

The women’s movements, in turn, have in part been responses to

legislation and the status of women; women and the transition to

major changes in capitalism in the last part of the twentieth

democracy; strategies for the empowerment of women; feminist

century as increasing numbers of the world’s women have had an

theory; women and nationalism; eco-feminism; and the global

opportunity to be educated and/or have moved from unpaid work

women’s movement and international relations” (www.ipsa.ca). To

to positions in the waged economy.

provide a separate forum for the issues important to women in

Now, at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century,
the field of gender and politics, like the global economy, is
undergoing major changes associated with globalization.
Globalization has brought more women from diﬀerent parts of the
globe together and generated a myriad of transnational women’s
networks and organizations that generate and transmit
knowledge about gender and politics. As illustrated in this

developing countries, in 1988, a group of IPSA RC 19 members
created the IPSA Research Group on Wom- en, Politics, and
Developing Nations. In 1992, IPSA recognized this group as a
Research Committee (RC 7). While many of the topics considered
by RC 7 were not diﬀerent from those considered by RC 19,
some topics such as women and development, women and
religion, women and the environment, women and nationalism,
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women, debt and structural adjustment were new or given a

grassroots organizing, political activity in transnational

greater emphasis reflecting the priorities of developing countries.

organizations and leadership training for women around the world

Both committees considered many of the same original topics of

are part of the agenda.

RC19 such as women and public policy in comparative
perspective, political participa- tion of women, women in public
administration, women in legislatures, elec- toral politics,
strategies for the empowerment of women, women and ethnic
conflict, women’s human rights, and women and democratization.
In 2000, a group of IPSA members – most were members of
RC19 and/or RC 7 – de- cided to create a new Research
Committee on Gender, Globalization and Democratization (RC52)
to study the new realities of globalization and its gendered
consequences. This research committee focuses on 1) the
various understandings of globalization in diﬀerent parts of the
world and the diﬀer- ential impact that these processes have on

Another way that the organizational history of gender and politics
in the International Political Science Association suggests the
nature of the field and its development is that membership in RC
19, RC 7 and RC 52 have included scholars primarily from
Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Russia, Latin America, Israel, Bangladesh, the Philippines and
India with very few from Africa, Japan, Korea, China, Central Asia,
Vietnam and other parts of Asia, the Caribbean, or the Arab
Middle East. In part this reflects the hegemony of the English
language (French is also an oﬃcial language of IPSA but most
sessions are conducted in English).

women in diﬀerent contexts; 2) the changes in gender

It also reflects the educational systems in various countries, the

relationships created by economic globalization processes such

status of women in those countries, the wealth of countries that

as: a) migration and gender; b) the changing patterns of

are able or not able to send scholars to international meetings,

production and modes of production, privatization, deregulation,

the kind and source of foreign aid available to the country, the

structural adjustment policies, trade agreements, and gender; c)

status of the discipline of political science in the educational

the rampant growth of sex traﬃcking;

systems of various coun- tries and the extent to which women are

d) transnational organizations and gender politics; and e)
transnational femi- nism. A third theme concerns the impact of
globalization processes on the prospects for democratization in

recruited into the discipline in various countries. All of these are
factors which shape this review of the status of gender and
politics at the end of the first decade of the 21st century.

the world, especially a kind of democratiza- tion that includes
women. Education for women – especially gender training,
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The Essays in the Volume

Imperialism of Categories: Situating Knowledge in a Globalizing
World.” In this address, Rudolph calls attention to the tendency of

The essays in this volume do not follow a uniform pattern in

those in a dominant culture or society to do cultural vio- lence by

structure or con- tent but do all illustrate commonalities with

imposing their own categories developed through their own

others in that they exhibit one or more of the four major

particu- lar history, culture and place on an alien culture in a

approaches or themes described above. We have learned as a

diﬀerent location with a diﬀerent history. Those in the dominated

group of authors that although we all are interested in studying

alien culture absorb the imposed categories and ideas to a

gender and politics, we do not necessarily think alike and we do

degree but not fully. Their view of the world or their knowledge is

not always have similar assumptions. We are representatives of

therefore inherently diﬀerent and needs to be understood, em-

our regions, but not of all aspects of the field in our regions. The

braced and respected (Rudolph 2005).

same can be said for the chapters in this book. Furthermore,
while the regions of Latin America, Africa, Europe, South Asia and
the United States are discussed here, the Old Commonwealth
countries (Australia, New Zealand, Canada), the Middle East, the
Caribbean, Russia, and many countries in Asia including Japan
and China are not repre- sented. Yet, in spite of its chapter
asymmetry with regard to approach and its limited sampling of
the world’s regions, this book as a whole oﬀers a picture of the
subfield of gender and politics as it exists in the first part of the
21st century, its contributions, its questions, its debates and the
kind of knowledge it generates. As a review of the field, it diﬀers
from previous reviews in that it raises the issue of the relationship
between knowledge production, knowl- edge transfer and
geopolitical power. The chapters about Latin America and Africa
in this collection support the insights articulated by India area
special- ist Susanne Rudolph in her 2005 presidential address to
the American Political Science Association entitled “The

The field of gender and politics has intellectual roots in 19th
century Western liberal, socialist and Marxist thought. Its
emergence as a field of study and policy making has been
strengthened by changes in the global capi- talist economy in the
late 20th century that have disrupted many patriarchal structures
and brought women all over the world into the waged labor force,
and also by the global emergence of women’s movements in the
20th century. The chapters on Latin America and Africa (chapters
two and three) oﬀer per- haps the most important “finding” or
new perspective of this book which is that knowledge production
is power based and that knowledge about both po- litical science
and gender and politics is conditioned by the global distribu- tion
of power. Countries and regions in the periphery often have
diﬃculty escaping the ideological hegemony of core countries.
Western Eurocentric assumptions about the “normality” of
knowledge production in universities, about the functioning of
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political science as an academic discipline in univer- sities and

or develop- ment of specific disciplines in those universities. As

about the relationship of gender and politics as a subfield of

both Mendoza and Gouws note in this volume, the existence,

politi- cal science do not apply or apply diﬀerently in many non-

status, funding, and control of uni- versities in Latin America and

western countries in the world. Chapters four, five and six in this

in Africa have in many cases not been condu- cive to nurturing

book document the emphasis and importance given by many

political science as a discipline. These same forces have shaped

gender and politics scholars in India, Europe and the United

the discipline where it does exist to be unwelcoming to the study

States to the idea of increasing women’s representation at all

of gender and politics as a sub-field.

levels in liberal forms of democratic government as the heart of
the field. Chapters seven and eight on international relations and
feminist theory dis- cuss still another dimension of the field of
gender and politics which involves the element of the field that
seeks to challenge “male-stream” political science concepts,
assumptions and theories within the discipline that make women
invisible, powerless, voiceless.

Furthermore, Breny Mendoza observes that in Latin America and
other colonized or post-colonial countries, political science as a
discipline is situated diﬀerently than it is in North American and
European countries. In Latin America, political science interacts
with North American and European po- litical science by
“mirroring and contesting” it, and in turn interacts with what she
calls a “shadow dialogue” constructed by western scholars to

In organizing essays for this volume, we have come to

pre- sent themselves as knowledgeable and others as incapable

understand that knowledge creation is linked to power

of knowledge. This shadow dialogue is unique and ever present,

configurations in the world, that the west is not the center of the

although often invisible and ignored. Knowledge paradigms and

universe for all, and that the discipline of political science has

public policies imposed on Latin Amer- ica by Europe and North

been and continues to be primarily western and Eurocentric in its

America have conditioned, contained and often si- lenced

orientation. Authors Breny Mendoza, from Latin America and

knowledge production in Latin America, especially ideas and

Amanda Gouws, from Africa, challenge the assumption that the

litera- tures written in Spanish or indigenous languages. Where

study of gender and politics takes place principally within the

political science de- partments do exist, for the most part they do

discipline of political science or even in universities in their

not include gender and politics as a part of the discipline. Latin

regions. The continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America have

American feminists who study gender and politics tend to be in

very diﬀerent and varied histories with regard to the existence,

other disciplines such as sociology, law, literature, an- thropology,

history and role of universities, not to mention the existence and/

communications, economics, economic development, women’s
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studies and/or psychology (Archina, Donoso 2009; Valdéz 2009,

scholarship in the academy in Africa has grown out of a critique

Vargas 2009, Richard 2008). This does not mean that neither

of women in development (WID) that dealt with symptoms rather

Africa nor Latin Amer- ica produces knowledge about gender and

than the causes of wom- en’s inequality. Gender studies started

politics. Rather it means that such knowledge is produced in

outside of the academy and moved in, although it is still not fully

some other venue by feminist and women scholars

accepted. Feminists still tend to teach gender cours- es in

– some working in universities in academic departments and
many in inde- pendent non-governmental organizations often
supported by indigenous or foreign funders. Mendoza calls
attention to an “epistemological decolonial revolution” occurring
in many parts of Latin America in support of the “shift to the left”
in opposition to neoliberal ideas and practices. This revolution
draws upon the histories, cultures and knowledge bases of
indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples to construct their own
centers of knowledge.
Amanda Gouws echoes Mendoza’s observations and criticisms in
her sur- vey of gender and politics in Africa. Gouws foregrounds
the sad condition of tertiary education in Africa, a condition which
means that although African feminist scholars attempt to
generate their own indigenous theoretical models to explain
African politics, they must compete in this endeavor with scholars
from Europe and North America who operate from more well
funded and es- tablished university bases. Feminist scholars in
Africa also must contend with the donor driven agendas of
funders from the North and with the male domi- nated nature of
most African academic departments. Gouws notes that feminist

addition to their normal responsibilities. As in Latin America,
Gouws notes that feminists in Africa have formed a variety of non
governmental or- ganizations that have had an important role in
increasing gender scholarship in Women’s Studies departments
and other multidisciplinary venues to promote African feminist
analysis. However, many institutional and cultural barriers persist,
including creeping au- thoritarianism and global donor
involvement in African agenda setting.
Coming from India, the largest democratic nation in Asia with a
British colonial history and a well established university system,
Ranjana Kumari in chapter four finds western ideas of democracy
and representation to be cen- tral in the field of gender and
politics. She reviews the literature concerning gender and
governance in South Asia to argue that the greatest obstacles to
women’s political participation in this part of the world lie in family
struc- tures and the social valuation of women. She notes that
some of this literature is devoted to arguments concerning why
women should participate in the po- litical process and why they
are needed. In a region with one strong democ- racy (India) and
several democratizing nations (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and
the Maldives), South Asia has one of the lowest levels of women
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in par- liaments of any region in the world, including East Asia and

science departments, most departments oﬀer gender and poli-

Sub-Saharan Af- rica. Kumari notes that family structure is not

tics courses and many universities in North America and Europe

only a negative but also a posi- tive factor in encouraging women

have Gender and/or Women’s Studies departments as well. (As

to enter politics. Asia has had an unusually large number of

Breny Mendoza notes, this is increasingly the case in Latin

powerful female leaders as heads of government primarily

America.)

because family is often seen as more important than gender in
Asian socie- ties. Women who are daughters, wives or widows of
powerful politicians of- ten ascend into politics in South Asia to
extend the family dynasty. At the lower levels of Indian politics,
quota systems and reserved seats have had considerable
success in populating the local government councils; however,
Kumari reports a dearth of women politicians between those at
the highest level and those at the lowest local level.

This may not necessarily mean that the struggles to have women
in positions of political authority, to have gender as a significant
and serious part of the curriculum in political science or to have
barriers to women’s equality with men removed have been
successful, but the political situation is diﬀerent from that in
Africa, Latin America, and Asia – not to mention the Middle East.
This observation may downplay the problems that exist here.
What ex- actly does it mean to have gender and politics

The final part of Kumari’s chapter summarizes the findings of

institutionalized? Does it mean more advanced feminist political

studies of the many ways that South Asian societies socialize

thinking and action? Does it reflect more political power and

women and men to ex- clude women from political participation

participation for women?

and of other barriers that mitigate against women assuming an
equal role in South Asian political life. She also discusses the
impact that quotas have had in improving women’s political
situation in South Asia.

Monique Leyenaar in chapter five, writes about the field of
women in politics in Europe by presenting a comprehensive
account of scholarly studies concerning the rise in women’s
participation in European parliaments over fifty years from

Writing from their positions in Western Europe and the United

1955-2005. While she recognizes that European gender scholars

States, Monique Leyenaar (chapter five) and Jane Bayes (chapter

have been active in producing and advocating feminist theory,

six) do not ques- tion the position or role of universities or the

femi- nist methodologies and gender policies, have studied

discipline of political science in their societies. While the field of

women’s movements and engaged in comparative and

gender and politics does not have a presence in all political

interdisciplinary research involving gender and politics, her
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chapter illustrates the concern and success that European

gender and public policy. Bayes adds to this a survey of

women have had in studying and improving the political

globalization in the gender and politics field to show how these

representation of women in European parliaments – institutions

trends have drawn on contributions from other disciplines to

which are not only public (as opposed to institutions such as the

become almost separate subfields in the literature – gender and

family) but institutions that are explicitly and traditionally

post-colonial studies, globalization and gender, and gender and

understood as political in western political theory. Her ap- proach,

democratization.

unlike that of Mendoza or Gouws, does not contest or question
the relevance of traditional Eurocentric political science, but
rather brilliantly il- lustrates how this kind of analysis can explain
and promote the representation of women in politics. Her chapter
focuses on 25 countries of the European Union where she finds
that states can be grouped from high to low levels of women’s
parliamentary representation. She then examines voting, recruitment, selection, election and representation in each to explain the
chances of women becoming elected to parliament. This
approach requires an extensive examination and comparison of
political parties in each country as well as their gender policies
such as quotas.
In chapter six, Bayes surveys the types of questions raised at
diﬀerent times by those developing the field of gender and
politics in the United States. She does this by summarizing and
comparing six diﬀerent surveys of the field that include primarily
United States authors: in 1983, 1993, 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2010.
The body of literature covered by these surveys gener- ally covers
the development of feminist theory and addresses questions related to gender and participation, gender and representation and

The chapter by Elizabeth Prügl discusses the developments in the
field of gender and international relations, noting that feminists
have focused on and made some limited gains in their gendered
critiques of mainstream interna- tional relations. She surveys
developments in the literature in security studies, gender and war,
gender and peacekeeping, international political economy and
global economic governance. This field and its many subparts
have grown exponentially as globalization trends of the last thirty
years have ex- panded the field of gender and politics to include
topics much more varied and far reaching than the struggle to
include women in the electoral and gov- ernance processes
within nation-states.
Mary Hawkesworth’s survey of western feminist political theory
litera- ture in chapter eight rounds out the volume by noting that
feminist theory from the beginning has had to develop strategies
to overcome the Aristotelian assumption of mainstream Western
philosophy that injustice cannot exist without being tied to
specific historical events. Hawkesworth argues that feminist
theorists have faced the challenge of how to develop concepts
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and analytic strategies to show that gender injustice is present in

among regions. We are reminded that political science as a

the on-going “natural,” legal social relations of most societies.

discipline is associated heavily with western, democratic,

The theoretical project has involved making these injustices

prosperous capitalist societies, ones with well-funded,

visible, questioning them, bringing them in- to the light of day for

independent universities. Yet other countries and re- gions

reworking and re-examination. These eﬀorts occurred as a part of

without these attributes also have women, women’s movements,

the liberal and socialist movements in the 18th and 19th centuries

and the production of knowledge about gender and women,

with liberals targeting the state and its laws and socialists

knowledge that circulates in often unconnected worlds separated

focusing more on the exploitative gendered divisions of labor

by hegemonic structures of language, custom and institutions.

brought on by capitalist industrial production. Hawkesworth then

The field of gender and politics consequently has much to oﬀer

presents and evaluates some of the ways that a rich variety of

the discipline of political science as it pushes it to expand beyond

feminist theories have been classified in the last part of the 20th

its current disciplinary boundaries. As Marian Simms and Marian

century – the “hyphenation model,” the “equality-diﬀerence”

Sawer observed in 1984, the discipline of political science with its

debate, postmodern feminism, socialist/Marxist feminism and

traditional focus on the nation state, continues to guide its

diﬀerence feminism. Using specific works to illustrate her points,

followers into studies of women’s representation in political

she provides a brief survey of ways that feminist political theorists

institutions, an approach that is well rep- resented in this volume.

have explored androcentric bias in the Western tradition of

Simms and Sawer also noted in 1984 that the disci- pline of

political theory and summarizes western feminist theo-

political science because of its focus on the nation state tends to

rists’ eﬀorts to learn from and rectify their mistakes as they have
attempted to break away from imperialist thinking in their search
for social justice.

di- rect its followers away from questions of gender. Other social
science disci- plines such as anthropology, sociology, geography,
and psychology have been less gendered-biased. Feminists
concerned with the political have con- sequently borrowed from

To conclude, Marian Simms and Jane Bayes note that this

many of these other disciplines to redefine and ex- pand their

volume has contributions from scholars from five diﬀerent regions

concepts and methodologies in ways that include women and

in the world, each bringing their own perspectives and

gen- der. This is another area where gender and politics has

approaches to bear on the topic and in so doing, shedding new

contributed to the dis- cipline of political science. Finally, the field

light on what has gone before and on some broad diﬀer- ences

of gender and politics has made important and innovative
conceptual, theoretical and linguistic contributions to the
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discipline of political science and to the knowledge base of the
world as a whole as it seeks to delegitimize gender biased
concepts and conscious- ness and to reconceptualize new
avenues towards social justice.

The previous section is provided by OAPEN’s open
access library, including Gender and Politics.
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Chapter 12

Ideology &
Religion in
Current Politics
Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Identify concepts of ideology and religion.
• Understand and critically think about ideology and
religion, and its connection to the state.
• Analyze current issues linked to ideology and religion.

Section 1

Ideology & politics
Most scholarly research on elections appears to accept

institutions and ideas. Formal theories of political choice are

Professor Rogers's first insight as true, and the second as

explicitly designed to focus on strategic move ments by

inexplicable. The "politics" of the cam paign, the speeches,

candidates to increase their expected vote share, given the

the persuasion, the posturing, and the symbolism, are just

expected platform of their opponent(s). This analysis relies on the

applesauce, a minor side dish to the main course of issue stew.

correctness of an analogy drawn from economic spatial location

Conse quently, it is hard to explain why enormous resources of

theory, an analogy that has systematically misled political

money, time, and energy are dissipated in this unimportant and

theorists. The alternative proposed here is a concept that, while

unexamined aspect of elections. For some reason, actual

hardly new, captures concisely what current theory omits. That

participants seem to take the process very seriously. The way

concept is ideology.

citizens make political choices aﬀects more than just the
immediate distribution of resources. The institutions, or
"humanly created rules of the game," 1 of the society help to
determine its long-run prosperity, the ideas that are important for
political debate in future contests, and the ability of citizens to
cooperate and trust each other. Ultimately, the ideas institutions
promote, and the ethical restrictions institutions place on
individual actions, are the most important determinants of the
very definition of a society and how it performs.2

In the following pages, a theory of ideology is spelled out, and its
implications for political choices in a community are explored.
Our first task is to convince social scientists that this conception
is important, and that its incorporation into existing work is
valuable. We begin by arguing that the present notion of political
interaction, particularly the theory of elections, can be greatly
improved by being modified to account for ideology. Then, the
theory of public goods, voting, and interest group influences on
elections are reviewed. Finally, we present a unified model of

Yet, the classical spatial theory of electoral competition among

purposive political action, incorporating voters, candidates,

parties and candidates consciously abstracts away from

parties, and interest groups in the face of immanent uncertainty.
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Along the way, we hope to persuade the reader of two things.

In constructing a formal theory of policy formation, we reprise

First, rigorous formal models of politics may someday account for

Downs's original motivation for using spatial theory: to represent

emotion, history, and the idiosyncrasies of human cognition.

political preferences in the face of uncertainty, where "represent"

Second, adding such factors to existing models will strengthen

takes on the technical meaning given it in microeconomic theory.

their power to predict and explain.

We require a theory that focuses on the simplified, abstract left-

As noted above, this formal perspective on ideology is not wholly
new. Many points addressed in this work were advanced in
Anthony Downs's seminal 1957 book, An Economic Theory of
Democracy. But this work has been misinterpreted; the orthodox
"Downsian" model of elections is diﬀerent from what Downs
intended. The main goal of Downs's theory was accounting for
the pervasive atmosphere of uncertainty and limited information
in which political decisions are made. Downs advances the
rudiments of a spatial model in his chapters 1-4, and it is on this

right "ideological" dimension Downs constructs, but that is still
based on voters who care about policies. Downs speaks of his
spatial theory as if this were his goal, but presents no model that
can represent choices by rationally uninformed voters. Later work
in political theory has confused Downs's simple model with his
ambitious goal, and has accepted "issues" as the space where
political choice takes place. This focus conflicts with the simple,
symbolic, and viscerally evocative messages of real cam paigns.
Until now, spatial theory has not accounted for ideology.

foundation that much of modem spatial theory, including the

Downs defines ideology as "a verbal image of the good society

"median voter theorem," is built. Unfortunately, the extensions of

and the chief means of constructing such a society" ( 1957, p 96;

the spatial model were accomplished mechanically, taking

emphasis added). Note that this definition has two parts:

"issues" as the dimension(s) of the relevant space. It was

identifying the ends toward which society should strive, and then

precisely Downs's point that voters have too little information

specifying policies that are means to these ends. The reason

about parties or candidates to make such a detailed analysis. In

that ideologies serve a vital purpose in politics is the uncer tainty

fact, the attenuated incentives for voters to learn much about

that suﬀuses political decisions. The decision rules political actors

politics prompted Downs to develop his theory in the first place.

use to select specific policies are hard to gauge. Perhaps more

The spatial theory of Chapters 1-4 in Downs was a man of straw,

important, the causal link between means and ends is clouded.

and it is time to begin to analyze men of flesh and blood.

Downs notes that diﬀerences between parties are bereft of
ideological conflicts in a world of certainty.
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When voters can expertly judge every detail of every stand

than an n-dimensional policy space would imply, even if what

taken and relate it directly to their own views of the good

voters care about is the n-dimensional

society, they are interested only in issues, not in

space . A reduced-dimensional policy space represents party

philosophies. Therefore parties never need to form

conflict very accurately, and at far less cost to the voters and the

weltanschauungen at all, but can merely take ad hoc stands

parties themselves. Further, the form of this cleavage is

on practical problems as they arise. ( 1957, 98)

predictable from the intellectual content of the ideologies: the

The situation is very diﬀerent if voters are unsure of what parties

verbal image of good doesn't just list the dimensions of conflict,

will do. Voters may be uncertain because (1) they don't know the

it logically implies them.

details of what the party claims as its platform, (2) they are unsure
of the implications of a policy, such as a new superconducting

Consequently, parties organize themselves around ideologies, not
policy positions. Platforms are more than a point in an n-

supercollider, for their individual welfare, or

dimensional space; they become abstract, even ethical,

(3) they find such claims less than completely credible. This is, in
Downs's view, no more, and no less, than a rational reaction to

statements of what is good, and why.
Each party realizes that some citizens vote by means of

the costliness of political information.

ideologies rather than policies; hence it fashions an ideology

[A] voter finds party ideologies useful because they remove

which it believes will attract the greatest number of

the necessity of his relating every issue to his own

votes. . . . This ideology must be both internally consistent

philosophy. Ideologies help him focus attention on the

and consistent with the party's concrete policies . . . In our

diﬀerences between parties; therefore they can be used as

model, each party designs its ideology to appeal to that

samples of all the diﬀerentiating stands. With this shortcut
voter can save himself the cost of being informed upon a

a

wider

range of issues. (1957, 98)
Downs is hinting here at something profound: the cleavages
between parties separate along simpler, more predictable lines

combination of social groups which it feels will produce the
most support. If its design is accurate, policies chosen for
their consistency with the ideology will automatically please
the citizens being courted by the party. (Downs 1957,
101-2)
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The point of these lengthy, repeated quotations is to establish

value most. We are left with a challenge: how are we to depict the

Downs's goal in applying spatial theory to politics. The irony of

relation between ideology, the realm of real political discourse,

crediting Downs with originating classical spatial theory in politics

and the complex n-dimensional space that real voters care

is that he was trying to accom plish exactly the opposite. A theory

about? In other words, how are ideologies projected or mapped

of ideology was his goal, and simple spatial theory was only the

onto predictions about policy?

means of accomplishing tis. What is now called the "Downsian"
spatial model is, instead, a synthetic spatial location theory
derived from economics and decision science.

The answer Downs gives is vague and confused, which probably
ex plains why little has been made of this connection until now.
He claims: "voters are ultimately interested in actions, not

Downs's earlier-cited opinion that, in a certain world, ideology is

ideologies, so each party must frequently check its actions

irrele vant has proved prescient: spatial theory has assumed

directly against the voters' preferences" (Downs 1957, 102).3

certainty, and has largely ignored ideology. Candidates position

But how are these preferences expressed? How can a party

themselves in n-dimension pol icy spaces in which voter ideal

measure policy preferences when political rhetoric, and the very

points are fixed and certain points. Ellipsoidal indiﬀerence curves

construction of an individual's political outlook, is expressed in

encompassing convex upper contour sets represent voter

ideological terms?

preferences, and allow the researcher to describe the choices
voters make among competing policies or candidates.
In the following chapters, we review both the contributions and
draw backs of this perspective in detail. For now, we wish only to
emphasize that this picture is wrong, or incomplete: the campaign
has been left out! In trying to bring the campaign back in, we are
led to notice the diﬀerence between choice based on issues and
choice based on campaigns. Real campaigns designed to attract
votes are dominated by symbolism and a few simple messages
or themes. Scholarly spatial analysis of voting has emphasized
issues, and positions on issues may be what voters ultimately

The fact that the two spaces are separate requires some
correspondence between them. Downs recognizes this, and
oﬀers the following explanation:
This dualism can be depicted on our graph of political space
. . . . Each party takes stands on many issues, and each
stand can be assigned a position on our left-right scale.
Then the party's net position on this scale is a weighted
average of all the particular policies it upholds . . . . Each
citizen may apply diﬀerent weights to the individual policies,
since each policy aﬀects some citizens more than others.
(1957, 132-3)
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The ideas embodied in this nascent theory of ideology have not

"median voter theorem." Various versions of the median voter

been extended, or even much noticed, by students of politics.

theorem (MVT) are identified with Downs ( 1957), Black ( 1958),

Political scientists have either rejected Downs or embraced only

Davis and Hinich ( 1966, 1967), and Plott ( 1967). The MVT is a

chapters 1-4. In part, the explanation lies in the fact that Downs's

highly abstract theoreti cal approach to voting behavior.

correspondence, or mapping, be tween ideology and policy is not

Nonetheless, the MVT purports to make important predictions

workable. If the ideological dimension is a weighted average of

about practical political interaction. The central point of

policy positions, where the weights diﬀer across voters, there is
no coherence in ideological messages, and therefore no
information (even on average) in ideological positions.
Consequently, ideology (as Downs defines it) might be a
shorthand rule or heuristic for individual voters, but it is not a
means of communicating in groups or organizing parties.
The thesis advanced in this book is that ideologies are quite
diﬀerent from personal belief systems or heuristics to guide
individual choice. Ideolog ical messages contain coherent
statements of how to choose and what to do. Citizens can, on
average, agree on the content and meaning of these state ments,
though their evaluation of the worth of the statements may diﬀer.
As a result, ideologies are the basis for choice in group decisions,
and provide the language in which groups debate and disagree.
In the following pages, Downs's fundamental insights on the
importance of uncertainty in political discourse are reformulated
in a more general theory of ideology. It is useful, before we begin,
to contrast a model of choice based on ideology with the best-

the MVT is to identify a general structural force in politics that
drives candi dates, parties, and policies toward the middle of the
distribution of voter preferences. In its more extreme form, the
MVT confers the powers of univer sal choice on a single actor, the
median voter.
The debt owed by such spatial theory to Hotelling ( 1929) and
Smithies (1941) is obvious. Still, as we shall soon see, this debt is
really not clearly understood, and in some ways, the insights of
Hotelling and Smithies have been subtly misapplied by political
theorists. 4 Spatial location theory in eco nomics generally took
as its object of analysis N firms (imagine them to be hot dog
vendors with wheeled carts), choosing where to locate along a
straight line (imagine a boardwalk along a beach). Some fixed,
exogenous distribution of potential customers along this line is
assumed. 5
Consider an example with two vendors (N = 2). The
prediction of

known of the voting models of choice under cer tainty, the
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Hotelling and Smithies in this case is that the vendors would end
up rubbing elbows at the location of the median beachgoer. Any
other arrangement would mean that one vendor serves more, and
the other less, than half the total market. Consequently, no
other pattern can be an equilibrium, since each vendor can either
(1) move closer to his rival, or (2) if already next to his rival, move
around, closer to the center, and capture for himself a larger
market share. More succinctly, since each vendor can guarantee

• Transactions are enforced at no marginal cost to any party to
the transaction.
• Movement is free, and it is clear what movement means: the
physical location of the hot dog cart changes along the single
dimension of the beach. The perception of relative distance is
objective and shared.
• The distribution of hungry sunbathers is exogenous, and does

himself at least half the market by locating in the center of the

not change in response to movements or fixed locations of hot

distribution of sunbathers, no other location makes sense. This

dog vendors.

nice result breaks down if N 3, since if three (or more) vendors are
side-by-side, the ones in the middle have zero market share.

Let us consider applying exactly these four assumptions to a

Such vendors could increase their profits by moving anywhere

simple political issue, say the proportion of total budget spent on

else in the space.

education. Let voters be distributed along the 0 percent to 100
percent interval. Pick the initial positions of two candidates

Consider for a moment the assumptions that underlie this

Theta and Psi and call these positions

model of spatial competition, and compare the situation
being analyzed to political interaction. The assumptions of the

(} and l/J, respectively. One possible configuration is depicted

hot dog game can be set out as follows:

in figure 1,

• Vendors are identical, except for location on the boardwalk:

where (} =/:- l/J. Assume that voters' ideal points are uniformly

they sell indistinguishable hot dogs and oﬀer the same buns,
napkins, and condiments; and their carts have similar
appearances. People choose one over the other based solely
on the concern for minimizing the walk from beach blanket to
frankfurter freighter.

distributed along
the 0 percent to 100 percent interval, so that the median lies at 50
percent. The question is, how directly applicable is the logic of
the spatial location game? If all hot dogs are identical, it makes
sense to choose vendors based purely on their physical
closeness to the hungry sunbather. Once the purchase is made,
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the sunbather has eaten and does not care if the vendor moves,

candidates who manifest leadership, calmness in a crisis,

as he can always patronize the competitor. But it is much less

good character, and consistency. None of these nonpolicy

clear what "move ment" means for a candidate in a political/

characteristics have analogues in the frank furter example,

policy location game. The politi cian is making a contingent

because the frankfurter purchase is a one-shot deal, with no

promise, separated in time from the point when the promise is

opportunity for reneging or ex post recontracting. Once we have

expected to be fulfilled. As a result, politicians often couch

received the hot dog and examined it, we pay for it, assuming the

pledges in terms that both state the promise and make a

vendor will not snatch the steaming tube steak back and run

commitment to carry

away chortling. All of these problems of reneging and ex post

it out.
For example, Theta might assert: "If I am elected I will, once in
oﬃce months from now, work for educational proportion (}
because I believe (} is the best policy." This is important because
no voter cares about any one of a series of campaign promises
for its own sake. Voters value only the single, final choice among
mutually exclusive alternatives (the budget cannot have both (}
and (}' proportions spent on education). The candidate can
improve his vote share (his sole concern) by "moving" from (} to
(}' , since (}' is closer to the median. The promise to choose (}
was incredible.

recontracting exist for politicians, however, and must be
accounted for by a successful theory of political choice.
The only way a candidate can persuade voters he will do as
promised is to create and maintain a reputation for probity and
consistency. 7 The candi date may want to avoid specific
promises and to maintain room for maneuver, but competitive
pressures make it diﬃcult. The campaign provides him with a
series of situations where he must somehow persuade
prospective voters he will behave as promised. 8 Ideally, he must
convince them he will deliver as promised because deep personal
beliefs prevent him from doing anything else. Returning to
figure 1 , this means that moving Theta's position from (} to (}'

Voters must therefore assess not just the platform, but also the

means that neither position is believable, since it is now obvious

candidate. More accurately, voters must assess the commitment

that the politician values winning more than policy. His promises

a candidate has to his professed platform, as well as other, more

were cheap talk.

abstract, qualities.6 The political leader must respond to
unforeseeable exigencies of national crisis or interna tional
conflict. Voters, therefore, rationally value, and vote for,

This discussion raises more questions than it answers. To wit, ( I )
What is the meaning of equilibrium or disequilibrium in a spatial
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location game where a candidate must persuade voters of his

compared as models, with the stories stripped away, the

position, rather than simply announc ing it? (2) How do parties

metaphor we invoke is significant if it suggests a new model. It

and potential candidates choose, or (more accu rately) acquire, a

cannot be said that classical spatial theory is useless because the

reputation for a particular ideology or set of positions? (3) Most

examples used to illustrate its logic are wrong. Our argument is

important, are these reputations chosen at all, or does the

that a slightly diﬀerent "story," one based on ideology, will allow a

competition of politics select for the best ideologies?

much richer model, one that boasts both practical verisimilitude

To answer these questions, we need a theory of ideology that has
precise formal implications but preserves the intuition behind

and theoretical rigor.

Defining Ideology: Decisions & Uncertainty

Downs's original con tribution. This intuition is lost in the modem
spatial theory; we bring it back. The received theorems of spatial

Of all political assets, the existence and maintenance of an

theory do not need to be corrected in achiev ing this synthesis.

ideology is by far the most fundamental. Most other strategic

The theorems are useful and obviously "correct," as equi librium

political activities, such as choos ing candidates, issues, or

conditions. If, instead of modeling individual candidates as

coalitions, as well as tactical decisions of the cam paign, such as

moving around the space, classical spatial models endogenized

spending money on advertising, or taking public positions, are

candidate choice and allowed parties to switch among

subordinate. Day-to-day "politics" can only be understood in its

candidates, the same results would still follow. 9 We seek not so

broader ideo logical context. Association between a party, or

much to modify spatial theory, as to reinterpret the intuition

candidate, and an ideology is logically antecedent to the political

behind its results.

strategy of selecting a point in the n dimensional policy space.

The metaphor of movement, and of fixed spatial representation of
prefer ences, has been widely criticized by political scientists

Consequently, to understand political choice, we must learn what
ideologies are and where they come from.

(including Stokes 1963 and Sartori, 1976). The metaphor

Settling on a definition of ideology is no mean task. Dozens of

scientists use to justify models is important, because it suggests

diﬀerent definitions exist, each with some claim to primacy. We

an approach to conceiving of the problems we are investi gating.

review three of the more prominent clusters of interpretations as

Metaphors also direct the way researchers think about new

follows:

solutions to these problems. Even if the models will ultimately be
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• Ideologies are collections of ideas with intellectually derivable

It is worth stressing that all notions of ideology exhibit an

normative implications for behavior and for how society should

inherent tension between two related phenomena. The first is an

be organized (Higgs and Twight 1987; Reichley 1981; North

anthropomorphic collection of ideas, and the second is the

1981, 1990a, 1994; Lodge 1976).

application of these ideas one finds in an individual 's belief

• Ideologies are economizing devices by which individuals
understand, and express ideas about, politics (Higgs 1987;
Enelow and Hinich 1984; Congleton 1991; North 1981,
1990a, 1994; Macridis 1980; Downs 1957).
• Ideologies are complex, dogmatic belief systems by which

system; his weltanschauung , if not his weltansicht. We shall
discuss this problem at some length later, but for now we will
resolve this tension by decree: ideologies are collections of
ideas. Individual belief systems or schema may mimic some or all
parts of a particular ideology, but these beliefs are distinct from
ideologies. As a practical matter, successful ideologies will find

individuals interpret, rationalize, and justify behavior and

substantial correspondence across individual schema, but this is

institutions (Higgs 1987, 1990; Domhoﬀ 1983; Joravsky

not necessary for the definition.

1970; North 1990a, 1994; Sartori 1969, 1976).

It is also important to distinguish the concept of "ideological

These terse summaries represent what we believe are the

dimension" from the usage of Almond ( 1960), which was stated

three major aspects of ideology emphasized by scholars. IO

more clearly and more forcefully by Sartori (1976):

Higgs ( 1987) emphasizes four separate aspects (cognitive,
aﬀective, programmatic, and solidary), but we will use only
three, choosing to merge the aﬀective and solidary functions.
Ideologies perform an important psychological service

The ideological continuum goes from the extreme of
ideological fanati cism and future-oriented principledness to
the opposite extreme of sheer practicalism and pragmatism
. . . . When speaking of more-or-less ideol ogy and,

because without them people cannot know, assess, and

conversely, of more-or-less pragmatism, the implication

respond to much of the vast world of social relations.

need not be motivational but might well be cultural. That is,

Ideology simplifies a reality too huge and complicated to be

the ideological dimension diﬀers from all others in that it

comprehended, evaluated, and dealt with in any purely

points to a cultural factor, to the overall temper (and

factual, scientific, or other disinterested way. (Higgs 1987,

temperature) of politics in a given cultural set ting. (Sartori

37-38)

1976, 78)
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This observation, and usage, is not wrong; it is simply diﬀerent

The definition just oﬀered is so general and encompassing, it is

from our meaning. The intensity with which beliefs are held, or

important to list as illustrations sotne ideologies and

commitment to the ideas the ideology embodies, are, for us,

nonideologies. Instinctual, genet ically programmed, or sexual

matters of voter perception, not the ideas a party espouses and

reactions are not ideological, for ideologies are always ideative.

represents. Sartori is quite right to claim, however, that an

Often an ideology (such as Islam, Marxism, or Mormonism) is

understanding of the extent of commitment by adherents, and

partly composed of ideas that serve to control or divert certain

the reasons for it, are crucial to an understanding of any political

aspects of human behavior by asserting their baseness. This may

system.

lead to some subtle distinctions, of course. Is a group of men

Following is the definition of ideology as it will be used throughout
this book.

who beat and rob a passerby traveling alone in a forest behaving
ideologically? One might answer no, they are simply thugs trying
not to starve. Yet if we asked these men what moti vates their

Ideology: an internally consistent set of propositions that makes

behavior, the answer would not be "self-interest," even if they tell

both proscriptive and prescriptive demands on human behavior.

the truth. Instead, they would likely oﬀer some justification (they

All ideologies have implications for ( a) what is ethically good ,

are op pressed politically; the man they robbed is wealthy; the

and (therefore) what is bad; (b) how society' s resources should

man they robbed is a tax-collector/Irishman/Muslim/Catholic/

be distributed; and ( c) where power appropriately resides.

immigrant/ Mets Fan) that implies their action is not "bad." In fact,
it may even be moral! Though their actions hurt the man they

More simply, an ideology tells us what is good, who gets what,

robbed, their conception of "society" might dictate that society is

and who rules. Given the generality of this definition, many ideas

better oﬀ after the robbery than before.

that are not obvi ously political are still, in our terms, ideologies. It
is no accident that these powerful ideas-including religion;

To clarify the notion of ideology, let us consider two of the best

seemingly simple moral precepts, such as Kant's "categorical

examples of well-known (if not always well-articulated) political

imperative"; formal familial relations; and traditional obligations-

ideologies, capitalism and communism. To illustrate the tripartite

are included. They all potentially shape the universe of political

categorization, we distinguish these two in table 1 , along with

discourse and the conceptual framework individuals use to

two other examples (fascism and the platform of the New Deal

understand and debate politics. Culture, history, ideas, and

Democrats). The interesting thing about this table is that it allows

emotion matter.
416

us to consider the particular conflicts among these competing

Formerly means no one believes this nonsense any longer. Surely

nations about how a society should be organized.

this is not true; some minor ity of elderly Japanese, no doubt, still

The "What is Good?" column has very diﬀerent answers for
capitalism, communism, and fascism. The latter two encourage
citizens to work for the state, the welfare of their fellow citizens
and country; capitalism lauds work for oneself. Though the New

believed in Emperor Hirohito's divine right to rule, or even his
outright divinity, until the time of his death in 1988. Many African
and South Pacific island nations retain some vestige of a divine
imprimatur on the mandate to rule.

Deal represents a mixture of these motives, its basis is closest to

Still, for our purposes, the condescending and western formerly

Capitalism. The diﬀerence is that the New Deal advocates

does not eliminate the divine right of kings as an ideology, even if

intervention by government to help those unable to help

it is true that literally no one believes it. The set of ideas that,

themselves. More than a duty to achieve, New Deal ideology

together, make up an ideology (the king rules with a divine

would claim each has a right to obtain suﬃcient education and

mandate, revolution is blasphemy, fealty to king is fealty to God)

wealth for self-fulfilment. A similar compari son in the "Who Gets

exists, independent of whether anyone accepts them. The fact

What?" and "Who Rules?" columns shows that, while the

that no one finds them persuasive as a way to live, or to organize

ideologies are diﬀerent across rows, the conception within each

a society (both physically and intellectually), reflects on the

row is similar; each is internally coherent. The ideas represented

ideology's power. But it does not change its identification as an

are mutually sup porting rather than contradictory, or just

ideology, at least in our semantic construction of ideologies as

unrelated.

anthropomorphic entities.

Imagine two further examples, an ideology that no one believes

The second example, an ideology that no one believes yet, is

any more, and an ideology that no one believes yet. For the first,

more amorphous, but in some ways more interesting. Imagine a

consider the "divine right of kings." A simple description of this

world, or, in Plato's sense, an Order of Being, in which all

ideology is "the sup posedly God-given right to rule formerly

potential ideologies can be mentally apprehended at once. That

attributed to monarchs. "11 Two aspects of the definition are of

is, let many internally consistent sets of ideas with implications for

interest, the word supposedly and the word formerly. For

human action and the "right" way to organize society be arrayed

someone believing in the divine right of kings, supposedly is

before us. Any individual could begin to comprehend fully only a

insulting; believing the right to be divine makes it so in fact.

fraction of these. The number one is persuaded by, believes in,
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or accepts as correct must be a small proportion of the space of

can identify with it and which in turn can give the individual

potential ideologies. Yet one can imagine conceiving a new set of

role in the drama it portrays. (Boulding 1964, 39; quoted in

ideas with implications for political behavior. We are led to look

Goertzel 1992)

to an ideology's origin.

The Origins of Ideology

a

In terms of the three questions (what is good, who gets what, who
rules) an ideology must answer, the implications of the Robin
Hood myth are ob vious. If the ruler behaves badly and allows

How can we explain the origin of ideologies? The most basic

illegitimate power to accumulate in the hands of the wealthy, he

human disputes are over property rights, rights to food, shelter,

has violated the implicit agreement that gives him the power to

and protection of the family from aggression. At their base, these

rule. It is not, then, wrong to steal if the theft is from the rich and

disputes are not ideological (in the sense we have defined the

distributed to the poor (after the Merry Men deduct appropriate

word as derived from abstract ideas), but any such contention

operating expenses, overhead, and consulting fees). Because the

possesses an ideological aspect. In the earlier example of

ruler behaves badly, an action normally proscribed (such as theft)

robbers in the forest, the wealthy traveler would tell you he was

may be encouraged. The poor get the proceeds, giving them the

attacked by unprin cipled thugs. The "thugs" themselves,

power to ensure that the ruler is ultimately overthrown.

however, may assert, and even believe, their right to redistribute
income from the rich to the poor. We will argue that, while
ideologies are used strategically in this fashion, they are created
out of culture, history, and emotion. Boulding gives an insight into
the role of drama in the creation of ideology.
An image of the world becomes an ideology if it creates in

We admire the stories of Robin Hood, and relate them to our
children. Though simple and incomplete, the dictum of "take from
the rich and give to the poor" is clearly ideological, and clearly
political. 12 This tendency to use ideas to justify and give
legitimacy to one's actions is well understood, its reasons for
existence obvious. The choice of how to justify something one

the mind of the person holding it a role for himself which he

already wants to do might be thought of as strategic.

values highly. . . . To create a role, however, an ideology

Nonetheless, we must be careful not to attribute too much

must create a drama. The first essen tial characteristic of an

intellectual power, bordering on foresighted ness, to people

ideology is then an interpretation of history suﬃciently

justifying primitive urges. Imagine you are hungry, and a passerby,

dramatic and convincing so that the individual feels that he

obviously well-fed, has a cartload of food. You tell yourself he
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won't miss the food you will take, and it will save your life. So you

Proponents of an ideology are people persuaded of its

take it, by force if necessary.

correctness, its moral force, or even just its coincidence with their

How far would you go? Would you injure the person if he tries to
resist? Does it matter whether the food is for him alone, or if he is
taking it to an orphanage? If he dies in the struggle, how will you
act the next time you are similarly hungry and see someone better
oﬀ than yourself? The answers to these questions become more
interesting, and, for our purposes, more useful, if the "you" we are

own private, non ideological goals. The crucial point is that
political disagreements will take the form of arguments over the
moral superiority of ideologies with contradic tory implications.
That is, arguments will turn into debates over how the disputes
should be resolved, not a comparison of the naked interests of
the disputants.

considering is part of a society of similar people, and these

To summarize, we have outlined the first, and perhaps most

confrontations become routine. Consistent actions, justified in

important, origin of ideology: legitimation and justification of acts

consistent ways, are the origins of ideologies. Over time,

the ideology's cre ator(s) found desirable for other reasons. Many

justifications that might be come ideologies are tested and

such justifications fail, of course, and are not heard again

compared, based on whether they work. At the outset, "working"

systemically. 16 For those that do succeed, as the acts or

may be defined as justifying something the actor(s) wants to do

processes become regular and routinized, the ideological justifica

anyway.

tion becomes accepted by repetition and by its utility in

Very soon, however, more is demanded, as "success" demands
two types of consistency. 13 First, the same ideology must justify
the same action, and vice versa, in all similar situations. Second,
as the ideology evolves over time and becomes more
sophisticated, it must avoid contradictions. Consistent failure of
either type of consistency can make the ideology wither away.
This is not to say that perfect consistency is required, since, as
Higgs ( 1987) notes, this is impossible. 14 Still, there exists a
threshold above which contradictions in an ideology weaken its

consistently resolving disputes. It becomes orthodox, and is
widely believed if the group or individ ual whose power is given
legitimacy does not (too often) contradict the ideology by word or
deed. This orthodoxy inevitably creates an opposing, or
heterodox, position. Such an observation is hardly novel, having
been dis cussed at length by Habermas, Hayek, Hegel, Marx, and
others. But our intended use of the opposition of the orthodox
and heterodox ideologies, as a basis for a rational spatial theory,
is novel.

foundations of legitimacy and make it rapidly lose adherents.
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Ideology Determines the Terms of Debate

be a centre party, but there is no centre tendency, no centre
doctrine. The term "centre" is applied to the geometrical

The terms of the debate, the logic and language of the dispute,

spot at which the moderates of opposed tendencies meet:

itself, in the most fundamental sense, are framed by the orthodox

moderates of the right and moderates of the left. Every

ideology. Dissidents are often those least advantaged by the

centre is divided against itself and remains separated into

orthodoxy, and their dissidence may be motivated by this

two halves, left-centre and right-centre. (Du verger 1951,

strategic, essentially economic objection. But dissidents are also

215)

often drawn from groups the system appears to serve best, their
objec tions fueled by a genuine moral and emotional outrage
against what they perceive as inequities. The rhetorical
requirements of a successful polemic ensure that any heterodox

Sowell points out that this dichotomizing tendency is noticeable
even in issues that seem unrelated:
One of the curious things about political opinions is how

ideology must oppose the orthodox by suggesting intellectual or

often the same people line up on opposite sides of diﬀerent

emotional reasons why the status quo is wrong or unsupport

issues. The issues them selves may have no intrinsic

able. The contest is more than one of persuasion: ultimately,

connection with each other . . . yet the same familiar faces

the contest is decided by who gets to use their words, their

can be found glaring at each other from opposite sides of

conception, to describe the conflict. I 7 This tension between two

the political fence, again and again. It happens too often to

opposing sets of ideas, and statements of those ideas, creates a

be a coinci dence, and it is too uncontrolled to be a plot.

relevant policy space of only a few dimensions. In the most

(Sowell 1987, 6)

extreme, and clearest, case, the orthodox and heterodox
ideologies cleave along a single dimension, as two points

Sowell is quite right that there need be no "intrinisic connection"

determine a line. As Duverger ( 1951) points out:

be tween issues. All that is necessary is that the orthodox
ideology support certain positions, and the opposing ideology

A duality of parties does not always exist, but almost always

will automatically take the other side. Though the orthodox and

there is a duality of tendencies. Every policy implies a choice

the heterodox ideologies may diﬀer on many issues, the basis for

between two kinds of solution: the so-called compromise

such diﬀerences derives from this reduced-dimensional

solutions lean one way or the other. This is equivalent to

contraposition. It is insuﬃcient simply to look into who benefits

saying the centre does not exist in politics: there may well

and who loses from a particular policy, as this will not allow one
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to understand policy outcomes. What is necessary to understand

The Importance of Ideology in Politics

any policy debate is to compre hend the ideologies that contest
the status quo. 18
For example, any local dispute tends to become not just one but
two ideas. The first is the legitimizing ideology that justifies the
resolution of the dispute in this instance, and implicitly advances
reasons why similar future disputes should find the same
resolution. The second is the heterodox ideol ogy used by those
who lost, or are not in power, claiming the result was not
legitimate and should be reversed. Thus, although the heterodoxy
may be de novo, it is never ex nihilo. Orthodoxy, because it is the
first move, can be chosen from all the ideas available for
justification. The heterodox position has no such latitude for
choice, but must attack the intellectual and moral basis of the
orthodoxy. 19
Finally, to the extent that a heterodoxy is successful, it replaces
(again, in the classic Hegelian-Marxian dialectic dynamic) the
orthodoxy. The old or thodoxy is not, generally, the best response
to the new. Nonetheless, the new orthodoxy will set the terms for
what the new heterodoxy will look like. As a result, the latitude for
genuine political strategizing of the sort routinely assumed by
classical spatial models is severely circumscribed. The political
process, depending as it must on the evolution of ideas, their
emotional and moral appeal, and the credibility of participants on
both sides, just won't allow it.

Recall the standard two-candidate spatial model of voting
discussed earlier, which assumes candidates locate in the
feasible policy space to maximize their chances of victory. In
game theoretic terms, if candidates choose strate gies solely
based on an objective of winning elections, if the space is uni
dimensional , and if all voters choose strictly according to
distance, the Nash equilibrium strategy for the two candidates is
to choose the median. As the MVT shows, no alternative can
attain a majority over the median position. As an equilibrium
condition, and a means to identify the powerful tendency in
political competition for the middle to wield power, the classical
spatial model has proved invaluable. Still, social science has gone
too far in applying the metaphor of spatial location competition to
the political process, which has, in truth, a very diﬀerent set of
incentives.
There are two possible remedies to the problem of representing
voter choice under uncertainty over candidate intentions and
future events. One is to try to adjust the classical model to
account for the candidates' incentive to misrepresent and voters'
consequent discounting of candidate announcements in
campaigns. The most advanced work in this area is Austen-Smith
(1990) and Banks ( 1990, 1991). This approach focuses on the
role of costs of misrep resenting intentions, and the credibility of
politicians. The information is specific, the issues are well known
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and understood; the only question is whether the candidate is

In real political campaigns, no party could be successful, either in

telling the truth.

elect ing its candidates or even in making known its platform,

This work is important, and may well restore the game model of
cam paigns to preeminence in spatial theory, but it addresses
only the narrow question of uncertainty about intentions. Worse, it
assumes the same level of information that the old spatial model
required, and does not address new issues at all. Candidates take
separate positions on all known issues, and voters evaluate them
based on their credibility. The other approach, the one we take in
the following pages, though in the same spirit of correcting the
standard spatial model, is radically diﬀerent in its logic and
application. We seek to represent voter choice directly as
ideology, rather than as a spatial communication/signaling game
where ideology plays a part.
We must be careful, however, lest it sound as if an ideology is a
fungible resource one buys, like a consultant or a commercial. An
ideology is a mechanism for transmitting information and
persuading, a generally consis tent set of ideas about what is the
"good" in politics and social intercourse. This mechanism is
evolved, not designed, and the extent of consistency among its
precepts is a consequence of that evolution. Any given ideology
may advance ideals that are in conflict (for example, the value of
the individ ual and the necessity of loyalty to the state), requiring
a balance of contradic tory imperatives.

without some coher ent and appealing ideology. Potential
candidates for ideologies are sparse. The creation and
popularization of a new ideology is a diﬃcult task, requiring time,
money, considerable organizational skills, and (not least) an
intellec tually powerful and emotionally compelling set of ideas. A
nascent political party faces an almost insurmountable problem of
entry. The diﬃculty is not one of choosing among a variety of
available and well-understood ideologies and then adopting the
set of positions associated with that ideology. It is generally
impossible to carve out some new position in the space of ideolo
gies, and then run campaigns against existing parties on that
basis. No new ideologies exist!
The reasons are not obvious, particularly from a theoretical
perspective. Consider the "space of ideologies" alluded to above.
We might imagine a collection of all functional relations, or
mappings, between some set of ideas and an exhaustive list of
implied policies. These mappings exist t the extent that they imply
a general, and largely consistent, set of policies. The means by
which this implication is arrived at and widely shared among
citizens is complex, but rests on some complicated, and perhaps
fuzzy, cognitive process of inference. Imagining this entire space
of mappings in any intuitive sense, however, is extraordinarily
diﬃcult. We can imagine a collection of ideologies that we know
(socialism, communism, ritual cannibalism, free market cap
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italism, Christianity, or Islam). The larger set of ideologies that

examine the set of policies implied: most sets of ideas have no

could exist, from which the smaller set of examples that we know

implication, or else imply everything. We are begging the question

are chosen, is quite beyond our comprehension, however. The act

of creation, of course, since creation recognized an implication

of creation of an ideology requires an intellectual step, a spark of

where none before existed. Choosing a set of ideas by some

recognition, of making a connection among apparently unrelated

arbitrary means, and then examining their implications, virtually

disputes or problems that no one else has ever conceived of. The

always results in failure, because, in general , no causal

question is, how large is the set of potential, or uncon ceived,

implication exists.

ideologies? We can, with diﬃculty, conceive of the abstraction of
an insensible space containing correspondences between sets of
ideas and the policies they imply. There are two restrictions on
the number of ideologies we might count as genuine elements of
this collection of sets of ideas, and the correspondences to policy
they represent.

The second problem harks back to our earlier discussion of the
origin of opposition. Even if there exists a universe of potential
discourse in the space of potential ideologies, the act of creation
ineluctably evokes the form of its own opposition. Conceiving of a
new ideology that does not address the existing orthodoxy is of
little use. Thus, the space of potential ideologies is very narrow. In

The first is the rule of consistency, alluded to earlier. Ideologies

any practical sense, it is restricted to a choice among those

are buﬀeted and reshaped by the values of the competing ethical

ideas that justify gainsaying the prevailing ideology, or (what

rules they in voke. This is not a process of logic alone, but tests

amounts to the same thing) attacking the justification that the

the emotional appeal and attraction of particular aspects of the

prevailing ideology oﬀers.

ideology to adherents. Nonetheless, the set of ideas comprising
the ideology must causally imply the set of policies that citizens
associate with that position. It is not enough for an ideology to be
a shorthand signal , a correspondence between a name and a list
of actions by government.

We can conclude that the set of feasible new ideologies at any
given point is severely restricted, even before one encounters the
problems of populariz ing and persuading. Any aspirant, in order
even to qualify for consideration, must answer or contradict the
prevailing ideology, and must do so in a way that is both logically

This rule of consistency dramatically restricts the set of

coherent and emotionally appealing. This barrier to the entry of

correspondences that qualify, in any reasonable sense, as

new parties is not remotely fungible. Groups that would otherwise

potential ideologies. We cannot simply take a set of ideas and

organize can be thwarted, permanently, by this barrier alone.
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Duverger notes this tendency for orthodox, established ideologies

But we must also emphasize that while a campaign to popularize

to block the creation of new ones, particularly in the manifestation

an ideology may founder on the reefs of poverty, it may not sail

of parties as advancers of an ideology (discussed later, in chap.

through on monsoons of money alone. At the end, we will

5). He notes:

have at least summarized an argument for using ideology as

The question is then to organize progressively a mass of
new electors. . . the development of local [party]
committees is the natural answer to this. But once this first
phase is passed, once parties are firmly consti tuted, fresh
parties as they appear beat against the barrier of the old
ones: separate local movements cannot pass beyond their
birthplace, and re main incapable of giving rise to a truly
national party. (Duverger 1951, xxvii)

the means of representing political choice. Further, preliminary
conclusions of the implications for community in society,
once the under standing of elections as an ideological debate is
accepted, are drawn out. The ability of societies to prosper, and
to create welfare for their citizens, depends on the ability of
those citizens to believe in the legitimacy of the existing order.
If ideologies form the basis of debate in polities, they also serve
as the means by which people understand each other and
themselves. Politics with out ideology is Babel.

Even if the new ideology overcomes the local organizational
barriers, it is also necessary that it attract the political resources
to bring the idea, or basis of the organized movement, to the

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s

attention of the public. Neither idea nor money is alone suﬃcient

use of Ebook Central Academic Complete.

for success. Both are necessary. The best ideology, in terms of
internal logical consistency and emotional appeal, is as nothing
without committed apostles to spread it, and financial resources
to make their eﬀorts eﬀective. Conversely, even an enormous
quantity of money, used to advertise an ideology in every
conceivable forum, is of little use unless the message is eﬀective.
Money does not rule the mind, and the mind motivates political
action by individuals. We must add money, or (better) political re
sources generally, to our list of necessary conditions for success.
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Section 2

Political ideology
Conservatism

classical liberalism, which supported freedom for the individual in
both the economic and social spheres.

Conservatism is a social and political philosophy that supports
retaining traditional social institutions and has many modern
variations.

Libertarian conservatism describes certain political ideologies
within the United States and Canada which combine libertarian
economic issues with aspects of conservatism. Libertarian

Conservatism, taken from the Latin word conservare (“to retain”)

conservatives generally support strict laissez-faire policies such

is a political and social philosophy that promotes retaining

as free trade and oppose any national bank, regulations on

traditional social institutions. Edmund Burke, an Anglo-Irish

businesses, environmental regulation, corporate subsidies, and

politician who served in the British House of Commons and

other areas of economic intervention.

opposed the French Revolution, is credited as one of the
founders of conservatism in Great Britain and is generally viewed
as the philosophical founder of modern conservatism.

Fiscal conservatism is the economic philosophy of prudence in
government spending and debt. Edmund Burke, in particular,
argued that a government does not have the right to run up large

Variants of Conservatism

debts and then throw the burden on the taxpayer.

Liberal conservatism is a variant of conservatism that combines

National conservatism concentrates more on national interests

conservative values and policies with classical liberal stances.

than standard conservatism, and it upholds cultural and ethnic

Historically, the term referred to combination of economic

identity. It is heavily oriented towards the traditional family and

liberalism, which champions laissez-faire markets, with the

social stability, and it is in favour of limiting immigration. As such,

classical conservatism concern for established tradition, respect

national conservatives can be distinguished from economic

for authority, and religious values. It contrasted itself with
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conservatives, for whom free market economic policies,

conservatism in the United States has been chiefly associated

deregulation, and fiscal conservatism are the main priorities.

with the Republican Party. Major movements within American

Cultural conservativism the preservation of the heritage of one
nation, or of a shared culture that is not defined by national
boundaries.Cultural conservatives hold fast to traditional ways of
thinking even in the face of monumental change. They believe
strongly in traditional values and politics, and often have an
urgent sense of nationalism.

conservatism include support for tradition, law-and-order,
Christianity, anti-communism, and a defense of “Western
civilization from the challenges of modernist culture and
totalitarian governments. ” Economic conservatives and
libertarians favor small government, low taxes, limited regulation,
and free enterprise. Social conservatives see traditional social
values as threatened by secularism, so they support school

Social conservatism is distinct from cultural conservatism,

prayer and oppose abortion and homosexuality.

although there are some overlaps. Social conservatives believe

Neoconservatives want to expand American ideals throughout the

that the government has a role in encouraging or enforcing what

world and show a strong support for Israel. Paleoconservatives,

they consider traditional values or behaviors. A social

in opposition to multiculturalism, press for restrictions on

conservative wants to preserve traditional morality and social

immigration.

mores, often through civil law or regulation. Social change is
generally regarded as suspect.

Liberalism

Religious conservatives principally seek to apply the teachings of

Liberalism is a broad political ideology or worldview founded on

particular religions to politics, sometimes by merely proclaiming

the ideas of liberty and equality.

the value of those teachings, and at other times by having those
teachings influence laws.
Conservatism in the United States

Sources of Liberal Thought
Liberalism, from the Latin liberalis, is a broad political ideology or
worldview founded on the ideas of liberty and equality. Liberalism

The meaning of “conservatism” in America has little in common

espouses a wide array of views depending on their understanding

with the way the word is used elsewhere, since what most

of these principles, and can encompass ideas such as free and

Americans consider conservatism is what much of the world

fair elections, free trade, private property, capitalism,

considers liberalism or neoliberalism. Since the 1950s
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constitutionalism, liberal democracy, free press, and the free
exercise of religion.

Classical vs. Modern Liberalism
Classical liberalism is a political philosophy and ideology

Liberalism first became a powerful force during the

belonging to liberalism in which primary emphasis is placed on

Enlightenment, when it became popular among philosophers and

securing the freedom of the individual by limiting the power of the

economists in the Western world. Liberalism rejected the notions,

government. The philosophy emerged as a response to the

common at the time, of hereditary privilege, state religion,

Industrial Revolution and urbanization in the 19th century in

absolute monarchy, and the Divine Right of Kings. The early

Europe and the United States. It advocates civil liberties with a

liberal thinker John Locke, who is often credited with the creation

limited government under the rule of law, private property, and

of liberalism as a distinct philosophical tradition, employed the

belief in laissez-faire economic policy.

concept of natural rights and the social contract to argue that the
rule of law should replace both tradition and absolutism in
government; that rulers were subject to the consent of the
governed; and that private individuals had a fundamental right to
life, liberty, and property.
Liberalism & Revolution
The revolutionaries in the American and France used liberal
philosophy to justify the armed overthrow of what they saw as
tyrannical rule. The nineteenth century saw governments
established around liberalist political ideology in nations across
Europe, Latin America, and North America. Liberalist ideas spread
even further in the twentieth century, when liberal democracies
were on the winning side in both World Wars I and II, and when

Both modern American conservatism and social liberalism split
from Classical Liberalism in the early 20th century. At that time
conservatives adopted the Classic Liberal beliefs in protecting
economic civil liberties. Conversely social liberals adopted the
Classical Liberal belief in defending social civil liberties. Neither
ideology adopted the pure Classical Liberal belief that
government exists to protect both social & economic civil
liberties. Conservatism shares an ideological agreement on
limited government in the area of preventing government
restriction against economic civil liberties as embodied in the
ability of people to sell their goods, services or labor to anyone
they choose free from restriction except in rare cases where
society’s general welfare is at stake.

liberalism survived major ideological challenges from fascism and

While many modern scholars argue that no particularly

communism. Today, liberalism remains a political force with

meaningful distinction between classical and modern liberalism

varying degrees of power and influence in many countries.

exists, others disagree. According to William J. Novak, liberalism
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in the United States shifted in the late 19th and early 20th century

into several major and minor movements in the following

from classical liberalism (endorsing laissez-faire economics and

decades. Marx rejected the foundational aspects of liberal theory,

constitutionalism) to “democratic social-welfarism” (endorsing

hoping to destroy both the state and the liberal distinction

such government involvement as seen in the New Deal ). This

between society and the individual while fusing the two into a

shift included qualified acceptance of government intervention in

collective whole designed to overthrow the developing capitalist

the economy and the collective right to equality in economic

order of the 19th century.

dealings. These theories came to be termed “liberal socialism”,
which is related with social democracy in Europe. According to
the Encyclopedia Britannica, “In the United States, liberalism is
associated with the welfare-state policies of the New Deal
program of the Democratic administration of Pres. Franklin D.
Roosevelt, whereas in Europe it is more commonly associated
with a commitment to limited government and laissez-faire
economic policies. ” Consequently in the U.S., the ideas of
individualism and laissez-faire economics previously associated
with classical liberalism, became the basis for the emerging
school of right wing libertarian thought.
Liberalism & Socialism
Some confusion remains about the relationship between social
liberalism and socialism, despite the fact that many variants of
socialism distinguish themselves markedly from liberalism by
opposing capitalism, hierarchy and private property. Socialism
formed as a group of related yet divergent ideologies in the 19th
century such as Christian socialism, Communism and Social
Anarchism. These ideologies — as with liberalism — fractured

Social democracy, an ideology advocating progressive reform of
capitalism, emerged in the 20th century and was influenced by
socialism. Yet unlike socialism, it was not collectivist nor anticapitalist. It was not against the state; rather it was broadly
defined as a project that aims to correct, through government
reformism, what it regards as the intrinsic defects of capitalism by
reducing inequalities. Several commentators have noted strong
similarities between social liberalism and social democracy, with
one political scientist even calling American liberalism “bootleg
social democracy”.
American Tradition & Liberal Heritage
Many fundamental elements of modern society have liberal roots.
The early waves of liberalism popularized economic individualism
while expanding constitutional government and parliamentary
authority. One of the greatest liberal triumphs involved replacing
the capricious nature of royalist and absolutist rule with a
decision-making process encoded in written law. Liberals sought
and established a constitutional order that prized important
individual freedoms, such as the freedoms of speech and
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association, an independent judiciary and public trial by jury, and
the abolition of aristocratic privileges. These sweeping changes in
political authority marked the modern transition from absolutism
to constitutional rule.
Traditional political spectrum: The traditional left-right political spectrum.

Later waves of liberal thought were strongly influenced by the

The terms “right” and “left” refer to political aﬃliations which originated early

need to expand civil rights. In the 1960s and 1970s, feminism in

in the French Revolutionary era of 1789–1796, and referred originally to the

the United States was advanced in large part by liberal feminist

seating arrangements in the various legislative bodies of France. The

organizations.Many liberals also have advocated for racial
equality, and the civil rights movement in the United States during

aristocracy sat on the right of the Speaker (traditionally the seat of honor)
and the commoners sat on the Left, hence the terms right-wing and leftwing politics.

the 1960s strongly highlighted the liberal crusade for equal rights.

The Traditional Political Spectrum
The traditional political spectrum models diﬀerent political
positions by placing them upon a left-right geometric axis.
Background
The traditional political spectrum is a way of modeling diﬀerent
political positions by placing them upon one or more geometric
axes symbolizing independent political dimensions. Most longstanding spectra include a right and left, and according to the
simplest left-right axis, communism and socialism are usually

Origins of the Political Spectrums
Originally, the defining point on the ideological spectrum was the
ancien regime (“old order”). “The Right” thus implied support for
aristocratic or royal interests and the church, while “The Left”
implied support for republicanism, secularism, and civil liberties.
Support for laissez-faire capitalism was expressed by politicians
sitting on the left, because these represented policies favorable to
capitalists rather than to the aristocracy, but outside of
parliamentary politics, these views are often characterized as
being on the right.

regarded internationally as being on the left, opposite fascism

As capitalist economies developed, the aristocracy became less

and conservatism on the right.

relevant and was mostly replaced by capitalist representatives.
The size of the working class increased as capitalism expanded
and began to find expression partly through trade unionist,
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socialist, anarchist, and communist politics, rather than being

In left-right politics, right-wing describes an outlook or specific

confined to the capitalist policies expressed by the original left.

position that accepts or supports social hierarchy or social

This evolution has often pulled parliamentary politicians away

inequality. Social hierarchy and social inequality is viewed by

from laissez-faire economic policies, although this has happened

those aﬃliated with the Right as either inevitable, natural, normal,

to diﬀerent degrees in diﬀerent countries.

or desirable, whether it arises through traditional social

Thus, the word “left” in American political parlance may refer to
“liberalism” and be identified with the Democratic Party, whereas
in a country such as France these positions would be regarded as
relatively more right-wing, and “left” is more likely to refer to
socialist positions rather than liberal ones.
Left-wing vs. Right-wing

diﬀerences or from competition in market economies. It typically
accepts or justifies this position on the basis of natural law or
tradition. Although the term ‘right-wing’ originally designated
traditional conservatives and reactionaries, it has also been used
to describe neo-conservatives, nationalists, Christian democrats,
and classical liberals.
In modern parlance, left-right has acquired the added dimension

In left-right politics, left-wing describes an outlook or specific

of the balance of governmental power and individual rights,

position that accepts or supports social equality, often in

wherein moving left increases the power of government and

opposition to social hierarchy and social inequality. It typically

moving right the rights of individuals. In this view, “reactionary”

involves a concern for those in society who are perceived as

has the aspect of “anarchy”. This introduces, or exposes, a

disadvantaged relative to others and an assumption that there are

limitation in this simple binary spectrum, where by social views of

unjustified inequalities that need to be reduced or abolished. In

left-right, fascists and totalitarian systems are on the far right;

left-right politics, left-wing describes an outlook or specific

whereas by a balance of government to individual power, fascists

position that accepts or supports social equality, often in

and totalitarian systems are on the far left.

opposition to social hierarchy and social inequality. It typically
involves a concern for those in society who are perceived as
disadvantaged relative to others and an assumption that there are
unjustified inequalities that need to be reduced or abolished.

Issues with the Traditional Political Spectrum
Researchers have frequently noted that a single left-right axis is
insuﬃcient to describe the existing variation in political beliefs.
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Researchers have frequently noted that a single left-right axis is

anticlericalism), foreign policy (interventionism vs. non-

insuﬃcient in describing the existing variation in political beliefs,

interventionism), and freedom (positive liberty vs. negative liberty).

and often include other axes. Though the descriptive words at

The Nolan Chart, created by libertarian David Nolan, shows what

polar opposites may vary, often in popular biaxial spectra the

he considers as “economic freedom ” (issues like taxation, free

axes are split between cultural issues and economic issues, each

trade, and free enterprise) on the horizontal axis and what he

scaling from some form of individualism (or government for the

considers as “personal freedom” (issues like drug legalization,

freedom of the individual) to a form of communitarianism (or

abortion, and the draft) on the vertical axis. This puts left-wingers

government for the welfare of the community). In this context, the

in the left quadrant, libertarians in the top, right-wingers in the

contemporary American on the left is often considered

right, and what Nolan originally named “populists” at the bottom.

individualist (or libertarian ) on social/cultural issues and
communitarian (or populist) on economic issues, while the
contemporary American on the right is often considered
communitarian (or populist) on social/cultural issues and

The previous section is provided by Lumen Learning’s
Boundless Political Science.

individualist (or libertarian) on economic issues.
Numerous alternatives exist, usually developed by those who feel
their views are not fairly represented on the traditional right-left
spectrum. One alternative spectrum oﬀered by the conservative
American Federalist Journal accounts for only the “degree of
government control ” without consideration for any other social or
political variable and, thus, places “fascism” (totalitarianism ) at
one extreme and “anarchy” (no government at all) at the other
extreme.
Other axes include: the focus of political concern
(communitarianism vs. individualism), responses to conflict
(conversation vs. force), the role of the church (clericalism vs.
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Chapter 13

Comparative
Politics &
International
Relations
Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Identify concepts of international relations and its theory.
• Understand and critically think about international
relations and comparative politics.
• Analyze current issues in international relations.

Section 1

Theories of international relations
The study and practice of international relations has led

Classical realists say this is just human nature. People, by nature,

international relations scholars to suggest diﬀerent ways that

are at some level greedy and insecure and behave accordingly.

states might and should behave with regard to their neighbors

So even if you’re not greedy and insecure, you have to behave

around the world.

that way, because that’s the game. Structural realists say it’s

Realism
RealismThe approach to international relations theory that says
that states must look out for their own interests first, and that
military and economic power are the keys to security. suggests
that states should and do look out for their own interests first.

more about how the world is organized—an anarchic system
creates the Hobbesian state of nature, referring to the 16th
century English philosopher who justified the existence of the
state by comparing it to a somewhat hypothetical “state of
nature,” a war of all against all. So states should seek peace, but
prepare for war.

Realism presumes that states are out for themselves first and

This tends to make national security look like a zero-sum game:

foremost. The world is therefore a dangerous place; a state has

Anything I do to make myself more secure tends to make you

look out for No. 1 and prepare for the worst. When George W.

feel less secure, and vice versa. A realist might counter that a

Bush convinced the U.S. Congress that he should send in U.S.

balance of power between states in fact preserves the peace, by

soldiers into Iraq in 2003 and take out Saddam Hussein, this was

raising the cost of any aggression to an unacceptable level.

realism in action. Realism suggests that international relations is
driven by competition between states, and states therefore do
and should try to further their own interests. What matters, then,

Realists argue that war, at some point, is inevitable. Anarchy
persists, and it isn’t going away anytime soon.

is how much economic and especially military power a state has.
When your neighbor misbehaves, you can’t call the police.
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Liberalism

international law in a way that parallels respect for the law
common in advanced democracies. Liberal commercialismThe

LiberalismA theory of international relations that says that

idea that economic growth and trade ties between states can

cooperation is possible to build global security. suggests in fact

foster global security. sees the advance of global commerce as

states can peacefully co-exist, and that states aren’t always on

making less likely. War isn’t actually very profitable for most

the brink of war. Liberal scholars point to the fact that despite the

people, and it really isn’t good for the economy. Liberal

persistence of armed conflict, most nations are not at war most of

internationalismThe belief that as more states become

the time. Most people around the world don’t get up and start

democracies, war will be less likely to occur. trades on the idea

chanting “Death to America!” and trying to figure out who they

that democracies are less likely to make war than are

can bomb today. Liberalism argues that relations between nations

dictatorships, if only because people can say no, either in

are not always a zero-sum game. A zero-sum game is one in

legislatures or in elections. Consider that public protest in the

which any gain by one player is automatically a loss by another

U.S. helped end U.S. involvement in Vietnam—that kind of thing

player. My gains in security, for example, don’t make you worse

doesn’t always happen in non-democratic states.Although it can.

oﬀ, and your gains in anything don’t make me worse oﬀ. Liberal

Argentina’s misadventures in Las Malvenas—the Falkland Islands

theory also points to the fact that despite the condition of anarchy

—led to protests that brought down a longstanding military

in the world, most nations are not at war, most of the time. So the

dictatorship and restored democracy to the nation in 1982.

idea that international relations must be conducted as though one

Together, these three are sometimes called the Kantian

were always under the threat of attack isn’t necessarily indicative

triangleImmanuel Kant’s belief that the combination of liberal

of reality.

institutionalism, commercialism and internationalism together will

There are diﬀerent flavors of liberalism. Liberal institutionalismThe
theory that world and regional structures such as the United
Nations can be used to create global security. puts some faith in

produce a more stable, prosperous world., after the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who outlined them in a
1795 essay, Perpetual Peace.

the ability of global institutions to eventually coax people into

The liberal argument that states can learn to get along is

getting along as opposed to going to war. Use of the United

somewhat supported by the work of Robert AxelrodRobert

Nations, for example, as a forum for mediating and settling

Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books,

dispute, will eventually promote a respect for the rule of

2006., who used an actual experiment involving a lot of players
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and the prisoner’s dilemma game to show how people and

understand that they would be facing each other for some time,

perhaps states could learn to cooperate. The prisoner’s dilemma

refraining from killing each other meant that they all got to live.

is a fairly simple game that is useful for understanding various
parts of human behavior. In this game, you have two players, both
prisoners. Each player has two choices: Defect to the authorities
and rat out the other player in exchange for a reduced sentence,
or cooperate with the other player and go free. If the players each
defect they get 1 point apiece; if they cooperate they get 3 points
apiece. If, however, one player cooperates and the other defects,
the defector gets 5 points and the cooperator gets zero. Given
that set of constraints, in a realist world, both players defect and
score only 1 point each. The best result would be for both to
cooperate, go free, and generate the most points between them.
In the Axelrod experiment, the game was iterated or repeated, so
that in a round-robin featuring dozens of players, each player
played the other player multiple times. The players were all
notable game theorists, and each devised a particular strategy in
an attempt to win the game. What Axelrod found was the player
in his experiment who used a strategy called “tit-for-tat” won. Titfor-tat simply began by cooperating, and then did whatever the
other player did last time in the next round. In a repeated game,
which certainly describes relations between states, players
eventually learned to cooperate. Axelrod cites real world
examples of where this kind of behavior occurred, such as the
German and Allied soldiers in the trenches of World War I, who
basically agreed at various times not to shoot each other, or to

Constructivism
ConstructivismThe international relations theory that suggests
that people create their own reality, making the decision to go to
war or remain at peace a matter of choice. is another and also
interesting way of looking at international relations. It may tell us
more about why things are happening the way they do, but
somewhat less about what we should do about it. Constructivism
argues that culture, social structures and human institutional
frameworks matter. Constructivism relies in part on the theory of
the social construction of reality, which says that whatever reality
is perceived to be, for the most part people have invented it.Of
course, if the theory were entirely true, then the very idea of the
social construction of reality would also be socially constructed,
and therefore potentially untrue. To the extent that reality is
socially constructed, people can make choices. Hence the
constructivist argument is, in part, that while the world system is
indeed a form of anarchy, that does not demand a realist
response to foreign policy. People can choose to otherwise. So
constructivists might argue that the end of the Cold War between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union was at least in part a decision by
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to change his thinking. He
attempted then to ratchet down tensions with the U.S., and to

shell incoming shipments of food. As the soldiers came to
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liberalize Soviet society.Bova, 2012, p. 26. The fact that the

have to confront the U.S. in anyway, the sites they were building

Soviet Union promptly disintegrated doesn’t change that.

looked just like all the Soviet missile sites they’d ever built.

Combining theories to explain: The Cuban missile crisis

In the governmental politics model, internal political struggles can

Although constructivism can be a bit mushy, some clear versions
of it are quite interesting and useful in helping to understand why
states behave the way they do. Realism tends to treat states as
single, rational actors—as though the state were a single being,
behaving in a consistent fashion with a constant eye to its own

lead to decisions that may at least be questionable. In this case,
Soviet President Nikita Khruschev may have been pushed by
internal political forces to put missiles in Cuba. President John F.
Kennedy faced internal pressure for air strikes on the Soviet sites
in Cuba, but resisted them.

interest. As detailed by the scholar Graham AllisonGraham

In the end, the two sides were able to negotiate their way out of

Allison, Essence of Decision, 1971., the rational actor model of

the standoﬀ and ratchet down the rhetoric. The Soviets pulled the

analysis sees states nearly as single organisms, pursuing policies

missiles out of Cuba; the U.S. pulled missiles out of Turkey—like

with some planning and coherence. Allison used the 1963 Cuban

Cuba for the U.S., right on the Soviets’ doorstep—and promised

missile crisis, in which the United States and the Soviet Union

not to invade Cuba. What’s also useful and interesting about

nearly came to blows over the Soviets’ eﬀorts to put nuclear-

Allison’s work is that it shows how using diﬀerent theories

armed missiles in Cuba, to explain how other factors could

together can explain why states behave the way they do. Putting

explain why states behave the way they do. Allison suggests two

missiles in Turkey and Cuba was a realist approach to

other models. In the organizational process model, the regular

international aﬀairs. A constructivist view can tell us why things

behavior and processes of government agencies (bureaucracies)

happened the way they did: The culture and politics of the U.S.

tends to dictate how and why things happen in government. So,

and the Soviet Union led them to make decisions, and respond to

for example, one of the ways in which U.S. oﬃcials were able to

each other’s decisions, in ways that can’t be viewed as entirely

figure out that the Soviets were building missile sites was from

rational. And, finally, the solution came from a somewhat liberal

aerial reconnaissance and satellite photos of the sites. Despite

approach to policy: Sit down, talk it out, reach an agreement and

the fact that the Soviets were trying to keep the missiles a secret,

pull back from the brink. Although in succeeding decades where

so they could be set up and ready to go if the Soviets should

the missiles were placed became less of an issue, as each side
developed weapons that could hit any spot on the globe from
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anywhere else, despite all the weapons, nobody fired a shot.

Critical feminism, on the other hand, sees capitalism as the

Despite more than five decades of nuclear tension, threats and

source of women’s oppression, and seeks to create new

military buildup, the world failed to blow itself up.

structures for society. Cultural or essentialist feminism stresses

Feminism
Realism, liberalism and constructivism may be the three most

the diﬀerences in how women view and think about the world. It
argues that women’s approach to the world would be more likely
to bring peace and avoid conflict.

prominent theories of international relations, but they are by no

As usual, there’s probably some kernel of truth in all of these

means the only ones or the most important. Feminist scholars

ideas, and places where we could find cases that contradict

look at international relations through the prism of gender

these notions. Clearly, for example, women tend to be less

relations, noting that for much of human history, women have

involved in violent crime, and women in some parts of the world

been relegated to a sideline role in politics and government. This

are being sold into slavery and prostitution, where their lives are

isn’t wise: More than half the people in the world are women.

largely controlled by men. On the other hand, it was a female

Nonetheless, males have dominated both the study and practice

politician, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who

of international relations, but feminist scholars note that women’s

marshaled her country’s military to go to war with Argentina and

roles as wives, mothers and workers have made all of that

reclaim the Falkland Islands in 1982. But while history is full of

possible. Also, a female perspective on foreign policy might be

valiant female warriors and strong leaders—from the Trung sisters

diﬀerent. Feminist theoryA body of theory that seeks to

and Trieu Thi Trinh of Vietnam, to Joan of Arc, and Queen

understand global politics through the prism of gender issues.

Elizabeth I—they are much less common than are men famous for

sometimes argues that having more women in positions of power

their conquering exploits. And the women warriors, generally, are

could change things, as women may be more likely to believe

famous for having defended their homelands as opposed to

peace through international cooperation is possible.

conquering somebody else’s. While some men have felt

Feminist international relations theory has variants, of course.
Liberal feminism wants to ensure that women have the same
opportunities in society as do men, so that means liberal in the
broader sense of general support for democratic capitalism.

threatened by the rise of feminism in the last 60 years, it really is
an opportunity to look at the world in a slightly diﬀerent way,
perhaps shedding some light on why things happen the way they
do.
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Neo-Marxism

analysis. Economic problems and conflicts do continue to inform
international relations, and states do continue to try to acquire

Neo-Marxists look at international relations through the

raw materials as well as markets for finished goods. China, for

perspective of our old friend Karl Marx. Remember that Marx saw

example, is investing heavily in Africa to lock up supplies of

the world in terms of its productive relations, so that the way in

minerals for its growing manufacturing sector. The Chinese

which we organize production determines social and political

apparently aren’t always the best employers. To the extent that

relations as well. Neo-Marxist theoryAn application of Marxist

they mistreat African workers, the states where this happens will

principles to the understanding of global politics, in particular how

face the competing demands of a big country that is paying them

the nature of production—capitalism—may drive states to act

a lot of money for resources, and the needs of its own citizens

toward each other in certain ways. applies this to international

who work for the Chinese.

relations, and tends to argue that capitalism drives states to
compete and attempt to dominate each other.

Neo-Marxists might point to this an example of where liberal
commercialism is really just the capitalist class protecting its own.

For example, under the variant known as Marxism-Leninism,

China is nominally still a communist state, but its economic

named after the Russian revolutionary leader, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

system is really much more a sort of state-sponsored capitalism.

(1870–924), world relations are really defined by the desire for

Capitalism, Neo-Marxists argue, in its relentless quest for rising

industrial nations to develop both sources of raw materials and

profits, leads to the degradation and impoverishment of workers.

markets for finished products (what Lenin called the core and the

The realist explanation of U.S. policy with regard to Central

periphery). Lenin was writing at a time when most of Africa had

America is that the U.S. propped up right-wing dictatorships there

been carved into colonies by the European powers, and the

because they opposed communism. The other explanation was

British Empire still stretched from Africa to India to Hong Kong, so

that U.S. commercial interests, such as the United Fruit

there was some evidence for what he was saying. The collapse of

Company, pushed to maintain their stranglehold on the banana

the Soviet empire and China’s turning away from purely Marxist

industry. This helped lead, for example, to a CIA-sponsored coup

economics has taken some of the steam out of the Marxian

in Guatemala 1954. The company had convinced the U.S.

railroad of history, and we may not agree with Marx and Lenin’s

government that the democratically elected Guatemalan

suggestion that a socialist dictatorship is a necessary step on the

president was pro-Soviet. What is known for sure is that he was

road to nirvana. But it could be wrong to completely reject their

promising to redistribute land to Guatemalan peasants, which
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would have threatened the company’s monopoly on the banana

From a realist perspective, Mexico is not in a position to go to war

trade.

with the U.S., so working with the U.S. seems a much more likely

In the view of neo-Marxist analysis, the Cold war was about the
threat to U.S. business interests. The same would be true for the
first and second Gulf Wars, with the U.S. fighting Iraq in part to
preserve access to Middle Eastern oil. The United States
intervened when Iraq invaded Kuwait much more quickly than it
intervened in the former Yugoslavia, when Serbs were killing
Bosnian Moslems in much greater numbers than Iraqis were
killing Kuwaitis. Neo-Marxism also is realist in its orientation,
since it presumes that conflict and potential between states is the
reality of international aﬀairs. But in their eyes, that conflict is
driven by the conflict between business interests and workers.
Combining Theories to Explain: Mexico and the Drug Wars

alternative. As Mexico’s overall economy is so dependent on
sales to and from the U.S., Mexico will do what it can to protect
and preserve an open trading relationship between the two
nations. A liberal perspective might suggest that Mexico put
pressure on the U.S. to address its own consumption problem,
while continuing eﬀorts to bring the drug lords to heel. A
constructivist approach might suggest that the real problem for
Mexico is poverty and the disparity of wealth in the country; it is
generally not rich people who go out and decide to sell illegal
drugs. It might also suggest that Mexico’s leaders can and should
make choices that diﬀer from what realism or liberalism might
suggest. A feminist analysis might suggest that Mexico’s
somewhat patriarchal society leads it to overlook more peaceful
avenues to solving the problem. A neo-Marxist take on it all would

Let’s look at these perspectives using Mexico as an example.

suggest that the capitalist nature of Mexico’s economy virtually

Many of Mexico’s foreign policy issues involve the United States.

ensures an unequal distribution of wealth, leading the poor to

The U.S. is Mexico’s biggest trading partner; Mexican workers in

seek other means of empowerment, and the rich to seek to

the U.S. send back a lot of money to their families still in Mexico;

maintain the system that helped them become rich in the first

and U.S. drug policy has helped lead the Mexican government

place. There may be some truth to all of these ideas; you will have

into an ongoing war with drug lords. That in itself raises a

to decide what makes sense to you.

question: Why does Mexico persist in fighting the drug war when
drug consumption is a much bigger problem for the United States

The previous section is provided by Archive.org’s

than it is for Mexico?

Primer on Politics.
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Section 2

The practice & study of international relations
International relations is both the practice and the study of the

A Brief History of International Relations

relations of nation-states and other entities in the international
system. This article reviews both of these. Traditionally,

In a sense, the history of international relations, literally meaning

international relations focused primarily on state-to-state

the relations between nations, must begin with the Peace of

relations, but today the field focuses as well on other actors such

Westphalia in 1648, which is regarded as the founding moment

as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental

of the nation-state. At the end of the Thirty Years'War in Europe

organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), and

between those states that wished to maintain the Catholicism of

even individuals. Thus today these interactions and their study

the former Holy Roman Empire and those who wished to be

are often termed global politics or world politics. While

Protestant, it was concluded that each state would follow the

international relations as a field of study originated largely within

religion of its sovereign. In that time we moved from what was

political science and remains centered there, it is also an

primarily a feudal system to what became the nation-state

interdisciplinary field, encompassing the study of economic,

system, so named when we assumed that each state would

social, and cultural interactions as well. While international

govern a single nation of people, and each nation would have its

relations has tended to be dominated by those who term

own state. Original concepts of the nation defined it as a group

themselves realist theorists, liberal or idealist theories continue to

of people who shared history, traditions, and culture, sometimes

abound, and radical theories of many varieties also exist. While

religion, and usually language. Over time, some have come to

international relations began as a field largely in the United

distinguish the concept of an ethnically based nation from that of

States, today it is studied widely all over the world in diﬀerent

a civic nation, based in common identity and loyalty to a set of

ways.

political ideas and institutions. Today the word nation, which
rightly refers to the people, is often used synonymously with
state, as in the United Nations (UN). In practice, however, a state
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may comprise more than one nation or, alternatively, a nation may

relations between groups or sovereign units of any kind, or

be spread out over several states. For example, the Kurdish

between any actors across the boundaries of those sovereign

people are spread between parts of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, among

units. The interaction between technological, social, economic,

other places. During the period when European colonialism

and political change has changed the character of international

ended in Africa and elsewhere, the lack of congruence between

relations over time. During the hunting and gathering period,

nations and the states that were established led to many conflicts

people wandered from place to place in search of food. At the

that continue even today. It is probably more appropriate today to

time of the Agricultural Revolution, people began to settle in one

speak of the interstate system than the international system, as

place. The Industrial Revolution led to settlement in cities, to the

the system is generally regarded as comprising sovereign and

rise of the bourgeoisie and eventually the labor movement, and to

equal states.

changes both in governance and warfare. Cities in Germany

A state is more properly the governmental apparatus by which a
nation rules itself. Max Weber provided the classic definition of
the state:

began to form into economic units, the Zollverein, or customs
unions, and other city-states formed in Italy, Greece, and China,
eventually integrating into nation-states. By 1776 the Declaration
of Independence led to the United States as the first new

Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human

democratic nation. In France, in 1789, the Declaration of the

community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the

Rights and Duties of Man was one of the first statements of the

legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that

human rights of individuals. The rise of democracy coupled with

‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at

industrial technology led to the rise of nationalism and a new kind

the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to

of warfare by the Napoleonic period, where civilian loyalty began

other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the

to play a role and war was no longer a matter between kings and

state permits it.

far removed from civilians.

It is important to keep in mind that this definition specifies the

By 1815 the first IGOs had come into being. In that year the

‘legitimate’ use of force.

Congress of Vienna established a system of regular meetings of
diplomatic representatives of states, a system that would become

International relations, more broadly speaking, could be regarded

the forerunner of the United Nations Security Council. It also

as originating much earlier than 1648, as it generally includes the

established the Central Commission for the Navigation of the
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Rhine, the first of many river commissions which would presage

Modern international relations changed significantly at the end of

the international single-functional organizations which would

World War II and with the construction of the UN and many other

attempt to solve the technical and economic problems of the

new international structures. In the areas of economics, security,

international system. Along with the rise of international

and human rights, major changes occurred in the international

nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), this new level of

system (Table 1).

aggregation would bring about both normative and legal changes
that would eventually become one of the forces changing the
character of international relations.

The Great Depression, which had begun with the American stock
market crash of October 1929, spread throughout the world for
roughly the next decade, becoming one of the factors that led to

Periods of war and peace have alternated in international

the next major war. World War II began in Europe in 1939, and the

relations, with periods of war often followed by the creation of

United States joined the war after the Japanese bombing of Pearl

international organizations intended to prevent additional war.

Harbor, 7 December 1941. The war led to the defeat of the Axis

World War I, 1914–18, led to the 1919 creation of the League of

powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, and to the restructuring of

Nations, the first international organization open to universal

European and other states. During and after the war, states came

membership. The League was based in the theory of collective

together to create both economic and security organizations, so

security, by which states agreed that there would be rules against

as to reduce the future possibility of either economic collapse or

aggression, and that violation of those rules would result in

world war.

punitive action by all the members of the organization against the
violator. However, the League, with a voting structure requiring
unanimity, was discredited when it was unable to stop the
violations when Italy invaded Ethiopia and Japan attacked
Manchuria. This, coupled with the failure of the Unites States to
join the League, and with other states leaving the organization,
were among the factors that led to its failure.
From World War II to the End of the Cold War

The Bretton Woods conference created the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), otherwise known as the
World Bank, and its sister institution, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), in 1944. The IBRD had as its original purpose the
reconstruction of Europe after the war, and later broadened its
purpose to include the economic development of the lessdeveloped states. The IMF, on the other hand, had the purpose of
stabilizing the international monetary system, by providing
shorter-term loans that would help stabilize a nation's currency in
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times of diﬃculty. There was also originally an attempt to create

culminating in the creation of the EU in the Maastricht agreement

an International Trade Organization, but agreement could only be

in 1992. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

reached on creating a more modest General Agreement on Tariﬀs

(OPEC), created in 1960, had an important impact when it cut

and Trade (GATT) in 1947. GATT conferences focused on

supplies and raised prices during the 1973 and 1979 oil crises,

outlawing quotas and foreign exchange controls, on reducing

thus forcing the high energy usage countries to pay attention to

tariﬀs, and on extending most-favored-nation protection to all

oil suppliers.

members (meaning there would be no most-favored nation in
trade agreements). By the time of the Kennedy Round in the early
1960s, there had been tremendous reductions in tariﬀs, especially
for industrial goods, and increases in exports, but the trade gap
between the industrialized North and the primarily agricultural and
commodity-based South had become more pronounced. This led
to the rise of North-South conflict especially during the 1970s,
and discussion of whether there should be a New International
Economic Order. Problems were compounded by the start of the
international debt crisis, often said to have begun on Friday, 13
August 1982, when Mexico announced it could not meet its
payments on its foreign debt. By the Uruguay Round of GATT, in
1995, the agreement had transformed into the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which continued, with the Doha Round

During the war, beginning in 1942, some of the Allied powers
began to work on a charter for a new global general-purpose
organization to replace the League of Nations. In the summer of
1945, after the end of the war in Europe, but before the end of the
war in Asia, the Allied powers, including the US, France, United
Kingdom, China, and Russia, and 51 states in all, came together
in the San Francisco conference to sign the United Nations
Charter. The Charter came into force on 24 October 1945, now
celebrated as UN Day. In the Charter, the member states declare
the maintenance of international peace and security to be a
central purpose of the organization, and collective security and
peaceful settlement to be the central methods to accomplish this.
In Article 1.1, the first purpose stated is:

beginning in September 2001, to be unable to come to agreement

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to

on issues of commodity and service trade and patents and

take eﬀective collective measures for the prevention and removal

intellectual property rights.

of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of

Regional economic organizations also began to play important
roles, with the original institutions of what would become the

aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice

European Union (EU) created in 1952 and 1958, ultimately
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and international law, adjustment or settlement of international

agencies that are part of the broader UN system, although not a

disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

part of the UN itself, the central ones are those discussed above.

Achieving international cooperation to solve economic, social,

Human rights became important especially in the decades after

cultural, and humanitarian problems and to promote respect for

World War II. While the American and French Revolutions had

human rights are also important purposes. The General Assembly

produced a codification of civil and political rights, often termed

was set up to include all member states (51 originally, 192 by

the first generation of human rights, the Bolshevik Revolution in

2007), with an equal vote, and the Security Council to include as

Russia in 1917 and the Maoist Revolution in China in 1949

permanent members the five Allied powers, the winners of World

acknowledged economic and social rights, or the second

War II, who would have the right of veto, and eventually ten other

generation of human rights. With the establishment of the UN,

rotating members, with decisions requiring 9 votes out of 15 (and

human rights began to become a recognized priority in the

no vetoes of permanent members). Under Article 25 of the

international system, with the Preamble of the Charter stating that

Charter, UN member states agree to accept and carry out the

the peoples of the UN were determined:

decisions of the Security Council. Its decisions, unlike the
recommendations of the General Assembly, have the force of
international law. Resolutions of the General Assembly, on the
other hand, are important because they represent the wide-

to reaﬃrm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small.

spread consensus of the states members of the international

The UN Commission on Human Rights, led by Eleanor Roosevelt,

system. The Economic and Social Council of the UN, along with

produced the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was

its commissions focusing on particular matters within its

adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948. By

jurisdiction, is unique in providing (under Article 71 of the Charter)

1966 this had been codified into international law, in the form of

consultative status for many NGOs, thus providing a voice for at

two treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political

least portions of civil society in UN aﬀairs. Any member state of

Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and

the UN must also be a member of the International Court of

Cultural Rights, both of which came into force in 1976. Other

Justice, the court intended to provide judicial decision making for

global and regional human rights treaties, on genocide, women's

disputes between states as an alternative to war. While there are

rights, against racial discrimination and torture, created an

other organs that are part of the UN, and also many specialized

infrastructure of rights based in treaties and courts which began
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to recognize at least some rights for individuals under

divisions. Today the G-77 continues to play an important role in

international law.

international politics and in the UN, where it has a membership of

Decolonization of the empires of the European states, occurring

130 states out of the total UN membership of 192.

primarily during the period from the late 1940s through the early

Many of these same countries joined with others in establishing

1960s, changed the political and economic landscape. The

the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), setting forth the principle of

independence of India and Pakistan from the British Empire in

nonalignment with respect to both the Eastern and Western blocs

1947 was followed by the independence of Burma (now

in their Cold War. The NAM, originally 25 states convened by Tito

Myanmar) and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in 1948, and of Indonesia

of Yugoslavia at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, and now a

in 1949. In the period 1957–63 most African states became

group of 118 states, chose not to create a formal structure.

independent from the French and British Empires, with others

Consensus decision making (which does not imply unanimity) has

gaining independence from Portugal in 1974–75. The rise of this

helped it to maintain solidarity.

new group of states began to change the power structure of the
international system as they came to be able to act together, first
in terms of joint interests in national liberation and in overcoming
Western colonialism and neocolonialism, especially beginning at
the Bandung Conference of 18–24 April 1955. The Group of 77
(G-77), which got its name from the 77 nonaligned nations who
first signed a joint declaration on 15 June 1964 and then adopted
the Charter of Algiers in October 1967, established a permanent
institutional structure to promote the collective economic
interests of the less-developed states. During the period of the
mid-1970s, while the international system debated the question
of whether there would be a New International Economic Order, a
unified political position strengthened the negotiating position of
the G-77, but as development proceeded at diﬀerent rates in
diﬀerent states, the group began to see regional and national

The emergence of Europe as a major player in the international
system was aided in the wake of World War II by reconstruction
assistance from the IBRD and through Marshall Plan aid from the
United States, but regional integration in Europe, eventually
culminating in the formation of the EU, also played an important
role. The Treaty of Paris led to the creation in 1952 of the
supranational European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
established by France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries,
Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, in order both to provide
an engine of growth for the region, as well as to link the
economies of France and Germany in such a way that it would
make it more costly and diﬃcult to go to war with each other
again. The treaty was intended to lead to spillover into other
sectors of the economy and did so with the establishment in 1958
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of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European

food, in 1976 on human settlements (especially cities), in 1977 on

Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), under the Rome Treaties

water and on desertification. The Stockholm Conference began a

among the same countries. The Merger Treaty of 1965 integrated

pattern of holding not only a meeting of UN member states, but a

the three into the European Communities, and eventually the

parallel forum of NGOs and civil society, which would consider

European Community. By February 1992 the Maastricht Treaty on

the same issues as the UN conference. The pattern was to persist

European Union had been signed, and by 1 January 2002, the

throughout the other conferences, and to repeat as these

Euro had been adopted by most EU members as a common

conferences repeated in the 1980s and 1990s. This led to an

European currency. On 1 January 2004, the EU was enlarged

increased role for civil society organizations in the UN system by

from 15 to 25 members with the addition of Eastern European

the mid-1990s. While these ad hoc conferences did not produce

members plus Malta and Cyprus, with two more Eastern Union

treaties, they led to the development of environment ministries in

memberships increasing the EU to 27 by the present. While the

many countries, and to the further development of international

EU has been unable to adopt a constitution, it does now have a

law on the environment, and of certain international organizations

Common Foreign and Security Policy that allows it to act in

as well. The Stockholm Conference resulted in the 1975 creation

unified fashion in many areas in other international forums such

of the United Nations Environment Program, or UNEP. The 1992

as the UN.

Rio Earth Summit, or the United Nations Conference on

While economics, security, and human rights received increasing
attention and institutionalization in the period immediately after
World War II, it was not until the 1970s that attention began to be
paid to environmental matters. Concerns with pesticide pollution
and with the rapidly rising world population led the UN in June,
1972 to hold the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm, Sweden. This was followed,
during the decade of the 1970s, by a large number of ad hoc- or
mega-conferences intended to put a variety of issues, especially
environmental issues, on the agenda of the UN and its members.

Environment and Development (UNCED), was the occasion for
the signing of the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) and the Convention on Biodiversity, and also led to the
creation of a new UN organ, the Commission on Sustainable
Development. Environmental matters began to be seen as more
and more significant, and led the parties to the FCCC to adopt
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, but political will to implement
measures to deal with many environmental issues has not yet
attained the momentum to actually stop a lot of environmental
damage.

Among these were conferences in 1974 on population and on
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Security continued after World War II to be a major concern to

Collective defense, backed up by nuclear deterrence, superseded

states, and a variety of approaches were pursued to further

collective security as the dominant theory of security during most

international peace and security. First, the UN Security Council

of the period of the Cold War.

was based in the theory of collective security, continuing the
system put forth in the League, by which states agreed that they
would jointly put forth rules against aggression, and that violation
of those rules would result in punitive action by all the members
of the organization against the violator. In the case of the UN,
Chapter VII of the UN Charter put forth the basic principles for the
operation of collective security. However, the unity of the
permanent members of the UN Security Council, which had been
presumed for the eﬀective working of the Security Council,
vanished with the onset of the Cold War between the US and the
Soviet Union, and their allies in the Western and Eastern blocs,
and the Security Council was left unable to function as planned
when faced with vetoes from one side or the other on security
matters. With George Kennan's 1947 article in the journal Foreign

Nuclear deterrence played a central role in the security theory of
the superpowers during the Cold War, and reliance on nuclear
deterrence made the achievement of nuclear weapons capability
attractive to other states as a result. The US dropping of the
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August
1945 marked the advent of the nuclear era. The Soviet Union
tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952,
France in 1960, China in 1964, India a ‘peaceful nuclear
explosion’ in 1974 and a nuclear bomb in May 1998, followed
within weeks by a Pakistani test Initial reliance on ‘massive
retaliation’ led eventually to the notion of graduated nuclear
responses and to the advocacy of limited nuclear war fighting by
the Reagan administration in the early 1980s.

Aﬀairs, espousing US and Western containment of Soviet

Along with nuclear deterrence, however, states also pursued arms

communism, especially in Europe, came the 1949 development of

control and disarmament. Bilateral eﬀorts between the US and

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, based in the

the USSR led to the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the

theory of collective defense. As the theory behind the security

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972 and the Strategic Arms

alliance, collective defense was based on the concept under

Reduction Treaty in 1991, as well as other agreements.

which states agreed to band together to defend each other

Multilateral agreements included, most importantly, the Nuclear

against outside aggression, agreeing that they would see an

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970, and a series of nuclear free

attack on one member as an attack on all. When West Germany

zones in the Southern Hemisphere, beginning with the Latin

joined NATO in 1955, the Soviet Union formed its own alliance of

American Nuclear Free Zone in 1967. Nuclear nonproliferation

the Eastern bloc, the Warsaw Pact, which lasted until 1991.
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was relatively successful until the North Korean withdrawal from

peacekeeping troops, supplied not by the major powers as with

the NPT and subsequent testing of a nuclear weapon in October

collective security, but by middle-level powers such as Canada,

2006.

India, and the Scandinavian countries. Thus the United Nations

Diplomacy and international law also played a role in the
maintenance of international peace and security. In the case of
the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, when the US
discovered that the Soviet Union was in the process of placing
nuclear weapons in Cuba, the crisis was resolved by a
combination of a generally low-key military blockade and
diplomatic eﬀorts. The development of a variety of instruments of
international humanitarian law, otherwise known as the laws of
war, was also significant in regulating war. The Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols to those
conventions are most significant here, focusing especially on the
protection of noncombatants.

Emergency Force came into being, policing the border between
Israel and Egypt after a cease-fire had been agreed upon. Many
peacekeeping missions were utilized to keep the peace after
cease-fires in many regions of the world, both during the Cold
War and after that. There continue to be important advances in
the development of all of these mechanisms, both in the UN and
in regional organizations.
After the Cold War
While the end of the Cold War meant that there was a possibility
of joint action for international peace and security in the UN, it
also led to the preponderance of the Western states and
especially the United States. In the early 1990s, the first Gulf War

During the period when the UN Security Council was unable to

was viewed as a triumph of collective security, as the UN Security

make collective security work in the intended way, the UN did

Council unanimously agreed to stop Iraq's illegal occupation of

develop a set of new instruments for international peace and

Kuwait. Peacekeeping also experienced a resurgence. In 1992,

security. Beginning in the late 1940s, and especially in 1956, the

the Security Council asked the UN Secretary-General to look

UN developed a set of techniques that were not specifically

again at the options for maintaining international peace and

mentioned in the UN Charter. In 1956, when Israel and Egypt

security after the end of the Cold War, and the resulting report

were engaged in conflict involving the Suez Canal, and Britain

Agenda for Peace suggested that a combination of preventive

and France entered on the side of Israel, and there was a threat of

diplomacy, peacemaking (especially mediation), peacekeeping,

Russian entry on the side of Egypt, Canada proposed that there

and peace building would be eﬀective.

be a withdrawal by all parties and their replacement by UN
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A renewed eﬀort toward development also transpired, and

caused the destruction of the World Trade Center and damage to

thinking on development expanded from an emphasis solely on

the US Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Worldwide opposition

economic development to a focus on human development as

to terrorism led to a variety of multilateral initiatives against

well, with the publication of the first Human Development Report

terrorist activities. By March of 2003, however, when the US

by the UN Development Program in 1990, and the Human

began its war against Iraq, this time it was without the support of

Development Index, encompassing not only GDP, but also

the UN Security Council. UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of

indicators of human health and education. There was the hope

8 November 2002, had explicitly denied the authorization of the

that developed states would finally reach the goal of increasing

use of military force without a further resolution, deleting the

their oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) to the level of 0.7% of

language of “all necessary means” that would have authorized

GDP, a goal they had established during the second ‘Decade of

force. The international consensus which had appeared to

Development’, but most had never met. With the Millennium

develop after the end of the Cold War, and after 9/11, evaporated

Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, hope

as US intervention accentuated the conflict in the Middle East.

was further increased, but instead, foreign aid after that period
remained between 0.2% and 0.3% of GDP.
Many have argued that the end of the Cold War transformed
international relations. Some argued transformation from an
ideological battle between East and West to greater international
cooperation. Huntington argued that the East-West conflict would
be superseded by a clash of civilizations, or a battle of the West
versus the rest. Others argued that the basis of conflict would be
the poverty, crime, corruption, and environmental degradation
that would accentuate conflict between the haves and the havenots.

Structures in International Relations
The question of structure in international relations includes both
who the actors are in the international system and how the
system itself is structured. Traditionally, nation-states have been
regarded as the primary actors in international relations, but today
most international relations scholars and practitioners also
recognize the importance of IGOs, NGOs, MNCs, and other
nonstate actors such as social movements, as well as terrorist
networks. The structure of the system, which had traditionally
been regarded as anarchic, in that it had no overall government,
has at various times been considered to be bipolar, multipolar, or

Much of the debate over a possible transformation of

unipolar. One of the basic debates, often termed the structure

international relations occurred again after the terrorism that

versus agency debate, asks whether stability and change in the
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system result primarily from the agency of individual actors or

created at the time of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when both

from the structure of the system itself.

diplomatic forums that can be regarded as the predecessor of the

While in earlier periods of history we witnessed the presence of
city-states, such as the Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta,
or Chinese city-states, as well as the growth of empires, such as
the Roman Empire, the Mayan and Inca Empires, the Ottoman
Empire, successive iterations of Chinese empires, and later, the

UN Security Council and functional organizations like the
International Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine were
created. IGOs come in both regional and global forms, with some
being general purpose, and others more specifically oriented to
single subjects.

British Empire; the dominant form of organization in the

The first major universal organization, open to all nation-states,

international system by the time it came to be studied as a

was the League of Nations, created primarily to avoid a relapse

separate field was the nation-state. Generally judged to have

into war after World War I in 1919. Both the League and the UN,

begun with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, at the end of the

its successor created in 1945 after World War II, were based on

Thirty Years'War, the nation-state system, based in the sovereign

the principle of collective security, under which states agreed to

equality of independent states governing people of a single

create international law against aggression and to enforce this

nationality, replaced the Holy Roman Empire. While in practice

with sanctions, both nonmilitary and military, if the law should be

both extensive immigration, and empires dividing up and

violated. While the League was plagued with a cumbersome

combining tribes and nationalities under diﬀerent governing

structure, including a unanimity voting requirement, and ultimately

structures, led to each state actually comprising multiple

did not include the US and some other major states, the UN has

nationalities, the system of independent states became the basis

been relatively successful in providing international security,

of the structures of international law and organization that

sometimes under the collective security doctrine of enforcement,

developed over the course of time.

but more often under the peacekeeping mechanisms which were

International organizations began to coordinate the relations
between these independent states. IGOs are organizations
created by a treaties among states, composed primarily of states,
and thus having some derivative degree of legal standing under
international law. IGOs are generally regarded to have been first

not originally provided in the Charter, but evolved beginning in
1948, and especially at the time of the Suez Canal crisis in 1956.
The security, development, human rights, and environmental
aspects of the UN, and its specific organs, are discussed in the
previous sections.
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Among the single-subject organizations are the functional

form of being able to tax, borrow, and lend, and to have direct

organizations, many of which were formed before the UN, but

power over individuals and firms. Other IGOs, in contrast, still

which became the specialized agencies of the UN system. These

function by means of cooperation between nation-states, with

separate organizations have separate memberships and budgets

final authority resting with the agreement of their member states.

from that of the UN itself, but are parts of the broader UN system.

Many other regional free-trade organizations, such as the North

Among these are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

American Free Trade Association, were also formed later,

located in Rome, the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and the

modeled on the success of the EU, but none have the close

International Telegraphic Union (ITU), the International Labor

degree of integration present in the EU.

Organization (ILO), and the World Health Organization (WHO), all
located in Geneva, and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), located in Vienna.

Other types of IGOs include alliances, like the NATO and the
former Warsaw Pact, which were regional defense pacts of the
Western and Eastern blocs, respectively, organized under

Regional IGOs have developed with diﬀerent degrees of

collective defense principles, under which each member agreed

integration in diﬀerent regions. One of the earliest was the

to regard an attack on one as an attack on all. Cartels, like the

Organization of American States, reorganized formally by the Rio

OPEC, and Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting

Treaty in 1945 to include security functions, but which had

Countries (CIPEC), the copper cartel, and others in bauxite,

previously been created as the Pan-American Union in 1890.

bananas, and the like, bounded together to attempt to increase

Among other multipurpose regional organizations are the

the prices of their goods, while international commodity

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the African

organizations, like the International Coﬀee Agreement, included

Union, formerly the Organization of African Unity. Probably the

both producers and consumers.

most significant, and certainly the most integrated of the regional
organizations, is the EU, of which the first part began in 1952, but
which was formally constituted as the EU under the Maastricht
Treaty of 1992. The EU, which was discussed in the previous
section, is really the only international organization (and then only
the European Community part of the EU), that can be regarded as
being supranational or having powers over the nationstate in the

INGOs, like IGOs, have regular meetings and decision-making
procedures and a permanent secretariat, but comprise individuals
and private organizations, and are not created by state
agreement. There are far more NGOs than IGOs. Among
prominent NGOs are groups like Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund,
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as well as the International Chamber of Commerce. The term

countries. The corporations have certainly been one of the

NGO generally does not include MNCs or terrorist organizations.

vehicles of globalization, spreading around the world patterns of

Many NGOs have consultative status with IGOs, and thus can
attend the meetings of IGOs and sometimes even speak at those
meetings. Under Article 71 of the UN Charter, both national and
international NGOs can apply for consultative status with the
UN's Economic and Social Council, and many attend UN human
rights bodies and international conferences on environment, food,
population, development, and women's and other human rights.
NGOs were responsible for the early development of ideas for
having environment conferences and for having the International
Women's Year conference in 1975. At many General Assembly
conferences, the practice has also developed of having a
separate meeting outside the formal conference structures for
other NGOs that do not have formal consultative status. NGOs
have also become important in the delivery of development aid

trade, consumption, and the cultural aspects associated with
them. While in the late 1950s multinationals were often regarded
as a major force for economic development, providing foreign
direct investment that would catapult economies without
suﬃcient savings into export-led industrialization, only a few
countries developed in this mode, with others continuing to be
damaged by the repatriation of profits to multinationals'home
countries and by the declining terms of trade for the primarily
agricultural and commodity products that were the chief exports
of the less-developed countries. With economic capacities larger
than that of most nation-states, MNCs came to be regarded as
significant actors in the world system, although diﬀerent theorists
have argued as to whether they reinforce or challenge the power
of nation-states.

and humanitarian aid in the field. Médecins sans Frontiéres won a

There are many actors that are not formal organizations. Among

Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 for its work in the delivery of medical

these are social movements and networks. The anti-nuclear-

aid, and the Grameen Bank in 2006 for its micro-credit programs.

weapons movements of the late 1950s were a major force in

MNCs, which developed first in the mining, milling, and
transportation industries around the 1850s, initially spread among
the industrialized countries, and later throughout the world. These
corporations have been lauded as being a great force for peace
and criticized as being a great threat to peace, by creating
exploitative relations between developed and developing

leading to such treaties as the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963.
Both environmental NGOs and the broader environmental
movement were important in leading to the UN's Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, and in turn to the
creation of the UN Environment Program and later the
Commission on Sustainable Development. Transnational
advocacy networks, consisting of certain states, IGOs, and
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NGOs, were significant in leading to the development of the

This system evolved over the course of two world wars and the

international ban on land mines, the program of action against

development of the Cold War into a bipolar system of the Western

illicit trade in small arms, and the International Criminal Court.

(capitalist and democratic) and Eastern (communist and

Finally, terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda have come to be
regarded as significant forces in the world system, beginning with
the bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
in 1998, and especially with the 9/11 attacks on of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Terrorist networks, in order to
avoid detection, are more likely to be structured in small cells,
with a looser central structure. While some groups employing
terrorism were formed specifically to push for liberation of certain

authoritarian) blocs, each organized in military alliances, NATO
and the Warsaw Pact. The hierarchical structure of the two blocs,
led by the US and the USSR, each with nuclear weapons thought
to deter the other bloc from attack, is also thought by many to
have provided stability within the blocs as well. At the end of the
Cold War, oﬀensive realist Mearsheimer argued that we would
soon miss this hierarchical set of structures backed by nuclear
deterrence, as we would more likely see armed conflict without it.

territories, as originally with the Palestine Liberation Organization

With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union,

(PLO) and later Hamas, others have more diﬀuse aims and more

and the decline of the Soviet bloc, it can be argued that the

global reach. The notion that one man's terrorist is another's

international system is now characterized by a unilateral power

liberation fighter has meant that it has been diﬃcult for states to

structure dominated by the US. Some have even argued that

agree on a definition of terrorism that would allow the completion

there is a US empire. Others note the relative decline of the

of a comprehensive treaty.

economic power of the US, and the rise of other states such as

While new actors have been recognized in international relations,
the structure of the system itself has also changed over time.
While many theorists regard the international system as
anarchical, in that it has no formal government, there have in fact
been various structures that have governed the system. Until

China and India, and regional organizations, especially the EU,
but also other regional free-trade areas and organizations such as
ASEAN, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the
African Union (AU), and conclude that the system is in fact
becoming more multilateral.

World War I, the system was generally considered to be a

Arguments over the power structure of the system rest to some

balance-of-power system, with Britain shifting its power so that

degree on definitions of power. Those who argue that we have a

neither continental European alliance could overpower the other.

unilateral system tend to emphasize the overwhelming military
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power of the US, while others emphasize economic power.

(1832). Each expressed concern with the acquisition and

Joseph Nye and others have emphasized “soft power” or the

preservation of state power that continues to characterize those

power of diplomacy, and cultural and other factors. If one takes

who identify themselves as realists. Machiavelli urged those who

into account all of the various possible measures of power, it is

govern to protect their own power. Hobbes believed human

more diﬃcult to see the system as unilateral.

beings were greedy and self-interested, and that life was a war of

Theoretical Perspectives in International Relations

all against all, and thus nasty, brutish, and short. He urged the
creation of Leviathan, all-powerful government, as the solution.

Traditionally, the main competing theoretical perspectives in

Clausewitz, defining war as “an act of violence intended to

international relations have been the meta-theoretical approaches

compel our opponent to fulfill our will,” argued that war was the

known as realism and liberalism, but radical and critical

continuation of politics by other means. Clausewitz, however, also

perspectives on international relations have always existed along

reminded us that war is a messy business, that armies in real war

with those. Over the course of time, the two main sets of theories

get mired in mud, and that there is thus a big diﬀerence between

evolved to become known as neorealism and neoliberalism.

real and ideal war.

Among radical theories have been a variety of theories known as
critical theories, including Marxism and neo-Marxism,
dependency theory, world systems theory, feminism, and
postmodernism or post-structuralism. Finally, constructivism,
which emphasizes the role of changing norms and the changing
construction of identities, and which some consider to be a spinoﬀ from liberal thinking, has become an important theoretical
perspective.

Among the forerunners of liberalism, or idealism (as it was more
often termed in the period between World Wars I and II), were
Immanuel Kant's Perpetual peace (1795), and William Penn's
proposals in the late 1600s for international law and government.
Kant's thesis that democratic governments associated in a
republic would bring about peace became the foundation of one
of today's major theoretical research areas in international
relations, that of democratic peace theory. Hugo Grotius, who

Among the forerunners of realist thinking were

authored The law of war and peace (1625), is widely regarded as

Thucydides'‘Melian dialogue’ from his fifth-century History of the

the father of international law. Woodrow Wilson, in his address to

Peleponnesian war, Machiavelli's Prince (1513), Thomas

Congress in April 1917, argued that the world needed to be made

Hobbes'On the natural condition of mankind, as concerning their

safe for democracy. In 1918, among his Fourteen Points were the

felicity and misery (1651), and Karl von Clausewitz's On war
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notion of open covenants openly arrived at and the creation of a

common good. Neoliberal institutionalists, beginning with the

general association of nations.

functionalist integration theory of Mitrany and moving through the

Realism became the dominant theory of international relations
after World War II. Among the realists are Carr, Morgenthau, Aron,
Waltz, Gilpin, and Grieco. Hans Morgenthau, perhaps the

neo-functionalism that underlaid Monnet's plans for the
development of the EU, now emphasize the importance of the
role of multilateral international institutions and regimes.

quintessential realist thinker, argued in 1948 that politics,

Neorealism and neoliberalism are adaptations of traditional

especially international politics, is a struggle for power and that,

realism and liberalism that bring them closer together. While

in an anarchical world, with no central government, each state will

traditional realists and idealists tended to argue over whether

protect its survival with self-help methods, seeking a

human beings were essentially evil and greedy, or good, with a

preponderant balance of power in its favor. Morgenthau

concern for others, the neorealist versus neoliberal debate

enumerated eight elements of power geography, natural

focuses more on the anarchical structure of the international

resources, industrial capacity, the state of military preparedness,

system and its consequent impact on state behavior. Kenneth

population, national character, national morale, and the quality of

Waltz's structural realism, the best-known neorealist theory,

diplomacy. Yet power can only be approximate, and the key

suggests that it is the lack of central authority that leads states to

elements of power change over time and space and issue.

behave as they do. Baldwin outlines the main diﬀerences in the

Deterrence theory rests in the theory of realism, yet sophisticated

neorealist versus neoliberal debate. While both acknowledge that

deterrence theorists recognize that it is the perception of both

the international system is to some degree anarchic, neorealists

capability and intention that deters, rather than capability alone,

argue that anarchy limits cooperation more than neoliberals

and that such perceptions can only be estimated, rather than

believe. For neorealists, cooperation is diﬃcult; for neoliberals,

calculated.

easier. Neorealists tend to place more emphasis on

Traditional liberal thinking stressed both democratic and
economic ideals, placing emphasis on the development of both
democracy and a market economy and free trade, based in Adam
Smith's laissez-faire theory that if each pursued his own interest,
the invisible hand of the market would transform this into the

states'concerns with relative gains over others, neoliberals on the
pursuit of absolute gains. Neorealists tend to study security and
to believe security is a more important goal of states, while
neoliberals emphasize economics. In terms of analysis of power,
neorealists focus on capabilities, neoliberals on intentions. Finally,
while neorealists see international institutions and regimes as
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insignificant, neoliberals, particularly neoliberal institutionalists,

to buy into the security system underlying the UN, and the

see them as significant. Steven Lamy, in his ‘Contemporary

economic system exemplified by the IBRD, IMF, and GATT.

mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism’ in the
Baylis and Smith text, provides more detail on the wide variations
among neorealist and neoliberal thinkers.
Foremost among early radical theorists was V. I. Lenin, who
extended Karl Marx's theories on capitalism and communism as
he wrote Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism (1916).
Dependency theory, which was nurtured in the Economic
Commission for Latin America, was a later version of neoMarxism, arguing that dependency of the less-developed states
on the more developed in the capitalist international system was
causing their under-development, and that they needed to de-link
themselves from that system. Since the system controlled world
markets, independence eventually proved impossible.
Wallerstein's world systems theory advanced similar arguments,
arguing that the world economy consists of a core (largely
democratic, high-wage, industrialized countries) which utilizes its
power to redistribute resources from the periphery (largely
nondemocratic, low-wage, raw material exporting countries).

Robert Cox reminds us that “Theory is always for some one, and

Gaining expanded on this by arguing that there exists a core and

for some purpose.” Cox makes the point that both neorealism

periphery in each country, as well as in the world system.

and neoliberalism are both status quo ‘problem-solving’

Gramsci's work on hegemony argues that hegemony is not

orientations which legitimate injustice in the international system,

simply domination, but a mixture of coercive power and consent.

as opposed to critical theory, which questions the status quo and

For example, one might argue that the US role immediately after

works for change. Critical theory is more often associated with

World War II was hegemonic in the sense that it got other states

the work of the Frankfort School, which has focused more on the
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role of culture and on a reconceptualization of emancipation,

professional diplomats. Presaging the rise of critical theory and

including a reconciliation with nature. Habermas, probably the

post-behavioralism almost half a century later, Carr spoke of the

most influential of the Frankfurt School, stressed the centrality of

inextricable linkage of purpose and analysis, and the impossibility

communication and of participatory democracy. For a while after

of separating the role of the investigator from that of the

the end of the Cold War, critical theory and neo-Marxist theories

practitioner of politics. He argued that purpose - especially the

fell out of favor in international relations, often dropping out of

specific purpose of preventing war - was the initiator of the study

textbooks altogether, but the increasing inequality of the world

of international politics, and that purpose remained, along with

economic and political system today has brought back serious

observation and analysis, as a necessary element of a mature

theoretical concerns based on more radical theorizing.

science.

History of the Field of Study

French scholar Raymond Aron argued that the study of
international relations, defined as the relations among nations or

Political science, in some sense, can be regarded as having

political collectivities that are territorially organized, was a

begun with the work of Plato in Greece and Confucius in China in

peculiarly American form of study, and that international relations

the fourth and fifth centuries BC. International relations,

in reality could not be separated from other social phenomena.

understood in the broader sense as the relationships between

He argued that the focus on international relations was actually

independent units, has always been a part of that study. However,

interstate relations, symbolized by the actions of the diplomat and

international relations as a separate field of study is generally

the soldier who represent the state in peace and war. His

understood as having begun in the United States in the early

argument that international relations could not “rigorously

twentieth century.

separate inter-state relations from inter-individual relations

British scholar E. H. Carr, writing in 1939 The twenty years'crisis
1919–1939, spoke of the debate between what were then called
idealists and realists in the growth of the science of international
relations. He argued that international relations as a field came
about as a result of democratization and of the popular demand
to overcome the secrecy of international politics as practiced by

involving several political units” presaged the distinction
otherwise not clearly made until the 1970s between international
and transnational relations. Yet he simultaneously argued that an
essential diﬀerence remained between internal and foreign
policies, based on the notion that states internally “reserve the
monopoly on violence to those wielding legitimate authority”
while states, not having emerged from the (Hobbesian) state of
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nature, exhibit foreign policies accepting “the plurality of centers

as US foreign policy establishment oriented. World Politics

of armed force.” Aron argued that historical and sociological

followed in 1948, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, which has

analysis was a more appropriate method of studying international

bridged the fields of peace research and international relations, in

relations than the formal rationalism that seemed to be the basis

1957, and the International Studies Quarterly, more oriented to

of this new American field. He also argued that the realist-idealist

work employing quantitative and behavioral methodologies, in

distinction made by American international relations scholars,

1962.

who particularly saw the old Europe as realist and the United
States as idealist, simply made no sense, as all states ultimately
followed realist principles in a system in which each was
responsible for its own survival.

The International Studies Association (ISA) is probably the most
important international organization of scholars in the field of
international relations. Created in 1959, ISA has sections on
virtually all of the subfields of international relations, five journals,

In terms of the development of the infrastructure of the new field,

including its flagship journal International Studies Quarterly, and

research institutions came first, with the foundation of the

holds an annual meeting that, while still including predominantly

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1910, the Council

Americans and political scientists, attracts international relations

for Ethics in International Aﬀairs in 1914, the Hoover Institution on

scholars from around the world. ISA cooperates with 57

War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University in 1918, and

international studies associations in over 30 countries. Other

the Council on Foreign Relations in 1921. The first university

scholarly organizations include the British International Studies

department of international relations appears to have been the

Association, sections of the European Consortium for Political

Department of International Politics, at University College of

Research, and sections of professional organizations in many of

Wales at Aberystwyth in 1919. It was followed by the School of

the social science disciplines.

International and Public Aﬀairs at Columbia University in 1946
and the School of International Studies at jawaharlal Nehru
University in 1947.

The Association of Professional Schools of International Aﬀairs
lists as members institutes in 19 schools from the United States
(American University, Columbia, Duke, George Washington,

Journals in the field proliferated with the advent of research and

Georgetown, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Princeton, Syracuse, Tufts,

educational institutions. The Council on Foreign Relations began

University of California, San Diego, the Universities of Denver,

Foreign Aﬀairs in September 1922, a journal which has been seen

Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Pittsburgh, Southern California,
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Washington, and Yale), and 11 outside the US, as well as 21

Nye's introduction of the concept of transnational relations as the

aﬃliates. While the institutes focus on the theory, as well as

interaction of all entities, at least one of which is not a state or an

practice of international relations, they place a particular

agent of a state, across state boundaries, the conceptualization

emphasis on producing professionals who will practice in the field

of international relations has broadened. Some may still consider

of international relations, either as diplomats or in international

the relevant distinction to be between the international politics of

business or NGOs.

state-to-state relations and the transnational relations of other

Chief among the best-selling textbooks in international relations
today are, at the graduate and advanced undergraduate level,
Baylis and Smith's Globalizataion of world politics, and at the
undergraduate level, Goldstein's International relations, by 2005
in its 7th edition authored by Goldstein and Pevehouse. Both oﬀer
comprehensive introductions to the theory and practice of the
field, although in both cases there is little emphasis on human
rights.

entities across state borders, but in actual usage the terms have
become blurred. Even within political science the term politics
has broadened beyond a sole focus on government and the state
to a focus on the political or power relations in all entities, ranging
from the family to university departments, to NGOs, and the
media as well. Today the blurring of the lines between domestic
and international politics has meant that the study of international
relations itself has broadened, examining the relations between
the two-level games of international and domestic politics (as per

A debate continues as to whether international relations is a

Putnam's work), and the two areas of transnational and

subfield of political science, or whether the international parts of

international relations. The terms global politics and world politics

the social science disciplines, such as political science, sociology,

are often used to replace the term international relations,

anthropology, are subfields of the interdisciplinary field of

indicating movement away from the traditional state-based

international relations. In institutional terms, international relations

analysis. Strangely enough, though, the terms global relations

is studied in both of those contexts. International politics has

and world relations seem not to be used at all.

generally been seen as that part of international relations that
focuses on interstate relations, while international relations
encompasses the broader relations between all entities, including
individuals, nongovernmental and business organizations, across
the boundaries of sovereign states. Particularly after Keohane and

Conclusions: Evolving Issues in International
Relations
The study and the practice of international relations, or global or
world politics, continues, then, to focus around both conflict and
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cooperation. Carr has argued that the fundamental problem of

recognized only states. The growth of MNCs, on the one hand,

political change is “the compromise between power and morality”

and NGOs, on the other hand, has forced the field to reconsider

and that the diﬀerence in the way this plays out in the domestic

its understanding of the relationship of the state system to global

and international realms is due to the lack of organization in the

civil society. As the structure of the system continues to change,

international sphere. He argues that change is inevitable and that

with increasing globalization and shifts in power as successive

thus “the defence of the status quo is not a policy which can be

waves of countries develop economic and military power, the

highly successful.” Ignoring either power or morality is thus

theories of the field have adapted to these changes.

unrealistic.

As the system changes, the question of global governance has

Sovereign equality, as embodied in the Westphalian order, in

come to occupy a central place in international relations. As

international law and most forms of international organization,

states emphasize the rule of law and good governance, and some

may no longer be adequate in the face of challenges from both

begin to cede powers to larger integrative eﬀorts, while others

those who argue that international politics should reflect the

continue to utilize military force to advance their interests, the

international power structures and those who argue that the

question of whether the role of military force is changing remains

continuously emerging framework of individual human rights

front and center. The theoretical diversity in the study of

means that international structures should become increasingly

international relations, strengthened now with the return of radical

democratic, based on one person one vote, rather than one state

perspectives to join realism and liberalism, will continue to be a

one vote. A change of views in the centrality of states in the

source of strength in examining these questions from the full

international system versus the role of individuals on the one

range of vantage points.

hand, and complex interdependence among Western
industrialized states on the other hand, has led to a more
nuanced understanding of the relationships between the structure

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s

of the system and the behavior of the multiple actors in the

use of Credo Reference.

system. The development of human rights perspectives and
human rights treaties, commissions, and courts, especially in
Europe, the Americas, and Africa, has increased the standing of
the individual in international law, a domain that formerly
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Section 3

Foreign policy analysis
Definitions

non-state actors have increased their influence over foreign
policy so that human rights, for instance, have become a field in

Foreign policy in its traditional definition is the policy of a state

which states and a network of national and transnational NGOs

towards external actors and especially other states. In contrast

closely cooperate (and compete) with each other (Risse et al.

particularly to neorealism (→ Theory Concept: Realism and

1999b).

Neorealism), it therefore does not primarily look at the
international system as such but oﬀers an ‘inside-out’
perspective to understand the decision-making process within a
state that produces policies directed beyond the state (→ levels
of analysis).
This traditional definition has become more problematic over
time, in particular in the light of (→) globalization and (→) regional
integration. On the one hand, this has made it more diﬃcult to
draw clear boundaries between what is to be counted as
‘domestic’ and what is ‘foreign’. In the setting of the European
Union, for instance, many policy decisions are no longer taken
purely within the member states, but have direct eﬀect across
the whole of the Union. The EU has also added an additional
layer of foreign policy in that such policy is now conducted both
on the member state and on the EU levels. On the other hand,

None the less, the state remains at the heart of foreign policy.
The focus on decision-making processes within the state is
therefore still useful, even though one needs to take into account
that the overall picture is a lot more complex.

Theoretical perspectives
For classical realism (→ Theory Concept: Realism and
Neorealism). foreign policy was a cornerstone in the study of
international relations. In the words of Walter Lippmann (1943),
foreign policy was ‘the shield of the republic’. For realists, the
task and the art of the statesman were to guide the ‘ship’ of the
state through the ‘rough sea’ of the international system so that
it was not conquered and life on board was well. Foreign policy
was to guard the predominantly geopolitically defined interests of
the state and maintain the balance of power through masterful
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diplomacy. The writings of the former United States Secretary of

the significance of bureaucracies. On the one hand, he treats

State, Henry Kissinger (e.g. 1957, 1994), can be seen as

these as machineries that operate on the basis of often unwritten

outstanding examples of this tradition, although his record in

codes and rules, the so-called ‘standard operating procedures’,

oﬃce is more contested (e.g. Hitchens 2002).

that allow them to make sense of events and respond within

When International Relations as a discipline became more and
more interested in explanation on the level of the system (→
levels of analysis) in the 1960s and 1970s, foreign policy analysis
increasingly developed as a separate subdiscipline with its own
discussions. These continued to be related to the debates in
International Relations as a whole, but developed their own

known practices. On the other hand, the notion of a machinery is
misleading to the extent that there are also diﬀerent interests, for
instance between diﬀerent government departments such as
those concerned with foreign policy, trade and defence, which
lead to what is known as ‘bureaucratic politics’. Both aspects
undermine the rationality of the decision-making process.

dynamic. For analysts of foreign policy, a focus on the properties

The importance of Allison's work cannot be underestimated.

of the system to explain particular outcomes such as war was

During the 1970s in particular, there followed a variety of attempts

insuﬃcient. The task was to open up the ‘black box’ of the state

to explain foreign policy through an inclusion of factors that

and see how foreign policy decisions were arrived at.

constrain rationality. In addition to the workings of a bureaucracy,

One of the most influential works written during that period was
Graham Allison's Essence of Decision (1971). In explaining the
decisions by the United States and Soviet Union governments
during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world to
the brink of the Third World War, Allison argued that the prevailing
‘rational actor model’ to account for policy decisions was
insuﬃcient to oﬀer a convincing answer to the question of why
such decisions are taken. He proposed two additional models

scholars focused primarily on psychological and cognitive
factors. Among the former, the eﬀect of stress under heavy time
constraints plays a particularly important role, but also the
question of personalities in interpersonal relationships among
policy-makers (e.g. de Rivera 1968; Kinder and Weiss 1978). It
was, however, the latter, cognitive factors that proved to be of
particular importance not only for foreign policy analysis but also
for the further development of the discipline as a whole.

that analysts would have to consider: the ‘organizational

The study of cognition tries to understand the way people think

behaviour model’ and the ‘government politics model’. Broadly

and arrive at decisions. The main argument of cognitive

speaking, Allison alerted the discipline with these two models to

approaches is that it is important to recognize that foreign policy
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is ultimately made by individuals; that these individuals have to

These attempts to include cognition in the analysis did however

understand events in specific ways before they can react to them;

ultimately open the door to other approaches that came to the

and that they will have developed specific ways of thinking both

fore from the 1980s onwards under the umbrella of constructivist

to make sense of events and to devise possible responses. Two

and reflectivist approaches (→ Theory Concept: Social

projects pursuing such an approach have become particularly

Constructivism; Theory Concept: Postmodernism and

famous. Robert Jervis (1976) argued that all events need to be

Poststructuralism). On the one hand, the focus on cognition fed

‘perceived’ by policy-makers and that the analyst has the task to

into attempts to explain foreign policy at least in part through the

distinguish between (correct) perceptions and ‘misperceptions’. A

importance of ideas in the policy-making process. In the work of

group around Robert Axelrod (1976) developed the method of

Goldstein and Keohane (1993), for instance, ideas are defined as

‘cognitive mapping’ through which they tried to distil from

‘beliefs held by individuals’ and therefore can be seen as

interviews, speeches and other texts the core concepts with

cognitive concepts (→ Ideas and Norms). On the other hand, a

which a policy-maker works, and how they are interlinked in his or

number of people from Axelrod's group later reflected on their

her thinking to lead to the assessment of the utility of possible

work and argued that in fact, they had not really mapped a

policy actions. Similar concepts had been put forward earlier, for

decision-maker's ‘inner thoughts’ but rather a (→) discourse in

instance by Ole Holsti (1962, ‘belief systems’) and Alexander

which the decision-maker had been participating. To infer from

George (1967, ‘operational code’).

this map that these were what the decision-maker actually

A strong motivation behind such approaches was not only to
explain particular foreign policy decisions, but also to make them
better by highlighting the biases and blind spots within a policymaker's mind. Cognitive maps, for instance, could serve as an
instrument for self-reflection. Alas, in the end, the complexity of
such maps and the time therefore involved in drawing them
meant that their success in the world of practitioners remained
limited.

thought, would be an untenable assumption (Bonham et al. 1987).
This led to studies of foreign policy from new angles, including
more critical approaches that focused on the problematization of
core assumptions and practices within foreign policy discourses
rather than the explanation of individual policies (e.g. Campbell
1998), although the latter was still pursued even from discursive
perspectives (e.g. Larsen 1997; Wæver 2002).
Many foreign policy analysts nowadays combine diﬀerent factors
in their explanation of foreign policies. One of the first to provide a
comprehensive matrix of variables influencing foreign policy
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decision-making was James Rosenau (1967, 1980). Later, notions

It was David Campbell (1998) who oﬀered a more radical

such as that of a ‘foreign policy system’ (Clarke and White 1989)

reformulation of the relationship between foreign policy and

also tried to integrate diﬀerent approaches within a coherent

national identity. For Campbell, national identity was no longer a

framework. The advantage of such overarching approaches is

given as in classical realist thought. Instead, foreign policy served

that they intuitively make sense - it seems unlikely that actors act

in part at least to construct such an identity through the

only according to rational criteria in a given situation or that they

representation of an ‘other’ without which national identities (and

only give in to their feelings. However, there is a trade-oﬀ with

identities in general) would be meaningless. Campbell saw the

parsimony, and many crucial insights in foreign policy analysis

institutionalized, state-centred form of foreign policy analysis as

would not have been possible without the more radical

part of a broader practice of foreign policy that was ‘foreign

approaches that emphasized one factor over others.

policy’ to the extent that it represented something or a group of

Empirical problems
An interesting empirical problem that also further illustrates the
development of foreign policy analysis is the relationship of
foreign policy and identity. In the classical realist account of
foreign policy, the identity of a nation (and that of others) was
given and had to be defended through foreign policy. With the
rise of cognitive and psychological approaches, authors such as
Kenneth Boulding (1959) stressed the role of national stereotypes
in decision-making, and argued that images of one's own identity
and that of other nations often lead to misjudgements and
consequently misguided policies, and eventually possibly war.
Clearly, such images were important aspects of cognitive maps

people as ‘foreign’, as ‘alien’ to the nation, in other words, it
‘made’ something ‘foreign’. This construction of the ‘foreign’ did
not have to be directed at other states or actors in the
international realm, but could also take place domestically, within
the confines of state borders, in the representation of minorities
and other socially marginalized groups. Campbell's work provides
a very diﬀerent perspective on foreign policy that questions from
a theoretical perspective the diﬀerence between the state and the
international that we already problematized in the introduction to
this entry.
The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of Credo Reference.

and misperceptions. Following this argument, a great number of
scholars pursued the problem of the impact of ‘enemy images’ in
conflict and war.
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Section 4

International relations theory
Theories of International Relations allow us to understand and try

the theories concerned as they have been developed within the

to make sense of the world around us through various lenses,

discipline of International Relations.

each of which represents a diﬀerent theoretical perspective. In
order to consider this as a whole for beginners it is necessary to
simplify IR theory. This chapter does so by situating IR theory on
a three-part spectrum of traditional theories, middle-ground
theories and critical theories. Examples are used throughout to
help bring meaning and perspective to these positions. Readers
are also encouraged to consult this book’s companion text,
International Relations Theory (2017), which expands greatly on
the subject matter of this chapter.

Traditional theories
Theories are constantly emerging and competing with one
another. For that reason it can be disorientating to learn about
theoretical approaches. As soon as you think you have found
your feet with one approach, you realise there are many others.
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientifi Revolutions (1962) set
the stage for understanding how and why certain theories are
legitimised and widely accepted. He also identifi the process that

Before we get started, one very important note. You may notice

takes place when theories are no longer relevant and new

that some of the theories you are introduced to here are referred

theories emerge. For example, human beings were once

to by names that also occur in other disciplines. Sometimes this

convinced the earth was fl and accepted this as fact. With the

can be confusing as, for example, realism in IR is not the same

advancement of science and technology, humans discarded this

as realism in art. Similarly, you may hear the word ‘liberal’ being

previously accepted belief. Once such a discovery takes place, a

used to describe someone’s personal views, but in IR liberalism

‘paradigm shift’ results and the former way of thinking is

means something quite distinct. To avoid any confusion, this

replaced with a new one. Although changes in IR theory are not

note will serve as a caveat that in this chapter we only refer to

as dramatic as the example above, there have been signifi
evolutions in the discipline. This is important to keep in mind
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when we consider how theories of IR play a role in explaining the

practice, US President Woodrow Wilson addressed his famous

world and how, based upon diﬀerent time periods and our

‘Fourteen Points’ to the US Congress in January 1918 during the

personal contexts, one approach may speak to us more than

fi year of the First World War. As he presented his ideas for a

another. Traditionally there have been two central theories of IR:

rebuilt world beyond the war, the last of his points was to create a

liberalism and realism. Although they have come under great

general association of nations, which became the League of

challenge from other theories, they remain central to the

Nations. Dating back to 1920, the League of Nations was created

discipline.

largely for the purpose of overseeing aﬀairs between states and

At its height, liberalism in IR was referred to as a ‘utopian’ theory
and is still recognised as such to some degree today. Its
proponents view human beings as innately good and believe
peace and harmony between nations is not only achievable, but
desirable. Immanuel Kant developed the idea in the late
eighteenth century that states that shared liberal values should
have no reason for going to war against one another. In Kant’s
eyes, the more liberal states there were in the world, the more

implementing, as well as maintaining, international peace.
However, when the League collapsed due to the outbreak of the
Second World War in 1939, its failure became diﬃ for liberals to
comprehend, as events seemed to contradict their theories.
Therefore, despite the eﬀorts of prominent liberal scholars and
politicians such as Kant and Wilson, liberalism failed to retain a
strong hold and a new theory emerged to explain the continuing
presence of war. That theory became known as realism.

peaceful it would become, since liberal states are ruled by their

Realism gained momentum during the Second World War when it

citizens and citizens are rarely disposed to desire war. This is in

appeared to oﬀer a convincing account for how and why the

contrast to the rule of kings and other non-elected rulers who

worst confl in known history originated after a period of supposed

frequently have selfi desires out of step with citizens. His ideas

peace and optimism. Although it originated in named form in the

have resonated and continue to be developed by modern liberals,

twentieth century, many realists have traced its origins in earlier

most notably in the democratic peace theory, which posits that

writings. Indeed, realists have looked as far back as to the ancient

democracies do not go to war with each other, for the very

world where they detected similar patterns of human behaviour

reasons Kant outlined.

as those evident in our modern world. As its name suggests,

Further, liberals have faith in the idea that the permanent
cessation of war is an attainable goal. Taking liberal ideas into

advocates of realism purport it refl the ‘reality’ of the world and
more eﬀectively accounts for change in international politics.
Thomas Hobbes is often mentioned in discussions of realism due
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to his description of the brutality of life during the English Civil

unavoidable and perpetual and so war is common and

War of 1642–1651. Hobbes described human beings as living in

inherent to humankind. Hans Morgenthau, a prominent realist,

an orderless ‘state of nature’ that he perceived as a war of all

is known for his famous statement ‘all politics is a struggle for

against all. To remedy this, he proposed that a ‘social contract’

power’ (Morgenthau 1948). This demonstrates the typical realist

was required between a ruler and the people of a state to

view that politics is primarily about domination as opposed to

maintain relative order. Today, we take such ideas for granted as it

cooperation between states. Here, it is useful to briefl recall the

is usually clear who rules our states. Each leader, or ‘sovereign’ (a

idea of theories being lenses. Realists and liberals look at the very

monarch, or a parliament for example) sets the rules and

same world. But when viewing that world through the realist lens,

establishes a system of punishments for those who break them.

the world appears to be one of domination. The realist lens

We accept this in our respective states so that our lives can

magnifi

function with a sense of security and order. It may not be ideal,

paint a certain picture of the world. Liberals, when looking at the

but it is better than a state of nature. As no such contract exists

same world, adjust their lenses to blur out areas of domination

internationally and there is no sovereign in charge of the world,

and instead bring areas of cooperation into focus. Then, they can

disorder and fear rules international relations. That is why war

paint a slightly diﬀerent picture of the same world.

seems more common than peace to realists, indeed they see
war as inevitable. When they examine history they see a world
that may change in shape, but is always characterised by a
system of what they call ‘international anarchy’ as the world has
no sovereign to give it order.

instances of war and confl

and then uses those to

It is important to understand that there is no single liberal or
realist theory. Scholars in the two groups rarely fully agree with
each other, even those who share the same approach. Each
scholar has a particular interpretation of the world, which includes
ideas of peace, war and the role of the state in relation to

One central area that sets realism and liberalism apart is how they

individuals. And, both realism and liberalism have been updated

view human nature. Realists do not typically believe that

to more modern versions (neoliberalism and neorealism) that

human beings are inherently good, or have the potential for

represent a shift in emphasis from their traditional roots.

good, as liberals do. Instead, they claim individuals act in their

Nevertheless, these perspectives can still be grouped into theory

own self-interests. For realists, people are selfi and behave

‘families’ (or traditions). In your studies, you will need to unpack

according to their own needs without necessarily taking into

the various diﬀerences but, for now, understanding the core

account the needs of others. Realists believe confl

is
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assumptions of each approach is the best way to get your

agreements. In terms of liberalism, its proponents argue that

bearings.

organisations are valuable in assisting states in formulating

For example, if we think of the simple contrast of optimism and
pessimism we can see a familial relationship in all branches of
realism and liberalism. Liberals share an optimistic view of IR,
believing that world order can be improved, with peace and
progress gradually replacing war. They may not agree on the
details, but this optimistic view generally unites them. Conversely,
realists tend to dismiss optimism as a form of misplaced idealism

decisions and helping to formalise cooperation that leads to
peaceful outcomes. Realists on the other hand believe states
partake in international organisations only when it is in their selfinterest to do so. Many scholars have begun to reject these
traditional theories over the past several decades because of their
obsession with the state and the status quo.

The middle ground

and instead they arrive at a more pessimistic view. This is due to
their focus on the centrality of the state and its need for security

The thinking of the English school is often viewed as a middle

and survival in an anarchical system where it can only truly rely on

ground between liberal and realist theories. Its theory involves the

itself. As a result, realists reach an array of accounts that describe

idea of a society of states existing at the international level.

IR as a system where war and confl is common and periods of

Hedley Bull, one of the core fi

peace are merely times when states are preparing for future

with the traditional theories that the international system was

conflict.

anarchic. However, he insisted that this does not imply there are

Another point to keep in mind is that each of the overarching
approaches in IR possesses a diﬀerent perspective on the nature
of the state. Both liberalism and realism consider the state to be
the dominant actor in IR, although liberalism does add a role for
non-state actors such as international organisations.
Nevertheless, within both theories states themselves are typically
regarded as possessing ultimate power. This includes the
capacity to enforce decisions, such as declaring war on another

of the English school, agreed

no norms (expected behaviours), thus claiming there is a societal
aspect to international politics. In this sense, states form an
‘Anarchical Society’ (Bull 1977) where a type of order does exist,
based on shared norms and behaviours. Due to its central
premise, the English school is often characterised as having an
international society approach to IR. This describes a world that
is not quite realist and not quite liberal – but rather a world that
has elements of both.

nation, or conversely treaties that may bind states to certain
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Constructivism is another theory commonly viewed as a middle

the past and the emerging norms of the future. As such,

ground, but this time between mainstream theories and the

constructivists seek to study this process.

critical theories that we will explore later. It also has some familial
links with the English school. Unlike scholars from other
perspectives, constructivists highlight the importance of values
and shared interests between individuals who interact on the
global stage. Alexander Wendt, a prominent constructivist,
described the relationship between agents (individuals) and
structures (such as the state) as one in which structures not only
constrain agents but also construct their identities and interests.
His famous phrase ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt
1992) sums this up well. Another way to explain this, and to
explain the core of constructivism, is that the essence of
international relations exists in the interactions between people.
After all, states do not interact; it is agents of those states, such
as politicians and diplomats, who interact. As those interacting on
the world stage have accepted international anarchy as the defi

Critical theories
Critical approaches refer to a wide spectrum of theories that
have been established in response to mainstream approaches in
the fi mainly liberalism and realism. In a nutshell, critical theorists
share one particular trait– they oppose commonly held
assumptions in the fi of IR that have been central since its
establishment. Thus, altered circumstances call for new
approaches that are better suited to understand, as well as
question, the world we fi ourselves in. Critical theories are
valuable because they identify positions that have typically been
ignored or overlooked within IR. They also provide a voice to
individuals who have frequently been marginalised, particularly
women and those from the Global South.

principle, it has become part of our reality. However, if anarchy is

Marxism is a good place to start with critical theories. This

what we make of it, then diﬀerent states can perceive anarchy

approach is based upon the ideas of Karl Marx, who lived in the

diﬀerently and the qualities of anarchy can even change over

nineteenth century at the height of the industrial revolution. The

time. International anarchy could even be replaced with a diﬀerent

term ‘Marxist’ refers to individuals who have adopted Marx’s

system if a critical mass of other individuals (and by proxy the

views and believe that society is divided into two classes – the

states they represent) accepted the idea. To understand

business class (the bourgeoisie) and the working class (the

constructivism is to understand that ideas, or ‘norms’ as they are

proletariat). The proletariat are at the mercy of the bourgeoisie

often called, have power. IR is, then, a never-ending journey of

who control their wages and therefore their standard of living.

change chronicling the accumulation of the accepted norms of

Marx hoped for an eventual end to the class society and
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overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. Critical theorists

challenges faced by people living within these regions as well as

who take a Marxist angle often argue that the internationalisation

an acknowledgement of how their issues could be better

of the state as the standard operating principle of international

addressed. Postcolonial scholars are, therefore, important

relations has led to ordinary people around the globe becoming

contributors to the fi as they widen the focus of enquiry beyond

divided and alienated, instead of recognising what they all have in

IR’s traditionally ‘Western’ mindset.

common as a global proletariat. For this to change, the legitimacy
of the state must be questioned and ultimately dissolved. In that
sense, emancipation from the state in some form is often part of
the wider critical agenda.

Another theory that exposes the inequality inherent in
international relations is feminism. Feminism entered the fi in the
1980s as part of the emerging critical movement. It focused on
explaining why so few women seemed to be in positions of power

Postcolonialism diﬀers from Marxism by focusing on the

and examining the implications of this on how global politics was

inequality between nations or regions, as opposed to classes.

structured. You only need look at a visual of any meeting of world

The eﬀects of colonialism are still felt in many regions of the world

leaders to see how it appears to be a man’s world. Recognising

today as local populations continue to deal with the challenges

this introduces a ‘gendered’ reading of IR, where we place an

created and left behind by the former colonial powers.

issue such as gender as the prime object in focus. If it is a man’s

Postcolonialism’s origins can be traced to the Cold War period

world, what does that mean? What exactly is masculinity as a

when much activity in international relations centred around

gender and how has it imposed itself on international relations?

decolonisation and the ambition to undo the legacies of European

As V. Spike Peterson (1992) argues, as long as gender remains

imperialism. This approach acknowledges that politics is not

‘invisible’ it may be unclear what ‘taking gender seriously’ means.

limited to one area or region and that it is vital to include the

Once it is recognised that gender is essentially a social

voices of individuals from other parts of the world. Edward Said

construction permeating all aspects of society, the challenges it

(1978) developed the prominent ‘Orientalist’ critique, describing

presents can be better confronted in a way that benefi all

how the Middle East and Asia were inaccurately depicted in the

individuals. Here, you might be beginning to see some overlaps –

West. As a result, more focus within the discipline was placed on

with constructivism for example. We are doing our best to present

including the viewpoints of those from the Global South to ensure

each approach separately so that you have a clearer starting

that Western scholars no longer spoke on their behalf. This

point, but it is wise to caution you that IR theory is a dense and

created a deeper understanding of the political and social
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complex web and not always clearly defi Keep this in mind as you

theories would rather avoid. If you can shake the foundations of a

read on, and as your studies develop.

structure, be that a word or an idea, you can move beyond it in

The most controversial of the critical theories is poststructuralism.
It is an approach that questions the very beliefs we have all come
to know and feel as being ‘real’. Poststructuralism questions the
dominant narratives that have been widely accepted by
mainstream theories. For instance, liberals and realists both

your thinking and become free of the power it has over you. This
approach introduces doubt to the reality we assume to share and
exposes the often thin foundations that some commonly held
‘truths’ stand upon.

Theory in practice: examining the United Nations

accept the idea of the state and for the most part take it for
granted. Such assumptions are foundational ‘truths’ on which

The United Nations (UN) is a highly respected international

those traditional theories rest – becoming ‘structures’ that they

organisation created at the conclusion of the Second World War

build their account of reality around. So, although these two

from the ashes of the League of Nations. Although it continues to

theoretical perspectives may diﬀer in some respect in regards to

exist, many doubt its claims to success. The United Nations

their overall worldviews, they share a general understanding of

General Assembly is an organ that provides every country with a

the world. Neither theory seeks to challenge the existence of the

seat at the table. However, the United Nations Security Council is

state. They simply count it as part of their reality.

where power ultimately resides. The Security Council has ten

Poststructuralism seeks to question these commonly held

elected non-permanent members, each with their own vote. More

assumptions of reality that are taken for granted, such as the

importantly, the Security Council also contains fi permanent

state – but also more widely the nature of power. Jacques

members – the United States, Russia, China, France and the

Derrida’s contribution in this area was in how he showed that you

United Kingdom – reflect the victors of the Second World War

could deconstruct language to identify deeper, or alternative,

who stood dominant in 1945 as the United Nations was created.

meanings behind texts. If you can deconstruct language (expose

Any of those fi permanent members can, through the use of a

its hidden meanings and the power it has), then you can do the

veto, stop any major resolution.

same with fundamental ideas that shape international relations –
such as the state. By introducing doubt over why the state exists
– and who it exists for – poststructuralists can ask questions
about central components of our political world that traditional

The United Nations does not possess complete power over
states. In other words, it has limited authority to interfere in
domestic concerns since one of its main purposes has generally
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been to mediate diplomatically when issues between countries

alternatives to war through trade and diplomacy (among other

arise. To better understand this last point, one can point to the

things), which are staples of the liberal account of IR. On the

challenges faced by the UN’s peacekeepers, who comprise

other hand, middle-ground theories such as constructivism focus

civilian, police and military personnel positioned in areas of confl

on ideas and interests. As constructivists focus often on the

to create conditions for lasting peace. Irrespective of any actual

interactions of elite individuals, they see large organisations like

desire to maintain peace in a certain area, peacekeepers are

the United Nations as places where they can study the

typically only permitted to apply force in matters of self-defence.

emergence of new norms and examine the activities of those who

This draws on the common (though not always accurate)

are spreading new ideas.

description of the United Nations as ‘peacekeeper’ rather than
‘peacemaker’. For these reasons, among others, it is possible to
argue that the United Nations as an organisation is merely
symbolic. At the same time, despite its limited ability to infl
heads of state or prevent violence, it is also possible to
argue that many nations have benefi

from its work. Aside from

its mission to maintain peace and security, the United Nations is
also committed to promoting sustainable development,
protecting human rights, upholding international law, and
delivering humanitarian aid around the world.
From a theoretical point of view, the eﬀectiveness and utility of
the United Nations diﬀers depending on which perspective we
choose to adopt. Liberals tend to have faith in the capacity of
international organisations, primarily the United Nations, along
with others organisations such as the International Monetary
Fund, the World Health Organization and the World Bank, to
uphold the framework of global governance. International
organisations may not be perfect, but they help the world fi

Realists, although they do not reject the United Nations
completely, argue that the world is anarchic and states will
eventually resort to war despite the eﬀorts of international
organisations, which have little real authority. Generally, realists
believe that international organisations appear to be successful
when they are working in the interests of powerful states. But, if
that condition is reversed and an organisation becomes an
obstacle to national interests, then the equation may change. This
line of enquiry is often used by realists to help explain why the
League of Nations was unsuccessful
– failing to allow for Germany and Japan’s expansionist desires in
the 1930s. A contemporary example would be the United States
invading Iraq in 2003 despite the Security Council declining to
authorise it. The United States simply ignored the United
Nations and went ahead, despite opposition. On the other hand,
liberals would argue that without the United Nations, international
relations would likely be even more chaotic – devoid of a
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respectable institution to oversee relations between states and

Poststructuralists would seek to question the meanings behind

hold bad behaviour to account. A constructivist would look at the

the role of the United Nations and the arbitrary power structure of

very same example and say that while it is true that the United

the Security Council. They would also look at how key terms are

States ignored the United Nations and invaded Iraq, by doing so

used by the United Nations and what they mean. For example,

it violated the standard practices of international relations. The

examining the wording of concepts like ‘peacekeepers’ and

United States disregarded a ‘norm’ and even though there was

‘peacekeeping’ as opposed to ‘peace-making’ and ‘peace-

no direct punishment, its behaviour was irregular and so would

enforcing’. Or similarly, ‘collective security’ versus ‘international

not be without consequence. Examining the diﬃculties the

security’: poststructuralists would be sceptical as to whether

United States faced in its international relations following 2003

these terms really diﬀer in meaning and would point to the power

gives considerable weight to the constructivist and liberal

of language in advancing the agenda of the United Nations – or

viewpoints.

perhaps that of the powerful states controlling it. Even the name

In contrast to liberals and constructivists, who value the United
Nations to an extent, critical theories oﬀer diﬀerent perspectives.
Marxists would argue that any international body, including the
United Nations, works to promote the interests of the business
class. After all, the United Nations is composed of (and was built
by) states who are the chief protagonists in global capitalism –
the very thing that Marxism is opposed to. Likewise, the United

of the dominant organ of the United Nations – the ‘Security’
Council – begs the question, security for whom? A critique here
would point out that at its core, the United Nations is primarily
concerned with facilitating the national security of powerful states
rather than human security. In instances like these, the tools that
poststructuralism provides to deconstruct and analyse wording
have real value.

Nations can be said to be dominated by imperial (or neo-imperial)

Feminists would look to how those in positions of power, whether

powers. Imperialism, according to Marxist doctrine, is the highest

politicians or those working for the United Nations such as oﬃ

stage of capitalism. The United Nations, then, is not an

and delegates, perpetuate a discourse of masculinity. Alternative

organisation that oﬀers any hope of real emancipation for citizens.

feminine perspectives are still not adequately recognised and

Even though it may appear humanitarian, these actions are

those in decision-making positions of power continue to be

merely band-aids over a system of perpetual state-led

disproportionately male. Many countries that make up the United

exploitation that the United Nations legitimises.

Nations marginalise the feminine voice domestically and thus
perpetuate this at the international level. This is especially true of
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states where women hold more traditional roles in society and are

However, this is a good starting point for achieving an overall

therefore less likely to be considered suitable for what may be

understanding of the fi and where the most common approaches

traditionally viewed as masculine roles, such as a delegate or

are situated. Hopefully this has helped you consider your own

ambassador.

theoretical inclination – or at least piqued your interest in

Finally, postcolonialists would argue that the discourse
perpetuated by the United Nations is one based on cultural,
national or religious privilege. They would suggest, for instance,
that, as it has no African or Latin American permanent
members, the Security Council fails to represent the current state
of the world. Postcolonialists would also point to the presence of
former colonial powers on the Security Council and how their
ability to veto proposals put forward by other countries
perpetuates a form of continued indirect colonial exploitation of
the Global South.

determining where you might stand. It is not necessary to adopt
one theory as your own. But it is important to understand the
various theories as tools of analysis that you can apply in your
studies. Using a theory to critique an issue, as this chapter did
with the United Nations, is to understand the reason why these
theories exist. Simply, they oﬀer a means by which to attempt to
understand a complex world. As international relations has grown
in complexity, the family of theories that IR oﬀers has grown in
number. Due to its complexity and diversity, it is common for
newcomers to have some diﬀerences in grasping IR theory, but
this chapter should give you the confict to get started.

Hopefully, this brief reading of the United Nations from these
varied perspectives has opened your eyes to the potential of IR
theory as an analytical tool. We have barely scratched the
surface, but it should be clear why so many divergent views are

The previous section is provided by the University of
Minnesota’s Open Textbook Library.

needed in IR and how, in a basic sense, they may be applied.

Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed the main approaches in IR theory, each
of which possesses a legitimate, yet diﬀerent, view of the world. It
is important to note that the theories listed in this chapter are not
exhaustive and there are many more that could be examined.
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Chapter 14

International
Case Studies

Learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students will be able to do the
following:
• Identify characteristics of several states.
• Apply comparative politics concepts and theories to
each state.
• Understand and critically think about international
relations and comparative politics in relation to states.
• Analyze current issues with each state.

Section 1

Brazil
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Before moving on to the next reading, tap on this link to visit the

terms of leadership, organization, and tactics, have taken place,

CIA’s World Factbook and read about Brazil.

making it well-prepared to confront the Temer administration's
eﬀorts to suppress mobilization.

From hostile skepticism to strategic utilization:
how the Brazilian landless movement learned from
repression to use legislation
This paper explores the evolution of the Landless Movement's
practices with respect to legislation and public policy from the
1980s to the Temer government, which took power after Dilma
Rousseﬀ was removed from the Presidency in 2016. The main
argument is that the movement has learned over time, from
viewing government with hostile skepticism, to understanding its
relationship with diﬀerent administrations in terms of strategic
utilization. Central to this argument is that instead of the
government's use of repression contributing to demobilization, a
variety of acts initially intended to suppress the movement
subsequently provided the Landless Movement with knowledge
on institutions, policies, and laws. Such lessons contributed to

Repression, it's not new
In November of 2016, as part of what was called Operação
Castra, police forces raided schools and training sites operated
by the Brazilian MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem
Terra/Landless Workers Movement). Fourteen members were
arrested for alleged illegal activities (Seabra & Boldrini, [31]).
Besides this overt act of repression, President Michel Temer –
who assumed power after the impeachment and removal of Dilma
Rousseﬀ earlier in the year – announced plans to privatize stateowned utilities, public lands, and airports, expressly defying
widespread mobilizations in opposition to such initiatives. As
these developments manifest, the era of working with what could
have been termed allied governments, namely, the center-left
Partido do Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, or PT) administrations
of Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva (2002–2010) and Dilma Rousseﬀ
(2011–2016), has ended.

the movement's ability to address a variety of its internal

For the Landless Movement, which includes the one million and a

weaknesses. How lessons have been acquired, as well as how

half people who have been mobilized by the MST and a coalition

the movement has altered its approach with respect to the state,

of rural and urban unions, movements, and religious

becomes apparent in subnational comparisons and in charting

organizations, mobilizing within a hostile environment is not new.

developments in the movement's approach to federal legislation

In its three-decade struggle for agrarian reform, the movement

over time. Actual changes in the movement, most notably in

has periodically encountered eﬀorts to quell its eﬀorts. Well479

known instances include the encounter in 1981, during Brazil's

addressing critical movement problems, chiefly in economic

period of military rule (1964–1985), at Encruzilhada Natalino

development.

(Christmas Crossing) in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, as well as
the massacre in the municipality of Eldorado das Carajás in 1997,
when 19 landless activists were gunned down by police forces.
Seminal studies on the movement document such episodes of
repression (Branford & Rocha, [ 2]; Fernandes, [16]; Wright &
Wolford, [43]), whereas later scholarship tends to analyze the
increase in movement interaction with the Brazilian state
concerning public policy (Carter, [ 7]; Pahnke, Tarlau, & Wolford,
[27]; Vergara-Camus, [39]; Wolford, [42]).

I argue that the movement has changed over time with respect to
how it conceives of and engages law and public policy. The
movement, which initially encountered government with hostile
skepticism, has learned to strategically utilize some laws and
policies to protect itself from repression and strengthen its
internal organization. This evolution becomes apparent when
charting the movement's development at both the subnational
and federal levels over time. Beyond Brazilian studies, the
Landless Movement's ability to persist for multiple decades

One gap in the literature concerns how the Landless Movement

makes it of interest to scholars of contentious politics generally,

has gained lessons from experiences of repression – when

mainly with respect to how social movements can learn from and

authorities attempt to suppress mobilization, both in terms of

adapt to hostile political environments.

using physical force and/or engaging in more covert actions. To
document such dynamics, I turn to the concept of learning,
especially as it pertains to the movement's educational project.
By educational project, I mean the network of schools and
informal sites where members receive training according to the
movement's pedagogy, known as Educação do Campo
(Education of the Countryside). Even as the movement is active in
other areas such as health care, economic development, human
rights, and international relations, its educational initiatives are
noteworthy for understanding learning and adaptation due to the
expansion of the movement's activities in this area since the late
1990s. In fact, eﬀorts in education have become central in

This article features data from semi-structured interviews,
ethnographic fieldwork, and textual analysis. The interviews were
conducted with movement leaders and members, as well as with
allies, opponents, and governmental oﬃcials over the course of
twenty months between 2009 and 2011. My interviews took place
in the capital city of Brasilia, and at multiple places in the states
of Pernambuco, São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraná. The
ethnographic section was conducted in primary, secondary, and
post-secondary schools, informal movement training sites, and
production cooperatives in these states. My time at each site
varied, from three days to one month. I participated in meetings,
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worked alongside members, and co-habitated with students.

words, when governments intend to suppress movements, the

These states are representative of the Landless Movement's

latter lose.

practices. First, the schools host students from every state in
Brazil.[ 1] Second, the economic and educational initiatives in
these states, in Rio Grande do Sul, especially, have become the
model for the movement's eﬀorts in general. I compliment the
data from my fieldwork with textual analysis of legislation,
newspaper articles, and movement documents that were
published between 1985 and 2016. I focus on 31 movement
manuals (17 in education, 12 in production, 2 on general
movement trends) and analyze articles from the movement's
principal publication for allies and members, the Jornal do Sem
Terra (Landless Journal).
Integrating studies of repression and learning
The nature of repression and its eﬀects on social movements
have been researched for decades. Some have conceived of

Critiques of this static conceptualization led scholars to conceive
of repression in a dynamic way. McAdam's ([20]) classic study of
the US Civil Rights Movement detailed how the potential for state
repression impacted movement strategy, particularly how leaders
selected certain cities for mobilization. In Europe, Kriesi ([19])
found that movements that endured repression developed
stronger identities and at times radicalized their demands. Della
Porta's ([11]) research shows how movements and police forces
interact over time, provoking one another to escalate conflict.
Others note that state violence creates crises in authority that
becomes opportunities for later mobilization (Melucci, [23]), as
well as chances for movements to assess failure (Davenport,
[10]). One trend in social movement research has been to discern
patterns of change over time.

repression in a mechanical or static manner. For instance,

Research on the dynamic nature of repression and movement

McCarthy and Zald ([21]) consider it a constraint, which functions

response has prompted scholars to exchange conceptual

as a 'cost' for movements. Tilly ([37]) finds that governments are

parsimony for complexity. Earl ([14], [15]) has encouraged greater

more likely to harshly repress movements in their early stages

theoretical and empirical sophistication concerning repression,

than after collective action has persisted. In terms of revolutionary

noting how repression includes arrests, police and military

contention, Skocpol ([33]) sees a correlation between weak states

violence, disappearances, imprisonment, infiltration, covert

that possess limited means to suppress and the ability for actors

counterintelligence, restrictions of free speech and assembly, and

to seize power. Such research considers the use of state

murder. In highlighting the complexity of repressive environments,

repression against movements in a zero-sum way, or in other

one study on the Alter-globalization movement highlights how
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increased monitoring, surveillance, and force led to

Wang and Soule ([40]) document how tactics travel between

demobilization (Buttel & Gould, [ 3]). Boykoﬀ ([ 1]), in embracing

movement organizations that are within networks. Just as much

multiple practices within how to understand repression, theorized

as movements learn how to engage authorities, they also learn

that the decline of US radical leftism was linked to governmental

what does not work from their counterparts (Zielińska, Kowzan, &

eﬀorts to infiltrate, stigmatize, divide, intimidate, cut resources,

Prusinowska, [44]). Robles and Veltmeyer ([29]) note that when

and then co-opt. Repression, as these studies highlight, has

the Brazilian Government cut public resources to disrupt the MST,

many dimensions.

the movement increasingly relied on foreign non-profit

Implicit within studies of repression – and what needs further
unpacking with respect to the state – are practices of learning
within movements. Scholars have theorized learning in a variety
of ways. Fox ([17]) work on Mexican food policy illustrates how
states and social actors collaborate, mutually constituting one
another in acquiring knowledge on public policy. Tarlau ([36]), who
adapts Fox's work to Brazil, explains how rural movements
successfully changed education policy when leaders and
government elites cooperated. Kilgore ([18]) equates learning with
how movements form identities and understand those of their
opponents in conflict. Some work on the Brazilian MST, in a
similar vein, notes the movement's eﬀorts to disseminate an anticapitalist identity among its membership (Meek, [22]; Meurer &

organizations, began to professionalize, and developed an
increased willingness to work with certain governmental oﬃcials.
Based on his own experiences and research, from the antinuclear movement in the 1980s to WTO and alter-globalization
protests in the 2000s, Choudry calls 'below the radar organizing'
the practices when activists produce knowledge and identities as
they 'learn-by-doing' ([ 8], p. 9). An analogous understanding is
found in Caldart's work on the MST, who claims that the
movement is 'an educational principle' because its history of
struggle provides opportunities for knowledge acquisition
(Caldart, [ 4], p. 323). Movements, for Chaudry and Caldart, are
knowledge producers that plan, act, and react to the conditions in
which they are embedded.

David, [24]). Many of these studies acknowledge that movements

Integrating the literatures on repression and learning allows us to

can acquire lessons by working through the state, and in the

analyze the mutual constitutive nature of states and social

process, remain relatively autonomous.

movements. Furthermore, bringing these literatures together

The few attempts to directly incorporate studies of repression
with learning have noted organizational and tactical development.

expands our theoretical understanding of how movements
mobilize through the state as they work towards their agenda.
This is most clearly seen in how state repression may initially
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pose serious problems for movements, yet at a later time, may

the administration's economic development plans. Ondetti's ([26])

potentially produce a variety of lessons that lead movements to

historical study notes other, equally significant moments – the

adapt. Other studies have gestured at this understanding of

government of Collor de Mello's (1990–1992) extensive use of

repression, yet have not made explicit the counterintuitive idea

wire-taps and force and the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC)

that repression can backfire, even benefitting a movement. What

administration's (1994–2002) creation of legislative obstacles for

at one time imperils a movement, subsequently, can provide

land redistribution – that contributed to periodic demobilization.

lessons and opportunities for movement persistence. In this
regard, the Landless Movement provides a particularly illustrative
case for deepening our knowledge concerning how social
movements learn from experiencing repression over time. With its
three-decade long existence, and resilience in the face of a
variety of forms of repression, the MST and its allies oﬀer a
privileged perspective on how state attempts at suppression can
generate lessons for movements, and in some moments,
strengthen them.

After surveying the many diﬀerent experiences of repression,
some questions arise: have the movement's tactics and mode of
engaging its opponents changed, or adapted, due to eﬀorts to
subdue its eﬀorts? Also, has the movement acquired any kind of
knowledge concerning how to interact with actors who are hostile
to its interests? To answer these questions, we must first posit an
early moment in the movement's existence to chart change over
time. One such point is in the 1980s, when the Landless
Movement demanded and mobilized for certain pieces of

Hostile skepticism: the landless movement's initial

legislation, particularly the drafting of the 1985 Programma

interactions with legislation

Nacional de Reforma Agrária (the National Program for Agrarian

Multiple studies of the Landless Movement highlight significant

Reform, or PNRA) and the 1988 Constitution.

episodes of repression. Even before activists decided to oﬃcially

On 10 October 1985, Brazil's first post-military regime President,

call themselves the MST, Colonel Curió's failed attempt to bribe,

José Sarney, issued the PNRA, a decree that declared the overall

divide, and coerce activists is considered a crucial moment in the

governmental strategy with respect to land redistribution for the

movement's history (Carter, [ 6]; Wright & Wolford, [43]). Such

following 15 years. Before and after its promulgation, the newly

encounters were not unusual during Brazil's military regime

formed MST and its emerging cadres of allies were skeptical, and

(1964–1985), when the government, in the name of national

even dismissive. Shortly before the decree was issued, the

security, strategically suppressed mobilizations that threatened

movement reported in the Jornal Sem Terra how 'it is unjust that
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certain interests, such as those in the Sociedade Rural Brasilero

46% of respondents believing that education was the first priority

(Brazilian Rural Society), are trying to block the PNRA ... they

and 40% who thought income inequality was paramount (Silva,

stand in the way of perfecting democracy' (JST June, 1985). One

[32]). Furthermore, the debates and discussions surrounding the

religious organization in the movement, the CNBB

drafting of the Constitution had more legitimacy then the PNRA

(Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil/National Conference

due to the participation of multiple political parties and

of Brazilian Bishops), stated that 'with or without the PNRA, the

movements in the convention. The Landless Movement, in

movements should continue to mobilize to expand the reach of

recognizing this, organized a petition that gained over a million

the PNRA. That is why we support that the movement's use of

signatures in support of a Constitutional Amendment concerning

land occupations.' (JST October/November, 1985) The MST even

agrarian reform that was drafted by member organizations and

published an entirely diﬀerent, alternative list of articles for the

allies.

PNRA in the article entitled 'How the PNRA Should Be' (October/
November, 1985). After the PNRA was issued, another story in the
MST's principal publication entitled 'Six Months of Waiting, and
only Deception' was followed with the statement 'PNRA or
PNRL? – National Program for Agrarian Reform, or National
Program for the Protection of Large Landowners?' (JST October/
November, 1985). Shortly before, and then after the promulgation
of the PNRA, the MST and its allies routinely expressed their
overall skepticism concerning the government's legislative
initiatives.

Even as this participation displays a certain kind of hope,
analyzing movement texts from the time of the Constitution's
drafting reveals the prominence of a hostile, if not antagonistic,
attitude with respect to government, as well as a simplistic
understanding of how legislation operates. With respect to
various legislative provisions and the movement's latter
approach, before the Constituent Assembly began in 1985,
leaders referenced clauses of the 1967 Constitution and the 1964
Rural Land Statute that claim that territory must serve a social
function (função social). Essentially, the clause stipulates that

The debates surrounding the 1988 Constitution were more critical

owners who do not use their land, and/or who break certain laws,

for a variety of social movements when compared to the PNRA.

are susceptible to governmental expropriation. The first edition of

Still, agrarian reform was not only the worry of a few rural actors –

the movement's newsletter from 1981 comments that the

a survey conducted by the periodical, the Jornal do Brasil in 1987

government should redistribute land to carry out the

found that 38% of Brazilians considered agrarian reform the most

Constitution's social function clause (JST, May 1981).

important issue for discussion in the Constituent Assembly, with
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The desire to carry out the law is mixed with rejections of it and

government as primarily an antagonist. Moreover, the

an overall skepticism. In 1987, the movement declared that 'only

movement's stance concerning law was quite simple: the social

popular pressure can change the direction of the Constituent

function clause was something to be enforced. When the

Assembly' (JST February/March 1987). Again, shortly after

government displayed a lack of willingness to carry this out and

publishing this statement, in an article entitled 'Only Popular

conduct expropriations, then the movement was quick to create

Pressure will Change the Constituent Assembly,' we find the

its own, quasi-parallel proposals, revealing its more pervasive

proposal for an entirely diﬀerent section for the Constitution

hostile skepticism. The movement did participate with formal

detailing criteria for expropriation and redistribution (JST May

authorities at certain moments, for instance, in proposing its

1987). Later, movement leaders comment that 'the assembly has

amendment to the Constitution, yet the MST and its allies found

lost the autonomy and ability to represent the real needs of

greater hope outside of institutions, minimally recognizing the

Brazilians,' (JST, June 1987) and that 'the government does not

importance of legislation in the promotion of its agenda. The

carry out agrarian reform, and so we will' (JST, July 1987). The

movement throughout the 1980s held a hostile view of law and

movement's skeptical attitude with respect to government is seen

public policy, and remained skeptical of governmental eﬀorts to

again, when months before the Constitution is even promulgated,

address its demands.

activists emphasize that 'agrarian reform does not come about
through laws. Our petition with over a million signatures was not

From hostile skepticism to strategic utilization: learning in

even taken into consideration. This means one thing: this

subnational experiences

Constitution is not ours' (JST May 1988). Just as the military

The 1990s saw the Landless Movement's near annihilation, and

government protected landed interests in the name of national
security, the movement saw no need to believe that any postmilitary administration would willingly redistribute land.
Analyzing the PNRA and the Constitution reveals how the
movement conceived of law and public policy in general. These
two pieces of legislation, the decree specifically oriented towards
the movement's interests, and the other, a more wide-reaching
document, reveal how the Landless Movement considered the

then growth that went beyond the expectations of its leaders.
One of the movement's founders, João Pedro Stédile, claims, 'we
could have ended at that time. If he [Collor] had pressured us just
a little more, we would have been destroyed.' (Stédile &
Fernandes, [34], p. 105). Collor's impeachment and then
resignation in 1992 ended two years of constant repression. A
few years after, two massacres of landless activists by police
forces occurred – the deaths of 16 people in the Rondonia in
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1995 and 19 protestors in Eldorado das Carajás in 1996. Popular

of activists and allies from all over Brazil for training on

sympathy for the movement grew after CNN covered the event

mobilization and politics (Plummer, [28]). These states also boast

internationally and a sympathetic soap opera, O Rei do Gado, ran

some of the most developed collective production operations,

in Brazil. As Ondetti ([25]) notes, the combination of popular

namely COPAVI in Paraná and COOPAN in Rio Grande do Sul, as

sympathy and continued mobilization explains the movement's

well as most of the movement's experiences with agroecological

'take-oﬀ' when the number of occupations and new members

production.

increased exponentially.

Despite these similarities, movement actions in each state with

Analyzing developments at the subnational level, principally in the

respect to legislation have diﬀered significantly. In Paraná, MST

states of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul, display how the

leaders and State Secretary of Education oﬃcials created a series

movement learned and changed its approach to legislation in light

of legally binding documents to promote, advance, and protect

of experiencing these instances of repression. At first glance, the

the movement's educational initiatives – a starkly diﬀerent

movement's activities in each state show many similarities.

appreciation of legislation when compared to the 1980s. For

Original members in both states were displaced, small farmers –

instance, in 2010, the Paranaense government issued pareceres

from large-scale public dams in Paraná and evictions from

117/10, 743/10, 1011/10, while the State Secretary of Education

Indigenous reserves in Rio Grande do Sul. The Landless

formalized resoluções 3922/10 and 4783/10, and instruções

Movement has a long history in Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul,

27/2010 and 001/2010.[ 3] This flurry of legislative activity ranges

emerging in the late 1970s/early 1980s. Additionally, thousands of

from formally recognizing the legitimacy of Education of the

movement members and allies have participated in educational

Countryside in certain elementary schools (parecer 117/10) to

projects in these states (MST 1998, 2000, 2010). Paraná features

listing the required classes that movement-aﬃliated teachers

four schools on movement settlements that have yearly

must take to work in schools (instrução 027/10).

graduated dozens of members and allies since the 1990s.[ 2] At
ITERRA in Rio Grande do Sul, every course of Técnico em
Administração de Cooperativas (Technician in Cooperative
Administration or TAC) – which in 2015 was in its 15th course –
usually graduates 30 students. The more formal aspect of these
schools does not include how they also have hosted thousands

Similar legislative work did not take place in Rio Grande do Sul.
While one parecer sanctioned the itinerant schools in 1996 in Rio
Grande do Sul, concomitant resoluções and instruções did not
follow. After gaining initial legal approval, the movement then
banked on the government's Constituinte Escolar (Constituting
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the School) program. Characteristic of Constituinte, the program

Antônio Britto (1995–1999), of the centrist PMDB (Partido do

actively involved social actors in crafting school directives and

Movimento Democrático Brasileiro/Brazilian Democratic

rules (Interview: Ex-CRE, Bagé-RS, 17 May 2011). At the time of

Movement Party). Britto's support for the movement did not arise

its creation, Constituinte was heralded as a 'process of popular

from some sense of social justice, but instead from the general

participation in the direction of public policies' and believed to be

political climate throughout Brazil in the wake of the events at

a way 'to strengthen control over the state' (Constituinte Escolar,

Eldorado das Carajás. Following his tenure, Olivia Dutra, with his

Secretary of Education 2000). Yet, while the program succeeded

movement-supported Constituente Escolar, took over.

in creating numerous conferences and meetings for discussion, it
did not result in legislation. When the ally Dutra government
(1999–2003) of the PT left power in 2002, Constituente Escolar
also came to an end.

Policies begin to change with Dutra's successor, Germano
Rigotto (2003–2007), also of the PMDB, when he became the
governor of Rio Grande do Sul in 2003. While interviewing MST
members in Rio Grande do Sul, I was told that the Rigotto

So, why was the movement far more active in legislative activity

government placed more reporting requirements on movement

in Paraná than in Rio Grande do Sul? Part of the answer concerns

schools. Still, more extreme changes took place after the Rigotto

changing external, non-movement conditions. The experiences of

administration. From 2007 to 2011, the Landless Movement faced

repression at Eldorado das Carajás created widespread public

a concerted eﬀort by the Ministerio Público (Public Prosecutor's

sympathy for the Landless Movement, which translated into

Oﬃce or MP) to end the movement, repression from the state-

various favorable public policies in economic development,

level government of PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia

agricultural extension, and education (Cardoso, [ 5]). As one MST

Brasileira/the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy) Governor Yeda

leader in Rio Grande do Sul commented on this historical

Crusius (2007–2011), and opposition from the State Secretary of

moment in the mid-1990s, 'we had been working on education

Education. The Secretary of Education from the Crusius

for ten years to create schools with teachers and classrooms. The

administration told me how she felt the MST was part of the

itinerant schools then began, they were legally approved, and for

'backward left' that is 'absolutely ideological ... really, out of this

the first few years we made frequent reports on our actions

world' (Interview: Former Secretary of Education, RS 11 March

without any problems.' (Interview: MST Sector Education – RS, 9

2011). At this time, the MST's escolas itinerantes (itinerant

March 2011). The subnational, state-level government in place at

schools), which are schools located in encampments where

the time of the itinerant school's creation was led by

families await land title, were closed in Rio Grande do Sul when
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the MP issued a TAC – Termo de Ajustamento de Conduta

member of the PMDB. Moreover, he had a reputation for favoring

(Conduct Readjustment Statement) – requiring that the State

movement objectives and demands. As one oﬃcial described,

Secretary of Education end its partnership with the MST.[ 4] The

'Requião was diﬀerent. His government was like a united front,

Crusius government's willingness to use force against rural and

with many parties and allies. And he made an agreement with

urban movements led to a federal investigation into its heavy-

movements that if elected, he would carry out their

handed tactics (Rondon, [30]; Weissheimer, [41]).

ideas' (Interview: Department of Diversity, Secretary of Education

In Rio Grande do Sul, the MP especially was opposed to the MST
and its allies. One leading MP oﬃcial described the movement as
'terrorist,' employing tactics 'similar to those used by guerrillas in
the Vietnam War,' and with children in schools 'never learning to
read or write anything but the name Karl Marx' (Interview: MP
Oﬃcial, 15 March 2011). The ministry sought to 'declare the MST
illegal,' in the name of 'protecting children' from the movement's
alleged 'disruption of public order,' and 'use of public resources
for criminal behavior' (Public Ministry, Act 1.116, 2007). Declaring

– PR, 3August 2011). Among such movement ideas was
increased funding for education in rural areas, as well as
enforcing a ban on exporting Genetically Modified Organisms
(GMOs) from Paranaense ports. The administration appointed key
oﬃcials into state government who regularly met and negotiated
with movement leaders over policy issues. The Requião
administration diﬀered dramatically from the prior Lerner
government (1995–2002), which was known for violently
repressing social actors (Branford & Rocha, [ 2], pp. 148–170).

the movement illegal involved denouncing it as a terrorist

External conditions, while crucial, provide a partial explanation for

organization, which sanctioned the arbitrary arrest and detention

the diﬀerences in movement actions in the two states. Once

of members, the increased use of force during protests, and

Requião was in power, in 2002 movement leaders from Paraná

creation of various spaces as 'oﬀ-limits' to mobilization (Scalabrin

went to Rio Grande do Sul to learn how its counterpart interacted

2010). One MST leader in the state claimed that such acts of

with public oﬃcials to establish schools in encampments. As I

repression led many activists to quit (Interview: MST State

was told by one MST leader who was on that trip, 'we went to

Director RS, 3 April 2011).

learn how the schools functioned, how they were organized. We

In Paraná, external conditions were more favorable for the
movement during the same period. Roberto Requião served as
governor from 2003 to 2011. Like Rigotto, Requião was a

copied them. We also went with some people from the
government' (Interview: MST Education-PR, 31 July 2011). It was
later, after repression unfolded in Rio Grande do Sul during the
Crusius administration, when movement leaders and government
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oﬃcials in Paraná saw the need to protect their gains. First, in

Diversity – PR, 12 August 2011). The cooperation that began in

2008, in the midst of government eﬀorts to suppress the

2002 continued, and then expanded once the movement and

movement in Rio Grande do Sul, the MST published Escola

certain oﬃcials saw repression unfold in Rio Grande do Sul. For

Itinerante do MST: História, Projeto, e Experiencias (the Itinerant

this reason, it was in Paraná – and not in Rio Grande do Sul –

School of the MST: History, Project, and Experiences). As stated

where cooperation between government oﬃcials and movement

in the document's opening, its 'principal objective' is to

leaders led to a flurry of laws and regularly practiced routines.

'disseminate the experience of the movement's work in education
for reflection and to translate the history of MST schools for
experiences in other states' (MST 2008, pp. 6–7). As it was under
attack, the movement reacted by publishing reports to circulate
for others to copy and imitate.

In comparing the experiences in the two states, we can observe
that the cause for the movement's extensive legislative work in
Paraná is not found solely in external conditions, but additionally
in how movement leaders and allies learned from the repression
that unfolded in Rio Grande do Sul. The massacre at Eldorado

Another, even more significant reaction occurred with legislation.

das Carajás sparked some legislative changes in each state, yet

When Requião announced that he would not seek reelection in

in Rio Grande do Sul, the movement initially capitalized on this

2010, the movement faced a period of uncertainty. One ally who

opportunity without extensively engaging in the legislative

worked in the state government mentioned how at this time he

process. In Paraná, looking to its neighbor just to the south, led

made a concerted eﬀort to discuss and formulate laws with

movement leaders and government oﬃcials to reflect on what

Indigenous and Landless movement leaders (Interview: Ex-

could be done to mitigate potential government repression. This

Departmento de Diversidade, Curitiba-PR, 20 August 2011). A

spurred the movement to work through the state to advance its

former member of the MPA who became part of government

agenda, acquiring knowledge from experiences of repression in

similarly mentioned how for fear of what took place in Rio Grande

one state to protect its gains in another. The eﬀorts to suppress

do Sul, the movement favored laws and created new routines. I

the movement in Rio Grande do Sul triggered increased action

was told that 'by the last years of the government, the

and mobilization in Paraná, making the movement stronger in the

government and the movement had learned. Things became

face of potential future opponents. Instead of facing the

routine. Like, when we needed buses for events, and we had over

government with hostile skepticism, the movement, particularly in

60 events in 2009 and 2010, the government would automatically

the 1990s, began to recognize the possibility to utilize public

provide them' (Interview: Ex-Administrator, Department of

policy and certain laws.
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Unlike eﬀorts in Paraná, movement eﬀorts have been ineﬀective

in 1997 the movement led a March to Brasilia to demand land

in São Paulo state. When I spoke with one activist in the Pontal

redistribution, rural education, and economic development

de Paranapanema region, I was told that 'the materials in

policies. After the March, the Encontro Nacional de Educadores

settlement schools are often printed and distributed by

da Reforma Agrária (National Meeting for Educators in Agrarian

agribusiness, promoting the use of pesticides and so on. And the

Reform, or ENERA) took place and featured movement members

director of education in the area, when he hears that we are with

and allies who helped create PRONERA as a federal program.

a social movement, doesn't even want to talk or listen' (Interview:

Beginning as one course in adult literacy, PRONERA has

MST Sector of Education – SP, 8 November 2011). This was

increased to become over 25 courses in areas such as history,

corroborated in my interview with the director of pedagogy in the

medicine, and cooperative management. PRONERA grants the

Pontal – where there are over on hundred schools on agrarian

movement a great deal of leeway – government finances are

reform settlements – who had never heard of Education of the

distributed to public and private host institutions, which Landless

Countryside (Interview: Secretary of Education, Instruction

leaders and members then use to select professors and provide

Supervisor – SP, 21 November 2011). While in São Paulo state,

pedagogical materials of their choosing. While the Landless

the MST has not succeeded in gaining resources or

Movement has been concerned with education since its

acknowledgment for primary or secondary education. Research

inception,[ 5] in Por uma Educação Basica do Campo (Towards a

on the failure in São Paulo highlights the role of governmental

Primary Education of the Countryside), which was the manual

elites that block movement initiatives (Tarlau, [35]). Unlike

published to disseminate the debates from the national

experiences in Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul, the movement has

conference on education, we find the first noted use of the term

not managed to adapt lessons to campaigns in São Paulo.

Educação do Campo (MST 1998, see also Tarlau, [36]).

Learning and strategic utilization at the federal level

How PRONERA became part of INCRA (Instituto Nacional de

Also beginning in the mid-1990s, PRONERA (Programma
Nacional para Educação na Reforma Agrária/National Program
for Education in Agrarian Reform) illustrates how the movement
learned to work through the state, strategically utilizing legislation
at the federal level. Following the events at Eldorado das Carajás,

Colonização e Reforma Agrária/National Institute for Colonization
and Agrarian Reform) reveals the movement's strategic use of law
and public policy. As part of the federal government, INCRA is
principally in charge of overseeing land redistribution and
managing the initial stages of rural settlement formation. Before
PRONERA, the MEC (Ministério da Educação/Ministry of
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Education), was principally in charge of education. This changed

flow of federal funds to social movements. During the

after movement leaders successfully included rural education into

investigations, funds that went to support movement education

INCRA's responsibilities. When I asked movement leaders why

and economic development projects were cut. As a result,

they chose to work with INCRA, I was told, 'INCRA has a diﬀerent

movement leaders began to protect themselves by codifying their

nature [than MEC], it allows for public policies to develop that are

educational project. Particularly relevant is Resolução 1 CNE/CEB

oriented for the countryside and that provide a place for social

from 2002, which recognizes Education of the Countryside and

movements. In MEC, a policy gets institutionalized, gets framed

that rural life requires a special form of education featuring social

in a certain way, and then we [the movement]

movements. Commenting on the resolution, one movement

disappear' (Interview: MST Sector of Education – SP, 29 October

leader emphasized that it is 'an instrument that the movement

2010). Another aspect of INCRA is that it has the reputation of

uses to assert the right to education, as well as something that

being staﬀed by social justice-minded oﬃcials (Wolford, [42]). An

gives people an increased sense of self-esteem (Interview: MST

additional quality of INCRA that the movement takes advantage

Sector of Education – SP, 29 October 2010).' From 2002 to 2015,

of is, as one INCRA oﬃcial mentioned, that it is a 'state within a

20 of Brazil's 26 states passed similar resolutions that recognize

state' that 'does too many things ... taking on 'responsibilities

the legitimacy of Education of the Countryside.[ 6]

other institutions ought to' (Interview: INCRA Oﬃcial, Brasilia, 1
February 2011). This latter feature, which may appear negative, is
beneficial because the combination of movement allies and an
imprecise internal division of labor allows the movement to utilize
INCRA. Thus, when PRONERA was created in the aftermath of
the massacre at Eldorado das Carajás, the movement pressured
authorities to have INCRA – and not MEC – oversee its execution.

The meaning of law as an 'instrument' is further clarified upon
analyzing two other legislative eﬀorts – one during the Lula
administration and the other while Rousseﬀ was in oﬃce.
Concerning the former government, decree 7352 made
PRONERA an oﬃcial public policy (política pública) in 2010.
When I asked movement leaders in Brasilia why they pressured
Lula to issue the decree, I was told that it functions as a 'legal

This strategic utilization of INCRA did not occur without attempts

impediment in case someone challenges [the movement's

to suppress the movement's objectives. Shortly after the initiation

actions]. Programs (programmas) do not have this kind of

of PRONERA, congressional inquiries (Comissões Parlamentares

protection' (Interview: MST Sector of Education 2011). Even if

de Inquérito, or CPIs) were launched in 2002, 2008, and 2010.

government authorities choose to defund PRONERA, they still

The CPIs began with the expressed purpose to investigate the

must yearly debate it. As a program and not a public policy,
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PRONERA could be ignored and cut without discussion in

members and that were intentionally returned blank (Interview

government. Treating law as an instrument entails such a

with INCRA oﬃcial – PR, 1 August 2011). Similarly, I was told of

strategic approach – legislation functions as a barrier in case

the lack of progress in settlements in São Paulo state, where only

future administrations attempt to oppose the Landless

one settlement experience was referenced with respect to the

Movement's objectives.

distribution of definitive titles (Interview with INCRA oﬃcial – SP, 1

The second eﬀort concerns agrarian reform settlements. Since
the 1980s, the movement has proposed that families who acquire
land should remain with usufruct (titulo de concessão) instead of
definitive title (titulo de dominio). This contradicts the stipulation
within the Brazilian Constitution, which stated that upon receiving
land, families should ultimately receive definitive title. Granting
definitive title allows members to rent and sell their land. The
argument, according to the movement, is that the government
should first provide extensive infrastructure investment before
definitive titles are even considered. Governmental actors,
especially since the 1990s, have promoted issuing definitive titles
to limit their financial obligations. In line with this rationale, in
2016, medida provisória 759 was passed with the twin goals to
force settled families to repay outstanding loans to the federal

November 2011). One way that the government's attempts to
issue definitive titles has encountered obstacles is found in the
coordinated, informal acts whereby movement members stall
titling by not filling in the paperwork. Also, after repeated
meetings and negotiations with the governmental actors, the
movement succeeded in 2014 to remove the Constitutional
provision on definitive title (MST 2014). Unlike the 1990s, the
movement has created legislative barriers and promoted informal
practices among its membership that function to block, or at least
complicate, eﬀorts at breaking up settlements. In changing laws
and understanding their strategic utility, instead of viewing
government with hostile skepticism, the Landless Movement has
organized eﬀorts to protect settlements by working through the
state.

government and privatize settlements through incentivizing

Responding to repression, addressing weaknesses, and

individuals to sell their lots.

accumulating forces

For years, definitive titles have been actively resisted by

When Lula came to power in 2002, the Landless Movement was

movement leaders and members. When I asked one INCRA

experiencing two opposing trends: on the one hand, an influx of

oﬃcial on his ability to convince families to accept definitive titles,

new members and allied groups after the two massacres in the

he pointed over his shoulder to boxes of titles sent to MST

1990s, which appeared positive, and on the other, a model of
492

economic development in crisis (Cristofoli, [ 9]; Diniz & Gilbert,

The Landless Movement's educational project became central to

[13]). An assessment conducted by the movement on its

the movement's attempts to address its weaknesses in economic

cooperatives had noted systematic mismanagement and

development, while simultaneously facing its antagonists'

unsustainable levels of debt (MST 1999). Debt was in part due to

changing modes of repression. The movement emphasized these

the structure of PROCERA (the Programa de Crédito Especial

priorities in its acumulação das forças (accumulation of forces)

para a Reforma Agrária/Special Program for Agrarian Reform

phase of resistance. In 2009, the MST issued two cadernos de

Credit). This credit program incentivized the formation of groups

debate (notebooks for debate) to describe this phase. The first –

by dividing funding opportunities into tetos (ceilings) 1 and 2 (De

os Desafios da Luta pela Reforma Agraria Popular e do MST

Souza, [12]). To receive Ceiling 2 resources, which were double

(Challenges Facing the Struggle for Agrarian Reform and the

Ceiling 1 amounts, individuals had to request credit as a group.

MST) – acknowledges how repression from large landowners and

Members called PROCERA 'easy money' because requirements

the Brazilian government changed after 2002. 'The agents of

for obtaining credit were lax (Interview: COPERLAT Director,

repression,' it is claimed, 'have begun to use other spaces and

former MST State Director – RS, 1 January 2011). Furthermore, at

other facets of the state (MST 2009, 10).' Oppositional

various cooperatives in the 1980s and 1990s, families intended to

governmental institutions identified include the MP and the

engage in the large-scale production of commodities like corn

Tribunal das Contas da União (the Government Auditor, or TCU),

and soy, heavily investing in machinery and storage facilities. At

as the use of CPIs is also considered by the movement a new

one cooperative, when I asked one member why they chose such

technique to suppress mobilization. 'We must confront,' reads Os

a course of action, I was told that the goal was 'to be like the big

Desafios, 'challenges to the building of political and economic

ones, you know, like the large landowners' (Fieldnotes: from

forces in our settlements and encampments. It is understood that

COOPTAR, Near Pontão – RS, 5 April 2011). Also at this time,

the struggle for agrarian reform today is a process of

members were encouraged to live and produce entirely

accumulating forces' (MST 2009, 13).

communally. Yet, often with few resources and little training, as
one leader remembered, 'when we came together to socialize
production, all we socialized was misery' (Interview: MST Sector
of Production Paraná, 11 August 2011). Without adequate
training, debt accrued, production stalled, and members quit.

Responding to the new forms of state repression, the movement
adapted in two ways. The first entails strengthening the
movement internally. Part of the rationale came from recognizing
that movement methods needed revision because of overbureaucratization and the inability to surprise enemies. A second
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notebook in the series, Para Debater os Desafios Internos do

2001). A subsequent description of the MST's professional

MST (Debating the MST's Internal Challenges), specifically

training courses state that they 'help form militant technicians

documents internal problems, including over-centralization, a lack

who are capable to influencing and organizing practical issues in

of creativity among the rank-and-file, excessive attention to

settlements, as well as provide political and technical

economic matters, and the lack of learning, debate, and reflection

assistance' (ITERRA 2008, 7). The CPIs and the endemic

(MST 2009, 14–18). Central to internal improvement means

economic challenges propelled the movement to create a new

encouraging members to learn how to engage in self-critique and

cadre of leaders who can meet practical, daily problems for

assessment.

members.

The second adaptation addresses weaknesses the movement's

One illustrative use of the militant technician is in oﬀering

weaknesses in economic development. Specifically, this has led

technical assistance concerning agroecology. Family-centered

to the promotion of new agricultural production techniques and a

forms of production have always sat at the center of the struggle

new kind of leader, which is known as the técnico-militante

for agrarian reform. Embracing agroecology continues these

(militant-technician). Creating the movement's leaders from its

earlier practices. The diﬀerence is the planned attempt to

own ranks has long been a staple of the MST (Veltmeyer & Petras,

confront problems on settlements and in economic production by

[38]). Since its formative years, dozens of Cadernos de Formação

coordinating transitions to collective, labor-intensive

(Training Notebooks) have been produced and used to educate

technologies, like permaculture, and away from mechanization

members on the reasons for demanding agrarian reform, how to

and debt. Agroecology is integral to the ongoing eﬀort to bring

organize meetings, and conduct land occupations.

back into movement ranks those members who had disapproved

While a continuation of past practices, the militant-technician
diﬀers. For this kind of leader, the movement requires formal
training in addition to commitment to the movement. In a
description of the Instituto de Educação de Josue de Castro, or
IEJC's,[ 7] pedagogical project from 2001, the school's goals
include oﬀering professional and high school education, training
militants to become technicians and work within the MST (MST

of past collectivization experiments on encampments and
settlements (Interview: MST State Director – RS, 3 April 2011).
Furthermore, every post-secondary Education of the Countryside
course – each of which receives PRONERA financing – features
courses on agroecology. At the MST's Escola Milton Santos,
(Milton Santos School) in the state of Paraná, I was told by one
student that in addition to receiving instruction about
agroecology, these new leaders were 'learning how to work and
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live collectively, with the idea to take this back to where we

movements work through states: diﬀerent kinds of repression,

live' (Interview: Nucleo Escola Milton Santos – Londrina, PR 6

which at one point sought to suppress the movement,

July 2011). The students were not only receiving technical

subsequently, have propelled movement adaptation and even

training, but were also being prepared on how to promote the

improvement. I reach this conclusion by integrating the social

movement's eﬀorts to recoup disillusioned members. Such

movement theories on learning and repression, drawing out the

activities are paid for with state financing, which the Landless

latent theme that an additional way to conceive of how

Movement has acquired by strategically using legislation for its

movements can work through state authority is by adapting in

own objectives.

response to repression. My analysis of the Landless Movement's

The political and economic dimensions of the militant technician
should not be underestimated. I was told that around 5% of
movement members nationally apply such production
approaches (Interview: MST Sector of Production – PR, 11 July
2011). If compared with the standard tally for movement
membership – a million and a half people – then roughly over
seventy thousand are involved in agroecology. While at first
glance a small figure, analyzing the eﬀort in relation to the
movement's overall goals reveals a sincere attempt at remedying

evolution illustrates these points, namely in how the movement
evolved from viewing the government with hostile skepticism to
strategically utilizing laws and policies for the movement's
benefit. Such changes are apparent at the subnational level, in
comparing developments in Paraná, where the MST prompted
the creation of various laws, and in Rio Grande do Sul, where
legislative activity was minimal. Lessons also were gained at the
federal level, in the movement's eﬀorts to promote legislative
changes and work through certain institutions, and not others.

problems in the movement's economic development plans. Also,

The Temer administration is decidedly opposed to the Landless

PRONERA resources are used in financing the training of militant

Movement in terms of the government's willingness to use

technicians, showing how the movement is using public policy to

repression and propose economic plans that run counter to the

improve its economic initiatives and train new leaders to engage

movement's goals. Well-before Temer came to power, the

new opponents.

movement took a series of steps to improve its internal

What's next

organization and address a variety of weaknesses, especially
since the 1990s. Unlike the early 1990s, when the movement was

In my theoretical and empirical analysis, I privilege a dynamic

fledging, it has grown in terms of numbers and geographic reach.

approach to repression that oﬀers a way reconceive how

International, in addition to domestic, allies now support the
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Landless Movement. The movement's past eﬀorts to address
weaknesses have produced real eﬀects, in terms of creating new
kinds of leadership and addressing economic problems. For
these reasons, the movement's adaptations provide the means
for it to persist despite governmental repression that may
continue into the foreseeable future.
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focus of the analysis will be on the processes that led up to
statehood, the conclusions oﬀer some insights into why pro-poor
policy shifts at the national level in India have uneven regional
eﬀects. Despite the change in national political regime in India
with the election of the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance

Questioning Borders: Social Movements, Political

in 2004, marginalized groups in India continue to experience the

Parties and the Creation of New States in India

state through the refractive lens of multiple regional political

As the world's largest multi-ethnic democracy, India has a federal
constitution that is well-equipped with administrative devices that
oﬀer apparent recognition and measures of self-governance to
territorially concentrated ethnic groups. This article analyzes how
demands for political autonomy-or statehood-within the federal
system have been used as a frame for social movement
mobilization. It focuses on the most recent states to have been
created in India: Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand, which
came into being in 2000. These are the first states to have been
created in India on a non-linguistic basis. Their creation has
triggered questions about whether the creation of more, smaller
states can improve political representation and help to make the
state more responsive to diverse needs in India. This article draws
attention to the processes which have brought borders into
question, drawing social movements and political parties into
alignment about the idea of creating new states. It ultimately
looks at why the creation of states as a result of such processes
may not lead to more substantive forms of political and economic

histories.
This article focuses on one part of the ever complex field of
popular politics and resistance. It examines how, why and with
what consequences some social movements in India have drawn
on regional identity frames in electoral politics and demanded
political autonomy in the form of statehood within the federal
system. Explanations for the creation of India's newest states,
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand in 2000, often draw
implicitly on the idea that state formation reflects the successful
mobilization of identity frames by social movements, in the
context of a multi-ethnic federal system that provides institutional
recognition of the country's diversity. The dominant shorthand
narrative about the formation of these new states can be
summarized as the view that they were formed to better represent
tribal or hill-dwelling communities, whose interests had been
expressed by long-running regional social movements.
Ramachandra Guha, for instance, expresses a commonly oﬀered
opinion when he states that: "Oﬃcial acknowledgement of the
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history of adivasi suﬀering ... came through the creation ... of two

demands for statehood. The first of the case study states,

states of the Union named Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh ... Also

Jharkhand was formed from the southern districts of Bihar. These

formed was the state of Uttaranchal,1 from the hill districts of

districts contain substantial deposits of minerals and large areas

Uttar Pradesh, likewise rich in natural resources and likewise

of forest. The Tata steel plant established in 1908 in Jamshedpur

subject to exploitation by powerful external interests."2

in Jharkhand was the first of its kind in India. These districts are

Alternatively, TK Oommen makes a direct link between social

also home to a once majority tribal population that today

movement mobilization and the achievement of statehood when

accounts for approximately 26 percent of the state's population

he suggests that "faced with the irresistible force of mobilization

(2001 census), but had been at the heart of a long-standing

the Jharkhand state was finally formed in the year 2000."3

demand for political autonomy in the region. Today, Jharkhand

The processes by which social movements come to foreground
identity and in some cases link this to statehood are, however,
often quite opaque in the existing literature on social movements
in India. This article submits that it is not the case that social
movements fall neatly into identity- or interestbased categories.
Instead, some movements are encouraged to foreground identity
claims as a result of the broader political context in which they
operate. A change in borders did not simply constitute an
institutional attempt to redress the marginalization of certain
groups in the population through a "politics of recognition" that
acknowledged the suﬀering of local communities. Instead, the
questioning of borders took place in the course of the processing
of social movement demands in local politics.

has the second-highest level of rural poverty in the country.
Uttarakhand comprises the former hill districts and two
neighbouring plains districts of Uttar Pradesh, India's most
populous state. Uttarakhand is also heavily forested. The hill
districts which were the epicentre of the statehood demand are
home to a predominantly upper-caste population, in contrast to
the plains of Uttar Pradesh which, along with Bihar, saw the rise
of new types of political parties specifically mobilizing lower
castes in the 1990s. The population of Uttarakhand is
considerably less poor than Jharkhand and its parent state of
Uttar Pradesh.4 Jharkhand and Uttarakhand were both home to
iconic "new social movements" formed in the 1970s, which raised
questions about the impact on local communities of new patterns
of development involving the exploitation of natural resources,

The discussion will be organized around a comparison of the

and sought to assert the rights of local populations to land and

reasons that social movement activity in the two new states of

livelihoods in the countryside. The third new state, Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand and Uttarakhand became increasingly concerned with

formed from Madhya Pradesh, did not see a strong popular
movement for statehood, although it too is rich in natural
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resources, and saw sustained social movement activity in the

including political parties, trade unions and intellectuals on the

1970s.

left, to represent issues aﬀecting the marginalized.9 Furthermore,

This article builds on the increasing recognition of the porosity of
the boundary between institutionalized and non-institutionalized
politics, or between social movements, electoral politics and the
state.5 As Jack Goldstone argues, social movements in most of
the world have become an essential part of "normal politics." The
"actors, fates and organisations" of social movements are often
closely intertwined with political parties: they are not simply
"challengers" outside the polity, as the traditional image of social
movements implied.6 Such an emphasis on the interconnections
between movements and the political sphere builds on the work
of Sidney Tarrow, which emphasizes the importance of the
political context in which movements operate in determining their
strategy and ability to achieve their goals.7
A focus on such relationships is a departure from earlier
conceptualizations of the new types of social movement that
emerged in India in the 1970s, including in the regions that
became new states. These were commonly described as "nonparty political formations," reflecting their emergence at a
moment of crisis in India's established political system.8 Many of
the "new social movements" raised critiques of prevailing
processes of development in diﬀerent regions of India. Authors
such as Gail Omvedt and Smitu Kothari have argued that they

as Rajni Kothari noted, the emergence of new movements was
linked to a shift towards a more participatory vision of
decentralized democracy and development, in which grassroots
issues became the subject of political activism.10 Partly because
their birth is linked to a crisis in the party system, social
movements in India have tended to be analyzed separately from
political parties. In part, this reflects something of a disciplinary
division of labour with political parties and social movements
analyzed in separate bodies of work. But social movements are
also commonly seen as an alternative mode of enabling social
change outside the party system, and social activists themselves
have often sought to retain autonomy from party politics because
of the fear of co-option.
Whatever the origins of social movements, however, the trajectory
of social movement activity in India since the 1970s suggests a
symbiosis between the development of movements, the
transformation of the Congress Party from the dominant party of
Indian politics and the emergence of new political parties, many
of which have politicized new types of identity based on caste
and/or region and taken up some of the issues raised by social
movements of the 1970s. Gradually, many non-party movements
have moved into a degree of alignment with electoral politics.

represented the failure of the established organs of opposition
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Furthermore, broader changes within electoral politics reflect

than others. Mary Katzenstein, Smitu Kothari and Uday Mehta

diﬀerent modes of mobilization by marginalized communities.

argue that identity-based movements (around caste, regional or

There is growing recognition of a wider range of political

religious identities) have engaged more successfully with electoral

participation on the part of the poor in India, from higher levels of

politics. By contrast, they suggest, movements concerned with

voting, to the ad hoc demonstrations and negotiations with the

wider social or economic change, such as environmental or

state within the realm of what Partha Chatterjee, drawing on a

women's movements, have been more confined to bureaucratic

Gramscian concept, defines as "political society."11 The success

or judicial activism.14 In slight contrast, this article resists

of new forms of caste-based political party in some states of

positing too sharp a distinction between identity- and interest-

northern India, especially Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, from the

based movements. Rather, it seeks to examine why some social

1990s has altered spaces for participation and engagement with

movements, or parts of such movements, have chosen to

the state. This has coincided with what Ajay Gudavarthy

foreground claims based on regional identity at particular points

describes as a shift away from a "civil society versus the state"

in time.

model of human rights activism, towards a "civil society versus
political society" model. Human rights organizations have begun
to question the utility of an anti-state framework for rights
movements. More attention has been paid to some of the
silences of earlier movements about issues of caste and gender,
for instance, and there is increasing recognition of the alternative
spaces of empowerment oﬀered by democratic politics.12 The
poor may have little choice but to engage in the shorter-term,
transactional thickets of political society without the luxury of
autonomy from politicians and political brokers, but there is also
some optimism about the changing grounds for engagement with
the state in this space.13

The discussion draws on archival research and field interviews
conducted as part of wider research into the politics of federal
reorganization in India. The first section will show that the social
movements that were formed in Jharkhand and Uttarakhand in
the early 1970s were not primarily preoccupied with demands for
statehood, and that a view of social movements as primarily
challengers outside the party system is fairly accurate in this
period. The second section will argue that a focus on statehood in
both regions resulted from interactions between social
movements, political parties and the state (in both coercive and
accommodating guises) in the 1980s. As the government sought
to accommodate elements of the original social movements,

Nevertheless, it seems likely that the changing nature of political

more radical actors within the movements began to foreground

space oﬀers greater opportunities to certain types of movement

demands for statehood. Furthermore the idea of statehood was
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seized on by other political parties, in particular the Hindu

Uttarakhand, social movement activists gradually became more

nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at a critical phase in its

focused on demanding statehood. This was in contrast to

expansion as a national party. These developments are important

Chhattisgarh, however, where statehood did not become a

because they challenge the idea that these states were the simple

subject for strong popular mobilization. For this reason,

product of resistance by marginalized groups. An epilogue to the

Jharkhand and Uttarakhand form the focus of this article.

paper will look beyond 2000 to ask whether the interactions
between social movements, political parties and the state in the

Land and Forest Struggles in Jharkhand in the 1970s

process of state formation have continued to shape the space for

Jharkhand has a two-century-old history of resistance in tribal

a "politics of the marginalized" to the present.

areas, and the demand for a tribal-dominated Jharkhand state

Social Movements and the Idea of Statehood in the 1970s

had been articulated by the Adivasi Mahasabha, led by Jaipal
Singh since 1938. This was reformed as the Jharkhand Party after

All three of the regions that became states in 2000 saw the

independence. The "Greater Jharkhand" state demanded by

emergence of distinctive types of social movement in the early

Jaipal Singh contained tribal-majority districts of Bihar, Madhya

1970s: Chipko, the people's forestry movement in the

Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal.15 The party became the main

Uttarakhand hills; the trade union movement among miners, the

elected opposition to Congress in Bihar in the 1950s, but

Chhattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh; and the workerpeasantry

declined in the late 1950s and especially after the party accepted

movement in Jharkhand led by the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

an invitation to merge with Congress in 1963. In the 1960s and

(JMM). These regions were all distinguished from the remainder of

1970s, a new, more radical phase of activism began that

their parent states by their distinctive ecology and concentration

developed at arm's length from existing political parties. The

of natural resources. In all three cases, the issues raised by social

demand for statehood was less central to the activities of these

movements related primarily to the role of the state in the

new groups.

management of natural resources and the rights of local
communities to substantive economic inclusion. The movements
of the early 1970s drew on the idea of statehood where it was
useful to them but for none of them was it a primary
organizational device or motivating idea. In Jharkhand and

The most prominent of the new social movements was the
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) which was formed in late 1972 by
the Bengali Marxist trade unionist AK Roy, Santal tribal leader
Shibu Soren and a Kurmi-Mahato leader Binod Bihari Mahato.
The JMM sought to unite protests of Scheduled Caste and
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Scheduled Tribe workers in the colliery sector in Dhanbad, with

repressed forcefully, culminating in a series of deaths in shooting

movements of the peasantry occurring in the rural hinterland

by police between 1978 and 1980.

around Dhanbad. Dhanbad and surrounding areas had not been
strongholds of the old, pro-statehood Jharkhand Party. The
background to the agitation in Dhanbad was stagnation across
the agrarian sector, the increasing transfer of land to industry and
flouting of land alienation laws,16 plus migration into the region.
Shibu Soren organized a dhan katti andolan ("cut down paddy"
movement) in which groups of Santal adivasis as well as nontribal Kurmi- Mahatos organized as part of BB Mahato's Shivaji
Samaj and forcibly harvested paddy and reclaimed tribal land.17
The dhan katti andolan and land reclamation movements reached
their climax in the harvests of 1974-1975. The JMM, and Shibu
Soren in particular, developed a reputation for delivering summary
justice against landlords, moneylenders and "exploitative
outsiders," or dikus as they were known in local languages.
Later in the 1970s, the JMM again took a leadership role in
protests against teak plantations in the forests of Singhbum in
Chotanagpur. Alongside the agitations associated with the JMM,
a number of other regional protest movements began in this
period. These included the activities of the Kisan Samitis of the
far-left CPI (ML), sympathetic to the Naxalbari movement in
neighbouring West Bengal. There were also protests against the
displacement to be entailed by the construction of the Koel Karo
dam and the Subarnarekha River multipurpose project. Some
parts of these movements, particularly in the forests, were

The JMM also demanded statehood, but this was not a primary
tool of mobilization. Instead, the JMM sought to provide
leadership to existing protest movements. They also appealed to
a common identity of Jharkhandis as "workers" in both rural and
urban areas. The Marxist AK Roy argued that the Jharkhandi
"nation" was suﬀering from a situation of "internal colonialism,"
exploited by outside interests.18 Thus, the idea of a Jharkhandi
nationality provided a useful frame to unite local agitations, but
social movement activity in Jharkhand in the 1970s was not
driven primarily by the urge for a separate state. As a
correspondent for Economic and Political Weekly wrote, what
distinguished the "Jharkhand" movement of the 1970s from its
earlier incarnations was its use of direct action more than its
commitment to achieving a concrete state:
None of the organisations, not even the Jharkhand party, is in
great haste to get a separate state. The reason for the revival of
the movement, according to Horo [then leader of the Jharkhand
Party], is to help the oppressed train themselves in mass
struggles. Shibu Soren, the general secretary of Jharkhand Mukti
Morcha, has a similar view: "Even if Jharkhand does not come
into being in my lifetime, why should I be bothered? Our first
concern is to chase away the blood-suckers and help the people
lead a respectable, quiet and fraternal life." ...It is not that until
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Jharkhand is attained, the 'liberation' should be postponed; what

repertoire on which the JMM could and did draw, but not the

they would do as the government, the organisations are doing

driving force for their activities. This observation helps to break

meanwhile, by mass struggles. That is when...the current

from a teleology that suggests that the creation of the new states

movement radically diﬀers from Jaipal Singh's agitation. To sum

in 2000 should be seen as the culmination of the longrunning

up, the current movement is basically for a political Jharkhand,

agitations in the region. Statehood was not the necessary, or

and not for a territorial Jharkhand, though this aim is never to be

primary focus of social movement activity in the 1970s.

lost sight of (emphasis added).19
But in contrast to Chipko in Uttarakhand, which will be discussed
in the next section, the JMM did have a strong repertoire of
demands for statehood on a cultural or ethnic basis to draw on.
As Shibu Soren said during an interview: "At the beginning I told
the others that establishing the JMM wasn't enough-we have to
do something to unite the people. And the Jharkhand andolan is
very old so we should support it and we should demand a new
state." He went on to suggest that a link to the Jharkhand
movement was something of an act of translation, a bridging
mechanism between the ideals of the JMM and the sphere of
reference of the local people: "I used to tell Roy-ji (AK Roy) ... that
the people in Jharkhand understand the language of Birsa
Munda, Tilka Manjhi, Sidhu and Kanhu Murmu and Shekh
Bhikhari [leaders of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century revolts].
They don't understand the language of Lenin. People here have a
right to land, forest and water." 20
Despite this the idea of statehood, per se, was not central to the

The Chipko Movement: Keeping Statehood at Arm's Length
In Uttarakhand, the attitude of social movements in the region
towards the demand for statehood was quite diﬀerent from the
1970s onwards. For a long time many social activists were
outwardly hostile to the idea, seeing it as one that had been
pushed by political parties from outside and not an appropriate
response to the issues raised by social movements. The Chipko
movement in Uttarakhand began a matter of months after the
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM). The movement started in
Chamoli district in Garhwal in early 1973 after the Forest
Department allocated 300 ash trees to Symonds Company,
having previously refused to allocate trees to a cooperative set up
to generate local employment by Chand Prasad Bhatt. Members
of the cooperative began hugging trees to prevent them being
felled and the movement became known as Chipko (the Hindi
verb chipna means "to stick to"). A series of similar local
agitations followed in other parts of Garhwal and from 1974 in
Kumaon, the other region of the Uttarakhand Himalayas.

JMM's activities in the early 1970s. It was part of a broader
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Chipko has been read as a series of local "peasant protests" that

case for statehood soon after independence. After the Janata

reflected the moral political economy of peasant communities in

Party formed governments in both Delhi and Uttar Pradesh from

regions which had been disturbed by the advent of commercial

1977 to 1980, Janata Party MP Trepan Singh Negi led a campaign

forestry.21 Authors such as Emma Mawdsley and Haripriya

for statehood for the region and sought to reach out particularly

Rangan have argued, somewhat diﬀerently, that participation in

to residents of Uttarakhand who were now living outside the hills.

the movement was motivated by concerns of people throughout

It was at this time, with a Janata government at the centre that

the hills who relied for their livelihoods on similar economic

was perceived to be sympathetic to regional movements more

activities including village-based agroforestry, and paid work in

generally, that more concerted voices were raised in favour of

the hills and plains.22 Diﬀerent groups, in more or less remote

statehood within the region. A local newspaper editorial

regions, had common concerns which Mawdsley summarizes as

summarized the rationale behind the emergent demand: "The

the growing sense "that the state's management of the forests

problem is that the majority of the state [UP], moreover the

oﬀered few dividends for the local people in this already

country, are plains areas and when it comes to planning no close

economically marginalised area, and further that it was degrading

attention is given to the fact that the hills have special needs."25

the ecological base upon which local people depended."23

In a bid to consolidate this kind of sentiment, and seeking to build

There were three major streams within the broader movement

a movement in the hills rather than among Uttarakhandis resident

that became known as Chipko: one led by the "Gandhian,"

outside the region, a new regional party-the Uttarakhand Kranti

Sunderlal Bahugana in Garhwal, the second by Chandi Prasad

Dal (UKD)-was established in 1979 with the sole agenda of

Bhatt, who was more influenced by socialism, and a third by the

campaigning for statehood.

Uttarakhand Sangarsh Vahini (USV) in Kumaon, which was more
Marxist in orientation.24 None of these streams, despite their
diﬀerent ideological proclivities, found it useful to promote the
goal of statehood.

Activists in the broader movements, however, continued to keep
a demand for statehood at arm's length, asking whether the
creation of a new state would do anything to alter the nature of
politics or the developmental environment in the hills. After a

Unlike Jharkhand, the demand for an Uttarakhand state before

degree of openness to the idea of statehood in the late 1970s,

the 1970s had been primarily made by national political parties.

articles in the Nainital Samachar, a newspaper sympathetic to

The leader of the Communist Party of India, PC Joshi, made a

social movements in the region (especially the USV), began to
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express hesitation about the idea of statehood. In 1979, one

within the social movements in each region from 1980 onwards,

writer expressed doubts about what statehood could achieve: "by

in light of the growing interventions of the central government. As

thinking about the idea of 'our state,' we build castles in the air in

the central government from 1980 to 1984 responded to elements

our hearts."26 Writers frequently sought to distance the social

of movement demands and sought to co-opt the mainstream of

movements from the demand for statehood. Some highlighted

each movement, more radical elements came to foreground the

the fact that the demand was mostly raised at election time and

idea of statehood.28 In both cases, however, local BJP politicians

was disproportionately backed by people who had left the hills to

also began to demand statehood. Support for statehood by the

live in Delhi or Lucknow. "These Delhi-walas think that they are

BJP locally began to weaken the connection between statehood

the contractors of the votes and trees of this region," wrote

demands and the critique of the state and patterns of regional

Narendra Rautela.27

economic development that had been central to earlier local

This section has highlighted the decision made by movement

struggles.

leaders not to use a demand for political autonomy as a primary

Jharkhand: Co-option, Electoral Competition and Statehood

frame for the struggles in Jharkhand and Uttarakhand in the

in the 1980s

1970s. At this stage, the conception of social movements as
challengers outside formal politics holds fairly well. The next
section will demonstrate how interactions between social
movements, political parties and the state brought a demand for
statehood to centre stage, as the activities of social movements
were met with responses within the formal political sphere. The
processes of negotiation and selected co-option that ensued
have influenced the longer-term nature of political inclusion in the

The first sign of the attempted co-option of social movements in
Jharkhand was Shibu Soren's electoral pact with Congress. Indira
Gandhi sought to lessen the challenge posed by the JMM in
Jharkhand by drawing its less ideologically driven wing into
electoral politics. Soren was apparently promised immunity from
prosecution for his activities while "underground" during the
Emergency in return for a seat-sharing arrangement with

emergent new regimes in these regions.

Congress in elections in 1980.29 However, despite the JMM's

From Social to Statehood Movements

strongly opposed by more left-wing JMM leaders such as A.K.

The push for statehood in both Jharkhand and Uttarakhand arose

electoral success in 1980, when it won 11 seats, the pact was
Roy and Binod Bihari Mahato. The JMM formally split for the first

as a result of increasing competition between diﬀerent actors
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time at the end of 1984, when Mahato formed a breakaway "real"

economic blockades.32 After a series of strikes, the central

JMM, accusing Soren of having been bought by Congress.30

government oﬀered to hold talks with Jharkhand leaders.

In June 1986, a new generation of activists in the Jharkhand

The decision by the leaders of the AJSU and the JCC to connect

movement less connected to the older forest and land struggles

more determinedly to historical discourses of place, territory and

set up a student wing of the JMM-the All Jharkhand Students

identity in Jharkhand arose out of competition between social

Union-under the leadership of Surya Singh Besra, a Santal

movement actors and opposition to attempts by the state to co-

adivasi student. Besra drew inspiration from the students'

opt malleable leaders. It can also be seen as logical for a

movement in Assam, whose leader had recently become chief

movement seeking to consolidate a base for collective action.

minister, travelling to Assam as well as to Gorkhaland to learn

The most sustained struggles led by the JMM had been in the

from the more radical tactics used by activists there. The murder

Santal Parganas, along with the forest movements in Singhbum,

of 37-year-old Nirmal Mahato, president of the JMM, in August

Chotanagpur. Elsewhere in the Chotanagpur region, which had

1987 strengthened the resolve of Besra and his colleagues to

been the main base for the older Jharkhand Party, the JMM did

push for statehood. 31 A month later, the Jharkhand Coordination

not have such strong roots. As Stephen Marandi, a former JMM

Committee was also formed in a bid to strengthen the Jharkhand

politician said, "We raised all these issues [land alienation, forest

movement by acting as an umbrella organization for diﬀerent

rights, etc.] but not in an organised way so we didn't get a good

groups and emphasizing the cultural unity of the Jharkhand

response in the Chotanagpur region. But everyone supported the

region. The founders of the JCC also sought to sideline the more

creation of Jharkhand."33

right-wing elements of the JMM, especially those who had moved
closer to Congress and were perceived to be less committed to
pushing the demand for statehood. In 1980 Ram Dayal Munda
had returned to Jharkhand and became vice chancellor of Ranchi
University, setting up a Centre for Tribal Languages and Literature
which became the centre of Jharkhandi cultural revivalism. In
1988 and 1989, AJSU and the JCC (sometimes acting in

The idea of statehood had deep popular resonance as a result of
the much longer-term mobilizations by the Jharkhand Party.
Extracts from focus-group discussions held in Jharkhand after
the achievement of statehood exemplified the significance and
sophistication of local understandings of the idea of becoming a
new state among adivasis:

harmony, sometimes independently) organized a number of mass

[Focus Group Member 1] We knew that if we had a separate state

rallies demanding statehood and introduced a new tactic of

everything would be ours. I remember that our elders told us that
513

we would be gifted with a state which would give prosperity

who were often the "dikus" (exploitative outsiders) who had been

specifically to us adivasis.

the targets of the earlier Jharkhand movements. It stepped up its

[Focus Group Member 2] The need for a state that would belong
to us-the land owners in this part-was very important for me
because somehow it was a question of my, as well as all my
adivasi brothers' and sisters' existence.

organization in Jharkhand in a period of uncertainty for the
Jharkhand "movement," after the Jharkhand Party's 1963 merger
with Congress. It hoped to counter the activities of the Church in
tribal regions (which had been closely associated with the
Jharkhand Party) and increasingly to mobilize the non-Christian

[Focus Group Member 3] Jharkhand: a piece of a promised land

tribals, who constituted the majority of the tribal population, and

that we had been waiting for ever since we got freedom, the land

to assimilate them into mainstream Hindu society.36

of Lord Birsa, the land of his beloved children-the adivasis. We
don't want anyone's money, just respect, and this was it.34

In the late 1970s under the Janata government in Bihar, Jana
Sangh politicians in Jharkhand began to discuss statehood. But it

Thus we should not see the shift to a focus on the goal of

was really in the 1980s, in response to the emergence of the JMM

statehood among prominent social movement activists as a

in electoral politics and the new agitational politics of AJSU and

betrayal of broader struggles around social and economic rights.

the JCC, that the BJP adopted a determined focus on statehood.

Nevertheless, many other local activists consciously kept the

The BJP's longer-term advocates of statehood for Jharkhand

campaign for statehood-both cultural and electoral-at arms'

used the fact that the region's developmental needs diﬀered from

length.35

the rest of Bihar to explain their support for the idea. Inder Singh
Namdhari, BJP state president between 1988 and 1990 and a

The forceful campaign for regional autonomy encouraged other

pivotal player in getting the party nationally to oﬃcially support

political parties to join the statehood bandwagon. One major

the demand for statehood in 1989, says that he got involved in

development of the late 1980s which was of critical importance in

politics because of "an obsession that there should be a separate

building political momentum behind the demand for statehood

state. If nature's resources were properly utilised or exploited

was the adoption of the demand as oﬃcial BJP party policy. The

then we could be the first state in the country. The resources here

Jana Sangh, forerunner to the BJP, had been building a base in

are greater than any other state."37

Jharkhand from the late 1960s. Its original support was drawn
from non-tribal groups, especially trading and industrial elites,
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Importantly, he also sensed that support for statehood would

state of Jharkhand, also joined the party in 1998. The traditional

allow the BJP to compete better against the JMM. Namdhari

support base of the BJP was among upper castes and non-tribals

proposed that the state be named Vananchal rather than

in Jharkhand, but it increasingly reached out to non-Christian

Jharkhand, and that the new state should comprise only the

tribals too in the 1990s. The party's support for statehood helped

districts of south Bihar, distinguishing the BJP's demand for a

to break down notions of cultural or ethnic exclusivity associated

new state from the Greater Jharkhand of the historical Jharkhand

with the demand. Some upper-caste villagers, for example,

movement. He underlined the fact that because the tribal

reported that they had begun to welcome the idea of statehood

population was no longer in the majority in the region, it was

during Lalu Prasad Yadav's anti-upper caste regime in Bihar, even

important for the movement to have a regional rather than "racial"

though many were wary about a state that they felt was being

character.38

created primarily for adivasis. As one Rajput villager explained, "I

There were strong concerns among many activists about the role
of political parties in demanding statehood, especially about the
extent to which the BJP should be oﬀered instrumental support

voted for the party which would give a new state as I was fed up
of Lalu's atrocities. We just wished that his cruel name would be
separate from our land." 40

as the party "most likely" to create a state. Was statehood to be

The emergent consensus between civil society activists and

seen by Jharkhand activists as a good in and of itself? One focus

political parties around the idea of statehood concealed

group participant expressed a commonly held view that

fundamental conflicts and ambiguities surrounding the meaning

statehood was to be achieved as the outcome of a popular

of statehood. What should be the borders of a new state? How

struggle, not through the ballot box: "I felt it would be a people's

would a new state reorient itself to the needs and expectations of

movement that would create the state," he said. "I never really felt

diﬀerent communities? The contraction to just those districts that

a political party or a candidate could do this." Nevertheless, a

fell into South Bihar perforce reduced the centrality of tribal

number of JMM politicians joined the BJP in this period,

identity to the idea of Jharkhand because it did not take in

apparently inspired by its commitment to statehood. One former

neighbouring regions with large tribal communities. The case for

JMM MP said that he joined the BJP in 1996 after falling out with

statehood made by the BJP reflected a vision of a state which

the JMM leadership because he felt that the BJP was the most

would support the expansion of industry and natural resource

likely party to create the state.39 Arjun Munda, a tribal politician

extraction and help to absorb tribals into the economic

from the JMM and the BJP's second chief minister of the new

mainstream, supported by their assimilation into Hinduism. This
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stood in contrast to the movements of the 1970s which had

more radical wing of the movement emerged in the All Jharkhand

grown from concern about exclusionary patterns of development

Students Union (AJSU) and the Jharkhand Coordination

and dispossession. This tension at the heart of the growing

Committee (JCC), which increasingly underscored the urgency of

consensus around the desirability of statehood led some of those

the need for statehood. At the same time, local BJP workers

who had led the call for statehood in the 1980s to feel uneasy

became convinced that the adoption of the statehood goal would

about the compromises involved in the state's formation. A

improve their chances of competing against the JMM. The idea of

veteran activist who had been deeply involved with the JCC

statehood arguably came from the "movement" but political

questioned the extent to which the BJP's eventual concession to

parties played a key role in shaping the new electoral arena, in

use the name Jharkhand, rather than Vananchal, for the new state

which support for statehood became the lowest common

represented a fundamental shift in their understanding of the

denominator among groups competing for electoral space in the

demand for statehood. For him, there was no distinction between

region.

a "territorial" and "political" Jharkhand. The simple achievement
of a state in the name of Jharkhand was a matter for ambivalence
not celebration in and of itself:
Freedom from exploitation would only be possible in a diﬀerent
type of state...The problem was one of protecting the political and
economic rights of the people in terms of the control of natural
resources (jal, jungle and jamin): their 'usufructory' rights. First,
you need autonomy in the form of a separate state, and then the
larger goal is to build on this movement in the interests of the
larger Indian population towards a socialist revolution.41
In Jharkhand, then, a shift from social to statehood movement(s)
took place in the 1980s after part of the JMM leadership led by
Shibu Soren had been brought within the Congress' sphere of
influence and began to contest elections. In the later 1980s, a

Uttarakhand: Political Parties and Popular Mobilization
In Uttarakhand, the transmission of the idea of statehood largely
went the other way: from parties to movements. Despite a history
of protest movements in the hills of Uttarakhand, it was not until
the mid-1990s that a movement focused on statehood could be
said to have emerged. This happened after political parties raised
the call for statehood and the political context in Uttar Pradesh
encouraged fresh mass mobilization in protest at the treatment of
the hills.
In 1980, after Indira Gandhi returned to power, a new Forest Act
had been introduced which increased state control over forestry
in the name of preventing deforestation. In 1981, in direct
response to Chipko, a 15-year moratorium on felling trees at over
1000 feet was implemented. The Chipko movement itself
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declined from this point but a new wave of protest movement

1983.43 Like the UKD, local leaders of the BJP were concerned

began in the hills. Now protests occurred because there were

about the implications of the 1980 Forest Act. Shoban Singh Jina,

incidents of the Forest Department continuing to fell trees while

an elderly leader of the BJP, organized a meeting in Almora

such opportunities were closed to local industry. Furthermore, a

district in 1984 to discuss the act. At the meeting, Jina argued

jungle katao andolan, a movement to cut down trees took place

against the Forest Act and in favour of the need for a separate hill

in 1988-89 as part of a protest against the new Forest

state.44 Another proponent of the idea of statehood within the

Regulations which had what many considered to be the perverse

Sangh Parivar, the "family" of Hindu nationalist organizations, was

eﬀect of preventing other much-needed development projects

the senior Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh leader Bhaurao

(such as electricity, roads, schools) from taking place across the

Devras. The RSS believed that national security would be at risk

region. The leadership of this andolan was drawn from the

in this border region without economic development. They were

Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD), the regional party established in

particularly keen to stem migration from the hills, which they saw

1979 to fight for statehood.42 Also in 1988, the Uttarakhand

as weakening India against its enemies.45 Dr Nityanand, another

Sangharsh Vahini (USV)-the most left-wing of the organizations

RSS worker and professor at a college in Dehra Dun, suggests

involved in Chipko-decided to take up the campaign for

that the RSS were also responding to the increasing agitations on

statehood. They claimed to be fighting for more than simply

the statehood question in the 1980s. He writes: "The campaign

statehood, however. Their vision was of a radically decentralized

for the creation of Uttaranchal gradually became intense in the

federalism in which all matters except foreign aﬀairs, defence,

1980s and the Naxalite factor also started to be invited from its

communications, currency and railways would be devolved to the

platforms."46 The BJP national executive first passed a resolution

state level (their slogan was "New Bharat [India] new

supporting statehood for what the BJP called Uttaranchal, as well

Uttarakhand"). They gradually began to link various strands of

as Vananchal (Jharkhand) in 1989. It highlighted the issue during

movement activity in the hills, such as the anti-liquor andolan of

the frequent elections of this period in Uttar Pradesh in 1989,

the early 1990s and protests about new forest regulations, to the

1991 and 1993.

demand for statehood.

The real moment at which social movement actors and parties

At a similar time, local BJP politicians began to pass resolutions

fused around the idea of statehood, however, came in 1994. The

on the need for statehood and demanded the national leadership

Uttar Pradesh state government had introduced new reservations

of the party support the demand for a hill state as early as

(aﬃrmative action) for lower-caste communities designated as
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"Other Backward Classes" (OBCs) in higher education institutions

character to the Uttarakhand regional movement, in a way

across Uttar Pradesh (including the hills with their predominantly

comparable to the ethnic content of the original Jharkhand

upper caste and only 2 percent OBC population). A series of

demand, regardless of the attempts by UP's political leadership

protests against the impact of this new reservations policy in the

to paint it in this light.47 Here, as in Jharkhand, the idea of

hills, organized by student leaders, spiralled into a mass regional

statehood became a subject for mass mobilization as a result of

movement demanding statehood. The movement gained

changes in the broader political context. Statehood was by no

momentum after a number of instances of police firing on

means naturally connected to a politics of resistance in the hills. It

demonstrators, and apparently deliberately incendiary statements

was the interactions between social movements, the state and

by state leaders such as Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati.

new types of political party that helped to produce a focus on

The OBC chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mulayam Singh Yadav,

statehood.

had seemingly deliberately seized an opportunity to make political
capital out of anti-reservations protests in the hills. He sought to

Conclusion & Epilogue

cement his own fraying social coalition among lower castes and

This article has shown how the intersection of movement and

highlight his own social justice credentials by portraying the

party politics helped to shape the goals and strategies adopted

protestors in the hills as chauvinistic upper castes whose main

by social activists in Jharkhand and Uttarakhand, bringing a

concern was their opposition to aﬃrmative action for lower castes

demand for new states to preeminence. Through a discussion of

tout court. In fact the movement in the hills drew together a

some of India's most iconic social movements, the article makes

diverse coalition of social groups including ex-servicemen,

it clear that we must pay attention to such interactions when

students' and women's groups. These groups were galvanized by

thinking about the spaces for, and possibility of, an autonomous

the provocations of the state government and began to bring

field of subaltern politics. These themes have been taken up not

together a broader set of grievances about the treatment of the

to diminish the agency of the marginalized but to argue that any

hills under the banner of statehood. Months of protests, road

account of the politics of marginality must take account of the

blockades and disruption to local services followed. Much of the

interrelationships between institutionalized and non-

leadership came from a younger generation, and hailed from

institutionalized politics.

outside the movement or political realm (such as the exservicemen) but older activists with memories of the Chipko era

The narratives presented in this paper stop short of the actual

also became involved. There was in fact no explicit caste

moment of state creation because the aim has been to
518

demonstrate the nature of the coalitions that developed locally in

Since the granting of statehood, Jharkhand has displayed greater

support of statehood as a result of interactions between social

political instability than possibly any other Indian state. In ten

movements and political parties. The explanations for the final act

years (2000-2010) it has seen the formation of eight diﬀerent

of state creation in the year 2000 lie at other levels of the federal

short-lived governments with four diﬀerent chief ministers, and

system.48 The compromises involved in the emergence of broad

two periods of President's Rule.51 Since state formation, the

prostatehood coalitions suggest that seeking statehood within the

BJP's rising adivasi leader of the 1990s and Jharkhand's first

federation-questioning borders-may not be a reliable route to

chief minister, Babulal Marandi, has left the BJP to form his own

creating new pro-poor regimes. In an argument developed further

party, the Jharkhand Vikas Morcha. There is a strong impression

elsewhere, I have suggested that one of the reasons for the

that weakly organized political parties oﬀer limited mobility for

emergence of political consensus around particular regional

aspiring candidates, even as the promise to extract rents from

identities was an attempt by some political parties to depoliticize

mining and industrial ventures increases the lure of political

ethnic cleavages and/or unsettle an attempt by social movements

careers. Jharkhand appears to be moving close to what Yadav

to associate a regional political identity with an emancipatory

and Palshikar have described as a "malady" of "systemless

politics of particular marginalized communities.49 Rather than

competition." This is a situation of extreme fluidity in which

representing a moment at which political regimes with new, more

electoral competition is not bound by political party conventions

inclusive social bases were constituted, such developments

and where individual entrepreneurship or loose, very short-term

meant that the process of state formation left an uneasy legacy of

groupings hold sway.52 The absence of a stable political regime

superficial political inclusion that masked continued practices of

has reduced the ability of the state to pursue long-term

exclusion. This brief epilogue will consider the impact of these

developmental goals. It has delayed the agreement, for example,

legacies in the new states. Such regional political histories help to

of minimum, implementable standards for rehabilitation and

explain why the reception of the anti-poverty initiatives of the

resettlement following industrial development. Equally, such

central government diﬀers on a regional basis. As John Harriss

instability has also forestalled movement on dozens of

reminds us, state-level political regimes, and in particular the

memorandums of understanding with business signed by the

extent to which the political power of lower castes/classes has

government. In some senses, the paralysis in governance in

been well-institutionalized, matter in explaining rates of poverty

Jharkhand reflects the strength and spaces maintained by local

reduction.50

resistance movements. But it also marks the absence of a
political settlement that can eﬀectively mediate between deeply
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divergent visions of development. Agreement in favour of

and of the intimidation of activists campaigning against

statehood masked such tensions rather than representing a new

corruption in its implementation.53 Until December 2010,

political contract. Without functioning state institutions, inclusive

Jharkhand is the only state in India not to have held elections to

economic growth looks set to remain elusive. Furthermore, in

panchayats since the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments

Jharkhand (and Chhattisgarh), there has been a reversion to

were enacted. This followed a 2005 ruling by the Jharkhand High

movements outside the electoral system since state creation with

Court challenging the reservation of the posts of pradhan

the spread of a variety of groups under the loose umbrella of

(chairperson) for adivasis in scheduled areas where the tribal

Naxalism (as well as counter-Naxal movements). This reflects in

population had fallen below 50 percent.54

part a dissatisfaction with the functioning of institutionalized
politics, as well as contests over the ownership of natural
resources in the context of increasing Maoist activity across
central India.

Uttarakhand has seen far greater political stability than Jharkhand
since 2000 but it too has been aﬀected by the nature of its
formation. The manipulation of the borders of the new state by
the central government to include large plains areas, as well as

All political parties play lip-service to tribal leadership-all four

the hills, has allowed for the eﬀective sidelining of calls for more

chief ministers have been adivasis-but substantive improvements

careful attention to development in the distinctive geography of

in the material lives of adivasis or their political representation are

the hills (central to the original idea of statehood). The plains

harder to discern. In some ways Jharkhand has become a more

districts of Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar were included in

hostile space for civil society since 2000, despite attempts by

the new state at the insistence of the central government on the

ministers in the UPA-led coalition between 2006-08 to institute

ostensible grounds of improving the new state's economic

consultations with key activists over issues such as rehabilitation

viability. The main axes of exclusion are thus topographical in this

and resettlement, and over the design of a "common minimum

region, which is much more ethnically homogenous than

program" mirroring the initiatives of the central UPA government.

Jharkhand. Some veteran activists complain, for instance, that

Shortly after the state was created in 2001, police opened fire on

the state capital Dehra Dun is on the edge of the plains, rather

villagers taking part in the decades-old protest against the Koel

than their preferred remote location of Gairsain, nestled on the

Karo dam, leading to eight deaths. There are serious reports of

border of the Kumaon and Garhwal hills, which they argue would

irregularities in the implementation of one of the UPA's flagship

have encouraged local legislators to become cognizant of the

schemes, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme,

specific needs of the hills.
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In short, the long-term history of state formation matters.
Supporting territorial reorganization allowed national political
parties to negotiate or blunt a critique of the forms of
development taking place in resource-rich regions such as
Jharkhand and Uttarakhand, or at least shift it from the centre of
electoral politics. Political inclusion requires stable, responsive
political regimes that can negotiate between diﬀerent interests
with a degree of autonomy. The state that has been produced out
of the struggles and counter-struggles in Jharkhand lacks these
characteristics. The state produced in Uttarakhand is quite
diﬀerent to the hill-state imagined by activists in the hills, but is
considerably more stable.
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Power & Plunder in Putin's Russia
Since Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999, the quest to restore
the might of the Russian state at home and abroad has been a
hallmark of his rule. Yet another such hallmark has been rampant
looting by the country's leaders. Thus Russia has figured
prominently in recent scholarly discussions about kleptocraciesregimes distinguished by a willingness to prioritize defending their
leaders' mechanisms of personal enrichment over other goals of
statecraft. In a kleptocracy, then, corruption plays an outsized
role in determining policy. But how have the state-building and
great-power ambitions of the new Russian elite coexisted with its
scramble for self-enrichment? Putin's Russia oﬀers a vivid
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illustration of how kleptocratic plunder can become not only an

with all property rights eﬀectively conditional on the regime's

end in itself, but also a tool for both consolidating domestic

goodwill.2

political control and projecting power abroad.

Even as the siloviki network took shape, emerging Russian elites

In Russia, circumstances have conspired to provide fertile ground

with newly acquired wealth were developing innovative uses for

for kleptocracy. The country's long history of feudalism, from

the international financial system. Since 1991, capital has

which it rapidly transitioned into totalitarianism and then again

streamed out of Russia on a breathtaking scale. A recent analysis

into oligarchic state capitalism, left little room for a tradition of

estimates the total assets held oﬀshore by Russian citizens to be

individual property rights. And the chaotic aftermath of the Soviet

roughly equal to the total assets held within Russia.3 The chief

Union's collapse paved the way for the rise of an elite with the

cause may be simply that those Russians who have captured

means and motivation to wield state power for private benefit.

large shares of the country's wealth now wish to keep that wealth

During the 1990s, Russia's political, social, and economic
institutions were reeling as they struggled to adapt after the longruling Communist Party's fall. Into the resulting power vacuum
stepped the remnants of the Soviet security services-one of the
few institutions still strong enough to assert its members'
economic and political prerogatives.1 Former KGB oﬃcers
(sometimes called the siloviki, or "strong-men") embedded
themselves in government bodies, businesses, and other
influential institutions throughout Russia. They used these
perches to observe, control, and build their power, often in
cooperation with organized-crime networks. Under Russia's
current president, himself a KGB veteran, these eﬀorts have paid
oﬀ: The network of former KGB oﬃcers surrounding Putin has
established de facto ownership of the entire Russian economy,

secure. Oligarchs can stow their assets in countries whose ruleoflaw systems oﬀer greater financial protections, while continuing
to enrich themselves in Russia. Yet the Russian government also
has been strategically using oﬀshore capital to pursue its
international political objectives.
A Strategy of Rule
Today, opaque financial flows and the equally murky ex-KGB
network come together in a system of corruption that serves dual
purposes. Those at the top follow the imperative of selfenrichment, while also finding in corruption a highly eﬀective
political tool. When these two motivations come into tension, selfenrichment will win out, meaning that Russia is indeed a
kleptocracy in the terms we set out above. Yet in practice, while
illicit enrichment creates myriad ineﬃciencies and injustices, it
rarely comes into conflict with the ruling regime's quest to tighten
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its grip. Often the two go together. Russia's kleptocratic system
does, however, decisively shape its rulers' choice of methods.

Sticks & Carrots
In modern Russia, corruption works in two key ways to keep

Russia's kleptocracy follows a distinctive foreign policy, with both

power squarely in the hands of the well-connected. First, favored

pragmatic and ideological drivers. While the Putin regime lacks a

oﬃcials and their allies enjoy great license to steal from the state

guiding ideology comparable in scope to communist dogma, one

budget, extort money from private businesses, and even

consistent trope it has advanced is that the Western countries

orchestrate the outright seizure of profitable enterprises. Indeed,

have conspired to weaken Russia, which must reclaim its rightful

oﬃcials are often essentially forced into participating in corrupt

place among the world's great powers. Lacking the economic

schemes. Property claims and business ventures thus become

and military might that elevated the USSR to superpower status,

contingent on the whims of the powerful. Second, as political

the Putin regime has sought to give itself a leg up by exploiting

scientist Alena Ledeneva has explained, this pervasive corruption

the rules of the globalized world order. To this end, it has used

provides Russia's elites with both a carrot and a stick for use in

corruption internationally both to undermine democratic resolve

controlling the oﬃcials themselves.4 Corrupt acts by bureaucrats,

and principles in established democracies and to bring foreign

whether willing or reluctant, produce evidence that can later be

political and economic elites (particularly in former Soviet states

used selectively to punish anyone who steps out of line.

and satellites) under its control.

Thanks to this web of illicit ties and compromising information, a

Domestically too, the Putin regime has used kleptocratic tactics,

hidden political hierarchy based on personal relationships, money,

in part, to restore certain aspects of the Soviet model. In parallel

and informal power supersedes Russia's often hollow formal

to their international chase after great-power status, Russia's

institutions. The resulting system is fundamentally undemocratic,

rulers have tried to banish the chaos of the 1990s at home by

unjust, and antithetical to good governance. It is, however, an

reestablishing a considerable degree of Soviet-style control over

eﬀective means of political control: Kleptocracy ensures that

all aspects of political, economic, and social life. Unwilling or

businessmen and oﬃcials stay pliable by keeping both in

unable to re-create a one-party system backed up by mass

permanent legal jeopardy.

repression, the Putin regime has developed a more modern set of
authoritarian strategies, with the tactical deployment of corruption
perhaps foremost among them.

One instructive example is the recent case of former Komi
Republic governor Vyacheslav Gaizer. After seven years as the
region's finance minister and deputy governor, Gaizer, by then a
530

prominent national leader of the ruling United Russia Party, was

soliciting a bribe. Making this charge against a cabinet minister

appointed governor by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2010 and

even more astonishing was the alleged victim: Igor Sechin, the

reappointed by Putin in 2014. But in September 2015, Gaizer and

chief executive of Russia's massive state oil company Rosneft

eighteen of his associates (including several members of the

and perhaps the closest political ally of President Putin. As with

regional administration) were arrested on charges of fraud and

the Gaizer case, the government's version of events demands

racketeering. As detailed in opposition activist Ilya Yashin's report

considerable suspension of disbelief. As implausible as it is that

"The Criminal Russia Party," the operations of Gaizer's team were

an entire region could be run for years by an organized-crime

essentially indistinguishable from those of a classic mafia group.5

operation without the national government's knowledge, it is

For years, the ex-governor's outfit used both violent and political

perhaps even harder to believe that a cabinet minister would

tactics to seize assets and extract bribes from local businesses.

demand that one of the most powerful men in Russia personally

The case against Gaizer was a national scandal, but not because
anyone was surprised to see such corruption and criminality in a
Russian regional administration: The situation in Komi was more
the rule than the exception. More startling was the national

deliver to him two-million dollars in cash. Nonetheless, the choice
of this pretext reflects an environment in which corruption
allegations are both a potent weapon and a pointed warning to
others.

government's de facto admission, implicit in the charges against

Moreover, the backstory to the Ulyukayev case involves a far

Gaizer, that an entire region had been run for years (with the

more plausible instance of corruption. In September 2014, one of

blessing of Russia's top leaders) by what was in essence a mafia

Russia's richest businessmen, Vladimir Yevtushenkov, was

organization. The crimes in question, after all, had long been well

charged with money laundering and placed under house arrest.

known and reported by local media outlets without any oﬃcial

The Russian government quickly seized Yevtushenkov's

response. Gaizer's fall was a punishment not for being a criminal,

controlling share in the highly profitable oil company Bashneft, a

but rather for going too far or otherwise displeasing his political

stake it kept despite Yevtushenkov's later release. Press reports

masters.

suggested that the charges against Yevtushenkov were part of a

Another recent corruption case sheds further light on
kleptocracy's political dimensions. In November 2016, Russia's
then-economy minister Aleksey Ulyukayev was arrested for

move by Sechin to incorporate Bashneft's assets into Rosneft,
then under fiscal stress due to a drop in oil prices. Sechin indeed
tried to claim the Bashneft shares, but others in government,
including Ulyukayev, opposed the move out of concern that too
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much of Russia's economy was being concentrated into massive

to strengthen civil society. The primary purpose of

state-owned firms. In October 2016, Rosneft acquired the

Khodorkovsky's imprisonment was to send a message to his

controlling Bashneft stake. On 15 December 2017, Ulyukayev

fellow oligarchs that their participation in opposition politics was

was sentenced to eight years in prison for allegedly insisting on a

unacceptable. The seizure and distribution of his assets was

bribe to seal his approval of the deal.

merely a side benefit for those involved.

The Bashneft saga was an unusually high-profile instance of a

The practices deployed against Yevtushenkov and Khodorkovsky

phenomenon that menaces all owners of Russian businesses,

occur at all levels of Russian society, with profound political and

large and small: reiderstvo (or "raiding"), the practice of corrupt

economic consequences. Local authorities can arrest

oﬃcials and business interests conspiring to seize commercial

compromised rivals and expropriate the businesses of any local

assets through tactics such as the falsification of documents,

entrepreneurs who might dare to support these oﬃcials'

lawsuits, and judicial orders.6 In the most notorious case, the

opponents or to fund any independent political activity. At the

Russian state in 2003 seized the oil company Yukos from

same time, the ease with which rapacious oﬃcials can seize

businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was imprisoned on

successful businesses has accelerated the concentration of

charges of a range of financial crimes. As with Bashneft, the bulk

Russia's economic resources in a small number of hands. In this

of Yukos's assets ended up under the control of Sechin's

way, Russia's kleptocracy is a self-sustaining system that closes

Rosneft.

down the possibilities for reform from within.

In many cases, reiderstvo is practiced for straightforward

Beyond Russia's Borders

economic reasons-a corrupt oﬃcial or businessman sees a
profitable company, and simply decides to take it.7 This appears
to have been largely the cause of Yevtushenkov's woes. But as
the Khodorkovsky case shows, "raids" on private business can
also have decidedly political motives. In the early years of Putin's
presidency, Khodorkovsky was unusual among Russia's oligarchs
in taking an interest in social and political reform. In 2001 he
launched the Open Russia initiative (the first of two by the name)

The political and economic logic of kleptocracy inevitably spills
over beyond Russia's borders. To launder and store its illicit
riches, the Russian elite depends on open markets, foreign legal
protections, and relations with other states-especially wealthy
ones (such as the United Kingdom and the United States) into
whose large luxury realestate markets it can sink vast wealth with
anonymity. One might expect that this would motivate Russia to
maintain stable foreign relations and behave as a traditional great
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power. In some cases-as in the international dealings of the

members). By reducing the leverage of these states vis-`a-vis

mammoth state-owned gas monopoly Gazprom, or in Moscow's

Moscow, the pipelines further Russia's traditional quest to divide

relations with elites in other post-Soviet states-eﬀorts to

Europe and gain dominance in its eastern half. The Nord Stream

strengthen Russia's political influence and to bolster its financial

initiatives-whose Swiss incorporation allows them to avoid EU

flows are indeed intertwined. Here, kleptocracy supplies

jurisdiction-also threaten to weaken the EU by generating

additional means to ends it largely shares with traditional great-

conflicts of interest (former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder

power politics.

was tapped to chair the Nord Stream shareholders' committee)

Yet revelations of the theft at the system's core, which could
intensify both international sanctions and domestic discontent,
pose a constant threat to Putin and his circle. As a result, fear
may propel them into reckless behavior. To avert perceived
threats to the kleptocratic system, Russia's elites are willing to

and sparking political squabbles pitting states imperiled by the
initiative against those that stand to gain. In a protest to the
European Commission, eight EU members expressed alarm at
the "potentially destabilising geopolitical consequences" of Nord
Stream 2.8

risk losing access to the markets that have been absorbing their

The funds that the pipelines will generate represent not only a

ill-gotten gains. In these cases, they resort to extreme measures

means of renewing the Putin regime's depleted treasury, but also

more characteristic of rogue states or nonstate actors than of

a potential source of rents. Completion of Nord Stream 2 would

traditional great powers.

be a boon for Gazprom, which has majority ownership of Nord

Gazprom's dealings in Europe demonstrate how the Russian
state uses its control of economic resources to advance
conventional great-power interests alongside those more
particular to kleptocracy. Two major pipeline projects, the already
operational Nord Stream 1 and the planned Nord Stream 2, stand
at the intersection of monopoly power, crony capitalism, and
foreign-policy opportunism. The aim of both pipelines is to carry

Stream. Currently chaired by Victor Zubkov, a former Russian
prime minister and close associate of Putin, Gazprom is
struggling with U.S. sanctions, as well as with an EU
antimonopoly investigation and prohibition on raising capital. The
CEO of Nord Stream 2, longtime Putin associate and former Stasi
agent Matthias Warnig, is another figure who represents Russia's
interwoven webs of economic and political influence.9

gas under the Baltic Sea to Germany, bypassing Ukraine as well

In post-Soviet states, corruption constitutes one of Russia's most

as several other Central or Eastern European states (including EU

important levers of influence. The outstanding example was
533

Moscow's relationship with former Ukrainian president Victor

This response has provoked costly European and U.S. sanctions

Yanukovych, who eﬀectively functioned as a Russian proxy until

on Russian companies and oﬃcials. It has also deeply

the 2014 EuroMaidan Revolution. After trying and failing to

antagonized Ukrainians, likely reducing Russia's long-term

suppress these mass protests, which were motivated in large part

chances of influencing elite factions in Ukraine. Confronted with a

by outrage over corruption, Yanukovych fled both his oﬃce and

popular grassroots movement in a neighboring state that

the country (tellingly heading to Russia). Before his fall,

challenged kleptocracy itself, however, the Kremlin eschewed

Yanukovych had benefited from a corrupt scheme that depended

these long-term geopolitical calculations. Instead, it behaved in a

on Gazprom providing gas at a substantial discount to an

manner that reflected its roots in the organized-crime syndicates

intermediary company owned by Ukrainian oligarch Dmitry

of the 1990s: Like a gangster, it sought to signal its lack of

Firtash. The company then resold it to Ukrainian customers at far

restraint.

higher prices, with much of the profit going to finance
Yanukovych's political campaigns. While the grotesque images of
Yanukovych's gold and marble palaces, car collection, and
private zoo may have resonated most with the public, his ledgers
also detail the spending of US$2 billion over five years on
unoﬃcial cash payments to politicians, media representatives,
and foreign consultants. This points to a political system driven
by bribery.10

Alexander Litvinenko, a former Federal Security Service (FSB)
oﬃcer who turned against the agency and migrated to London in
2001, used a diﬀerent term for kleptocracy. He called Russia a
"mafia state." In two politically explosive publications, Litvinenko
described the KGB's transformation into a mafia organization and
alleged that the FSB (a KGB successor agency) had organized a
series of explosions in Russian apartment buildings in 1999,
helping to spark the Second Chechen War and cement Putin's

The case of Ukraine also highlights the more erratic side of

rise to power.11 He also began to cooperate with Spanish

Russia's kleptocratic foreign policy. The Kremlin saw an

prosecutor José Grinda, who was investigating St. Petersburg

existential threat in Ukraine's 2014 "Revolution of Dignity," which

mafia bosses with alleged money-laundering operations in Spain.

had the potential not only to cement the country's place in

Litvinenko was scheduled to travel to Madrid for an in-person

Europe and outside Russia's grasp, but also to set an example for

meeting with Grinda in November 2006.

Russia's own civil society. Moscow reacted by annexing Crimea
and starting a war, now more than three years old, that has
ravaged the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk.

A week before his trip, Litvinenko was poisoned on U.K. soil with
polonium, a rare radioactive isotope. Following a painful hospital
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stay, he died on November 23. A lengthy U.K. investigation found

and a Spanish judge has issued an arrest warrant for twelve

that two KGB veterans, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitri Kovtun, had

Russian citizens, including Aulov and Vladislav Reznik, the former

carried out the murder. The inquiry concluded that they probably

chairman of the Duma's finance committee.14

had done so under the direction of the FSB, and most likely with
the approval of Putin and FSB director Nikolai Patrushev.12

Facing the Backlash

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Russia has refused to turn the alleged

Kleptocracy puts enormous resources at the Russian

assassins over to the United Kingdom, and in 2007 Lugovoi

government's disposal, enabling Moscow to coopt foreign

secured a seat in the State Duma. To silence a loose-lipped

business and political elites. Yet with Western societies waking up

defector, Moscow proved willing to risk a crisis in Anglo-Russian

to the security threat stemming from Russia's kleptocracy, it also

relations. The timing suggests that defending kleptocracy was a

makes the regime vulnerable to international sanctions. In August

priority: Litvinenko's prior sensitive accusations notwithstanding,

2017, a near-unanimous act of the U.S. Congress codified and

he was killed only as he started to cooperate in exposing the

amplified the sanctions (including visa bans, asset freezes, and

regime's financial crimes.

prohibitions on business activities and technology transfers)

Despite Litvinenko's untimely passing, Grinda's investigation
succeeded in producing damning evidence of extensive
connections between Russian elites and the mafia bosses
passing their money through Spain. An indictment in the case
was issued in 2015. Using intercepted telephone conversations
between known mafia figures and high-level Russian oﬃcials,
Grinda found that the mafia "is integrated into Russia's police
structures." The oﬃcials mentioned as having ties to the mafiosi
included former prime minister and current Gazprom chief
Zubkov, Investigative Committee chairman Alexander Bastrykin,
and top drug enforcer Nikolai Aulov; the latter had spoken to the
crime boss at the center of Grinda's case 78 times in about

already in place against certain Russian companies and
individuals due to Moscow's aggression in Ukraine and cyberinterference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The act calls
specific attention to the fight against corruption. It tasks three
U.S. government agencies with compiling a report that will detail
the holdings, involvement in corruption, and relationships to
President Putin of significant individuals in Russia; the U.S.
economy's exposure to "Russian politically exposed persons and
parastatal entities" (with particular attention to "the banking,
securities, insurance, and real estate sectors"); and the possible
results of further sanctions.15 This requirement for a systematic
analysis of Russia's kleptocracy demonstrates a new

eighteen months.13 The case is slated for trial in February 2018,
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understanding of the threat, as well as bipartisan political resolve

Russia's rulers also face growing social and economic discontent.

to address it.

The country's economy is struggling, with bankruptcies in the

When kleptocracy took hold in the 2000s, Russia's economy was
growing, oil prices were soaring, and the rising middle class was
grateful to Putin. Maintaining this system during the current
economic downturn is proving more diﬃcult. It is no coincidence
that the most significant opposition political movement in Russia
today centers on an anticorruption message. Activist Alexei
Navalny, persevering through spells of imprisonment, has
galvanized a protest movement that in March and June 2016
drew tens of thousands of people, most of them young, to take to
the streets against kleptocracy. The tech-savvy team at Navalny's
Foundation Against Corruption produces documentaries
unmasking high-level corruption, which have drawn tens of
millions of views on YouTube. Despite frequent arrests and

third quarter of 2017 nearing record numbers. Economic, social,
and labor protests-which occur throughout the country, but
especially in major urban areas in the central regions-are also
growing more frequent. The majority are sparked by local
grievances such as salary arrears, housing-construction scams
that defraud would-be homeowners, and ecological damage.16 A
few campaigns, such as the recurring protests by long-haul
truckers against new taxes imposed in late 2015, have been
coordinated and national in scope. Permeating these protests has
been outrage at the grave injustice of a system in which the
nation's wealth goes abroad to support the lavish lifestyles of a
small minority, while the vast majority face a diminished quality of
life and reduced salaries, pensions, and social services.

attempts at intimidation, Navalny's backers have also organized a

Domestic and international scrutiny of kleptocracy is the most

national campaign for Russia's March 2018 presidential election,

serious challenge that Putin's system currently faces. During

with oﬃces in more than a hundred cities and towns. As of this

Putin's first two terms as president, his administration was able to

writing, the authorities are refusing to register Navalny on the

harness kleptocratic structures and tactics to project Russian

technical grounds that he has a criminal conviction (on trumped-

power and influence on a global scale. But since Putin's 2012

up fraud charges). But Navalny and his team have defined the

return to the presidency, maintaining this system amid swelling

presidential contest to such an extent that an election without

domestic criticism has necessitated greater levels of repression,

them will be an unmistakably empty ritual. And the emerging

and the shrinking economy has brought about increasingly visible

network of young activists will persist in fighting corruption long

divisions within the Russian elite. Internationally, kleptocracy now

after the election is over.

portends financial and political isolation. The longer Russia
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remains in thrall to corruption, the more isolated, poor, and
authoritarian it is likely to become.

The previous section is provided by Lynn University’s
use of ProQuest Military Database.
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